Opinion

Cooper

Court: District Court, E.D. California
Filed: Aug 3, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases

The opinion

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 BRIAN L. COOPER No. 1:26-cv-05698-JLT-EPG

11 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER

12 v. ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO:

13 COUNTY OF FRESNO, et al., (1) FILE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT;

14 Defendants.

(2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT SHE

15 WISHES TO STAND ON HER

COMPLAINT

(ECF NO. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

19 Plaintiff Brian L. Cooper is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff filed the

20 complaint commencing this action on July 22, 2026. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint is 52

21 pages long with and additional document titled “Exhibits” that is 97 pages long. (Id. and ECF No.

6) Plaintiff generally alleges that his home was fraudulently locked out of this home via an ex-

parte order from law enforcement and an individual who is presumably his current/former spouse

(ECF No. 1 at 5). Plaintiff’s complaint largely seeks to overturn orders made in state court.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state any

cognizable claims. After Plaintiff reviews this order, Plaintiff can decide to file an amended

complaint, which the Court will screen in due course. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended

complaint, it must be no longer than twenty pages, including exhibits.

1 Plaintiff can also notify the Court that he wants to stand on his complaint, in which case

2 this Court will issue findings and recommendations to the district judge assigned to the case

3 recommending that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for the reasons in this order. If Plaintiff

4 does not file anything, the Court will recommend that the case be dismissed.

5 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court screens this complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff filed his complaint on July 22, 2026 (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s complaint is 52

pages long with an additional 97 pages filed as a separate document titled “Exhibits” (Id. and

ECF No. 6). Plaintiff’s complaint asserts 4 causes of action, including violations of 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; equal protection and

substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; unreasonable seizure under the Fourth

Amendment; and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act. (ECF No. 1 at 5). Plaintiff

brings these claims against defendants County of Fresno, Stephanie Cooper, and DOES 1-50. (Id.

at 1).

Plaintiff’s complaint presents the following factual allegations. He states that during the

underlying state action1, he submitted evidence of financial and domestic abuse committed by

defendant Stephanie Cooper, including “theft of over $150,000 in corporate and personal funds—

including $40,000 stolen directly from corporate payroll.”(Id. at 2). He claims the state court

improperly refused to adjudicate his petitions. (Id.).

Plaintiff represents that during a pending mortgage foreclosure sale set to occur on April

30, 2026, defendant Stephanie Cooper and her counsel submitted ex parte applications alleging an

emergency based on the mortgage foreclosure sale. (Id.). Plaintiff states he paid $40,000 of

personal and business funds to “cure the HELOC default in full” and eliminated the foreclosure

28 1 Superior Court of California, County of Fresno case number 22CEFL05210.

1 risk. (Id.) Plaintiff then states the foreclosure was the result of defendant Stephanie Cooper’s

2 refusal to sign a modification to the HELOC loan months before the sale. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges

3 that “Defendants intentionally concealed this proof from the court and maintained false

4 emergency filings to dispossess Plaintiff.” (Id.)

5 Next, Plaintiff states that defendant Stephanie Cooper fraudulently obtained ex-parte

6 orders stating Plaintiff had barricaded himself inside the home, which caused a three-hour SWAT

7 standoff, whereas Plaintiff states Clovis Police Department logs verify no SWAT standoff ever

8 occurred. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff claims he only received notice of the orders by physical postings on

9 his door by Fresno County Sheriff department. (Id.). Plaintiff states he submitted emergency ex-

10 parte filings to the court, but they were “repeatedly dropped or removed from the court calendar

11 without notice or hearing.” (Id.).

12 Plaintiff claims there was a “short cause” trial and the assigned trial judge stopped

13 proceedings after twenty minutes and only allowed defendant Stephanie Cooper to present

14 evidence. (Id.). The judge allegedly declared a mistrial and ordered Plaintiff to allow defendant

15 Stephanie Cooper to proceed with the sale of the home. (Id.).

16 Next, Plaintiff claims he was only provided twenty-four hours’ notice of a pre-trial zoom

17 hearing. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff states he logged into the designated court portal and sat in a virtual

18 waiting room but was never admitted to the hearing and as a result Plaintiff was deemed a failure

19 to appear, leading to dispossession orders for the property being “fast-tracked.”

20 Finally, Plaintiff states on July 7, 2026, Fresno County Sheriff’s Office executed an

21 unconstitutional lockout to oust Plaintiff from the home. Subsequently, complete disposal and

22 permeant destruction of all Plaintiff’s personal belongings was scheduled. (Id.).

23 Plaintiff seeks: (1) an emergency restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining

24 Defendants from selling, destroy, moving, or disposing of Plaintiffs property and business and

25 corporate records located at the home; (2) an order to restore personal possession of the home

26 pending a trial; (3) compensatory, statutory and punitive damages; (4) and reasonable costs and

27 attorney fees. (Id. at 5).

28 Attached to his complaint and in a separate filing, Plaintiff provides numerous exhibits,

1 ranging from state court filings, checks made out from Plaintiff, as well as various email

2 correspondence Plaintiff had with unknown parties.

3 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

4 a. No Short and Plain Statement

5 Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 8 of the Federal Rule of Civil

6 Procedure because it does not contain a short and plain statement of any claim.

7 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

8 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

9 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

10 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

11 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual

12 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting

13 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this

14 plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not

15 required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681

16 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The complaint must also contain

17 “sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to

18 defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Moreover, Plaintiff

19 must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in deprivation of his

20 rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77.

21 Additionally, complaints that are needlessly long, highly repetitious, or conclusory violate

22 Rule 8 and may be dismissed. Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1289 (9th Cir. 2026)

23 (“district courts do not have to accept such shotgun pleadings. It is not the job of the district

24 courts to make sense of the pleading, to supply facts to support the claim, or to imagine the claims

25 that might fit the facts”); Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir.

26 2011) (citing McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a Rule 8(a)

27 dismissal of a complaint that was “argumentative, prolix, replete with redundancy, and largely

28 irrelevant”); Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding a Rule 8(a)

1 dismissal of a complaint that “exceeded 70 pages in length, [and was] confusing and

2 conclusory”)).

3 Finally, a complaint should not be pled in a “shotgun” manner, which occurs when

[A] party indiscriminately incorporates assertions from one count to another, for example,

by incorporating all facts or defenses from all previous counts into each successive count

5 ... prevent[ing] the opposing party from reasonably being able to prepare a response or

simply mak[ing] the burden of doing so more difficult.

5A Wright & Miller's Federal Practice and Procedure § 1326 (4th ed. 2024).

With these standards in mind, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8.

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to provide a short and plain statement as to why he is entitled to relief

against each defendant for each claim. Each claim is a single sentence description, which states

in a conclusory manner that defendants are liable for the claim, such as “Defendants, acting under

color of state law, deprived Plaintiff of protected real and personal property interests without Due

Process by enforcing ex parte orders generated by an unconstitutionally biased tribunal…” (ECF

No. 1 at 5) Statements such as these are merely a “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action” and is “… supported by mere conclusory statements…” Ashcroft 556 U.S. at 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). These claims do not

describe the underlying facts that give rise to each claim. Nor do they explain what each

defendant did or failed to do that supports each claim. Moreover, even if Plaintiff provided a

description of the underlying facts, the description he provided is argumentative and conclusory.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s complaint is pled in a “shotgun” manner. The complaint is

arranged in chronological order recounting his mortgage foreclosure sale, the proceedings

resulting from attempting to prevent such a sale, and the allegedly unconstitutional entry and

dispossession of the real property. Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations incorporate all the factual

allegations and groups all defendants together when seeking relief.

In conclusion, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 as it does not contain a

short and plain statement of the claims as required.

b. Improper defendants

Plaintiff’s complaint also does not state any claims for violation of his constitutional rights

1 because he does not name defendants who are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. If Plaintiff wishes

2 to sue someone for constitutional rights violations, the complaint must name a specific person that

3 violated those rights under color of law, or a city or county that had an official policy or

4 established custom that violated those rights.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

6 usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

7 jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

9 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely

10 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490

11 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also

12 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles,

13 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir.

14 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

15 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under

16 color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or

federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh

v. County of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of state

law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which

he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Preschooler

II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)).

Under this statute, Plaintiff must name a person as a defendant. “The term ‘persons’

encompasses state and local officials sued in their individual capacities, private individuals, and

entities which act under the color of state law and local governmental entities.” Jay v. Med. Dep’t

of Fresno Cnty. Jail, No. 1:10-CV-00685-GBC PC, 2011 WL 3875523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 1,

27 2011). However, “municipal departments and sub-units of local governments are not generally

1 considered ‘persons’ within the meaning of Section 1983.” Id. (collecting cases dismissing

2 correctional facilities and law enforcement departments as improper defendants under § 1983).

3 Likewise, “[s]tate agencies . . . are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983, and are therefore

4 not amenable to suit under that statute.” Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004).

For this reason, Fresno County and by extension, Fresno County Sheriff’s Office are not

proper Defendants under § 1983. See Gatlin v. Bank of Am., No. 2:23-CV-0272-DAD-KJN P,

2023 WL 2529725, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2023) (“Turning to plaintiff’s claim against

defendant Sacramento County Jail, an agency or department of a municipal entity is not a proper

defendant under Section 1983.”); Spears v. El Dorado Cnty. Superior Ct., No. 2:17-CV-2202-

MCE-EFB P, 2019 WL 698202, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2019) (“A state court is not a ‘person’

for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and hence is not subject to lawsuit under that statute.”) (citation

omitted); Morris v. State Bar of California, No. CV F 09-0026-LJO-GSA, 2010 WL 4977677, at

*2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2010) (“The Fresno County District Attorney’s office is a ‘sub-unit’ of the

County of Fresno and is not a person under § 1983.”).

There is a limited exception to this rule for cities and counties, such as Fresno County, if a

Plaintiff alleges facts showing that they caused a violation of Plaintiff’s rights due to an official

16 policy or established custom. Specifically, “[m]unicipalities and other local governmental units

17 are ‘persons’ subject to suit under § 1983, but to prevail on a claim against a municipal entity for

18 a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must also show that his or her injury is attributable ‘to

19 official municipal policy of some nature.”’ Kirkpatrick v. Cty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 788, 793

20 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). To state a claim for municipal

21 liability, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; “(2)

22 that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the

23 plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional

violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A Monell claim can proceed under three theories:

“(1) when official policies or established customs inflict a constitutional injury; (2) when

omissions or failures to act amount to a local government policy of deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights; or (3) when a local government official with final policy-making authority

1 ratifies a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Brown v. Contra Costa Cty., No. C 12–1923

2 PJH, 2014 WL 1347680, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014) (citation omitted).

3 However, Plaintiff’s complaint does not list any specific persons associated with these

4 entities as defendants. It also does not claim that Fresno County had an official policy or

established custom that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights.

Furthermore, Plaintiff attempts to bring claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against a private

citizen, Stephanie Cooper. As the text makes clear, § 1983 protects against acts attributed to a

state actor, not those of a private person. “[e]very person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” deprives someone of a federal

constitutional or statutory right. 42 U.S.C § 1983. (emphasis added).

Thus, as alleged against these defendants, Plaintiff has failed to state any constitutional

claims.

c. Improper Challenge to States Proceedings and Orders

Plaintiff’s claims are also subject to dismissal to the extent they seek to challenge state

proceedings and orders.

There are various legal doctrines that generally prevent parties from challenging state

court orders through federal cases, rather than the state appellate review process.

17 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in

18 “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments

19 rendered before the [federal] district court proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] district

20 court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,

21 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In other words, a federal district court generally does not have

22 authority to review state court decisions and reverse those decisions. The purpose of this doctrine

23 “is to protect state judgments from collateral federal attack. Because [federal] district courts lack

24 power to hear direct appeals from state court decisions, they must decline jurisdiction whenever

they are ‘in essence called upon to review the state court decision.’” Doe & Associates Law

Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482

n.16).

The Younger abstention doctrine is rooted in the “desire to permit state courts to try state

1 cases free from interference by federal courts.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). Thus,

2 “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, interests of comity and federalism instruct federal courts

3 to abstain from exercising our jurisdiction in certain circumstances when asked to enjoin ongoing

4 state enforcement proceedings.” Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2019) (alterations,

citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) there

is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3)

there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; and (4)

the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state

judicial proceeding. Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (alterations, citation,

and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to dismissal under these doctrines because it seeks an order

from this court invalidating orders in his state court proceedings. Plaintiff’s complaint asserts due

process violations in the state court proceedings that, he claims, led to the “unconstitutional

seizure of real and personal property.” (ECF No. 1 at 5). Similarly, in his request for relief,

Plaintiff seeks the Court to “issue an order restoring possession of the real property to Plaintiff,”

which necessarily requires the Court to review the state court decision. (ECF No 1 at 5).

16 Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are also subject to dismissal because he is improperly seeking an

17 order in this court invalidating state court orders, without appealing those orders through the state

18 appellate process.

19 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

20 The Court has screened the complaint and finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state

21 any cognizable claims and is subject to dismissal.

22 Under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the court should freely give

23 leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Accordingly, Plaintiff is granted leave to file an

24 amended complaint within thirty days. However, any amended complaint must be no longer than

25 twenty pages, including exhibits.

26 Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v.

27 Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete in

28 itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an

1 | amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each

2 || defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly

3 || titled “First Amended Complaint,” and refer to the appropriate case number.

4 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

5 1. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall either:

6 a. File a First Amended Complaint; or

7 b. Notify the Court in writing that he wants to stand on his Complaint.

8 2. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the

9 amended complaint “First Amended Complaint” and refer to case number 1:26-cv-

10 05698-JLT-EPG.

11 3. If Plaintiff chooses to file a first amended complaint, that must be no longer than

12 twenty pages, including exhibits.

13 4. Failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action.

15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 | Dated: _ August 3, 2026 [Jee Fey

17 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.