LEANDRY-MORALES

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

GIOVANNI LEANDRY-MORALES, ) Civil Action No. 2:25-CV-266-CCW-CBB

)

) United States District Judge

Plaintiff, ) Christy Criswell Wiegand

)

vs. )

) United States Magistrate Judge

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) Christopher B. Brown

)

LIEUTENANT MCSHANE,

)

SERGEANT WOOLDRIDGE, )

Defendants,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS, ECF No. 381

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Recommendation

Plaintiff Giovanni Leandry-Morales, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

initiated this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges the Department

of Corrections and two correctional officers McShane and Woodridge, violated his

Constitutional rights during a serious of events where they confiscated his Quran,

threatened him with weapons, confiscated his clothes and bedding, and twice

sprayed him with OC spray despite knowing he was asthmatic and had one lung.

ECF No. 37. Plaintiff brings: an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim (Count I),

1 This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a

Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

an assault and battery claim (Count II), a First Amendment retaliation claim

(Count III), a civil conspiracy claim (Count IV), and an Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”) claim (Count V). Id. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Defendants have now filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss any official capacity

claims, as well as Plaintiff’s retaliation, conspiracy, and ADA claims. ECF No. 38.

The Partial Motion to Dismiss is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. ECF Nos.

38-39, 45. As set forth below, it is respectfully recommended that the Partial

Motion to Dismiss be granted or denied as follows:

- GRANTED as to all claims brought against Defendants in their official

capacities;

- DENIED as to the First Amendment Retaliation claim against

Defendants Woodridge and McShane;

- GRANTED without prejudice as to the civil conspiracy claim, and with

leave to amend if Leandry-Morales can do so in good faith;

- GRANTED without prejudice as to the ADA claim, and with leave to

amend if Leandry-Morales can do so in good faith.

II. Report

a. Factual Background

The following allegations in the Complaint are accepted as true with all

reasonable inferences drawn in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Phillips v.

Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).

Leandry-Morales’ alleges that on December 16, 2024, Defendant Woodridge

directed a subordinate to confiscate his Quran. ECF No. 37 at ¶ 6. Plaintiff then

told McShane about the confiscation, saying that Woodridge confiscated the Quran

because he does not like Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 7. McShane told Plaintiff he would look

into the matter and then walked away with Woodridge. Id. at ¶ 8.

McShane then told Plaintiff he would give him the Quran back in exchange

for the confiscation slip. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff refused and said he was going to keep

the confiscation slip as evidence towards Defendant Woodridge in a grievance he

planned to file against him for “antagonizing and oppressing him.” Id. at ¶ 10.

McShane then told Plaintiff that if he wanted to use the grievance process then he

would get his Quran back. Id. at ¶ 11.

According to the Amended Complaint, Woodridge and McShane then went to

the armory and got a shield, a baton, and canisters of OC spray “with the intent to

use force upon Plaintiff in retaliation of him intending to file a grievance against

Woodridge.” Id. at ¶ 12. With “their weapons” they “antagonized and oppressed”

Plaintiff by making him strip out of his clothes for a search, and then confiscated

his property including his clothes and bedding. Id. at ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges this

occurred on a particularly cold day and being without clothing or bedding caused

him “unnecessary and wanton pain and discomfort.” Id. at ¶ 15.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Woodridge and McShane threatened

him with the weapons, and twice sprayed OC spray directly in his face – after

Plaintiff told them he had only one lung and was asthmatic, so the OC spray could

kill him. Id. at ¶¶ 16-20. After being given medical care, Woodridge and McShane

“forced” Plaintiff into an observation cell without his clothing, bedding, or property

despite the “extreme cold temperatures.” Id. at ¶¶ 22-23. Plaintiff alleges he

defecated “blood from swallowing of the OC spray” and had to be prescribed an

antibiotic. Id. at ¶ 24.

a. Standard of Review - Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a

Claim (Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6))

A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion challenges whether the complaint states an

actual claim. A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and can be

dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A defendant has the burden to show a complaint fails to state a

claim. See Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must be dismissed if it merely alleges

entitlement to relief without supporting facts. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578

F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at

the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.’” Phillips,

515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court need not accept as

true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,” Doug Grant, Inc. v.

Great Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2000), nor a plaintiff's “bald

assertions or legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902,

906 (3d Cir. 1997). The court's role is limited to determining if a plaintiff is entitled

to offer evidence in support of their claims – not if they will ultimately prevail.

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (overruled on other grounds).

b. Discussion

In their motion, Defendants move to dismiss any official capacity claims, as

well as Plaintiff’s retaliation, conspiracy, and ADA claims. ECF No. 38. Each

argument is addressed in turn.

a. Official Capacity Claims – Eleventh Amendment

Immunity

To the extent Leandry-Morales is bringing any claims against Defendants in

their official capacity, Defendants move to dismiss on the basis of immunity. ECF

No. 39 at 4-5. Defendants argue they are immune from any claims brought against

them in their official capacity under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. Leandry-

Morales opposes the Motion to Dismiss, but only generally, and suggests the

Complaint has pled enough facts to survive at this stage. See ECF No. 45 at 2-3.

Defendants are correct that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment

Immunity to the extent that Leandry-Morales is bringing any claims against them

in their official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state and

its agencies in federal court that seek monetary damages. Because a lawsuit

against state officials acting in their official capacities are suits against the

employing state agency, such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania); Mt. Healthy

City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (state agencies); Edelman

v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (state employees acting in their official capacity).

Specifically,

[b]ecause the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's Department of Corrections is

part of the executive department of the Commonwealth, see Pa.Stat.Ann., tit.

71, § 61, it shares in the Commonwealth's Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Such immunity, however, may be lost in one of two ways: (1) if the

Commonwealth waived its immunity; or (2) if Congress abrogated the States’

immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of its power.

Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dept. of Corrections, 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000).

Congress has not expressly abrogated this constitutional immunity for civil rights

lawsuits against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and Pennsylvania

has not waived its immunity. Id. Pennsylvania instead enacted a statute invoking

its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8521(b). This is fatal to

Leandry-Morales’ claims against the Defendants in their official capacities for

damages and, as a result, Defendants are immune from any claims made against

them in their official capacities.

Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants’ Partial Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED as to all official capacity claims.

b. First Amendment Retaliation

Defendants next move to dismiss Leandry-Morales’ First Amendment

Retaliation claims against Defendants Woodridge and McShane. ECF No. 39 at 6.

Defendants argue Leandry-Morales has not alleged that he engaged in

constitutionally protected activity or an adverse action, nor that there is any causal

connection. ECF No. 39 at 6-11. Again, Leandry-Morales opposes this only in

general terms. See ECF No. 45 at 2-3.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges these Defendants retaliated

against him for intending to file a grievance against Woodridge by getting a shield,

metal baton, and OC spray “with the intent to inflict serious bodily harm” on him.

ECF No. 37 at ¶¶ 12, 35. He alleges they made him strip out of his clothes for a

search and confiscated his clothes and bedding. Id. at ¶ 14. It was a particularly

cold day, so this caused him “unnecessary and wanton pain and discomfort.” Id. at

¶ 15. He also alleges they threatened him with the weapons, and twice sprayed OC

spray directly in his face – after Plaintiff told them he had only one lung and was

asthmatic, so the OC spray could kill him. Id. at ¶¶ 16-20. After being given

medical care, Woodridge and McShane “forced” him into an observation cell without

his clothing, bedding, or property despite the “extreme cold temperatures.” Id. at

¶¶ 22-23. He defecated blood from swallowing the OC spray and had to be

prescribed an antibiotic. Id. at ¶ 24.

To bring a retaliation claim, an incarcerated plaintiff must show “(1)

constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an adverse action by prison officials sufficient

to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights,

and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the

adverse action taken against him.” Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir.

2003).

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff has not shown a constitutionally

protected conduct because he did not file a grievance against either Defendant.

ECF No. 39 at 8. They also argue that a “cell search” and being asked to strip is not

a sufficient adverse action. Id. at 9. Finally, Defendants argue there is no

causation. Id. at 9-11.

As to the first element, it is well-settled that filing a grievance is

constitutionally protected conduct. See Robinson v. Taylor, 204 F. App'x 155, 157

(3d Cir. 2006) (grievance). However, merely threatening to file a grievance is not

constitutionally protected activity. See Bendy v. Hutler, 2007 WL 87632, at *2

(D.N.J. Jan. 9, 2007), aff'd sub nom. Bendy v. Ocean Cnty. Jail, 341 F. App'x 799 (3d

Cir. 2009) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss First Amendment retaliation

claim where plaintiff “failed to allege ... that he actually filed a grievance against”

defendant and therefore did not engage in constitutionally protected activity).

The inquiry does not, however, end there. In Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417,

422 (3d Cir. 2016), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered a similar situation

where “the allegedly retaliatory conduct occurred before [the plaintiff] filed his

grievance.” The Court concluded that chronology does not necessarily defeat the

“retaliation claim because [the plaintiff] informed prison officials of his intent to file

a grievance and requested an appropriate form ... before any misconduct was filed

against him.” Id. at 422-23. The Court pointed out that “[f]or purposes of [the

plaintiff's] retaliation claim, we cannot discern a substantive distinction between

retaliation for informing prison officials of an intent to file a grievance or requesting

the necessary forms to do so on the one hand, and actually filing such a grievance on

the other.” Id. at 423.

Here, Leandry-Morales not only told McShane he was going to file a

grievance, he specifically told him he would not return the confiscation slip because

he was going to use it in his grievance against Defendant Woodridge. ECF No. 37

at ¶ 10. The Court finds that explicitly telling a Defendant about collecting specific

evidence for a grievance and then threatening to file a grievance is a concrete step

towards filing a grievance akin to “requesting the necessary forms” in Watson. See

also Nestor v. Allegheny Cnty. Pennsylvania, No. 2:23-CV-807-MRH-CBB, 2025 WL

849459, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2025) (finding “request to speak to a supervisor and

threat to file a lawsuit” adequate for first element of retaliation claim at Motion to

Dismiss stage), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:23-CV-807, ECF No. 41

(W.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2025). Therefore, at this stage in the proceeding, Plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged the first element of a retaliation claim.

Next, Plaintiff has clearly alleged an adverse action sufficient to satisfy the

second element of retaliation. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Woodridge and McShane

threatened him with weapons, confiscated his clothes and bedding during an

extremely cold season “for several days,” and twice sprayed him with OC spray to

the point where he defecated blood and had to be prescribed an antibiotic. ECF No.

37 at ¶¶ 12-24. Jackson v. O'Brien, No. 1:18-00032, 2021 WL 3174687, at *3 (W.D.

Pa. July 27, 2021) (“threats of violence do constitute an adverse action for

retaliation”); Hill v. Harry, No. 3:24-CV-01393, 2025 WL 1238368, at *7 (M.D. Pa.

Apr. 29, 2025) (confiscated clothing and bedsheets for a period of time can support

an inference of adverse action); Parker v. Kyper, 2024 WL 264677, at *4 (M.D. Pa.

2024) (holding that “the act of spraying a person with OC spray is substantially

more than a de minimis action or consequence”). Discovery will reveal just how

long Plaintiff went without bedding and clothing. But at this stage, Plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged adverse actions.

Finally, Plaintiff alleged the third element of causal connection. He alleges

that right after he told McShane he was going to use the confiscation slip as

evidence in a grievance against Woodridge, McShane and Woodridge returned with

weapons and OC spray. ECF No. ¶¶ 10-12. An “unusually suggestive temporal

proximity” between the protected activity and the adverse action can demonstrate

the causal connection. Watson, 834 F.3d at 424.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged a causal connection as to

Defendant Woodridge because he “merely speculates to Defendant Woodridge’s

personal knowledge.” ECF No. 39 at 10. Plaintiff, however, alleges that

immediately after Plaintiff and McShane discussed his forthcoming grievance

against Woodridge, Woodridge himself came back to join in the intimidation with

McShane. That is sufficient at this stage to show that Woodridge had some

knowledge of Plaintiff’s intent to file a grievance – and discovery can reveal what

Woodridge actually knew. See Nestor, 2025 WL 849459, at *5 (finding that a

defendant “who joined the violence immediately and seemingly without question”

was sufficient to show temporal proximity at the motion to dismiss stage).

Finally, Defendant argues there is no causal connection with McShane

because Plaintiff did not intend to file a grievance against him. ECF No. 39 at 10.

The Court rejects this argument. Accepting the allegations in the Amended

Complaint as true and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is clear that

Plaintiff is alleging McShane committed the adverse actions because Plaintiff was

going to file a grievance against his teammate Woodridge. Plaintiff alleged

McShane specifically acknowledged Plaintiff was going to use the grievance process,

because he told Plaintiff that if he was going to go the route of filing a grievance, he

could not have the Quran. ECF No. 37 at ¶ 11. Additionally, as stated above,

Plaintiff alleges McShane returned with weapons shortly after his conversation

with Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 12. That is sufficient at this stage in the proceeding. See

Bey v. Holt, No. 1:23-CV-00328, 2024 WL 1356683, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2024)

(rejecting argument that a retaliation claim against one defendant cannot be based

upon a grievance filed against another because a “Plaintiff need not specifically

name each Defendant . . . otherwise, a third party could – essentially – carry out the

adverse actions on behalf of those who are named as wrongdoers in a grievance”).

Accordingly, as Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the three elements of a First

Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Woodridge and McShane, it is

respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss this claim be DENIED. Any

additional open questions can be resolved in discovery.

c. Civil Conspiracy Claim

Defendants next move to dismiss Leandry-Morales’ civil conspiracy claim at

Count IV. ECF No. 39 at 11. Defendants argue that Plaintiff “merely makes a

conclusory allegation” about conspiracy but does not sufficiently allege a factual

basis for this claim. Id. Again, Leandry-Morales opposes this only in general

terms. See ECF No. 45 at 2-3.

In the Amended Complaint, Leandry-Morales alleges that Woodridge and

McShane “had a meeting of the minds to retaliate and use excessive force” against

him when they confiscated his clothes and bedding, threatened him with the

weapons, and twice sprayed him with OC spray despite his asthma and one lung.

ECF No. 37 at ¶ 36. He does not allege any other joint actions. Id.

To show a claim of civil conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1)

two or more persons conspired to deprive him of a constitutional right; (2) one or

more of the conspirators performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy;

and (3) the overt act injured plaintiff by depriving him of his constitutional right;

and (4) the conspirators were acting under color of state law. Barnes Found. v.

Twp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

For a § 1983 conspiracy claim to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff

“must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action amongst the

defendants.” Harmon v. Delaware Sec'y of State, 154 Fed. Appx. 283, 285, n.3 (3d

Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). A “mere general allegation” or “averment of

conspiracy or collusion without alleging the facts which constituted such conspiracy

or collusion is a conclusion of law and is insufficient” to state a claim for civil

conspiracy under § 1983. Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 595 F. Supp.

1385, 1400 (D. Del. 1984), aff'd, 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985). See also Brown v.

Camp Hill, 2015 WL 5675575, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2015) (“A conspiracy claim

requires more than mere speculation as to an agreement. Plaintiff must provide

specific allegations of combination, agreement, or understanding among all or

between any of the defendants to plot, plan or conspire to carry out the challenged

conduct.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants are correct that Leandry-Morales has not alleged facts showing

agreement between Defendants Woodridge and McShane. Leandry-Morales has

only alleged that they acted together. However, “‘the linchpin for conspiracy is

agreement,’ [and] allegations of parallel or concerted conduct, without more, are

insufficient” to state a conspiracy claim. Mitchell v. Wieland, No. 1:25-CV-00012-

RAL, 2026 WL 1623062, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 5, 2026) (quoting Watson v. Sec'y Pa.

Dep't of Corr., 436 Fed. Appx. 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)).

The Amended Complaint does not support a plausible inference that

Defendants Woodridge and McShane had an actual agreement to violate his rights.

Contrast Mitchell, 2026 WL 1623062, at *6 (saying allegations of “coordinated

conduct” was not enough to “support a plausible inference of an actual agreement”

between the defendants) with Whetzel v. Mangino, No. 2:23-CV-01595-CCW, 2024

WL 4266556, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2024) (finding understanding between

defendants because there was evidence of conversations and military salutes

between them).

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss the

conspiracy claim be GRANTED. However, it is also respectfully recommended that

the dismissal be without prejudice, and that Leandry-Morales be given leave to

amend if he can do so in good faith. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d

103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

d. ADA Claim

Defendants next move to dismiss Leandry-Morales’ ADA claim. ECF No. 39

at 12. At Count V, Leandry-Morales alleges that the DOC failed to reasonably

accommodate his respiratory disability – asthma and one lung – by failing to

prevent its staff from using OC spray on him “despite him having a medical

contraindication for its use.” ECF No. 37 at ¶ 37. Plaintiff opposes only in broad

terms. See ECF No. 45 at 2-3. It is respectfully recommended that Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss this claim be GRANTED without prejudice and with leave to

amend.

Title II of the ADA provides that “[n]o qualified individual with a disability

shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. It is “well established” that

“[s]tate prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of public entity.”

Chmiel v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. CV 18-1691, 2020 WL 1332830, at *8

(W.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2020) (citing Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206,

210 (1998)).

To state an ADA claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) they are a qualified

individual; (2) with a disability; and (3) they were excluded from participation in or

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or were

subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of their disability.

Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2023). See also Furgess v.

Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2019) (same). Here,

Defendants do not dispute that Leandry-Morales is a qualified individual with a

disability. Defendants instead argue that he has not alleged any facts showing he

was excluded from a program or service, or otherwise discriminated against based

on his respiratory disability. ECF No. 39 at 12.

Defendants are correct. Leandry-Morales has not alleged any facts

supporting a plausible inference that he was excluded from a program or service, or

otherwise discriminated against based on his respiratory disability. See generally,

ECF No. 37. Courts in this District have rejected nearly identical claims because

the plaintiff failed to identify any “service, program, or activity offered by the DOC

and for which he was qualified and from which he was excluded.” Barksdale v.

Department of Corrections, 2024 WL 5238210 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2024) (granting

motion for judgment on the pleadings on ADA claim based on staff member’s use of

OC spray despite knowledge of plaintiff’s asthma because plaintiff did not identify

program or service); Mitchell v. Wieland, No. 1:25-CV-00012-RAL, 2026 WL

1623062, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 5, 2026) (granting motion to dismiss ADA claim

based on use of OC spray against plaintiff with asthma because allegations “do not

support a plausible inference that Mitchell was excluded” from a program or service

or otherwise discriminated against); Talbert v. Dep't of Corr., No. 1:24-CV-00166-

RAL, 2026 WL 797460, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2026) (same, at the summary

judgment stage).

As Leandry-Morales has not alleged the elements of an ADA claim, it is

respectfully recommended that the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

It is also respectfully recommended that the dismissal be without prejudice and

with leave to amend should Leandry-Morales – in good faith – be able to identify a

service, program, or activity that he was excluded from or denied the benefits of

based on his disability. See Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

c. Conclusion

Based on the above, it is respectfully recommended that that Defendants’

Partial Motion to Dismiss be granted or denied as follows:

- GRANTED as to all claims brought against Defendants in their official

capacities;

- DENIED as to the First Amendment Retaliation claim against

Defendants Woodridge and McShane;

- GRANTED without prejudice as to the civil conspiracy claim, and with

leave to amend if Leandry-Morales can do so in good faith;

- GRANTED without prejudice as to the ADA claim, and with leave to

amend if Leandry-Morales can do so in good faith.

Any party is permitted to file written specific Objections to this Report and

Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Leandry-Morales,

because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file written objections, if

any, to this Report and Recommendation by August 20, 2026. Defendants, because

they are electronically registered parties, must file objections, if any, by August 17,

2026. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).

The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will

waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir.

2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983)). See also EEOC

v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of

appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to

review for plain error).

DATED this 3rd day of August, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

CC: Hon. Christy Criswell Wiegand

United States District Judge

GIOVANNI LEANDRY-MORALES

QP6329

SCI FAYETTE

50 Overlook Drive

LaBelle, PA 15450

All counsel of record, via ECF