Caron

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION

CASE NO. 24-60506-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/HUNT

SHELLIE LYNN CARON,

JENNAMARIE SCALES SINGH,

and ANTHONY PARISOTTI,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNLIMITED HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INC.,

and SHERRY L. HANNAKA,

Defendants.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before this Court on Plaintiffs’ Verified Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(B), ECF No. 92, and Bill of Costs, ECF No. 86. The Honorable

William P. Dimitrouleas referred the Motions to the undersigned for a report and

recommendation. ECF Nos. 87; 93; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 1.

Upon thorough review of the record and the Motions, Responses, any Replies, the

applicable law, and the entire record, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS Plaintiffs’

Motions be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

On March 29, 2024, Plaintiffs filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act

(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), for unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages. ECF

No. 1. On June 26, 2025, following a three-day bench trial, judgment was entered in favor

of Plaintiffs and against Defendants. ECF No. 78. Plaintiffs now seek an award of

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs. It is well settled that a prevailing FLSA plaintiff is entitled to

recover attorney’s fees and costs based upon the language of the FLSA, which provides

that “[t]he court . . . shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,

allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”

29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Silva v. Miller, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2008).

In the instant case, Plaintiffs are prevailing parties under the FLSA statute and are entitled

to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.

This Court uses the lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney’s fees,

multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended.

Norman v. House. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). A

reasonable hourly rate for attorney’s fees is determined by evaluating “the prevailing

market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

895 (1984)); see also ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 438 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The significant

disparity in their experience should be reflected in the rates awarded.”); Brown v. Sch. Bd.

of Broward Cty., No. 08-61592-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2010 WL 3282584, at *3 (S.D. Fla.

June 30, 2010) (reducing the requested hourly rate).

The movant bears the burden of proving the requested rate is consistent with

prevailing market rates. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299. In addition to evidence presented by

the movant, “[a] court . . . is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own

knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an

independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Id. at 1303

(quoting Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)) (internal quotations

omitted). Thus, even when the submitted evidence is deficient, a court has the power to

make a fee award without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. Id.

Moreover, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is unnecessary for issues about which the

district court possesses sufficient expertise: ‘Such matters might include the

reasonableness of the fee, the reasonableness of the hours, and [the] significance of the

outcome.’” Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Norman, 826 F.2d at 1309). The primary issues here are the reasonableness of

counsel’s hourly rate and the reasonableness of the number of hours expended, matters

over which this Court possesses sufficient expertise.

A. Attorney’s Fees

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

Plaintiffs seek attorney’s fees based upon professional services rendered. When

“determining what is a ‘reasonable’ hourly rate and what number of compensable hours

is ‘reasonable,’” this Court must consider twelve factors:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal

service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the

attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee;

(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations

imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount

involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience,

reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability”

of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

The reasonable hourly rate is defined as the prevailing market

rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by

lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and

reputation. The fee applicant bears the burden of establishing

the claimed market rate. The Court may use its own

experience in assessing the reasonableness of attorney’s

fees.

Meyrowitz v. Brendel, 16-81793-CIV-MARRA, 2018 WL 4440492, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept.

17, 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Generally, “[a] reasonable hourly

rate is one that is adequate to attract competent counsel in the relevant legal market, but

yet does not produce a windfall to that attorney.” Hermosilla v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 10-

21418-CIV-TORRES, 2011 WL 9364952, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2011), subsequently

aff’d, 492 F. App’x 73 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894–95

(1984)).

This Court has considered the attorneys’ affidavits and the twelve factors.

Because of their practice, reputation, and legal experience, counsel request the following

hourly rates:

• Elliot Kozolchyk, counsel in this case with over 13 years of experience, asks

for $450 per hour for 217.4 hours of work.

• Dillon Cuthbertson, an associate and co-counsel in this case, requests a rate

of $400 for 116.6 hours of work.

ECF. No. 92 at 2.1

After the undersigned’s order requiring notice of previously awarded fees and

costs, Plaintiffs’ counsel provided relevant fee awards which indicate that Mr.

Kozolchyk’s proposed rate is slightly higher than the majority of rates previously awarded

1 Plaintiffs represent this is a slight (0.4 percent) discount on the total fees incurred. ECF

No. 92-1 at 15.

in the Southern District. ECF No. 115. The undersigned has previously recommended

an award of $400 per hour for Mr. Kozolchyk, and recommends he receive the same rate

here. See Alcine v. Tile & Marble by Valentin, Inc., No. 24-61319-CIV-HUNT, 2025 WL

3723307, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2025).

In that same Notice, counsel indicated that Mr. Cuthbertson had recently been

awarded a rate of $375 per hour in this district. The undersigned notes this award to be

in keeping with the rates he has most commonly been awarded in this district. Therefore,

it is recommended that Mr. Cuthbertson be awarded a rate of $375 per hour for his work

on this case.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Upon determination of the hourly rate, a court must determine the reasonable

number of hours expended in the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433

(1983). Inquiry into the reasonable number of hours focuses on an attorney’s exercise of

“billing judgment,” such as the attorney’s exclusion of hours “that would be unreasonable

to bill a client, and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation, or

experience of counsel.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 428 (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted). Fee applicants must exclude

hours that were not “reasonably expended” or that are determined to be “excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” from their fee calculations. Hensley, 461 U.S. at

434.

Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks compensation for 217.4 hours for Mr. Kozolchyk, and

116.6 hours for Mr. Cuthbertson. Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ counsel billed for hours

that were not reasonably incurred, and that counsel’s actions needlessly increased the

time spent on this case. ECF No. 95. Plaintiffs did not file a reply.

Courts routinely find that “adjustments to . . . attorney hours are warranted [if] the

time sought is ‘excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary.’” Nat’l All. for

Accessibility, Inc. v. Hull Storey Retail Grp., LLC, No. 3:10-CV-778-J-34JBT, 2012 WL

3853520, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:10-

CV-778-J-34JBT, 2012 WL 3853455 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2012). The undersigned has

therefore examined Plaintiffs billing records to determine if a reduction in hours is

appropriate.

The undersigned notes that the case underwent an unsuccessful mediation, and

that no dispositive motions were filed. Having examined the billing records, the Court

does indeed find that counsel’s claimed hours are somewhat excessive. For instance,

the Court observed several entries spent on tasks such as reviewing docket entries and

other simple functions that, read together, appear gratuitous. Further, the Court has

previously denied counsel’s requests to collect legal fees for work that consisted of

coordinating schedules, basic communications, and procedural matters usually

performed by legal assistants, not lawyers. See Williams v. R.W. Cannon, Inc., 657 F.

Supp. 2d 1302, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2009). Accordingly, these hours should be excluded.

“If the court concluded that the number of claimed hours is excessive, it may

engage in ‘an across-the-board cut,’ so long as it provides adequate explanation for the

decrease.” Galdames v. N & D Inv. Corp., 432 F. App’x 801, 806 (11th Cir. 2001). Courts

need not become “green-eyeshade accountants.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011).

The essential goal for the court is to “do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.”

Id. The undersigned finds an additional 30 percent across-the-board cut appropriate

here. Accordingly, Mr. Kozolchyk should be compensated for 152.2 hours of work, while

Mr. Cuthbertson should be compensated for 81.6 hours of work.2

3. Lodestar Amount and Adjustment

“[T]here is a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar figure is reasonable, but that

presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does

not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining

a reasonable fee.” Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010).

The Supreme Court has specifically identified three circumstances that may justify

a deviation from the lodestar amount: 1) “where the method used in determining the hourly

rate employed in the lodestar calculation does not adequately measure the attorney’s true

market value, as demonstrated in part during the litigation”; 2) “if the attorney’s

performance includes an extraordinary outlay of expenses and the litigation is

exceptionally protracted”; and 3) when there are “extraordinary circumstances in which

an attorney’s performance involves exceptional delay in the payment of fees.” Id. at 554–

56.

In this case, the undersigned finds no reason to depart from the lodestar,

calculation. Therefore, Plaintiffs should be awarded $60,880.00 for Mr. Kozolchyk (152.2

2 Such a reduction is in keeping with similar reductions in this District. See, e.g., Keefe v.

Britt’s Bow Wow Boutique, Inc., No. 22-62138-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/AUGUSTIN-BIRCH,

2024 WL 1286139, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2024), report and recommendation approved,

No. 22-62138-CIV-DIMITROULEAS/AUGUSTIN-BIRCH, 2024 WL 1285203 (S.D. Fla.

Mar. 26, 2024), aff’d, No. 23-14024, 2025 WL 1483009 (11th Cir. May 23, 2025) (reducing

Mr. Kozolchyk’s requested hours from 299.5 to 208.9 hours).

hours at $400.00 per hour), and $30,600.00 for Mr. Cuthbertson (81.6 hours at $375.00

per hour), for a total award of $91,480.00.

B. Costs

Plaintiffs also request this Court award them $5,225.20 in costs. Rule 54(d) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part that “[u]nless a federal statute,

these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—

should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Rule 54 “creates a presumption in favor of

awarding costs to the prevailing party which [the opposing party] must overcome.” Manor

Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo, 929 F.2d 633, 639 (11th Cir. 1991). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1920,

the Court may tax costs for the following:

(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;

(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily

obtained for use in the case;

(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;

(4)Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials

where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;

(6)Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters,

and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services

under section 1828 of this title.

The burden is initially on the prevailing party to “submit[] a request that enables a

court to determine what costs or expenses were incurred by the party and the party’s

entitlement to an award of those costs or expenses.” Katz v. Chevaldina, 127 F. Supp.

3d 1285, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (citing Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 784 (11th Cir.

1994)). But in challenging those costs, “the losing party bears the burden of

demonstrating that a cost is not taxable, unless the knowledge regarding the proposed

cost is within the exclusive knowledge of the prevailing party.” Monelus v. Tocodrian, Inc.,

609 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2009). A court “must have and state a sound basis”

for denying the full amount of costs that the prevailing party incurred because “denial of

costs is in the nature of a penalty for some defection on the prevailing party’s part in the

course of the litigation.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1039 (11th Cir. 2000)

(alteration and quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs request the following: $405.00 in filing fees, $108.00 in service costs,

$1,250.80 in transcript fees, and $3,461.40 in printing and copying fees. ECF No. 86 at

1. Defendants do not object to the filing or service fees, nor do they object to $960.00 in

transcript fees. ECF No. 88. The undersigned has reviewed Plaintiffs’ submissions and

agrees that those unobjected-to costs are compensable and therefore should be

awarded.

Defendants do, however, object to Plaintiffs’ copy expenses of $3,461.40, as well

as $290.80 in expenses incurred due to Zoom conferencing costs, condensed transcripts,

processing litigation support package costs, and court reporter copies. Plaintiffs in reply

do not appear to contest Defendants’ objections to the $290.80, and the undersigned

agrees that these costs should be disallowed.

As for the $3,461.40 for in-house copy expenses, Plaintiffs respond that multiple

courts, including this one, have recently awarded counsel such expenses. See, e.g.,

Keefe, 2024 WL 1286139, at *3 (“Plaintiff seeks copying costs at a rate of $0.15 per page

for black-and-white copying and at a rate of $0.59 per page for color copying. Judges

within the Southern District of Florida have approved both rates.”). The undersigned

agrees with Plaintiffs that such costs are recoverable and therefore finds Plaintiffs’ copy

costs compensable. Plaintiffs should therefore be awarded $405.00 in filing fees, $108.00

in service costs, $960.00 in transcript fees, and $3,461.40 in printing and copying fees,

for a total award of $4,934.40.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Plaintiffs’ Verified

Motion for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(B), ECF No. 92, be GRANTED IN

PART to the extent that Plaintiffs be awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $91,480.00,

which shall bear post-judgment interest at the rate prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

Plaintiffs should also be awarded costs in the amount of $4,934.40. The total award

amount should therefore be $96,414.40. The Motion should be otherwise DENIED.

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation, any Party may serve and file written objections to any of the above

findings and recommendations as provided by the Local Rules for this district. 28 U.S.C.

§636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(b). The Parties are hereby notified that a failure to timely

object waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and

Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).

DONE and SUBMITTED at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 3rd day of August 2026.

Pe mm It

PATRICKM.HUNT

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas

All Counsel of Record

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