Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NATHANIEL JACKSON, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. 2:24-CV-1399

)

v. )

)

AMAZON.COM, INC. et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

)

MEMORANDUM ORDER

J. Nicholas Ranjan, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Nathaniel Jackson purchased a ladder on Amazon.com. The ladder

was manufactured by Zhejiang Kangqian Industry & Trade Co. Ltd. and marketed

and sold by Changxing International Trade (US) Co. Ltd d/b/a Superworthboutique.

The ladder was marketed as heavy duty and having a 330-pound load capacity. On

October 8, 2022, while Mr. Jackson used the ladder according to the marketed load

capacity, the ladder collapsed. Mr. Jackson fell approximately sixteen feet, suffering

various injuries.

On October 4, 2024, Mr. Jackson sued Amazon. On December 10, 2024, Mr.

Jackson filed an Amended Complaint adding Changxing and Zhejiang as additional

defendants. On March 17, 2025, Mr. Jackson filed his Second Amended Complaint,

which is the operative complaint.

Amazon and Changxing (“Defendants”)1 now move for judgment on the

pleadings on certain counts. ECF 44. After careful consideration, the Court will

grant Defendants’ motion in part and deny it in part.

1 Zhejiang failed to appear, and the Clerk of Court entered default against it. ECF

40.

DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS2

I. Mr. Jackson’s Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices & Consumer

Protection Law claim (Count I) is limited to the cost of the ladder.

Defendants argue that Mr. Jackson’s UTPCPL claims fails because that

statute doesn’t allow recovery for personal-injury damages. Mr. Jackson doesn’t

really dispute this. Instead, he argues that he sufficiently pleads a pecuniary injury

recoverable under the UTPCPL: the cost of the ladder. Mr. Jackson’s right.

A plaintiff can recover “any ascertainable loss of money or property” under the

UTPCPL. 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-9.2(a). Most of Mr. Jackson’s alleged damages

relate to his personal injuries and are not recoverable under this claim. See Vey v.

Amazon.com, No. 2-23-CV-2055, 2024 WL 2396840, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 23, 2024)

(Stickman, J.) (“Personal injury claims are not permitted under the UTPCPL.”). But

Mr. Jackson does allege one recoverable pecuniary injury—the purchase price of the

ladder. ECF 25, ¶ 36.

2 “The standard for deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is not materially different from the standard

for deciding a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).” Kaite v. Altoona Student Transp., Inc., 296 F. Supp. 3d 736, 739 (W.D. Pa.

2017) (Gibson, J.) (cleaned up). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. Any reasonable inferences should be considered in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. See Lula v. Network Appliance, 255 F. App’x 610, 611 (3d

Cir. 2007) (citing Rocks v. City of Phila., 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989)).

The Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion on Count I. Mr. Jackson’s

recovery of pecuniary damages under Count I is limited to the purchase price of the

ladder.

II. Mr. Jackson’s Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim (Count II) is also

limited to the cost of the ladder.

Like the UTPCPL, the MMWA “does not create a private, independent cause

of action for personal injuries which are otherwise state law claims for breach of

warranty.” Santarelli v. BP Am., 913 F. Supp. 324, 333 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (citing

Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1068 (5th Cir. 1984)). Mr. Jackson’s

recovery under the MMWA is therefore also limited to exclude his personal-injury

damages.3

The Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion on Count II. Mr. Jackson’s

recovery of pecuniary damages under Count II is limited to the purchase price of the

ladder.

III. Mr. Jackson’s strict liability claim (Count III) against Changxing is

not clearly time-barred based on his allegations.

Changxing was added late to this case, and argues it was actually added too

late. It contends that Count III is time-barred by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of

limitations for personal-injury claims. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. A claim should be

dismissed as time-barred on the pleadings “only if the time alleged in the statement

3 Defendants rightfully note that Mr. Jackson does not plead that they were provided

an opportunity to cure, as required by the MMWA. ECF 46, p. 6. But Mr. Jackson

attaches some evidence of a notice to cure, so he could easily replead around this

defect. Further, what qualifies as a reasonable opportunity to cure is a factual

question that would require discovery. So the Court defers on ruling on the “cure”

issue, and can take it up at summary judgment, if necessary.

of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of

limitations.” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Robinson

v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134–35 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotations omitted).

Mr. Jackson sued Changxing in December 2024, more than two years from the

date of the ladder accident, in October 2022. On its face, this seems to pose a statute-

of-limitations problem. But, as Mr. Jackson points out, if there is relation back to the

original complaint (filed within the statute of limitations in October 2024), then the

claim is timely. The Court agrees with Mr. Jackson and finds that there is a

possibility of relation back here.

When a plaintiff amends a complaint to add a party after the statute of

limitations has run, an otherwise time-barred claim can “relate back” to the original

complaint’s filing date under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C). Rule

15(c)(1)(C) applies when (1) the claims against the new party arise out of the same

occurrences set forth in the original complaint, (2) the new party received notice of

the action within the Rule 4(m) service period, and (3) the new party knew or should

have known that the action would have been brought against it but for a mistake in

identity.

Here, Mr. Jackson’s allegations do not foreclose Rule 15’s application. While

Changxing was not served until June 20, 2025, well after the Rule 4(m) service period,

Rule 15 “does not require actual service of process on the party sought to be added.”

Singletary v. P Dept. of Corrs., 266 F.3d 186, 195 (3d Cir. 2001). Rule 15 notice can

occur “when a party who has some reason to expect his potential involvement as a

defendant hears of the commencement of litigation through some informal means.”

Id. Because Mr. Jackson doesn’t allege a date when Changxing received notice, it’s

impossible to conclude that this claim is untimely on the pleadings alone. Discovery

is needed to determine whether Rule 15 applies.

The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion on Count III.

IV. Mr. Jackson withdraws his negligent design claim against Amazon

(Count IV).

Based on Mr. Jackson’s agreement (ECF 54, p. 11), the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion on Count IV and enters judgment in favor of Amazon as to Count

IV.

V. Mr. Jackson’s negligent undertaking claim against Amazon is

sufficiently pled (Claim V).

Mr. Jackson brings a claim for negligent undertaking against Amazon. The

gist of this claim is that Amazon assumed responsibility for the safety of the ladder

and increased the risk of harm to Mr. Jackson. Amazon argues that this claim is

deficient because there are no affirmative allegations of an increased risk of harm

(i.e., acts of commission). The Court finds an increased risk of harm can be

established though acts of omission, and the complaint pleads as much. So, this claim

survives.

Pennsylvania has adopted Sections 323 and 324A of the Second Restatement

of Torts. See generally Gradel v. Inouye, 421 A.2d 674 (Pa. 1980); Walters v. UPMC

Presbyterian Shadyside, 187 A.3d 214 (Pa. 2018). Under Sections 323 and 324A, a

party who promises to undertake a specific responsibility that it should recognize as

necessary to the safety of others can be held liable for negligently performing its

assumed responsibility. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 323, 324A. Section 323

covers the party’s assumed duty to the promisee and Section 324A covers the party’s

assumed duty to a foreseeable third party. To state a claim under Section 323, a

plaintiff must plead that (1) the assuming party’s negligence increased the risk of

harm or (2) that he relied on the assuming party’s undertaking.4 Amazon moves for

judgment on the pleadings on the basis that Mr. Jackson insufficiently pled these

elements.

Mr. Jackson has sufficiently pled that Amazon’s failure to ensure the ladder’s

safety increased his risk of harm. Mr. Jackson alleges that Amazon assumed

responsibility for the safety of products on its website.5 ECF 25, ¶ 102. Having

assumed that responsibility, Amazon then failed to take corrective action to recall the

ladder, warn buyers about the ladder, or remove the ladder from its website, despite

multiple consumer complaints about the ladder. ECF 25, ¶ 34. Any one of these

omissions could be enough to plausibly conclude that Amazon increased Mr. Jackson’s

risk of harm. See Hill v. Slippery Rock Univ., 138 A.3d 673, 680 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016)

(“In Pennsylvania, an increased risk of harm can occur through a failure to act.”). For

example, had Amazon recalled the ladder, then “Mr. [Jackson] may not have suffered

4 Under Section 324A, a plaintiff may also plead that the assuming party has

undertaken to perform a duty owed by another to the plaintiff. Id. § 324A(b).

5 Amazon does not move for judgment on the grounds that Mr. Jackson insufficiently

pled that Amazon assumed this responsibility. ECF 60, p. 6 n.2. So, the Court doesn’t

consider this issue here.

the event that caused his [injury].” Id. at 679. That is enough to meet Mr. Jackson’s

burden at the pleading stage.

The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion on Count V.

***

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Counts I and II are limited to

damages associated with the cost of the ladder. Judgment is entered in favor of

Amazon as to Count IV.

Dated: September 2, 2026 BY THE COURT:

/s/ J. Nicholas Ranjan

United States District Judge