The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 JOSE ANTONIO MADRIGAL-TORRES, No. 1:26-cv-5079 DAD AC
A-220-151-549,
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Petitioner,
13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
v.
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WARDEN OF THE CALIFORNIA CITY
15 IMMIGRATION PROCESSING
CENTER, et al.,
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Respondents.
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19 Petitioner, an immigration detainee proceeding through counsel, has filed a petition for a
20 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention by the Department
21 of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). ECF
22 No. 2. Specifically, petitioner contends that ICE’s revocation of his prior release violates the
23 Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and his
24 federal due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 4. As discussed below, the court
25 recommends that petitioner’s request for habeas relief be granted, and that petitioner be
26 immediately released under the same conditions to which he was subject immediately prior to his
27 December 2025 re-detention.
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1 I. Factual Background
2 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. ECF No. 6 at 6. He entered the United States
3 without inspection in 1992 and has worked and resided in the United States for approximately
4 thirty years. ECF No. 2 at 2-3. He has had primary legal and physical custody of his children,
5 who are all United States citizens, since 2011. Id. at 3.
6 Petitioner was convicted of residential burglary on December 11, 2023,1 placed in
7 removal proceedings and detained by DHS. ECF No. 6-1 at 5-6, 14. Petitioner was subsequently
8 granted bond by an immigration judge and released from custody on February 12, 2024, based on
9 the immigration judge’s finding that DHS did not meet its burden of establishing by clear and
10 convincing evidence that petitioner’s release would pose a danger to the community or a
11 significant flight risk. ECF No. 2-1 at 1-2; ECF No. 6 at 29, 36-37. Petitioner was subsequently
12 arrested and re-detained during an appointment with ICE on December 22, 2025, based on
13 violations of his alternatives to detention (“ATD”).2 ECF No. 6 at 29.
14 Petitioner requested review of his custody determination by an Immigration Judge. ECF
15 No. 6 at 32. On April 29, 2026, petitioner was granted a 42B Cancellation of Removal. ECF No.
16 2-1 at 3-6; ECF No. 6 at 1. Respondents have appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration
17 Appeals, and the appeal remains pending. ECF No. 2-1 at 7-8. Meanwhile, petitioner has been
18 detained for over seven months. He is currently detained at the California City Immigration
19 Processing Center. ECF No. 2 at 1.
20 II. Procedural History
21 On July 1, 2026, the court received petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
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23 1 According to documentation provided by respondents, petitioner was initially convicted of
possession for sale of a controlled substance (cocaine) by the Ventura County Superior Court but
24 subsequently re-sentenced for first degree burglary. ECF No. 6-1 at 5-6, 14. He was also
previously arrested by U.S. Border Patrol near Calexico, California, on January 23, 2001, and
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granted a voluntary return to Mexico, but re-entered the United States without inspection. Id. at
26 6.
2 Although the petitioner asserts in the petition that he was detained in “November 2025” (ECF
27 No. 2 at 1), the records provided by respondent reflect that petitioner was arrested at the DHS
Ventura Sub-Office on December 22, 2025. ECF No. 6 at 28, 32 (Notice of Custody
28 Determination).
1 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention. ECF No. 2. Petitioner contends that his continued
2 detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), as the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C.
3 § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to him because he was residing in the United States prior to being
4 apprehended and placed into removal proceedings by respondents. Id. at 14-15. His second
5 claim is that his detention is arbitrary and capricious and therefore violates the APA, 5 U.S.C.
6 § 706(2). Id. at 15-16. Finally, petitioner alleges that his re-detention despite his prior grant of
7 bond by an immigration judge violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Id. at 16.
8 On July 6, 2026, the undersigned directed respondents to show cause why the writ should
9 not be granted. ECF No. 5. Respondents filed an opposition to the petition, arguing that
10 petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory immigration detention under 8
11 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and as such, petitioner “does not possess the right to freedom from immigration
12 detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress.” ECF No. 6 at 2 (citing DHS v.
13 Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139 (2020) and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
14 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)). However, respondents also concede that “this case is in the category of
15 immigration habeas cases for which the Court has typically ordered immediate release.” Id. at 1.3
16 To date, petitioner has not filed a reply to respondents’ opposition.
17 III. Legal Standard
18 A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to anyone who is held in custody in violation of
19 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Magana-Pizano
20 v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241 expressly permits the federal
21 courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those aliens are ‘in custody in violation of
22 the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” (citations omitted)). In federal habeas
23 proceedings, the petitioner is required to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence.
24 Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004).
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3 Although respondents reference petitioner’s December 2023 conviction and ATD violations in
27 their opposition brief, they do not contend that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention based
on his criminal history – presumably because his 2023 residential burglary conviction preceded
28 enactment of the Laken Riley Act in January 2025.
1 IV. Discussion
2 A. Violation of the INA
3 As noted above, in addition to his due process and APA claims, petitioner contends that
4 because he was already present in the interior of the United States for decades, his current
5 detention violates the INA because he is subject to § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2) as an
6 “applicant for admission” as respondents contend. ECF No. 2 at 7-15.
7 8 U.S.C. § 1225 governs the procedures by which the government may mandatorily detain
8 “an applicant for admission.” Section 1225(a)(1) defines “an applicant for admission” as a
9 noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United
10 States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including [a noncitizen] who is brought
11 to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters).”
12 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). “[A]pplicants for admission fall into one of two categories, those covered
13 by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287
14 (2018). Both categories are subject to mandatory detention until a certain point or until certain
15 proceedings have concluded. Id. Despite mandatory detention, applicants for admission may be
16 temporarily released on parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Id.
17 at 288 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b), 235.3 (2017)). The “express exception
18 to detention” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) “implies that there are no other circumstances under
19 which [noncitizens] detained under § 1225(b) may be released.” Id. at 300. Accordingly, there is
20 no statutory right to a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under § 1225(b). Id. at 296-97. By
21 regulation, release is available only where “the aliens present neither a security risk nor a risk of
22 absconding.” 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b).
23 Section 1226, on the other hand, “provides the general process for arresting and detaining
24 aliens who are present in the United States and eligible for removal” and, under subsection (a),
25 the government has broad discretion to detain or release. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th
26 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288). It also provides that “a detainee
27 may request a bond hearing before an immigration judge at any time before a removal order
28 becomes final” and “an individual detained pursuant to § 1226(a) may request an additional bond
1 hearing whenever he experiences a material change in circumstances.” Id. at 1197 (citing 8
2 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1003.19). “Until this year, the DHS has applied § 1226(a) and its
3 discretionary release and review of detention to the vast majority of noncitizens allegedly in this
4 country without valid documentation.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06924 EMC, 2025
5 WL 2637503, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2025).
6 The Ninth Circuit recently issued binding precedent resolving the question of what
7 provision of the INA applies to noncitizens like petitioner. In Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, __
8 F.4th __, 2026 WL 2196424 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026), the Court of Appeals rejected DHS’s
9 interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) as extending mandatory detention to noncitizens like petitioner who
10 entered the United States without inspection, were not apprehended on arrival, and are not
11 otherwise subject to mandatory detention. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that “unadmitted
12 aliens entering the United States at the border” are subject to § 1225(b), but “unadmitted aliens
13 present in the interior of the country are subject to § 1226(a).” 2026 WL 2196424, at *26.
14 Although the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez Vazquez does not mandate a
15 particular remedy, it is consistent with the wealth of precedent from this district granting habeas
16 relief to noncitizens like petitioner who entered the United States without inspection and resided
17 within the interior of the United States for many years before ICE detained them as an “applicant
18 for admission.” See e.g., Ramirez Pena v. Warden, Golden State Annex Detention Facility, No.
19 1:26-cv-4194 DAD CKD, 2026 WL 1637497, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2026) (ordering
20 petitioner’s immediate release based on petitioner’s INA claim); Valencia Cardenas v. Chestnut,
21 1:26-cv-2073 DAD SC, 2026 WL 785871, *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026) (ordering petitioner’s
22 immediate release based on petitioner’s INA claim that he was wrongfully detained pursuant to 8
23 U.S.C. § 1225(b)); Quichimbo-Jimenez v. Warden, No. 2:26-cv-0739 DAD EFB, 2026 WL
24 679378 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2026) (ordering petitioner’s release based on a finding that petitioner
25 was subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)). Indeed, respondents correctly
26 acknowledged that “[t]his case is in the category of immigration habeas cases for which the Court
27 has typically ordered immediate release.” ECF No. 6 at 1.
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1 Accordingly, the court follows Rodriquez Vazquez and adopts the reasoning of prior
2 decisions from this court, such as Ramirez Pena, Valencia Cardenas, and Quichimbo-Jimenez,
3 and rejects the government’s contention that § 1225(b)(2)(A) is the applicable immigration
4 detention authority for a non-citizen like petitioner who is already within the interior of the
5 United States. For these reasons, the court finds that respondents have violated the INA by
6 improperly subjecting petitioner to mandatory detention under § 1225(b).
7 Finally, the undersigned finds that release from confinement is the appropriate remedy for
8 petitioner’s unlawful confinement in this case. Petitioner was already granted bond by an
9 immigration judge in February 2024 (ECF No. 2-1 at 1-2), and respondents failed to respond or
10 otherwise contradict petitioner’s argument that his bond was never cancelled by DHS. Moreover,
11 petitioner was granted a 42B Cancellation of Removal by an Immigration Judge in April 2026.
12 ECF No. 2-1 at 3-6. Under these circumstances, the appropriate remedy is petitioner’s immediate
13 release from custody because respondents have failed to provide any authority to justify
14 petitioner’s continued confinement. Because relief is appropriate on petitioner’s statutory claim,
15 the court declines to address petitioner’s due process and APA claims, as they seek the same or
16 similar relief (i.e., petitioner’s immediate release).
17 CONCLUSION
18 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
19 1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 2 be GRANTED, as follows:
20 a. Respondents shall IMMEDIATELY RELEASE petitioner JOSE ANTONIO
21 MADRIGAL-TORRES, A-220-151-549, under the same conditions to which he
22 was subject immediately prior to his December 22, 2025 detention. At the time
23 of release, respondents must return all of petitioner’s documents and possessions.
24 b. Respondents shall not impose any additional restriction on petitioner unless it is
25 determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing.
26 c. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner
27 unless they provide at least 7 days’ written notice to petitioner and hold a pre-
28 deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decision maker, at which hearing
] respondents will bear the burden of demonstrating that petitioner is a flight risk or
2 danger to the community and petitioner’s eligibility for bond must be considered.
3 d. The order does not address the circumstances in which respondents may detain
4 petitioner in the event petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of
5 removal and petitioner receives notice of that final order of removal
6 2. Within three days of an order adopting these findings and recommendations,
7 || respondents be required to file a notice of compliance confirming petitioner’s release and that the
8 | conditions of his supervision are the same as those to which he was subject prior to his December
9 | 22, 2025 detention.
10 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for petitioner and close this case.
11 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
12 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The undersigned finds
13 || that a shortened objection period is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as
14 || well as the fact that the parties have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written
15 || briefs. See United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that
16 | 28 US.C. § 636(b)(1) sets the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local
17 | Rule 304(b). Within three days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any
18 || party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The parties are
19 || advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the
20 | District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
21 || DATED: August 5, 2026 . ~
22 Chthion— Chore
ALLISON CLAIRE
23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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