Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DAINCA BROWN, individually and on be-

half of all others similarly situated,

NO. 1:25-CV-07810

Plaintiff,

Judge Edmond E. Chang

v.

THE CHICAGO HOTEL COLLECTION,

LLC,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Dainca Brown brings this proposed class action on behalf of individuals who

paid an online deposit to stay at a Chicago Hotel Collection property and were billed

undisclosed fees when they arrived. R. 22, Am. Compl. ¶ 59.1 She alleges that this

hidden-fees practice violates the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business

Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq., and constitutes unjust enrichment. Id. ¶¶ 67–

80.2 The Chicago Hotel Collection, LLC moves to dismiss under Civil Rules 12(b)(1)

1Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,

a page or paragraph number.

2This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case under the Class Action Fair-

ness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). Specifically, there is minimal diversity of citizenship

between at least one class member and the defendant because Brown is a Minnesota citizen

and The Chicago Hotel Collection, LLC is an Illinois limited liability company with its prin-

cipal place of business in Illinois. Am. Compl. ¶ 18; R. 23, 09/05/2025 Status Rep. at 2; see 28

U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) (for CAFA, changing the usual LLC-citizenship rule by directing that

“an unincorporated association shall be deemed to be a citizen of the State where it has its

principal place of business and the State under whose laws it is organized”). And Brown

plausibly alleges that there are more than 100 class members and that the amount in con-

troversy exceeds $5 million. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 62.

and 12(b)(6), arguing that it is not the proper defendant because it does not own or

operate the hotel where Brown stayed. R. 36, Def.’s Mot. Because this is not a juris-

dictional issue, and Brown plausibly pleads that the Collection is responsible for the

hotel’s alleged hidden-fees practice, the motion is denied.

I. Background

In June 2025, Brown booked a one-night stay at the Chicago Hotel Collection

Magnificent Mile Hotel & Suites using a third-party website, Algotels. Am. Compl.

¶¶ 26–27. The booking stated that she would owe $128.63 total, and she paid a non-

refundable deposit of $62 to reserve the room. Id. ¶ 28. But when Brown arrived at

the hotel, she was informed that Algotels “had posted the wrong rate online” and that

she would have to pay $201.95 for the room—$73.32 more than she expected. Id.

¶¶ 29, 32. Because Brown could not afford the room, she forfeited her deposit and

found a last-minute booking elsewhere. Id. ¶ 33. Brown now brings a proposed class

action on behalf of those who paid an online deposit to stay at one of the Collection’s

hotels and were billed previously undisclosed fees when they arrived. Id. ¶ 59.

II. Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion tests whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction,

Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir.

2009); Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999), whereas a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of the complaint, Hallinan, 570 F.3d at 820;

Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In order to survive a

Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the plaintiff must establish that the district court has subject

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matter jurisdiction. United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946

(7th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds, Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 683 F.3d

845 (7th Cir. 2012). “If subject matter jurisdiction is not evident on the face of the

complaint, [then] the ... Rule 12(b)(1) [motion is] analyzed [like] any other motion to

dismiss, by assuming for purposes of the motion that the allegations in the complaint

are true.” Id. But “the district court may properly look beyond the jurisdictional alle-

gations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue

to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Evers v. Astrue, 536

F.3d 651, 656–57 (7th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).3

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only

include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the de-

fendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up). The Seventh Circuit has

explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended

to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might

keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)). At the same time, the Su-

preme Court instructs that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible

3This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,

and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,

18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).

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claim for relief will … be a context-specific task.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679

(2009). The Seventh Circuit has drawn a context-dependent distinction between, for

example, relatively straightforward employment discrimination claims versus more

complex claims. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2010).

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan, 570 F.3d at 820. “[A] com-

plaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). These allega-

tions “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those

that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

III. Analysis

A. 12(b)(1) Motion

The Collection first moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint for lack of sub-

ject matter jurisdiction because Brown supposedly lacks Article III standing. Def.’s

Mot. at 3. “[S]tanding is an essential ingredient of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Bazile

v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 983 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 2020). But at the pleading

stage, Brown need only plausibly allege the elements of standing: “(1) she must have

suffered an actual or imminent, concrete and particularized injury-in-fact; (2) there

must be a causal connection between her injury and the conduct complained of; and

(3) there must be a likelihood that this injury will be redressed by a favorable

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decision.” Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 620–21 (7th Cir. 2020);

Bazile, 983 F.3d at 278.

The Collection contends that it does not own or operate the Magnificent Mile

hotel where Brown booked her room, and thus Brown fails the second standing ele-

ment because the Collection did not cause her alleged injury. Def.’s Mot. at 3. To

support its contention, the Collection offers an affidavit from its manager, Michael

Ward, who states under oath that the limited-liability company does not own, oper-

ate, or otherwise have any business relationship with the hotel. R. 36-1, Ward Aff.

¶¶ 1–6. The Collection also cites public records that show another company—166 Su-

perior Hotel, LLC—owns the property and holds a license to sell liquor at the hotel.

R. 40, Def.’s Suppl. at 3–4. In response, Brown offers a set of records suggesting that

the Collection has some substantial connection to the hotel’s operations. See R. 45,

Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 5–9 (describing articles of organization, online sites and reviews,

and a union contract that suggest three companies are connected to the hotel: the

Collection; 166 Superior Hotel, LLC; and Magnificent Mile Hotel Management, LLC).

Brown requests permission to conduct jurisdictional discovery to understand which

entities are responsible for the alleged hidden-fees practice at the hotel, and thus

should be named as defendants. Id. at 11–13.

But the Court need not wade through the parties’ evidence or permit jurisdic-

tional discovery because the Collection’s argument is not really about subject matter

jurisdiction. Instead, its argument goes to the merits of Brown’s claims: whether

Brown has plausibly alleged that the Collection—rather than some other entity—is

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responsible for the hidden fees. Usually, defendants raising a causation argument to

contest standing contend that the casual chain between the plaintiff’s injury and the

defendant’s alleged conduct is too attenuated. See Taylor v. Salvation Army Nat’l

Corp., 110 F.4th 1017, 1025 (7th Cir. 2024). Whereas here, assuming that Brown has

adequately alleged that the Collection is responsible for setting the Magnificent Mile

hotel’s room pricing and failing to advertise hidden fees, her injuries are “fairly trace-

able” to the Collection’s alleged conduct. California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 668–69

(2021). So the Collection’s argument does not identify a true standing or jurisdictional

defect. See Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 347–48 (3d Cir. 2016) (describing how

standing “is generally not an inquiry into whether the plaintiff has got the right de-

fendant”); see also AbbVie Inc. v. Alvotech hf., 2021 WL 3737733, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill.

Aug. 23, 2021) (stating that the argument that the plaintiff named the wrong defend-

ant “is not jurisdictional in nature and is more properly analyzed under Rule 12(b)(6),

rather than Rule 12(b)(1)”); Brown v. Chi. Mun. Emps. Credit Union, 2014 WL

1613037, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2014) (finding that the “plaintiff named the wrong

defendant, but that does not mean that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the claim”).

Time (and discovery) will tell whether the Collection can be held responsible for the

undisclosed fees. But the motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(1) is denied.

B. 12(b)(6) Motion

The Collection also moves to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to

state a claim, contending that Brown fails to allege the Collection’s connection to the

hotel or involvement in the hidden-fees practice. Def.’s Mot. at 3–4. For a 12(b)(6)

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dismissal motion, the Court considers only the plaintiff’s allegations and ignores any

evidence that the defendant attaches to its motion (outside of narrow exceptions that

the Collection does not invoke here). See Levenstein v. Salafsky, 164 F.3d 345, 347

(7th Cir. 1998).

In the Amended Complaint, Brown alleges that the Collection operates a port-

folio of boutique hotels across Chicago, and that she reserved a room at the Chicago

Hotel Collection Magnificent Mile Hotel & Suites. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 26. These alle-

gations raise a reasonable inference that the Collection operates the Magnificent Mile

Hotel because the Collection and the hotel are both Chicago-based and share the same

name. Id. ¶¶ 20–21, 26. Brown further alleges that the Collection controls the sys-

tems used to advertise the hotel’s room pricing and to book rooms online through

third parties. Id. ¶ 37–38. Through that system, Brown says that the Collection con-

ceals mandatory fees until check-in. Id. ¶¶ 39, 43–52. These allegations raise a an-

other reasonable inference that the Collection was involved in the hidden-fees prac-

tice at the hotel. Contrary to the Collection’s argument, Brown need not attach a

written contract or booking confirmation that specifically connects the limited-liabil-

ity company to the hotel. See Def.’s Mot. at 3–4; Def.’s Suppl. at 4–5. To survive a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Brown need only plausibly allege that the Collection

was involved in the hidden-fees practice that injured her. And she does.

The motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is thus denied, and this case will

move forward on the merits. The Court acknowledges that the evidence produced by

both parties raises some ambiguity about the relationship between the three

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companies (The Chicago Hotel Collection, LLC; 166 Superior Hotel, LLC; and Mag-

nificent Mile Hotel Management, LLC) and the Magnificent Mile Hotel. In light of

this ambiguity, Brown requests permission to file a second amended complaint nam-

ing the other two companies as defendants. Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 13–14. At this stage,

without prejudging the merits of Brown’s claims, it appears that there is a reasonable

basis to name all three companies as defendants. The Court thus grants Brown leave

to amend, if she wishes to do so. In the meantime, the parties should begin to engage

in prompt discovery, including on the Collection’s relationship to the hotel and the

other two companies. Based on discovery, the Collection may then opt to seek early

permission to move for summary judgment on the ground that it is not a proper de-

fendant.

IV. Conclusion

The motion to dismiss, R. 36, is denied.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang

Honorable Edmond E. Chang

United States District Judge

DATE: September 2, 2026

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