Opinion

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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 RYAN TATARA, No. 2:25-CV-2831-DMC-P

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 SACRAMENTO COUNTY JAIL, et al.,

15 Defendants.

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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to

18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and second

19 amended complaint, ECF Nos. 7 and 9.

20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

22 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was

23 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.

24 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or

25 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can

26 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

27 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

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1 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a

2 “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

3 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See

4 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)).

5 These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim

6 and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996).

7 Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific

8 defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this

9 standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law

10 when the allegations are vague and conclusory.

11 Plaintiff initiated this action with a pro se complaint submitted on a state court

12 form for personal injury actions. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff then filed his first amended complaint

13 as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. See ECF No. 7. Subsequently, Plaintiff

14 filed a second amended complaint without leave of court to do so. See ECF No. 9. The first and

15 second amended complaints were also filed on a state court form for personal injury actions.

16 None of Plaintiff’s pleadings, however, contain any factual allegations related to any of the

17 named defendants – the Sacramento County Jail, Deputy Thompson, or Deputy Verdon. See ECF

18 Nos. 1, 7, and 9. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend consistent with the legal

19 principles outlined below relating to the need to allege facts to establish a causal link between the

20 conduct of individual defendants and a constitutional violation, as well as the requirements to

21 establish municipal liability of the Sacramento County Jail.

22 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual

23 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See

24 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A

25 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of

26 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform

27 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”

28 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations

1 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See

2 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth

3 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional

4 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).

5 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to

6 whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

7 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id.

8 at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local

9 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials

10 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.

11 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of

12 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the

13 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or

14 custom of the municipality. See id.

15 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

16 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

17 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is

18 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See

19 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to

20 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended

21 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if

22 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make

23 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be

24 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.

25 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the

26 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

27 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

28 each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between

1 || each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167

2 | (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

3 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

4 || time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

5 || 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff also warned that a complaint which fails to comply

6 || with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).

7 || See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).

8 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

9 1. Plaintiffs second amended complaint, ECF No. 9, is stricken as having

10 || been filed without leave of court when such leave is required.

1] 2. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, ECF No, 5, 1s dismissed with leave to

12 || amend.

13 3. Plaintiff shall file a third amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

14 || service of this order.

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16 | Dated: August 4, 2026 SS GC

M7 DENNIS M. COTA

18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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