ABDUR-RAHEEM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SHAMSIDDIN ABDUR-RAHEEM,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 24-9054 (RK) (TJB)

v.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

VICTORIA L. KUHN et al.,

Defendants.

KIRSCH, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff

Shamsiddin Abdur-Raheem’s (“Plaintiff’s”) Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1) filed by

Defendants Victoria Kuhn, Michael Kostbar, Willie Bonds, Erin Nardelli, Donna Gies, and Amy

Emrich (collectively, “Defendants” or “Moving Defendants”) (“Motion,” ECF No. 10). The Court

has considered the parties’ submissions and resolves the matter without oral argument pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently serving a life sentence at New Jersey State Prison (“NJSP”) in Trenton,

New Jersey. (Compl. ¶¶ 3, 15.) On September 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed his pro se Complaint and

application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP application”). (See ECF Nos. 1, 1-3.) The Court

granted Plaintiff’s IFP application, screened his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),

and directed the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint. (“Screening Decision,” ECF No. 3.)

Plaintiff’s suit, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenges the constitutionality of the New

Jersey Department of Corrections’ (“NJDOC”) mail policy and implementation thereof. (Compl.

¶¶ 32–41.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants do not allow inmates to receive mail from Post Office

Boxes (“P.O. Boxes”) and reject such mail without notice in violation of his First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. (Id.)1

Plaintiff alleges that between January and April 2024, he was expecting incoming mail

from approximately twenty businesses, including “WriteAPrisoner.com,” in response to mail he

previously sent. (Compl. ¶¶ 18–19.) On April 21, 2024, after Plaintiff “realized that he had not

received responses from any of the businesses that he contacted,” he submitted an informal

grievance. (Id.) He stated in his grievance that the NJSP mailroom was withholding his mail from

WriteAPrisoner.com and returning it to sender without providing him with notice. (Id. ¶ 19.)

Defendant Michael Kostbar, the NJSP mailroom sergeant, responded that NJSP “do[es] not accept

mail from a P.O. Box” and advised Plaintiff to have the mail sent “from a street address.” (Id.) On

April 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a formal grievance about the same issue—“not receiving his

incoming mail from . . . WriteAPrisoner.com without being provid[ed] any notice of its rejection

and being returned to sender”—to which Defendant Kostbar responded that “mail is not accepted

from P.O. Boxes.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff filed a final administrative appeal on May 15, 2024, to which

Defendant Kostbar again responded. (Id.)

1 The Court screened the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and concluded that the following

claims could proceed: Plaintiff’s First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims for

money damages against Defendant Kostbar in his personal capacity, Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claims

for money damages against all other Defendants in their personal capacities, and Plaintiff’s claims for

injunctive relief against all Defendants in their official capacities. (Screening Decision at 3 n.1, 7.) As

explained herein, the Moving Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s money damages claims. (See

Motion.)

Plaintiff summarizes the policy and its enforcement as follows: “When incoming mail is

sent to an inmate at NJSP from a P.O. box address[,] . . . defendants are simply returning the mail

to sender without providing the inmate with any notice whatsoever of the occurrence, and without

providing the sender any notice for its return or why it[’]s being returned.” (Id. ¶ 26.) Plaintiff

alleges that this policy is new, and inmates have not been informed about it through the NJSP

Inmate Handbook or in any formal or organized manner. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 25; see id. ¶¶ 22–25 (alleging

that new policy of rejecting inmates’ incoming mail from P.O. Boxes “has not been promulgated

to the inmate population at NJSP or any other prison” and “has not been reduced to writing in any

compilation of NJDOC . . . or NJSP rules or procedures”).) Plaintiff “challenges the

constitutionality of the defendants[’] policy banning inmates from receiving mail from post office

boxes . . . [and] the constitutionality of the process, or lack thereof, of defendants rejecting and

returning to sender inmates[’] incoming mail from PO boxes.” (Id. ¶¶ 16–17.)

Plaintiff sues Defendant Kostbar (the mailroom sergeant who allegedly returned Plaintiff’s

mail without notice and informed him of the P.O. Box policy) and several NJDOC and NJSP

administrators:2 NJDOC Commissioner Victoria L. Kuhn; NJDOC Assistant Deputy

Commissioner Willie Bonds; NJDOC Assistant Commissioners Erin Nardelli, Donna Gies, and

Melinda Haley; NJSP Administrator Bruce Davis; NJSP Associate Administrator Amy Emrich;

and NJSP Assistant Superintendent Derrick Bodtmann.3 (Id. ¶¶ 19–20, 29–30.) According to

Plaintiff, these supervisory Defendants implement and enforce the allegedly unconstitutional mail

2 Only the NJDOC Defendants (i.e., the Moving Defendants) have been served. (ECF No. 5.) The three

NJSP Defendants have not been served and have not appeared in this action. (See ECF No. 6.) Any

outstanding service issues are referred to the Honorable Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J., pursuant to

Judge Bongiovanni’s Order Regarding Service of Process (ECF No. 4).

3 Plaintiff also sues “Unknown Agents And/Or Employees of [NJDOC] 1-99” and “Jane/John Does 1-99”—

respectively, “all currently unknown agents/employees of NJDOC . . . [and] any and all currently unknown

defendants who may be held liable in the course of this action.” (Compl. ¶¶ 13–14.)

policy. (Id. ¶¶ 4–8, 10–12, 29–30.) Plaintiff further alleges that the NJSP Defendants knew about

and acquiesced in Defendant Kostbar’s alleged misconduct. (Id. ¶ 29 (alleging the NJSP

Defendants “individually or collectively authorized, ordered, directed or w[ere] aware that

[D]efendant Kostbar was rejecting inmates’ such as Plaintiffs incoming mail from P.O. boxes in

his capacity as the Mailroom sergeant”).)4 From all Defendants, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and

punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. ¶¶ 36, 41–43.)

On February 13, 2026, Defendants Kostbar, Kuhn, Bonds, Nardelli, Gies, and Emrich

moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in part. (See Motion.) Plaintiff did not respond or otherwise

oppose Defendants’ Motion.5

II. LEGAL STANDARD

For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it “must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In

evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, “[a]ll allegations in the complaint must be accepted as

true, and the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every favorable inference to be drawn

therefrom.” Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original). However,

the Court “need not credit bald assertions or legal conclusions” or allegations that “involve

4 As explained in the Court’s Screening Decision, although supervisory officials cannot be held vicariously

responsible under § 1983 for the acts of their employees, § 1983 claims may proceed against such officials

under other theories of liability. (See IPF Decision at 4–5.) Based on Plaintiff’s allegations that the NJDOC

administrators “instituted and/or implemented the policy at issue” and the NJSP administrators “had

knowledge and acquiesced in Kostbar’s alleged wrongs,” the Court “permit[ted] the supervisory claims for

damages to proceed against these Defendants in their personal capacities.” (Id. at 5.) The Court likewise

permitted Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief to proceed against all named Defendants. (Id. at 5, 7.) The

Moving Defendants do not specifically or separately address Plaintiff’s supervisory claims. (See Motion.)

5 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s failure to respond, “the Court must address unopposed motions to dismiss a

complaint on the merits.” Est. of Casella v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 09-2306, 2009 WL 2488054, at *2

(D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2009) (citing Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991)); see also infra

note 7.

fantastic factual scenarios . . . lack[ing] any arguable factual or legal basis” or that “surpass all

credulity.” Degrazia v. FBI, No. 08-1009, 2008 WL 2456489, at *3 (D.N.J. June 13, 2008)

(alterations in original), aff’d, 316 F. App’x 172 (3d Cir. 2009).

A pro se plaintiff’s complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Cason v. Middlesex Cnty. Prosecutors’ Off.,

No. 18-2101, 2022 WL 2871195, at *3 (D.N.J. July 21, 2022) (quoting Montgomery v. Pinchak,

294 F.3d 492, 500 (3d Cir. 2002)); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per

curiam). Notwithstanding that liberal interpretation, “a pro se plaintiff must still plead the essential

elements of [his] claim.” Alfred v. Atl. City Police Dep’t Swat, No. 14-7536, 2015 WL 5823057,

at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 1, 2015) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)).

III. DISCUSSION

In their Partial Motion to Dismiss, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s monetary

damages claims only. (See, e.g., Motion at 2 (“This brief does not address the claims asserted

against the Defendants, in their official capacities, for injunctive relief.”).) They raise two

arguments. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages are barred by

the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (See id. at 5–7.) Second, Defendants assert that

Plaintiff’s remaining monetary damages claims (for punitive and nominal damages) under the First

Amendment are barred by qualified immunity. (See id. at 7–12); see also infra note 6. For the

reasons below, the Court grants Defendants’ Partial Motion as to their first argument but not as to

their second. Plaintiff’s compensatory damages claims must be dismissed against all Defendants,

but qualified immunity is premature at this early stage.

A. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages under § 1983 for Defendants’ alleged violations of

the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Compl. ¶¶ 36, 41, 43(b).) Defendants argue that

Plaintiff is precluded from obtaining compensatory damages under the PLRA because he does not

allege any physical injuries. (Motion at 5–7.) The Court agrees with Defendants.

The PLRA provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a

prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury

suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)

(emphasis added). The Third Circuit has interpreted this provision to mean that an incarcerated

plaintiff cannot recover compensatory damages under § 1983 without alleging a “more-than-de

minimis physical injury as a predicate to allegations of emotional injury.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318

F.3d 523, 536 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the at-issue mail policy caused

him any physical injury, let alone a “more-than-de minimis” physical injury, as required to obtain

compensatory damages for his claims. See id. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory

damages as against all Defendants must be dismissed without prejudice.

B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Defendants next argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not

violate a clearly established right. (Motion at 7–12.) With respect to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment procedural due process claim, Defendants “concede” for “purposes of [their] motion

only” that “rejecting mail addressed to an inmate without giving them notice can violate a clearly

established right.”6 (Id. at 2 n.1.) Defendants do not argue under the first qualified immunity prong

6 Defendants make no argument for qualified immunity specifically addressed to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment claim and, as stated, expressly concede a clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to

notice before an incarcerated person’s mail may be rejected. (See Motion at 2 n.1, 11–12.) The Court thus

understands Defendants to argue they are entitled to qualified immunity only as to Plaintiff’s First

that no constitutional violation occurred and do not move for dismissal of Plaintiff’s injunctive

claims under either the First or Fourteenth Amendment. (See id. at 2, 7–12.) Because Defendants

have not carried their burden of showing entitlement to qualified immunity, and because qualified

immunity is not “established on the face of [Plaintiff’s] complaint,” the Court denies without

prejudice Defendants’ request for qualified immunity as premature. See Thomas v. Independence

Township, 463 F.3d 285, 291, 293 (3d Cir. 2006).7

Qualified immunity “shield[s] government officials performing discretionary

functions . . . ‘from liability [for] civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”

Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)); see Burns v. PA Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The general rule of

qualified immunity is intended to provide government officials with the ability ‘reasonably [to]

anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.’” (alterations in original)

(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987))). Thus, a government official sued

under § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity where (1) he did not violate the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights or (2) the constitutional right was not clearly established at the time of the

alleged violation. Stringer v. County of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 85 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing George v.

Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 571–72 (3d Cir. 2013)). The court may address the two prongs in any order.

James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555

Amendment claim. To the extent Defendants seek qualified immunity as to both constitutional claims, they

fail to carry their burden as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for the reasons explained herein.

7 Although Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ Motion—and thus did not address Defendants’ assertion

of qualified immunity—his lack of a response does not entitle Defendants to automatic dismissal on

qualified immunity grounds. See, e.g., Stringer v. County of Bucks, 141 F.4th 76, 88 (3d Cir. 2025) (noting

that “the burden of pleading qualified immunity rests with the defendant, not the plaintiff” and that an

“absence of detailed factual allegations supporting a plaintiff’s claim for relief under § 1983 does not . . .

establish defendants’ immunity” (second omission in original)); see also supra note 5.

U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). “[T]he burden of pleading a qualified immunity defense, like any other

affirmative defense, rests with the defendant.” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 85 (internal quotation marks

omitted); Thomas, 463 F.3d at 289 (“[E]stablished precedent . . . recognizes that a plaintiff has no

pleading burden to anticipate or overcome a qualified immunity defense.”). “In qualified immunity

cases,” as on a motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw[s]

all inferences in his favor.” Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 914 (3d Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).

Defendants rely on the clearly established prong as the basis for their assertion of qualified

immunity. This prong entails two steps: “defin[ing] the right allegedly violated at the appropriate

level of specificity,” then “ask[ing] whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of its

alleged violation.” Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 228 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Jefferson v. Lias, 21

F.4th 74, 81 (3d Cir. 2021)). Defendants do not engage in the required rights-definition step. They

simply assert that “the NJDOC policy prohibiting inmates from receiving mail from P.O. Boxes

does not violate any clearly established right,” then proceed to argue that no Supreme Court

precedent or Circuit cases make “this right” clearly established. (Motion at 11.) However, as

explained, Defendants bear the burden of pleading the affirmative defense of qualified immunity,

and defining the right at issue is essential to showing that right was not clearly established. See,

e.g., Mack, 63 F.4th at 228–29; Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 181 (3d Cir. 2022) (“Before

searching for relevant caselaw, however, we must first identify the specific right [Plaintiff] alleged

was violated. Defining the contours of the right is critical to determining whether it was clearly

established . . . .”). “It is unclear how Moving Defendants can assert they are entitled to qualified

immunity because a right was not clearly established without identifying that right.” Wagner v.

Mifflin County, No. 23-100, 2025 WL 3619334, at *36 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2025), report and

recommendation adopted in relevant part, 2025 WL 3565338 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2025); see also

Gregory v. Dawdy, No. 24-12, 2025 WL 4635306, at *6 n.8 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2025) (“Defendants

do not attempt to define the rights at issue or argue why those rights were not clearly

established. . . . Defendants effectively shift the burden of proof to [Plaintiff] to both specify what

right is at issue and state why the right was clearly established.” (cleaned up)), report and

recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 305090 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2026); Greco v. Senchak, No. 12-

2576, 2013 WL 4520847, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss “because

defendants fail to establish that the right at issue was clearly established or, for that matter, define

what exactly the right would be in this case”); Bryant v. Pottsgrove Sch. Dist., No. 25-3140, 2025

WL 2691044, at *12–13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 2025) (“[Defendant] neither defines the rights

allegedly violated nor demonstrates that they were clearly established. Accordingly, her request

for qualified immunity as to these claims will be denied. If appropriate, [Defendant] may raise this

defense again at summary judgment . . . .”).

Defendants may well avoid defining the right at issue because to do so is a “fact-intensive

inquiry” that “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case.” Stringer, 141 F.4th

at 85–86 (cleaned up) (first quoting Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1996);

then quoting Thomas, 463 F.3d at 300); see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (explaining

that the constitutional right must be framed “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a

broad general proposition,” under qualified immunity); see also Mack, 63 F.4th at 229–30

(explaining that the framing of the right at issue must “track [the plaintiff’s] portrayal of the harm

he experienced” and “appropriately reflect ‘the specific context of the case,’ as viewed in the light

most favorable to [the plaintiff]”). The Third Circuit has “repeatedly recognized” that the “fact-

intensive” nature of the clearly established prong “presents unique difficulties at the pleading

stage,” and “complaints typically lack the case-specific details needed to conduct the clearly

established analysis.” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 85–86 (3d Cir. 2025) (collecting cases); see id. at 86

(“[T]he fact-bound nature of the clearly established inquiry combined with the dearth of facts at

the pleading stage makes it ‘difficult for a defendant to claim qualified immunity on the pleadings

before discovery and before the parties (much less the courts)’ uncover the precise contours of the

official’s conduct and the context in which it occurred.”); Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d

Cir. 2022) (“[T]he imperative to decide qualified immunity issues early in the litigation is in

tension with the reality that factual disputes often need to be resolved before determining whether

the defendant’s conduct violated a clearly established right.”).

The Third Circuit has accordingly cautioned that, although qualified immunity should be

resolved “at the earliest possible stage” in litigation, “Rule 12(b)(6) is often ‘a mismatch for

immunity and almost always a bad ground for dismissal.’” Stringer, 141 F.4th at 85. “[I]t is often

the case that, without more than the complaint to go on, a court cannot fairly tell whether a right

is obvious or squarely governed and thus clearly established by precedent, making qualified

immunity inappropriate on a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 86 (internal quotations omitted). Where, as

here, “the clearly established inquiry ‘is not possible’ at the pleading stage without a more

developed factual record, a district court must reject qualified immunity as ‘premature,’ deny the

motion to dismiss, and proceed with at least limited discovery.” Id. at 89 (quoting Schrob v.

Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1421 (3d Cir. 1991)); see Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F. App’x 788, 791

n.3 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is generally unwise to venture into a qualified immunity analysis at the

pleadings stage as it is necessary to develop the factual record in the vast majority of cases.”).

“The Court finds that this case falls into ‘the vast majority of cases’ for which further

development of the factual record is necessary.” Castro v. Del. River Port Auth., No. 13-4467,

2014 WL 2916506, at *8 (D.N.J. June 26, 2014). Without attempting to define the rights at issue,

the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to generally implicate prisoners’ First

Amendment right to receive mail and Fourteenth Amendment right to notice before such mail is

rejected.8 See Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting First Amendment right);

Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 186 (3d Cir. 2021) (noting Fourteenth Amendment right). Indeed,

Defendants concede, for purposes of their Motion, prisoners’ clearly established right to receive

notice before mail is rejected. (Motion at 2 n.1); see Vogt, 8 F.4th at 186 (“[P]risons must provide

‘minimum procedural safeguards’ when they ‘censor or withhold delivery of a particular letter.’

Notice and a reasonable chance to challenge the original official’s decision satisfy due process.”

(citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 417–9 (1976))); Mojica Carrion v. Wetzel, No. 22-

51, 2023 WL 4534597, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July 13, 2023) (denying qualified immunity at summary

judgment as to Fourteenth Amendment claim and explaining “clearly establishe[d] . . . due process

right to notice and an opportunity to challenge a prison’s decision to censor or withhold an inmate’s

mail”). Similarly, “federal courts have long recognized that ‘prisoners, by virtue of their

incarceration, do not forego their First Amendment right to the use of the mails.’ Jails and prisons

may, however, restrict a prisoner’s access to the mails where such a restriction is rationally related

to a legitimate state purpose.” Lomonico v. Presley, No. 17-6143, 2018 WL 2383155, at *3 (D.N.J.

May 24, 2018) (citation omitted). Neither the at-issue policy nor Defendants’ justifications for this

policy are presently before the Court. The factual record is thus “insufficient for determination of

Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity,” such that dismissal would be premature and the Court

8 Although neither of those “broad general proposition[s]” constitute the right at issue for purposes of the

clearly established prong, they inform the inquiry. Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d 633, 638

(3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Saucier, 553 U.S. at 201) (explaining distinction between general statements of

constitutional rights as relevant to first qualified immunity prong and “particularized” right for purposes of

clearly established analysis).

“must deny the motion to dismiss and seek to resolve qualified immunity at summary judgment.”9

Stringer, 141 F.4th at 86, 90; see id. at 86 (“[W]ithout more than the complaint to go on, a court

‘cannot fairly tell whether a right is obvious or squarely governed and thus clearly established by

precedent.”).

In sum, because factual development is needed for a proper qualified immunity analysis,

Defendants have not carried their burden to establish entitlement to the defense, and qualified

immunity is not clear on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendants’ request for qualified

immunity is premature and is denied without prejudice.10 See, e.g., Thomas, 463 F.3d at 291

(“[Q]ualified immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the immunity is established

on the face of the complaint.”); Debrew v. Auman, 354 F. App’x 639, 642 (3d Cir. 2009) (per

curiam) (vacating district court’s decision, where district court dismissed incarcerated plaintiff’s

First Amendment claim on qualified immunity grounds under Rule 12(b)(6), and finding dismissal

was “premature” because sparse complaint “failed to disclose whether the defendants’ actions did

not violate a clearly established constitutional right” (citing Thomas, 463 F.3d at 291)).

9 “It is by no means sure that discovery of any kind will unearth facts that would move this case into the

category of involving a clearly established right. However, assuming this at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage is

unnecessary and inconsistent with the Third Circuit’s clear guidance as to how to address such situations.”

Reader v. Blair County, No. 22-140, 2025 WL 4354749, at *17 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2025), report and

recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 512243 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2026). “This is simply not one of the

unusual cases where qualified immunity can be determined from the face of the complaint.” Id. at 18.

10 The Court reiterates that Plaintiff’s claims would not be dismissed in their entirety based on qualified

immunity alone, including because Defendants do not seek dismissal of his claims for injunctive relief. (See

Compl. ¶ 43; Motion at 2); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 244 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he defense

of qualified immunity is available only for damages claims—not for claims requesting prospective

injunctive relief.”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Moving Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. An appropriate Orderaccompanies this

Memorandum Opinion. a / f /

ROBERT KIRSCH | Me

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE a

Dated: September 2, 2026 -

13