The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
9 AT SEATTLE
10
11 GREGGY SORIO, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-02492-TL-BAT
12 Petitioner, ORDER ON PETITIONER’S
13 v.
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
AND COSTS
14 LAURA HERMOSILLO, Seattle Field
Office Director, Enforcement and Removal
15 Operations, United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), et al.,
16
Respondents.
17
18 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Greggy Sorio’s motion for attorney fees and
19 costs.1 Dkt. No. 34. Having considered Petitioner’s motion, Petitioner’s declaration of net worth
20 and fee assignment (Dkt. No. 38 (Sorio Decl.)), Petitioner’s counsel’s declarations, which
21 include their timekeeping records (Dkt. No. 35 (Carhart Decl.), Dkt. No. 37 (Sueoka Decl.), Dkt.
22 No. 40 (Jacobsen Decl.)), Respondents’ response (Dkt. No. 41), Petitioner’s reply (Dkt. No. 42),
23 and the relevant record, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s motion.
24 1 While Petitioner seeks fees and costs, no costs are included in the documentation or request.
1 I. BACKGROUND
2 Petitioner obtained habeas relief declaring that Respondents’ unreasonable treatment of
3 him constituted deprivations so excessive that they took Respondents’ detention of Petitioner out
4 of the realm of constitutional civil detention and rendered it punitive. See Dkt. No. 25 (Order on
5 Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Order”)) at 21. The Court further held that having been subject to
6 punitive detention without due process of law, Petitioner was in custody in violation of the
7 Constitution of the United States. Id. at 22. Petitioner now seeks attorney fees related to this
8 litigation under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Dkt. No. 34.
9 II. LEGAL STANDARD
10 The purpose of the EAJA is “to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or
11 defending against[,] governmental action because of the expense involved in securing the
12 vindication of rights.” Forest Conservation Council v. Devlin, 994 F.2d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 1993)
13 (citation modified); accord EAJA, Pub. L. No. 96–481, § 202(c)(1), 94 Stat. 2321 (1980) (“It is
14 the purpose of this title . . . to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending
15 against, governmental action by providing in specified situations an award of attorney
16 fees . . . against the United States[.]”). Therefore, “in an action brought by or against the United
17 States, a court must award fees and expenses to a prevailing non-government party ‘unless the
18 court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special
19 circumstances make an award unjust.’” Medina Tovar v. Zuchowski, 41 F.4th 1085, 1089 (9th
20 Cir. 2022) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). “For the court to award attorney’s fees and costs
21 pursuant to the EAJA, it must be shown that (1) the [petitioner] is the prevailing party; (2) the
22 government has not met its burden of showing that its positions were substantially justified or
23 that special circumstances make an award unjust; and (3) the requested attorney’s fees and costs
24 are reasonable.” Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 2002).
1 “[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and
2 documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.
3 424, 437 (1983). The attorney hourly-fee award shall not exceed $125 per hour “unless the court
4 determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability
5 of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C.
6 § 2412(d)(2)(A). Based on the limited availability of qualified attorneys under the EAJA, courts
7 may award market rates when the attorneys possess (1) “distinctive knowledge and specialized
8 skill” that was (2) “needful to the litigation in question” and (3) “not available elsewhere at the
9 statutory rate.” Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation modified).
10 When a court rules on a motion for attorney fees, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 54(d)(2)(C), the court “must find the facts and state its conclusions of law as provided in Rule
12 52(a),” meaning “the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law
13 separately,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).
14 III. FINDINGS OF FACT
15 Given the very detailed and extensive facts in this case, the Court adopts in its entirety
16 the Background section of the Order (Dkt. No. 25 at 2–10) but will give a brief summary here.
17 Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines who was admitted into the United States in 2007
18 as a lawful permanent resident. Dkt. No. 14 (Melendez Diaz Decl. and Exhibits) ¶¶ 4–5.
19 Petitioner was apprehended by ICE in February 2025 following his release from criminal
20 incarceration and transferred to the Northwest ICE Processing Center (“NWIPC”) shortly
21 thereafter. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.
22 Petitioner was in good health when he entered ICE detention. See Dkt. No. 1-9 (DHS
23 Form I-213) at 2 (“The subject claims good health”). Eight months later, hospital records show
24 that Petitioner’s health had declined to include two partial foot amputations, a diagnosis of
1 ulcerative colitis (a type of inflammatory bowel disease (“IBD”)),2 acute blood loss anemia, a
2 kidney injury, a severe vitamin D deficiency, and dramatic unintended weight loss. Dkt. No. 16
3 at 3. Petitioner’s ulcerative colitis will be a lifelong condition, putting him at increased risk of
4 colon cancer. Dkt. 17 ¶ 4.
5 Following his ulcerative colitis diagnosis and amputations, and while Petitioner’s health
6 continued to worsen, Respondents attempted to remove him to the Philippines. Dkt. 23 ¶ 6; Dkt.
7 22 at 6. Respondents attempted this removal despite receiving an email on December 3, 2025,
8 from a representative of the Philippine Consulate expressing concern that Petitioner be able to
9 recover before his removal and requesting that his travel documents not be finalized until after
10 his pending stay of removal request was adjudicated. Dkt. No. 14 at 10–11 (Consulate–ERO
11 correspondence). On December 6, 2025, ICE denied the stay of removal request. Dkt. No. 1-2
12 (ICE denial letter). The next day, ICE attempted to deport Petitioner; however, Philippine
13 Airlines refused to allow Petitioner to board the flight due to his medical condition. Dkt.
14 No. 1-11 (First Carhart Decl.) ¶¶ 4–7.
15 On December 8, Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the conditions of
16 his confinement had become unconstitutionally punitive and requesting immediate release from
17 ICE custody. Dkt. No. 1. At the same time, Petitioner filed a temporary restraining order (Dkt.
18 No. 2) which the Court provisionally granted in order to maintain the status quo (Dkt. No. 6).
19 In responding to the petition, Respondents acknowledged that “the Supreme Court has
20 left open the question of whether there are circumstances when a challenge to the conditions of
21
22
2 Inflammatory bowel disease, also called IBD, is an umbrella term for a group of conditions that cause swelling and
inflammation of the tissues in the digestive tract. Ulcerative colitis, one of the most common types of IBD, involves
23 inflammation and ulcers along the lining of the colon and rectum. Symptoms usually include belly pain, diarrhea,
rectal bleeding, extreme tiredness and weight loss. Ulcerative colitis can lead to disability and life-threatening
24 complications. Inflammatory Bowel Disease (IBD), Mayo Clinic (Dec 18, 2024), https://www.mayoclinic.org
/diseases-conditions/inflammatory-bowel-disease/symptoms-causes/syc-20353315 [https://perma.cc/AR75-7BMD].
1 confinement is properly brought in a habeas petition . . . .” Dkt. No. 22 at 15 (citing Ziglar v.
2 Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 144–45 (2017)). Respondents largely did not address the conditions of
3 Petitioner’s confinement, arguing instead that “the medical care [Petitioner] has received is
4 constitutionally adequate.” Id. at 15. Beyond this, Respondents veered away from defending the
5 conditions of IHCS’s medical treatment and limited their argument to the fact and length of
6 Petitioner’s detention: “Petitioner’s continued immigration detention after he has been subject to
7 a final order of removal, and is still within the INA’s removal period, cannot be described as
8 punitive or excessive in relation to the legitimate governmental purpose of protecting the public
9 and enforcing U.S. immigration laws.” Id. at 20. But the Court found the record here compelled a
10 finding that Petitioner’s medical care, and denial of medical care, included objectively
11 unreasonable failures of care that more likely than not resulted in permanent disability, including
12 the loss of his toe and part of his foot. Dkt. No. 25 at 17–19. On February 13, 2026, the Court
13 granted Petitioner’s petition and held that he had been subject to punitive detention for which he
14 had not been given due process of law, and that his detention therefore violated the Constitution
15 of the United States. Id. at 22.
16 On April 14, 2026, Respondents filed a notice of appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of
17 Appeals. Dkt. No. 31. Respondents voluntarily dismissed their appeal on June 3, 2026. Dkt.
18 No. 33.
19 Petitioner now seeks an award of $23,370.32 in attorney fees and costs under the EAJA.3
20 Dkt. No. 42 at 6. Petitioner’s counsel spent a total of 90.5 hours on the matter (89.1 hours related
21 to the petition and the motion for attorney fees plus 1.4 hours for the reply to the motion for
22 attorney fees). Dkt. No. 35 at 7, Dkt. No. 37 at 9, Dkt. No. 40 at 7, Dkt. No. 42 at 6. Petitioner
23
24 3 While Petitioner asks for fees and costs, no costs are included in the documentation or request.
1 seeks attorney fees at the rate of $258.46 per hour. Dkt. No. 34 at 11. In the Ninth Circuit, the
2 applicable statutory EAJA rate, adjusted for inflation, is $258.46 for work performed in 2025.
3 Dkt. No. 35 at 4, Dkt. No. 37 at 5, and Dkt. No. 40 at 4; see also United States Courts for the
4 Ninth Circuit, Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
5 https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ [https://perma.cc
6 /RHB7-TA4G]. Petitioner declares that he retained counsel to represent him pro bono on the
7 case, authorizes the recovery of fees and expenses to his attorney for work done but not
8 compensated, and assigns payment of any award and fees to his attorney. Dkt. No. 38 ¶¶ 4–6.
9 Respondents oppose Petitioner’s motion for fees and costs. Dkt. No. 41. Respondents do
10 not dispute that Petitioner is a prevailing party. Id. at 3. While Respondents do not concede that
11 their position was not substantially justified, for the purpose of this motion, they do not raise a
12 substantial justification defense to the request for fees. Id. However, Respondents assert that the
13 United States is immune from an award of attorney fees in an immigration habeas action. Id.
14 In addition, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s request should be reduced for 2.7 hours
15 of improperly billed clerical work by Peyton Jacobsen (0.6 hours at an attorney rate for filing
16 documents on December 8, 2025) and Sam Sueoka (2.1 hours at an attorney rate for filing
17 documents and related activities on 12/8/25, 12/13/25, 12/16/25, and 3/13/26). Id. at 8. While the
18 Court agrees that Ms. Jacobsen spent 0.6 hours on filing documents, the total hours on the
19 designated dates that Mr. Sueoka spent on filing documents only add up to 1.9 hours, not 2.1
20 hours. See Dkt. No. 37 at 7–8.
21 Petitioner does not dispute that the 2.7 hours (2.5 hours adjusted for Respondents’
22 mathematical error) are clerical tasks. Dkt. No. 42 at 5. However, Petitioner asserts that because
23 his counsel do not employ any paralegals and needed to perform the clerical tasks, they should
24 be allowed at the market rate for paralegals, which Petitioner argues is $225–$250 per hour, with
1 $250 being appropriate in the present matter. Id. at 5–6 (first citing Hill v. Continuum Glob.
2 Sols., LLC, No. C12-717, 2026 WL 592270, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 3, 2026)4 ($250 hourly
3 paralegal rate); then citing Human Rights Def. Ctr. v. Pacific County, No. C24-6068, 2025 WL
4 3294990, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2025) ($225 hourly paralegal rate); and then citing
5 Cymbidium Restoration Tr. v. Am. Homeowner Preservation Tr., No. C24-25, 2025 WL
6 2592252, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 8, 2025) ($235 hourly paralegal rate)).
7 IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
8 A. Petitioner Is the Prevailing Party
9 Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner was the prevailing party. Dkt. No. 41 at 3. The
10 Court finds that Petitioner was the prevailing party.
11 B. Respondents’ Position Was Not Substantially Justified5
12 The government has the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified.
13 Medina Tovar, 41 F.4th at 1089. To determine whether the government has met its burden to
14 show that its action was substantially justified, courts examine both the underlying agency action
15 giving rise to the civil action and the government’s litigation position. Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d
16 867, 870 (9th Cir. 2013). The first question “by definition concern[s] only the merits of th[e
17 government] action.” Kali v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1988). The second question
18 “encompass[es] the first inquiry to the extent that the government chooses to defend the merits of
19 the challenged action[ but] must also focus upon extraneous circumstances bearing upon the
20 reasonableness of the government’s decision to” litigate the case. Id. The government bears the
21 burden of demonstrating substantial justification by showing it had “a reasonable basis both in
22 law and fact.” Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569–70 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S.
23
4 The Court will refer to this case as Continuum to avoid confusion with In re Hill.
24 5 Respondents do not argue that any special circumstances make an award unjust. See generally Dkt. No 27.
1 at 565)). “[E]xtraneous circumstances bearing upon the reasonableness of the government’s
2 decision” include “relevant legal or factual precedents.” Medina Tovar, 41 F.4th at 1090 (quoting
3 Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Madigan, 980 F.2d 1330, 1332 (9th Cir. 1992)). Put differently, to prove
4 that its position was substantially justified, the government must show that the position was
5 “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Meier, 727 F.3d at 870 (quoting
6 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). Determining whether the government’s
7 position was substantially justified is within the discretion of the district court. See id. at 869.
8 For the purpose of responding to this motion, Respondents do not contend that their
9 position was substantially justified. Dkt. No. 41 at 3.
10 “The Supreme Court held more than a century ago that civil detention of a removeable
11 noncitizen violates the Constitution if it is punitive.” Doe v. Becerra, 732 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1078
12 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237–38 (1896)). Before
13 punishment can be imposed, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution
14 together require the opportunity for trial by jury with specific procedural protections. See Wong
15 Wing, 163 U.S. at 233–34. A civil detainee, even a noncitizen with a final order of removal, has
16 not been afforded a trial or any of the attendant procedural safeguards. See id. Respondents’ legal
17 argument related to punitive detention completely ignored the issue of whether Petitioner’s
18 conditions were excessive in relation to a legitimate non-punitive purpose served by his
19 detention. Respondents evaded any legal analysis whatsoever to justify Petitioner’s conditions of
20 confinement, instead focusing simply on the length of Petitioner’s detention. Dkt. No. 22 at 20.
21 The government has therefore failed to bear its burden of demonstrating substantial justification
22 by showing the underlying agency action had a reasonable basis in law.
23 Relatedly, Respondents’ litigation position in opposing the habeas petition and defending
24 the underlying agency action lacked a reasonable basis in fact, and the Court found that the
1 government was responsible for “objectively unreasonable failures of care[.]” Dkt. No. 25 at 17.
2 In litigation, Respondents broadly defended the care given by their medical providers (while
3 sidestepping discussion of any specific actions), arguing generally that “the medical care
4 [Petitioner] has received is constitutionally adequate.” Id. at 15. In light of the undisputed facts
5 presented to the court, this argument bordered on the frivolous. See Dkt. No. 25 at 17–19.
6 Therefore, government failed to bear its burden of demonstrating substantial justification by
7 showing it had a reasonable basis in fact. As such, Respondents’ position was not substantially
8 justified.
9 C. The United States Is Not Immune from Attorney Fees
10 Respondents argue that the United States is immune from attorney fees in this action.
11 Dkt. No. 41 at 3–7. They assert that the EAJA applies “only to ‘any civil action (other than cases
12 sounding in tort).’” Id. at 4. While conceding that “habeas petitions are often categorized as civil
13 for general purposes” (id.), they argue that for purposes of the EAJA “there is no meaningful
14 difference between the habeas petition challenging criminal confinement and the habeas petition
15 challenging immigration detention here.” Id. at 5. Respondents further argue the Court should
16 adopt the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Obando-Seguro v. Garland, 999 F.3d 190 (4th Cir.
17 2021) and the Fifth Circuit in Barco v. Witte, 65 F.4th 782 (5th Cir. 2023) and find that habeas
18 petitions challenging immigration detention are not unambiguously “civil actions” under the
19 EAJA. Dkt. No. 41 at 5–6. The Court declines to do so.
20 The EAJA limits recovery by a party that prevails against the United States to an award
21 of attorney fees and expenses “incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases
22 sounding in tort).” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The Supreme Court has found that habeas corpus
23 proceedings are “technically ‘civil’” in general, Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4
24 (1971), and the Ninth Circuit has held that EAJA fees are available in the context of some
1 immigration habeas actions. In re Hill, 775 F.2d 1037, 1040–41 (9th Cir. 1985). Further, the
2 Third Circuit in Michelin v. Warden, 169 F.4th 418 (3d Cir. 2026), reh’g en banc denied, 169
3 F.4th 160 (3d Cir. 2026), and the Tenth Circuit in Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152 (10th Cir.
4 2025), recently held that the EAJA “unambiguously” encompasses habeas challenges to
5 immigration detention and found that such proceedings qualify as “civil actions” so that
6 prevailing petitioners are eligible for an award of fees. See Michelin, 169 F.4th at 423–25; Daley,
7 158 F.4th at 1162. Both courts relied, in part, on the EAJA’s use of the phrase “any civil action
8 (other than cases sounding in tort)” as the qualifying language entitling a prevailing party to seek
9 an award of fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see Michelin, 169 F.4th at 428–
10 29; Daley, 158 F.4th at 1157, 1162. Given this split in the circuits, the Supreme Court will
11 consider this issue next term. Palacios v. Liggins, No. 25-1223, 2026 WL 1855057 (U.S. June
12 29, 2026) (granting certiorari). See infra Section V.
13 As the Supreme Court in Schlanger characterizes habeas corpus proceedings as
14 “technically ‘civil’” actions and the plain text of EAJA states that it applies to “any” civil action
15 “other than cases sounding in tort,” this Court agrees with the Third and Tenth Circuit’s
16 interpretation that the EAJA unambiguously includes habeas proceedings challenging
17 immigration detention. A number of courts in this Circuit and elsewhere have similarly held that
18 immigration habeas petitions are civil actions for purposes of fee awards under the EAJA. See,
19 e.g., Veronica V.O. v. Noem, No. C25-1796, 2026 WL 2169089, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2026)
20 (“agree[ing] with the Third and Tenth Circuit’s interpretation that the EAJA unambiguously
21 includes habeas proceedings challenging immigration detention”); Gurjinder S. v. Warden,
22 No. C26-188, 2026 WL 2110865, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2026) (“Courts in this district have
23 held that habeas petitions are civil actions for purposes of fee awards under the EAJA.”); S.F. v.
24 Bostock, No. C25-1084, 2026 WL 1230044, at *3 (D. Or. May 5, 2026) (“The plain text of the
1 EAJA, as well as the substance of Petitioner’s remedy, establish that this [immigration habeas]
2 case is a ‘civil action’ under the EAJA.”); Krajekian v. Cantu, No. C25-2666, 2026 WL 598226,
3 at *3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 2, 2026) (“EAJA fees may be awarded in cases involving a petition seeking a
4 writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL
5 596300 (Mar. 3, 2026).
6 * * *
7 Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner is the prevailing party in a civil action, the
8 government’s position was not substantially justified, the EAJA applies to this action, and the
9 government is not immune from a fee award. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
10 D. The Requested Attorney Fees Are Reasonable
11 Almost all of the fees sought by Petitioner are reasonable and in compliance with the
12 EAJA. See id. § 2412(d)(1)(B), (2)(A).
13 1. Attorney Tasks
14 First, the Court finds the number of hours expended by counsel reasonable given the
15 issues in this case and the need to delve into extensive medical records and consult with medical
16 practitioners about those records.
17 Second, the Court finds that the requested hourly rate of $258.46 per hour for attorney
18 tasks reflects the applicable statutory rate, adjusted for inflation, for work performed in 2025. See
19 United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to
20 Justice Act, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ [https://perma.cc
21 /RHB7-TA4G].6 The Court finds that the hourly rate should be adjusted for an increase in the
22 cost of living, and that the increased hourly rate is reasonable for this single-petitioner case and
23 the issues involved in it.
24 6 2026 rates have not been posted.
1 2. Clerical Tasks
2 Respondents dispute 2.7 (corrected to 2.5) hours of attorney time for clerical tasks. Dkt.
3 No. 41 at 7–8. Petitioner concedes the tasks were clerical but requests to be able to recover fees
4 at the paralegal rate for the tasks. Dkt. No. 42 at 6. The Supreme Court noted in Missouri v.
5 Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), that “purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a
6 paralegal [or lawyer’s] rate, regardless of who performs them . . . [The] dollar value [of such
7 non-legal work] is not enhanced just because a lawyer does it.” Id. at 288 n.10 (citation
8 modified). However, “[s]uch non-legal work may command a lesser rate.” Id.
9 As to rates for paralegals or other support staff, the EAJA provides that
10 [t]he amount of fees awarded under this subsection shall be based
upon prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the
11 services furnished, except that (i) no expert witness shall be
compensated at a rate in excess of the highest rate of compensation
12 for expert witnesses paid by the United States; and (ii) attorney
fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the
13 court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special
factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the
14 proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.
15 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). As the EAJA specifically includes specific additional requirements
16 for exceptions to the default prevailing market rate for rates paid to expert witnesses and
17 attorneys, rates for other service providers such as paralegals (and, therefore, legal assistants) are
18 to be compensated at the prevailing market rate. See Richlin Sec. Serv. v. Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571,
19 579–81 (2008) (under EAJA, paralegal fees may be awarded at prevailing market rates);
20 Nadarajah, 569 F.3d at 918.
21 However, the Court finds the hourly rate of $250 for clerical work requested by Petitioner
22 is unreasonable. Petitioner bases the requested rate on the prevailing hourly market rates for
23 paralegals. Dkt. No. 42 at 6. He cites cases in which the hourly rate was based on the following:
24 $250 per hour for paralegals with eleven to twenty-four years’ experience, see Marshall
1 Declaration at 13, Continuum, No. C12-717 (Oct. 13, 2025), Dkt. No. 278; $235 per hour for a
2 senior litigation paralegal, see Cymbidium Restoration Tr., 2025 WL 2592252, at *1; and $225
3 per hour for a paralegal who had previously owned a paralegal business and ran a nonprofit
4 corporation and another who had over twenty years’ experience, see Human Rights Def. Ctr.,
5 2025 WL 3294990, at *6–7. Dkt. No. 42 at 6. For reasons already discussed, while non-legal
6 work may be compensated, the paralegal rate is unreasonable for clerical work. Jenkins, 491 U.S.
7 at 288 n.10. However, in the Continuum case cited by Petitioner, the court approved a rate of
8 $150 to $200 per hour for three legal assistants (the $200 per hour rate was for legal assistants
9 with 20 to 28 years legal experience). Continuum, 2026 WL 592270, at *3; Marshall Declaration
10 at 13, Continuum, No. C12-717 (Oct. 13, 2025), Dkt. No. 278. Given that the clerical work
11 here—the filing of documents—could be performed by entry-level legal assistants, the Court
12 finds that a rate of $125 per hour is reasonable.
13 The Court therefore AWARDS Petitioner $23,137.06 in attorney fees. This amount reflects
14 the Court awarding 88.6 hours of the total requested 90.5 hours (inclusive of the time spent on
15 the reply) at $258.46 per hour for attorney work and an additional 1.9 hours of clerical work at a
16 rate of $125 per hour.
17 V. REQUEST FOR STAY
18 Respondents request that enforcement of any order awarding fees be stayed until the
19 Supreme Court decides Palacios. Dkt. No. 41 at 8. However, they provide neither analysis
20 demonstrating that a stay should be granted nor authority supporting their position. Id. In light of
21 this lack of any analysis or authority and given binding Ninth Circuit authority that EAJA fees
22 may be awarded to a prevailing petitioner in an immigration habeas proceeding, see In re Hill,
23 775 F.2d at 1040–41, the Court declines Respondents’ request to stay enforcement of this Order.
24
1 VI. CONCLUSION
2 For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners’ motion for fees and costs (Dkt. No. 34) is
3 GRANTED, and the Court AWARDS Petitioner $23,137.06 in attorney fees.
4 Dated this 2nd day of September, 2026.
5
A
6
Tana Lin
United States District Judge
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24