Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

ANGELOS WASHINGTON, )

) Case No. 1:26-cv-107

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Travis R. McDonough

v. )

) Magistrate Judge Christopher H. Steger

CENTURION OF TENNESSEE, LLC, et )

al., )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff Angelos Washington, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of

Correction (“TDOC”) currently incarcerated at the Morgan County Correctional Complex

(“MCCX”), filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tennessee law (Doc. 1), a motion for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 6), a motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 7), a

motion to correct the names of Defendants (Doc. 9), a motion to reenter the motions from his

miscellaneous case into this action (Doc. 10), a motion to effect service of process (Doc. 11), and

a motion for a ruling on his pending motions (Doc. 13). For the reasons set forth below, the

Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis; DENY his motion for

counsel; GRANT his motion to correct names; DENY his motion to reenter motions as moot;

GRANT his motion to effect service of process insofar as it will order the United States

Marshals Service (“USMS”) to serve any process in this action; GRANT his motion for a ruling

on his pending motions; permit certain claims to PROCEED against Centurion of Tennessee,

LLC (“Centurion”) and Defendants Jones, Human, Wyrick, and Hill in their individual

capacities; and DISMISS all remaining claims and Defendants.

I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS

A. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner bringing a civil action may

apply for permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A

review of Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 6) demonstrates that he lacks sufficient financial resources to

pay the filing fee in a lump sum. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this motion (id.)

will be GRANTED.

Plaintiff will be ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s

inmate trust account will be DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 900

Georgia Avenue, Suite 309, Chattanooga, Tennessee, 37402 as an initial partial payment,

whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to

Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in

his inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B). Thereafter, the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account

shall submit twenty percent (20%) of his preceding monthly income (or income credited to his

trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars

($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred and fifty dollars ($350.00) has been paid to the

Clerk. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(2).

The Clerk will be DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the Court’s financial

deputy and the custodian of inmate trust accounts at Plaintiff’s current facility to ensure

compliance with payment of the filing fee.

B. Motion to Appoint Counsel

Plaintiff moves the Court to appoint counsel, maintaining that court-appointed counsel is

necessary given his indigency, physical disability, limited access to legal materials, and the

case’s complexity (Doc. 7).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any

person unable to afford counsel” (emphasis added). However, “[a]ppointment of counsel in a

civil case is not a constitutional right[,]” but a “privilege that is justified only by exceptional

circumstances.” Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F. 2d 601, 605–06 (6th Cir. 1993) (internal citations

omitted). In determining whether “exceptional circumstances” exist, the Court considers “the

complexity of the case and the ability of the plaintiff to represent himself.” Cavin v. Mich. Dep’t

of Corr., 927 F.3d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Lavado, 992 F.2d 601). Like Cavin, this case

does not contain complex legal issues and it appears that Plaintiff has adequately represented

himself. Further, indigency, limited access to legal materials, and unfamiliarity with the law are

conditions common among prisoners, and these do not constitute exceptional circumstances

warranting the appointment of counsel at taxpayer expense. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for

the appointment of counsel (Doc. 7) will be DENIED.

C. Motion to Add Full Names of Defendants

Plaintiff has filed a motion to add the full names of certain Defendants (Doc. 9). The

motion is well taken and will be GRANTED. The Clerk will be DIRECTED to update the

docket to correctly reflect Nurse Deniece as “Deniece Davis”; Nurse Beth as “Bethany Wyrick”;

Nurse Elizabeth as “Elizabeth Byrd”; Nurse Sharp as “Darla Sharp”; and Nurse Amanda as

“Amanda Hill.”

D. Motion to File Motions from Plaintiff’s Miscellaneous Case

Plaintiff’s complaint and initial motions were originally opened in a miscellaneous case,

because Plaintiff did not submit the filing fee or a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See

Washington v. Centurion of Tennessee, LLC, No. 1:26-MC-12. But that case, and documents

filed in it, were transferred to this civil action when Plaintiff submitted his motion to proceed in

forma pauperis. Therefore, this motion (Doc. 10) will be DENIED as moot.

E. Motion to Effect Service of Process

Plaintiff asks the Court to order process to issue and USMS to serve process in this case,

so that service may be timely completed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 11).

Because the Court has permitted Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff’s motion will be

GRANTED insofar as the USMS will be ordered to attempt service of process on Plaintiff’s

behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

F. Motion for a Ruling on Pending Motions

Plaintiff’s motion for the Court to rule on his pending motions (Doc. 13) will be

GRANTED insofar as this Order resolves those requests.

II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT

A. Screening Standard

Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss

any claims that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted,” or “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th

Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals

for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant

statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Thus, to survive an

initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them

to a less stringent standard than lawyer-drafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972). Even so, allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later

establish undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible

claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the

elements of a claim which are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible

claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

To state a claim against any Defendant, Plaintiff must establish that a “person” acting

“under color of” state law deprived him of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations1

A 2001 gunshot wound left Plaintiff partially paralyzed from the waist down and mostly

dependent upon a wheelchair for mobility. (See Doc. 1, at 5.) Plaintiff has “very little

movement” in his legs and has no control over his bladder or bowels, which requires him to use

1 Plaintiff’s attached grievance records form part of the complaint. See Commercial Money Ctr.,

Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[D]ocuments attached to the

pleadings become part of the pleadings[.]”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c))). Thus, the Court

includes the allegations contained in those records in its factual recitation. And, to the extent

these exhibits contradict the complaint, “the exhibit trumps the allegations.” Brown v.

Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 135 F.4th 1022, 1030 (6th Cir. 2025) (citing Kaplan v.

Univ. of Louisville, 10 F.4th 569, 576 (6th Cir. 2021)).

catheters to urinate and adult diapers to contain his bowel movements and cover the bedsore on

his right buttock. (Id. at 5–6.)

Plaintiff entered TDOC custody in 2022, after he was sentenced to 30 years of

incarceration for first-degree murder. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff was initially housed at the Bledsoe

County Correctional Complex2 (“BCCX”) before he was transferred to MCCX on June 4, 2024.

(Id.) Plaintiff “received fair medical treatment” at MCCX until December 4, 2024, “when

things . . . took a turn for the worse.” (Id.)

During breakfast service on the morning of December 4, 2024, Plaintiff asked Warden

Stacey Oakes if he could “go to the old compound clinic” for bedsore wound treatment, noting

that he had a clinic pass form and was already almost three hours behind the original scheduling

time. (Id. at 6–7.) Warden Oakes told Plaintiff that things were “kind of slow this morning and

that if it[’]s not an emergency, you can wait and you’ll be just fine.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff advised

Warden Oakes that if he did not receive “wound[]care treatment in the next [10] minutes, [he

would] file a grievance about it and add this matter to [his] lawsuit.” (Id.) Warden Oakes

replied, “What[’]s your name, pack your shit, I’m moving your ass back across the field to the

triangle.” (Id.) The triangle is “the more dangerous side of the prison.” (Id.) When Plaintiff

began writing down these events, Warden Oakes slapped Plaintiff in the face and slapped the pen

and paper out of Plaintiff’s hand. (Id.) Warden Oakes ordered an officer to escort Plaintiff to

high security, and he falsely charged Plaintiff with creating a disturbance. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a

grievance about the incident and appealed it through the proper channels, but he never received a

final grievance response. (Id.) During his incarceration, at least ten doctors employed by

2 Plaintiff’s medical care at BCCX was the subject of a separate lawsuit, see Washington v.

Centurion of Tennessee, LLC, No. 1:24-CV-284-CEA-MJD.

TDOC’s contract medical provider, Centurion of Tennessee, LLC (“Centurion”), have diagnosed

Plaintiff with paralysis without consulting Plaintiff’s outside medical records. (Id. at 9.)

Plaintiff also has neuropathy, a painful nerve condition, but none of Centurion’s medical

providers have scheduled Plaintiff for an appointment with a spinal cord specialist or neurologist

to verify the disease. (Id. at 10.) On November 19, 2024, Nurse Practitioner (“NP”) Caleigh

Cline prescribed Plaintiff gabapentin, a non-formulary drug designed to treat neuropathy. (Id.)

The medication was approved by Medical Director Dr. Emma Rich and the Offender

Management Office of TDOC. (Id.) On the same date, NP Cline ordered Plaintiff some adult

diapers (i.e., Depends) and catheter supplies. (Id.)

In January 2025, NP Raelan Duncan renewed orders for Plaintiff to receive Depends and

catheter supplies for 6 months. (Id. at 10, 11.) On January 21, 2025, NP Duncan discontinued

Plaintiff’s Depends order without meeting with Plaintiff or advising him why she was

discontinuing the order. (Id. at 11.) “All of the nurses did not know” why NP Duncan

discontinued Plaintiff’s Depends order, but “all of the nurses kept on giving [him] a pack of

briefs every week.” (Id.)

One month later, on February 19, 2025, Dr. Racheal3 Agard and Medical Assistant

(“MA”) Teniesha Dvorak came to Plaintiff’s cell in the high-security unit. (Id.) After Plaintiff

was handcuffed by Correctional Officer (“CO”) Thorton, Dr. Agard conducted a rectal

examination of Plaintiff. (Id. at 11–12.) After determining that Plaintiff could not move his

prostate and had no control over his bladder or bowels, Dr. Agard ordered Plaintiff to receive

adult diapers for 6 months. (Id. at 12.)

3 Plaintiff spells this provider’s name both as “Racheal” (see Doc. 1, at 1) and “Rachael” (see id.

at 11).

Sometime between January 1, 2025, and February 20, 2025, Medical Director Dr. Caleb

Jones approached Plaintiff’s cell and inquired whether Plaintiff would be interested in taking the

medication Pamelor (“nortriptyline”) instead of gabapentin, because gabapentin was “to[o]

expensive.” (Id. at 13, 37.) Plaintiff declined, stating that gabapentin worked “just fine for [his]

nerve pain.” (Id. at 13.) Dr. Jones stated, “We need to try a fucken [sic] cheaper medication!”

(Id.) When Plaintiff asked Dr. Jones not to curse at him, Dr. Jones stated, “I can say what the

fuck I want and talk how I want.” (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance about this incident as soon as

Dr. Jones left Plaintiff’s cell door. (Id.) Cpl. Harris told Plaintiff that the grievance was

forwarded to Heath Services Administrator (“HSA”) Pete Wright, who did not respond to the

grievance. (Id.)

On March 6, 2025, NP April Barton requested Plaintiff receive another 30-day order for

gabapentin, and that request was approved the following day by Dr. Rich. (Id. at 14, 55.) But on

April 2, 2025, NP Barton discontinued the gabapentin “for no apparent reason” and without

notice or substitution. (Id. at 14.) HSA Wright responded to Plaintiff’s grievance about the

discontinuation by noting that Plaintiff was non-complaint with the medication, Dr. Jones and

NP Barton had discussed the possibility of discontinuation with Plaintiff if the behavior

persisted, and that lab test results on March 27, 2025, showed an “almost undetectable” level of

the medication in Plaintiff’s system, which indicated diversion. (Id. at 55.) In an order, NP

Barton wrote that she would “discuss Pamelor/[C]ymbalta[,]” even though Pamelor had

previously been prescribed to Plaintiff and is less effective than gabapentin. (Id. at 14.) NP

Barton wrote an order for Plaintiff to receive Pamelor on April 4, 2025. (Id. at 15, 55.)

On April 16, 2025, Plaintiff’s prescription for Pamelor was discontinued due to its

ineffectiveness and side effects, which NP Barton already knew would be the case. (Id. at 15.)

Dr. Jones had Plaintiff removed from his cell and escorted to the front of the pod on May

9, 2025, for a follow-up visit. (Id. at 16.) There, in front of entire pod, Dr. Jones began

discussing Plaintiff’s medical and “private” issues. (Id.) Plaintiff signed a treatment plan at the

beginning of the meeting, and Dr. Jones asked why Plaintiff needed Depends if he used

catheters. (Id.) Plaintiff explained that he needed the Depends due to bladder leakage and his

inability to control his bowel movements. (Id. at 16–17.) Plaintiff informed Dr. Jones that he

had used both catheters and Depends for the previous 24-year period. (Id. at 17.) Nonetheless,

Dr. Jones told Plaintiff it was too expensive for him to use both Depends and catheters, and that

he did not need both. (Id.) Dr. Jones also stated, “[S]ince you want to file grievances on

me, . . . I’m gonna [sic] perform a test study” to determine whether Plaintiff actually required

catheters, Depends, and a wheelchair. (Id.) Plaintiff tried to refuse the test study, but Dr. Jones

told him he could not refuse and stated his intention to enter an order for Plaintiff to go to the

main clinic’s infirmary. (Id. at 18.) When Plaintiff told Dr. Jones he had the right to refuse the

test study, Dr. Jones threatened to have officers come to Plaintiff’s cell with tasers and use force

to get him to the infirmary. (Id.) Dr. Jones then exited the pod, and Plaintiff was returned to his

cell. (Id.)

At approximately 1:30 to 2:15 p.m. on the afternoon of May 9, 2025, Sgt. Caleb Armes

and Cpl. Evans arrived at Plaintiff’s cell to escort him to the infirmary, but Plaintiff stated, “No, I

refuse.” (Id.) Sgt. Armes told Plaintiff that he would be tased unless he got into his wheelchair

and let them escort him to the infirmary. (Id. at 18, 19.) Plaintiff informed both Sgt. Armes and

Cpl. Evans that the study was a retaliatory act by Dr. Jones, but Plaintiff was nonetheless

compelled to comply out of fear that he would be tased if he continued to refuse. (Id. at 19.)

Plaintiff was then transported to the main clinic infirmary. (Id.)

Upon arriving at the infirmary, Plaintiff was placed in Room 106, and his vital signs were

taken by Nurse Tyler Trout. (Id.) Nurse Trout had Plaintiff transfer himself from the wheelchair

to the bed, and Nurse Trout removed the wheelchair from the room and told Plaintiff that Dr.

Jones had discontinued his wheelchair order. (Id. at 19–20.) Dr. Jones then entered Plaintiff’s

room and told Plaintiff that he was discontinuing the wheelchair to see how well Plaintiff could

walk without it, and that he was discontinuing Plaintiff’s Depends and catheter orders to assess

Plaintiff’s bladder control. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff told Dr. Jones he could not urinate without a

catheter, that his bladder otherwise leaks, and that he could not “walk that good [sic] due to”

weakness in his legs, osteoarthritis in his right knee, an “expired” knee replacement in his left

knee. (Id.) Dr. Jones told Plaintiff he would be fine and left the room. (Id. at 20–21.) Dr. Jones

wrote an order for the on-shift nurses to assess Plaintiff for bladder distension every 6 hours and

to notify Dr. Jones if there was concern for bladder distension. (Id. at 21.) Dr. Jones

discontinued Plaintiff’s catheter orders and told all nurses not to provide Plaintiff with Depends

or his wheelchair. (Id.)

At around 3:45 p.m., Plaintiff realized his bladder was getting full, so he pressed the call

button in his room to alert the nurse’s station. (Id.) Nurse Tyler responded to Plaintiff’s room at

3:57 p.m., and Plaintiff told him he needed a catheter to urinate. (Id.) Nurse Tyler told him the

catheter order had been discontinued and to try to urinate on his own. (Id.) When Plaintiff told

Nurse Tyler that he could not urinate without a catheter, Nurse Tyler advised him that “there’s

nothing he can do without an order.” (Id. at 21–22.) At 5:02 p.m., Plaintiff told Nurse Tyler that

his bladder was painfully full and that he needed a catheter. (Id. at 22.) Nurse Tyler denied his

request. (Id.) Plaintiff pressed the call button again at 5:48 p.m. and requested a new Depends,

as the one he was wearing was soiled from leaked urine. (Id.) Nurse Tyler again denied

Plaintiff’s request based on Dr. Jones’ instructions to the nurses. (Id.) He also denied Plaintiff’s

request for his wheelchair for the same reason. (Id.)

At 7:30 p.m. on May 9, 2025, Nurse Brad came to Plaintiff’s cell door and asked Plaintiff

if he needed anything. (Id. at 24.) Plaintiff told Nurse Brad that his bladder was full, that he

only had one kidney, and that he would have kidney failure if he did not empty his bladder soon.

(Id.) Nurse Brad stated he would need to contact the on-call physician and obtain an emergency

order. (Id. at 24.) Nurse Brad subsequently told Plaintiff that Dr. Jones ordered Nurse Brad to

examine Plaintiff to see how full his bladder was. (Id. at 24–25.) Dr. Jones purportedly told

Nurse Brad that if Plaintiff’s bladder felt “like a water balloon, then go ahead and give [Plaintiff]

a catheter and a urinal” and record the output. (Id. at 25.) After Nurse Brad examined Plaintiff

and discovered his bladder extremely full, he issued Plaintiff a catheter and urinal. (Id.) Plaintiff

“put out over 1,000 cc[]s of urine[,] which is about 50–60 ounces.” (Id.) Plaintiff then asked for

a Depends, because the one Plaintiff was wearing was leaking from the sides. (Id.) Nurse Brad,

without obtaining an order, “went and got a large adult [D]epend[s] and gave it to” Plaintiff.

(Id.)

Plaintiff remained in the clinic’s infirmary for approximately 2 weeks. (Id.) He was

issued one catheter every six to eight hours and one large Depends every 6 to 8 hours, as needed.

(Id.) But Plaintiff was denied his wheelchair for 2 weeks “out of staff retaliation.” (Id. at 25–

26.)

On May 23, 2025, Dr. Jones wrote an order for Plaintiff to be discharged back into

“security’s custody[,]” to continue an order for Plaintiff’s catheters as needed; and to discontinue

Plaintiff’s Depends order. (Id. at 26.) He also ordered a neurology consult, nerve conduction

studies, and a “CT monogram.” (Id.) Before he left the infirmary, Plaintiff asked Dr. Jones why

his Depends order was being discontinued, and Dr. Jones informed him that, due to Centurion’s

“budget cut[s] to reduce the amount of money being spent on inmates[’] medical needs[,]” it was

too expensive to keep Plaintiff on both Depends and catheters. (Id.) Plaintiff pushed his

wheelchair to intake to receive his property. (Id.) Plaintiff was “still able to take two packs of

adult [D]epends and a box of 30 catheters with [him] to general population.” (Id.)

Plaintiff wrote a grievance against Dr. Jones about the test-study observation period, and

he requested a response from Grievance Officer Cpl. Delk. (Id. at 27–28.) Eight days later, he

completed the third step of the grievance process but never heard a response. (Id. at 28.) Cpl.

Delk “never checks the grievance boxes in the units.” (Id.)

On June 18, 2025, Plaintiff noticed he only had four Depends left. (Id. at 29.) Plaintiff

sent a request to NP Duncan for a renewed order for Depends and the results of his HIV and

Hep-C tests. (Id.) On June 24 or 25, 2025, NP Duncan, NP Carrie White, and MA Dvorak came

to Plaintiff’s unit for a follow-up appointment. (Id.) Sgt. Scott Brisk retrieved Plaintiff from his

cell and pushed Plaintiff in his wheelchair to see NPs Duncan and White “for the same

complaint.” (Id. at 29–30.) NP Duncan told Plaintiff that he had tested negative for both HIV

and Hep-C and inquired whether Plaintiff had any questions. (Id. at 30.) When Plaintiff

requested additional Depends and told NPs Duncan and White he “was completely out” of

Depends, NP Duncan stated she would not order any Depends because Plaintiff was using

catheters. (Id.) NP White then informed Plaintiff that Dr. Jones did not want Plaintiff using both

Depends and catheters due to the cost, and that he could “only have one or the other.” (Id.)

Plaintiff cursed at both of them and was escorted to high security for assault on staff. (Id.)

Once Plaintiff arrived at high security, he filed a grievance on NPs Duncan and White.

(Id. at 31.) Plaintiff exhausted the process, even though he never heard anything back from the

grievance department. (Id.)

Between 7:00 and 8:50 p.m. on the same day, Plaintiff requested a Depends from Nurse

Deniece, who stated, “I’m not giving you anything because you spitted [sic] on my fellow staff

member Provider Duncan.” (Id.) Plaintiff removed the Depends he was wearing, because he

had a bowel movement. (Id. at 31–32.) He also did not have any catheters, because they had

been taken by Lt. Carl Gaskin when Plaintiff was put into a room in intake. (Id. at 32.) Once

Plaintiff was in the intake room, Lt. Gaskin and Cpl. Carol allowed Dr. Jones to remove a brown,

poisonous spider from a small black container he retrieved from his pocket and throw it on

Plaintiff’s left shoulder. (Id.)

At 9:55 p.m. on June 24, 2025, Cpl. Payne came to Plaintiff’s cell in high security with

catheters sent by Nurse Josey, who had heard about the incident between Plaintiff and NP

Duncan. (Id.) Plaintiff asked Cpl. Payne to ask Nurse Josey for some Depends. (Id.) Cpl.

Payne left and returned at 10:20 p.m. (Id.) Cpl. Payne reported that Nurse Josey could not give

Plaintiff a Depends because he did not have an order for them. (Id. at 32–33.)

Between 7:00 and 9:00 a.m. on June 25, 2025, Nurse Rhaylan Bowlin gave Plaintiff

medications in his cell, and Plaintiff asked her if she could bring Plaintiff back some Depends,

because his bladder had leaked all over his bed sheets and blanket. (Id. at 33.) Nurse Bowlin

stated she would not return to the unit unless it was a medical emergency and walked away. (Id.)

That night, between 7:00 and 8:45 p.m., Nurse Amanda was passing medications when

Plaintiff asked her to bring him some Depends and catheters. (Id.) Nurse Amanda responded,

“Screw you” and walked away. (Id.) At this point, Plaintiff was forced to put a bath towel

around his penis and buttocks. (Id.)

During the morning medication pass on June 26, 2026, Plaintiff asked Nurse Beth to

provide him with catheters and Depends, showing her that he was wearing a bath towel as a

makeshift diaper. (Id. at 34.) He also told her he was having to reuse the same catheter. (Id.)

Nurse Beth stated she would not return to the unit absent a medical emergency, but that she

would “tell the charge nurse.” (Id.) At the night shift medication pass that evening, Plaintiff

made a similar request of Nurse Kristy, who stated she was not returning to the pod but would

tell “them” to bring Plaintiff’s catheters in the morning. (Id.) By this time, Plaintiff was wearing

a plastic bag underneath his towel to stop urine from leaking on his wheelchair seat and pants.

(Id.)

At morning medication pass the following day, June 27, 2025, Nurse Beth gave Plaintiff

a box of 30 catheters. (Id.) When Plaintiff requested a Depends, Nurse Beth told Plaintiff that

she was not coming back to the unit because she was tired and her knees were hurting, but that

she would “tell the night nurse.” (Id. at 35.) Plaintiff mailed a grievance on Nurses Beth, Kristy,

Amanda, “and all of the other nurses.” (Id.) Plaintiff pursued the grievance through the third

step but has not heard anything in response to his grievance. (Id.) But the grievance box in the

unit only gets checked once every two to three weeks. (Id.)

On June 28, 2025, Plaintiff requested a Depends from Nurse Elizabeth, who stated she

could not provide Plaintiff one without an order. (Id.) On July 1, 2025, Plaintiff mailed letters to

HSA Wright and Dr. Jones requesting an order for Depends, but he did not hear back from either

of them. (Id.) On July 3, 2025, Plaintiff placed a sick call to Nurse Jesse about needing

Depends, and although Nurse Jesse stated she would “try and bring some back,” she never did.

(Id. at 35–36.)

On July 4, 2025, Nurse Whitney gave Plaintiff his morning medications and asked what

the nurses had been doing to treat Plaintiff’s bedsore. (Id. at 36.) When Plaintiff informed her

that he had not received wound care in two weeks, Nurse Whitney said she would look at the

orders and be back at noon. (Id.) At 12:35 p.m., Nurse Whitney came to Plaintiff’s cell, stated

she did not feel like coming into Plaintiff’s cell to perform wound care, and provided Plaintiff

with “mediplex dressing” to place on the wound. (Id.) She did not provide Plaintiff anything

with which to clean the wound. (Id.)

On July 10, 2025, Plaintiff placed a sick call request with Nurse Bowlin for antibiotics,

because his “bladder, bedsore, and whole body” had developed a methicillin-resistant

Staphylococcus aureus (“MRSA”) infection. (Id.)

Plaintiff received new catheters on July 10, 2025. (Id.) At 7:45 a.m. on July 11, 2025,

Plaintiff told Nurse Beth that he “had a large MRSA infection knot under [his] left arm pit that

came from wearing the same bath towel for almost 3 weeks” because of medical providers’

failure to order him Depends. (Id. at 36–37.) Between July 12 and 30, 2025, NP Cline examined

Plaintiff’s MRSA knot in front of the pod. (Id. at 37.) She diagnosed Plaintiff with an MRSA

infection and ordered Plaintiff a seven-day course of antibiotics. (Id.). Plaintiff informed NP

Cline that the infection was caused by wearing a towel and a plastic bag for weeks, which caused

a build-up of bacteria, but NP Cline stated she would not order Plaintiff Depends because of Dr.

Jones’ instructions. (Id.)

Sometime between 10:00 and 10:45 a.m. on August 9, 2025, Sgt. Paul Pappas came to

Plaintiff’s cell and asked him if he wished to attend a telehealth appointment in the medical

clinic. (Id. at 67–68.) Plaintiff stated he did, and Sgt. Pappas told Plaintiff he would return in

ten minutes to escort him to the clinic. (Id. at 68.) At 11:00, Cpl. Allen came to escort Plaintiff

to the clinic, and Plaintiff stated he needed a Depends due to leakage. (Id.) Cpl. Allen

dispatched Sgt. Pappas about the request and stated he would check with medical. (Id.) He left

and returned approximately ten minutes later with a refusal form. (Id.) Since Plaintiff was not

refusing the appointment, he declined to sign the form. (Id.) At 11:47 a.m., Cpl. Allen again

approached Plaintiff’s cell and asked whether Plaintiff wanted to move to general population, to

which Plaintiff responded, “Yes, but I need an adult [D]epend[s] from medical” and new pants,

because both his Depends and pants were soiled with urine. (Id.) Cpl. Allen stated he would see

what he could do but returned at 12:15 p.m. with a disciplinary write up for refusing a cell

assignment (“RCA”). (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance about the issue, to which HSA Wright

responded. (Id. at 70.) HSA Wright responded that: (1) Plaintiff does not have a supporting

diagnosis for Depends to be ordered; (2) a provider’s diagnosis is not grievable; (3) Plaintiff does

not have a diagnosis of paralysis; (4) Plaintiff “has been observed and noted in his chart as able

to ambulate”; and (4) Plaintiff “refused the CT to determine any degree of injury and has refused

physical therapy to help rebuild strength.” (Id.)

On September 16, 2025, Plaintiff received a chronic-care visit in the medical triage room.

(Id. at 77–78.) Plaintiff “was being seen” by NP White, Dr. Jones, MA Dvorak, and Nurse

Assistant (“NA”) Christia Dickerson. (Id. at 78.) Plaintiff maintains that during this visit, he

became afraid for his life and “assaulted” NA Dickerson. (Id.) Plaintiff was pulled out of the

room and the door shut behind him, “for the safety of them both.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that

while he was waiting in his wheelchair for the door to be opened so that CO Huffman could push

Plaintiff back to his cell, Dr. Jones rushed out and pushed Plaintiff in the face, even though

Plaintiff was restrained and sitting in his wheelchair at the time. (Id.)

Dr. Jones responded to Plaintiff’s grievance about the incident. (Id. at 75.) Dr. Jones

stated that when Plaintiff arrived to the clinic, he was asked to step on the scale. (Id.) Plaintiff

stated, “I am paralyzed. I can’t stand up[,]” to which NA Dickerson replied, “We have all seen

you walking.” (Id.) Dr. Jones noted that Plaintiff had “been observed during a previous

infirmary admission standing up, ambulating freely around his room as well as dragging his

furniture around his room.” (Id.) At the end of the visit, Plaintiff purportedly stated, “I got

something coming for you and that bitch Raelan” and spit on NA Dickerson. (Id.) Plaintiff

rolled himself out of the clinic, and Dr. Jones “jumped up and confronted [Plaintiff] about

assaulting CNA Dickerson by spitting on her.” (Id.) Plaintiff attempted to spit on Dr. Jones and

grabbed Dr. Jones by the collar of his shirt and attempted to pull Dr. Jones toward himself. (Id.)

Plaintiff was handcuffed in the wheelchair at the time, so Dr. Jones braced himself on the armrest

of the wheelchair to avoid falling onto Plaintiff. (Id.) COs “Deluca and Hoffman were present

and helped de-escalate the situation.” (Id.) Dr. Jones’ shirt was “pried free of [Plaintiff’s] grip[,]

and [Plaintiff] was returned to his cell.” (Id.)

Dr. Jones reported that neither NA Dickerson nor any other medical staff was ever

threatening toward Plaintiff, and he was never shoved in the face while Dr. Jones was present.

(Id.) Dr. Jones was informed that Plaintiff had refused to make a statement to Internal Affairs

(“IA”) regarding the incident. (Id.) Dr. Jones also recorded that Plaintiff “has an extensive

history of assault and offence against medical staff.” (Id.) Dr. Jones noted it was the third

incident of Plaintiff spitting on medical staff during his tenure, and that since Plaintiff was

“known to be a carrier of a highly infectious disease[,]” his spitting attempts should be

considered assault. (Id.) He also noted that since Plaintiff has accessed his medical records on

many occasions, he has knowledge of his diagnosed infectious disease and has made an “obvious

attempt to transmit infection.” (Id.)

IA investigated the incident and determined that Plaintiff assaulted NA Dickerson. (Id.)

On November 13, 2025, HSA Wright noted that Plaintiff “continues to be combative and

aggressive toward providers and staff when he does not receive the desired results from his

complaints despite relevant clinic data.” (Id.)

At 6:12 a.m. on October 9, 2025, Officer A. Delvin approached Plaintiff’s cell and asked

whether he was “ready to go to special needs for an outside appointment.” (Id. at 37.) Officer

Delvin did not know the reason for the appointment. (Id. at 38.) Plaintiff stated he wanted to go

but realized that he did not have any towels to use as a Depends, and he “needed emergency

assistance because the towel that [he] had on was completely covered in urine” and had a strong,

foul odor. (Id. at 38.) Plaintiff asked Officer Delvin if he would call medical and inform them

that Plaintiff was having a medical emergency and needed a Depends so that he could get to his

appointment. (Id.) Officer Delvin stated, “You don’t look like you’re having a[n] emergency,

but I’ll call medical and see if someone could come and talk to you.” (Id.) Officer Delvin came

to Plaintiff’s cell at 6:48 a.m. and stated that someone would be by to speak to Plaintiff “shortly.”

(Id.)

At 7:30 a.m., Officer Delvin and Nurse Whitney came to Plaintiff’s cell and administered

Plaintiff’s morning medications. (Id.) Nurse Whitney told Plaintiff “that the appointment at

special needs was for a test study and a CT monogram scan of [his] spine[,]” but that Dr. Jones

told transportation to “refuse [Plaintiff] and go without [him], all because [Plaintiff] needed an

adult [D]epend[s] to put on” for the appointment. (Id. at 38–39.) Nurse Whitney told Plaintiff

he would be charged with a $10 fee for refusing the outside appointment, to which Plaintiff

objected. (Id. at 39.) Plaintiff refused to sign the inmate personal withdrawal for the $10 refusal

fee, so Nurse Whitney signed it, and Officer Delvin witnessed it. (Id.) The fee was paid on

November 4, 2025. (Id.)

Sometime before noon on October 13, 2025, a Medical Consultant Elbert Springs came

to Plaintiff’s cell asking Plaintiff to sign a personal withdrawal trust-fund form for the $10

refusal fee. (Id.) Plaintiff told Mr. Springs that Nurse Whitney had already turned in a

withdrawal form, but Mr. Springs told Plaintiff to sign his form, and that he would ensure the

other form was disposed of if he saw it. (Id. at 39–40.) Mr. Springs also told Plaintiff he should

have gone to his appointment. (Id. at 40.) Plaintiff refused to sign the form, and Mr. Springs put

“refuse to sign” on the form, witnessed it, and submitted it. (Id.) On November 4, 2025, this

$10 was also deducted from Plaintiff’s account, so Plaintiff paid twice for one missed

appointment. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance about the matter on October 14, 2025, but he never

heard anything back from the grievance department. (Id. at 40–41.)

On December 10, 2025, Plaintiff was transferred to Unit 21-C, cell 109. (Id. at 42.)

Plaintiff was without Depends “all this time” and wore a bath towel and a plastic bag in lieu of

Depends. (Id.) The only medical provider who consistently performed her duty and brought

Plaintiff Depends despite him not having an order for them was Nurse Sharp. (Id.) Plaintiff

requested Depends from Nurse Sharp on January 7, 2026, and she gave him a pack of Depends

that evening—the first pack he had received in 7 months. (Id.)

On January 18, 2026, Plaintiff requested Depends from Nurse Sharp after evening

medication pass, and she provided Plaintiff with a pack of Depends that she had stored in the

bottom drawer of the medication cart. (Id. at 43.) She provided Plaintiff Depends again on

February 14, 2026. (Id.) Nurse Sharp approached Plaintiff’s cell on February 27, 2026, and

asked if he needed anything. (Id.) Plaintiff informed Nurse Sharp that he had only one Depends

left and asked if she could bring him some more. (Id.) Nurse Sharp stated that MA Dvorak told

Nurse Sharp not to provide Plaintiff additional Depends because he did not have an order for

them. (Id.)

On March 13, 2026, Plaintiff noticed he had developed another painful MRSA

infection—this time under his right arm pit—because he had to revert to wearing a bath towel

and a plastic bag as a makeshift Depends. (Id. at 44.) Plaintiff would vomit when he ate because

of the infection. (Id.) So, on March 13, 2026, Plaintiff turned in a sick call. (Id.) No one ever

came to assess him. (Id.)

On March 18, 2026, NP Carrie White and NA Christia Dickerson approached Plaintiff’s

cell, and NP White asked to see the MRSA knot Plaintiff had been complaining about to the

nursing staff. (Id.) Plaintiff showed NP White the knot, and NP White said, “Ooh, that looks

awful” and that she would order Plaintiff a 7-day course of antibiotics. (Id.) She inquired

whether Plaintiff had any additional complaints, and Plaintiff said that he needed an order for

Depends. (Id. at 44–45.) Plaintiff informed her that wearing a towel and plastic bag in lieu of

Depends caused him to develop the MRSA infection and sores between his thighs and in his

genital area. (Id. at 45.) NP White stated she could not order Depends because of Dr. Jones’

instructions, but that she would talk to him about it. (Id.)

Because of these events, Plaintiff filed the instant action alleging violations of his civil

rights under § 1983 and Tennessee law against Centurion and 27 individual Defendants in both

their official and individual capacities, seeking monetary damages, the award of costs and

attorney fees, and injunctive relief. (Id. at 1, 3, 49–50.)

C. Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint explicitly raises claims that: (1) Defendants acted with deliberate

indifference to his serious medical needs (see, e.g., id. at 14, 15,16,17, 21, 22–24, 26); (2) Dr.

Jones and staff retaliated against him (id. at 17, 18, 33); (3) Defendants Armes and Evans

threatened him with excessive force (id. at 19); (4) his constitutional right to be free from

involuntary servitude was violated (id. at 28–29); (5) his grievances are met with deliberate

indifference (id. at 35); (6) Defendants’ conduct gives rise to claims of negligence and

intentional infliction of emotional distress under Tennessee law (id. at 27–29, 33, 36, 41, 45);

and (7) Defendants have violated the Tennessee Constitution’s prohibition against “intimidation,

harassment, and abuse” in the “Tennessee state prison system”4 (id. at 28).

However, with liberal construction of Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court also finds that he

has alleged facts implicating: (1) a failure-to-protect claim against Gaskin, Carol, and Dr. Jones

4 Plaintiff cites Tenn. Const. art. 1, § 13 for this claim (Doc. 1, at 28).

(id. at 32); and (2) a due process claim related to the deprivation of funds in his inmate account

(id. at 39–40). The Court addresses Plaintiff’s constitutional claims first.

1. Section 1983 Claims

a. Time Barred Claims

Tennessee’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 28-3-104; Foster v. State, 150 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the one-year

statute of limitations from Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104 in a § 1983 claim). When the statute

begins to run is an issue of federal law. Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510

F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Under federal law, a cause of action accrues,

and the limitations period begins to run, when the injury forming the basis of the claim is

discoverable. See Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing

Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984)).

Plaintiff “filed” this action by submitting it to prison authorities for mailing on April 2,

2026 (Doc. 1, at 79). See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 273 (1988) (finding pro se prisoner’s

notice of appeal filed at moment of delivery to prison authorities for forwarding to district court).

Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning Warden Oakes’ conduct on December 4, 2024; NP

Duncan’s discontinuation of his Depends in January 2025; Dr. Agard’s rectal examination and

subsequent Depends order in February 2025; and Dr. Jones’ cursing at Plaintiff and his attempts

to get Plaintiff to take a medication less expensive than gabapentin are all time-barred. Any

injuries from these events were discoverable at the time they occurred, but they were not asserted

within the one-year limitations deadline. Accordingly, these claims are properly dismissed as

untimely. See In re Royal Manor Mgmt., Inc., 652 F. App’x 330, 339–40 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting

that “courts have no authority” to modify “statute-of-limitations deadlines”). And as these

claims form the only factual basis of Plaintiff’s claims against Warden Oakes5 and/or Dr. Agard,

they will be DISMISSED from this action.

b. Threat of Force

Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Armes and Cpl. Evans threatened to tase Plaintiff unless he

complied with Sgt. Armes and Cpl. Evans’ orders to move to the infirmary for Dr. Jones’ test

study. (See Doc. 1, at 18, 19.) Had they carried out their threat, Plaintiff maintains, their

conduct would have constituted excessive force. (See id. at 19.) However, the threat of force is

not the equivalent to an actionable use of force. See, e.g., Mattingly v. Barnes, No. 3:14-CV-

591-J-32JBT, 2018 WL 1496929, at *14 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Mattingly v.

Duval Cnty. Jail, 777 F. App’x 971 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting “Plaintiff’s allegation that

Defendant Khan threatened to ‘taze’ him” failed to state a claim, as “verbal threats and

harassment are generally not actionable under § 1983”); Hamilton for J.H. v. Fort Wayne, No.

16-cv-132, 2017 WL 5467038, *8 (N.D. Ind. 2017) (“The Court finds that a verbal warning

about a particular use of force that never transpires is not the same as actually using the force.”);

see also Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he action of a police officer in

pointing a gun at a person is not, in and of itself, actionable[.]”). And the Sixth Circuit “has

never found that pointing a taser, as opposed to actually discharging one, constitutes the use of

excessive force.” Evans v. Plummer, 687 F. App’x 434, 442 (6th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, any

claims against Defendants Armes and Evans related to their alleged threatened use of force will

be DISMISSED.

5 Insofar as Plaintiff seeks hold Warden Oakes liable for subsequent events merely because, as

Warden, he is in charge and responsible for his subordinates, such claims are impermissible in a

§ 1983 action. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[O]ur precedents establish . . . that Government

officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a

theory of respondeat superior.”).

c. Failure to Protect/Exposure to Harm

Plaintiff contends that in June 2025, Lt. Carl Gaskin and Cpl. Carol “st[oo]d[] by

watching” Dr. Jones remove a poisonous spider from a container in his pocket and throw it on

Plaintiff’s shoulder. (Doc. 1, at 32.) The Court finds this claim rises “to the level of the

irrational or the wholly incredible” and thus is factually frivolous. Denton v. Hernandez, 504

U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992); see also Huey v. Raymond, 53 F. App’x 329, 330–31 (6th Cir. 2002)

(dismissing as frivolous and finding plaintiff’s claim that he was being poisoned “undoubtedly”

presents a claim that is clearly baseless and “may be fairly described as fanciful, fantastic,

delusional, wholly incredible, or irrational”); Turner v. Yolo Cnty. Mayor, No. 2:24-CV-2803 DC

AC P, 2025 WL 2799733, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (dismissing as factually frivolous

complaint alleging, in part, that defendants “left poisonous spiders and snakes” at plaintiff’s

home to cause death of family members); McGee v. Warden F/N/U Hayward, No. SA-24-CV-

00035-XR, 2025 WL 625694, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2025) (denying motion for

reconsideration of dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint as frivolous where it “asserted fantastic

or delusional scenarios” of inmates injecting him with substances and “throwing scorpions or

spiders on him” at the Warden’s instructions).

And the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations are not otherwise sufficient to state a plausible

claim. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishment” “places duties”

on prison officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Those duties require officials

to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of” inmates. Id. (quoting Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). But for a failure-to-protect claim to lie against a prison

official, the plaintiff must show that: (1) objectively, he was incarcerated under conditions

posing a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) the official acted with deliberate indifference to

inmate safety, meaning the official was subjectively aware of the risk and fail[ed] to take

reasonable measures to abate it.” Reedy v. West, 988 F.3d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 2021) (citations and

quotations omitted) (alteration in original).

Here, Plaintiff does not explain how he knows the spider allegedly thrown on him was

poisonous. But more importantly, he does not allege that Defendants Gaskin and/or Carol—or

Dr. Jones, for that matter—knew the spider was poisonous. Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegation that

the spider was poisonous is not entitled to the presumption of truth. See Smith v. Gen. Motors,

LLC, 988 F.3d 873, 885 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding complaints made “on information and belief”

cannot rest on conclusory allegations, but rather, “must set forth a factual basis for such belief”).

Nor does Plaintiff allege that he was injured by the exposure to the spider. That is, he

does not allege facts suggesting that the mere exposure to a spider deprived him of his

constitutional rights. And “[a] § 1983 claim only occurs when the threats or threatened conduct

result in a constitutional deprivation.” Branham v. Grinage, No. 88-1611, 1989 WL 11070, at *1

(6th Cir. Feb. 10, 1989) (citing Macko v. Byron, 760 F.2d 95, 97 (6th Cir. 1985)). Accordingly,

any claims against Defendants Armes, Evans, and/or Jones based on this alleged incident will be

DISMISSED.

d. Property

Plaintiff maintains that Defendants Nurse Whitney and Elbert Springs each charged him a

$10 medical fee for the same refused medical visit, which is both an “excessive fee and a

violation of [TDOC] [p]olicy.” (Doc. 1, at 39–40.) But these Defendants’ alleged failure to

follow TDOC policy does not give rise to a constitutional claim, as TDOC’s policies and

procedures do not create constitutionally protected interests. See McVeigh v. Bartlett, No. 94-

23347, 1995 WL 236687, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 21, 1995) (holding failure to follow policy

directive does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because policy directive does not

create a protectible liberty interest); see also Stanley v. Vining, 602 F. 3d 767, 769 (6th Cir.

2010) (“It has long been established that the violation of a state statute or regulation is

insufficient alone to make a claim cognizable under § 1983.”).

Neither can Plaintiff sustain a § 1983 claim because his property interest in his inmate

account was infringed by the alleged double billing. The United States Supreme Court has held

that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when a government

employee deprives an individual of property, provided that the state provides a post-deprivation

remedy. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (extending

Parratt’s holding to intentional deprivations of property). Tennessee law provides for the

recovery of personal property. See McQuiston v. Ward, No. 2001-201-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL

839037, at * 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 2001) (citing to Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-30-101 and

§ 29-30-201). Plaintiff has not pled that Tennessee’s procedures are inadequate for addressing

the alleged wrong, as is necessary to sustain his § 1983 claim. See Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d

1062, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for the deprivation of property

against Defendants Whitney and Springs will be DISMISSED.

e. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Jones performed a retaliatory “test study” on Plaintiff in May

2025, whereby he took Plaintiff’s catheters, adult diapers, and wheelchair because Plaintiff filed

grievances on Dr. Jones in January–February 2025 (see Doc. 1, at 17), and he was denied his

wheelchair for two weeks by Dr. Jones and the nursing staff “out of staff retaliation” (see id. at

25). Plaintiff also claims that he was denied adult diapers out of “staff retaliation.” (Id. at 31,

33.)

A retaliation claim requires a plaintiff to show three things: (1) he “engaged in protected

conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against [him] that would deter a person of ordinary

firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between

elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff’s

protected conduct.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). “[C]onclusory

allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to

state . . . a claim under § 1983.’” Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (6th Cir. 1987)).

An inmate has a right to file non-frivolous grievances on his own behalf. See Herron v.

Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Jones stated he

intended to subject Plaintiff to a study where he would be stripped of purportedly medically

necessary supplies because Plaintiff filed an allegedly non-frivolous grievance against Dr. Jones.

At this stage of the proceedings, the Court does not find that this allegation is “frivolous or

malicious” or that it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim will PROCEED against Dr. Jones in his individual capacity.

Because Plaintiff has not alleged, however, that Dr. Jones’s actions were taken pursuant to or in

furtherance of a custom or policy of Centurion, any claim against Dr. Jones for retaliation in his

official capacity will be DISMISSED. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)

(holding “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit

against the entity”); Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011)

(holding plaintiff must allege “a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving

force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not set forth any facts to support his remaining

allegations of “staff retaliation,” and his subjective belief that he has been retaliated against is

insufficient to state a claim. Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997); see also

Cantley v. Armstrong, 391 F. App’x 505, 507 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s holding

that a prisoner’s complaint was insufficient to demonstrate a causal relationship between

protected activity and adverse action because “‘bare allegations of malice on the defendants’

parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims’ that will survive § 1915A screening”

(quoting Lewis v. Jarvie, 20 F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001))). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

remaining retaliation claims will be DISMISSED as conclusory. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.”); Quisenberry v. Valentine, No. 3:23-CV-P393-JHM, 2024 WL

1261911, at *2, 5 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 25, 2024) (holding that the plaintiff’s assertion that a

defendant housed a dangerous inmate near him “because I filed grievance” was conclusory and

therefore did not state a plausible § 1983 retaliation claim).

f. Grievances

Plaintiff alleges that the non-response to his grievances and the failure to regularly check

the grievance box in Unit 26-D “is deliberate indifference.” (Doc. 1, at 35.) However, inmates

have no constitutional right to a grievance procedure. Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430

(6th Cir. 2003) (providing that a prisoner has “no inherent constitutional right to an effective

prison grievance procedure”); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir.

2005) (“All circuits to consider this issue have . . . found that there is no constitutionally

protected due process right to unfettered access to prison grievance procedures.”). Thus, inmates

have no attendant interest in having their grievances addressed or resolved. See LaFlame v.

Montgomery Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 3 F. App’x 346, 348 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding jail staff’s

disregard of grievances did not state a § 1983 claim “because there is no inherent constitutional

right to an effective prison grievance procedure”) (citing Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422,

1430 (7th Cir. 1996))). Therefore, Plaintiff’s grievance-related claims fail to state a § 1983 claim

and will be DISMISSED.

g. Thirteenth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that, by denying him medical supplies to address his serious medical

needs, Defendants’ conduct violates his Thirteenth Amendment “right to be free from

involuntary servitude.” (Doc. 1, at 28–29.) The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, “except as a punishment for crime

whereof the party shall have been duly convicted[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. Plaintiff

does not allege any facts suggesting that he is subjected to involuntary servitude. Therefore, this

conclusory claim will be DISMISSED.

h. Medical Care

The cornerstone of Plaintiff’s complaint is that he has been denied constitutionally

adequate medical care. (See generally Doc. 1.) The Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual

punishments” clause, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Robinson

v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962), requires the government “to provide medical care

for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).

This does not require a prisoner “unqualified access to healthcare.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Instead, it proscribes acts or omissions that produce an “unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).

An Eighth Amendment claim for the denial of adequate medical treatment is composed

of two parts: (1) an objective component, which requires a plaintiff to show a “sufficiently

serious” medical need; and (2) a subjective component, which requires the plaintiff to show the

defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to that need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

834, 842 (1994). The subjective component is met when officials know “of the facts that show

the serious medical need” and they “personally conclude that this need exists.” Phillips v.

Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2021). Under this standard, officials do not act with

deliberate indifference when they reasonably respond to a serious medical need after they learn

of it, even if the harm is not ultimately adverted. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. “In fact, a response

does not exhibit deliberate indifference unless it reaches a culpability level higher ‘than ordinary

negligence.’” Pearson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 170 F.4th 1027, 1037 (6th Cir. 2026) (citing

Campbell v. Riahi, 109 F.4th 854, 860 (6th Cir. 2024)).

Accordingly, a prisoner cannot state a claim of deliberate indifference by suggesting that

he was misdiagnosed or not treated in a manner he desired. Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151,

154-55 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding provider possibly negligent but not deliberately indifferent when

unaware of prisoner’s serious heart condition); Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL

160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997) (finding “misdiagnoses, negligence, and malpractice” are

not “tantamount to deliberate indifference”). “Medical malpractice does not become a

constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06.

In his complaint, Plaintiff lodges § 1983 medical-care claims against Centurion, and all

individual TDOC and Centurion Defendants in both their official and individual capacities (see

Doc. 1, at 3). The Court addresses the official-capacity claims first.

i) Official-Capacity Claims

Plaintiff seeks to hold all Defendants liable in their official capacities as employees of

Centurion or TDOC. (See Doc. 1, at 3.) By seeking relief against any individual Defendant in

his/her official capacity, Plaintiff is actually seeking suit against the entity “of which an officer is

an agent.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (“[O]fficial-capacity

suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

officer is an agent.”); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (holding “an

official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”).

A. TDOC Defendants

Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 claim against any of the TDOC Defendants in their

official capacities. TDOC is an arm of the State of Tennessee. See Hix v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corrs.,

196 F. App’x 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding TDOC is equivalent of the “State”). And “a state

is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

64 (1989).

Also, the Eleventh Amendment typically “bars all suits, whether for injunctive,

declaratory or monetary relief, against the state and its departments.” Thiokol Corp. v. Mich.

Dep’t of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100–01 (1984)). Because there has not been congressional abrogation

or waiver of immunity, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities are

otherwise barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345

(1979) (finding § 1983 does not waive state sovereign immunity); Berndt v. State of Tennessee,

796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding Tennessee has not waived immunity to suit under

§ 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot maintain an official-capacity suit against any of the TDOC

Defendants, and all official- capacity claims against the individually named TDOC Defendants

will be DISMISSED.6

B. Centurion & Centurion Employees

As noted above, suit against the medical-provider employees in their official capacities is

suit against Centurion itself. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. But

Centurion cannot be subject to § 1983 liability merely because it has employed someone who

violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (noting § 1983 does not

permit liability on a “respondeat superior theory”). Rather, to maintain a claim against

Centurion, Plaintiff must identify a policy or custom of the entity and show that his particular

injury was incurred due to the execution of that policy. See Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t,

8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Braswell v.

Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding plaintiff must allege “a

policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving force’ behind the alleged

deprivation” of his rights).

6 The Ex Parte Young doctrine allows a prisoner to obtain relief from an ongoing violation of

federal law from a state official sued in his or her official capacity. See Ex Parte Young, 209

U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). To determine if the exception is applicable, courts “need only conduct

a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal

law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 412

(6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Dubuc v. Mich. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 342 F.3d 610, 616 (6th Cir. 2003)).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege an ongoing violation of federal law by any TDOC employee, and

thus, his claims do not fall within the Ex Parte Young exception.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that although he needs both diapers and catheters, he was only

permitted orders for one of the items in order for Centurion to reduce expenses and cut costs.

(Doc. 1, at 17, 26.) Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has arguably stated a non-frivolous

claim against Centurion for the denial of constitutionally adequate medical care, and this claim

will PROCEED. But insofar as Plaintiff has sued the individual Centurion employee

Defendants in their official capacities, all such claims will be DISMISSED as redundant to the

claims against Centurion itself. See Jackson v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, No. 07-6356, 2008 WL

4915434, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2008) (affirming dismissal of redundant official-capacity

claims).

ii) Individual-Capacity Claims

To state a claim against any named Defendant in his or her respective individual capacity,

Plaintiff must adequately plead that the Defendant, through his or her own actions, has violated

the Constitution. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; see also Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764

(6th Cir. 2002) (providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally

involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted). The Court addresses Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims topically, rather than

Defendant by Defendant.

A. Gabapentin

Plaintiff complains that NP Barton discontinued his gabapentin prescription in April 2025

and placed him on an alternative, Pamelor (i.e. nortriptyline) that she already knew would be

ineffective. (See Doc. 1, at 14–15.) But the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s complaint

demonstrate that Plaintiff’s gabapentin, a controlled substance7, was discontinued only after

Plaintiff’s noncompliance with and suspected diversion of the medication. (Id. at 55.) NP

Barton’s substitution of another (even if allegedly less effective) medication considering these

circumstances is not deliberate indifference. Instead, the substitution was a reasonable response

to Plaintiff’s medical needs while taking into account his noncompliance and suspected misuse

of the controlled medication. Therefore, any medical-care claims based on the denial of the

prescription gabapentin will be DISMISSED.

B. Wound Care

Plaintiff contends that during medication pass on July 4, 2025, Nurse Whitney asked

Plaintiff how his bedsore had been treated, stated she would consult his chart to review the

orders, and return to his cell. (See id. at 36.) Plaintiff maintains that when she returned, she

stated she did not feel like entering Plaintiff’s cell to perform wound care and provided Plaintiff

with a dressing to place on the wound himself, though she failed to provide him anything with

which to clean the wound. (Id.)

These allegations are insufficient to state a deliberate-indifference claim against Nurse

Whitney related to Plaintiff’s wound care. Plaintiff maintains that Nurse Whitney: (1) initiated

the conversation into whether Plaintiff’s bedsore had been treated while performing medication

pass, (2) stated her intention to consult Plaintiff’s chart, and (3) returned to Plaintiff’s cell with

supplies with which to cover Plaintiff’s wound. And while Plaintiff complains that she did not

provide him “anything” to clean the wound, it is apparent from Plaintiff’s complaint that he was

permitted to keep medical supplies in his cell. He does not allege that he told Nurse Whitney he

7 Gabapentin is a controlled substance in Tennessee. See https://www.drugs.com/medical-

answers/gabapentin-narcotic-controlled-substance-3555993/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2026).

did not have any means to clean his wound, nor does he advance any facts suggesting that Nurse

Whitney knew that Plaintiff did not have any means to clean his wound. Therefore, Plaintiff has

failed to state a claim against Nurse Whitney related to his wound care.

Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to impose liability against any Defendant for the

approximate two weeks he allegedly went without wound care, he fails to name any individual

who denied him wound care. And, as noted above, § 1983 liability lies only for one’s own

involvement in the alleged constitutional wrongdoing. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Accordingly,

Plaintiff has not stated a claim related to the denial of wound care, and this claim will be

DISMISSED.

C. Medical Supplies

Plaintiff maintains that after Dr. Jones decided to perform a “test study” on Plaintiff in

May 2025, he was temporarily deprived of access to his wheelchair and thereafter routinely had

trouble getting consistent access to catheters and adult diapers, despite his partial paralysis and

incontinence. (See, e.g., Doc. 1, at 19–45.) He contends that he developed at least two MRSA

infections because of Defendants’ refusal to provide him supplies to manage his incontinence.

(Id. at 36–37, 44–45.) And he alleges that all Defendants’ refusals originated from Dr. Jones’

orders discontinuing Plaintiff’s orders for adult diapers. (Id. at 19–45.) Therefore, the Court

finds Plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous claim of deliberate indifference against Dr. Jones related

to the denial of constitutionally adequate medical treatment, and this claim will PROCEED

against Dr. Jones individually.

The Court also finds that Plaintiff has stated non-frivolous claims of deliberate

indifference against Nurses Amanda, Beth, and Kristy, as he alleges that each of these

Defendants denied (at least temporarily) his requests for catheters, despite Dr. Jones entering

orders for Plaintiff to be provided catheters as needed. This claim will PROCEED against

Defendants Nurses Amanda, Beth, and Kristy in their individual capacities.

Plaintiff cannot, however, state a plausible deliberate-indifference claim against Nurse

Tyler, Nurse Brad, Nurse Deniece, Nurse Bowlin, Nurse Elizabeth, Nurse Jesse, Nurse Sharp,

and MA Dvorak. Plaintiff alleges that these medical personnel failed to provide him with

Depends upon his request. However, Plaintiff notes throughout his complaint that he did not

have an active order for Depends during the relevant times.8 And the nursing staff cannot be

deemed deliberately indifferent for reasonably following the orders entered by Plaintiff’s

treatment physicians. See Bauer v. Kramer, 424 F. App’x 917, 919 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding

“[a] nurse is not deliberately indifferent when she reasonably follows a doctor’s orders”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims against these Defendants will be

DISMISSED.

Plaintiff also asserts deliberate-indifference claims against NPs Duncan, Cline, and

White, for their failure to renew Plaintiff’s order for Depends. (See Doc. 1, at 29–30, 37.) These

medical Defendants, unlike members of the nursing staff, can enter orders for treatment, albeit

such orders must be in collaboration with a licensed physician.9 But Plaintiff states that NP

Duncan stated she did not believe Plaintiff needed adult diapers since he used catheters, NP

White stated that Dr. Jones did not want the staff to order Plaintiff both catheters and Depends,

and NP Cline also stated that Dr. Jones did not want Depends ordered for Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, at

8 The same is true as to Plaintiff’s allegation that staff denied him a wheelchair for a two-week

period. (Id. at 25–26.) Dr. Jones discontinued Plaintiff’s wheelchair order for that two-week

“test study” period. (Id. at 21, 22.)

9 See American Ass. of Nurse Practitioners, State Policy Fact Sheet: Tennessee,

https://storage.aanp.org/www/documents/no-index/state-fact-sheets/tennessee.pdf (last visited

Aug. 18, 2026).

29–30.) Plaintiff has not alleged facts to suggest that Defendants personally knew that Plaintiff

had a serious medical need for Depends in addition to catheters but withheld treatment in

disregard of that need. And Plaintiff’s allegations otherwise indicate that the NP Defendants’

treatment of Plaintiff was curtailed—not by deliberate withholding of medical supplies—but by

the instructions of their supervising physician, Medical Director Dr. Jones. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims against these Defendants will be DISMISSED.10

Plaintiff has also named HSA Wright as a Defendant, but his only allegations against this

Defendant are that he failed to respond to Plaintiff’s letter, and that he responded to Plaintiff’s

grievances. (See Doc. 1, at 35, 55, 70.) However, Plaintiff cannot maintain a constitutional

claim related to a grievance response, see LaFlame, 3 F. App’x at 348, and § 1983 liability

cannot be based on a failure to act, see Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)

(holding “liability under § 1983 must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be

based upon a mere failure to act”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against Defendant Wright will be DISMISSED.

Plaintiff also implies that TDOC staff met his medical needs with deliberate indifference.

Specifically, he notes that: (1) Officer Delvin sent medical personnel to Plaintiff’s cell to

address Plaintiff’s “emergency” request for Depends so that he could attend his special needs

appointment (see Doc. 1, at 37–38); (2) Sgt. Pappas was involved in the events that resulted in

Plaintiff missing his telehealth appointment because he did not have a Depends (see id. at 67–

68); and (3) Cpl. Allen was also involved in the missed telehealth appointment and stated he

would check with medical concerning Plaintiff’s requests for Depends and new pants but did not

10 The Court notes that NPs Cline and White, on separate occasions, diagnosed Plaintiff with

MRSA and ordered antibiotics to treat the condition. (Id. at 37, 44.)

provide them, instead returning to Plaintiff’s cell’s cell with a disciplinary write up for refusing a

cell assignment (see id.)

However, Plaintiff cannot maintain a § 1983 deliberate-indifference claim against these

officers, because he contends that these Defendants contacted medical following Plaintiff’s

request for Depends. And TDOC personnel are not responsible for whether medical care is

ultimately rendered by medical staff. See Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. County of

Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 384 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding it is not “unconstitutional for

municipalities and their employees ‘to rely on medical judgments made by medical professionals

responsible for prisoner care’”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims against

these Defendants will be DISMISSED.11

2. State-Law Claims

Plaintiff maintains that by ignoring his medical need for catheters, adult diapers, and a

wheelchair, Defendants violated the Tennessee Constitution, as well as Tennessee laws

governing intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and negligence. (See Doc. 1, at

28–29.)

First, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s IIED claim. Under Tennessee law, a plaintiff states

an IIED claim by alleging intentional or reckless conduct by the remaining Defendants “so

outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society” that “resulted in serious mental injury to

the plaintiff.” Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 (Tenn. 2012). But in his

11 Further, to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim against Cpl. Allen for the allegedly

false disciplinary write-up for refusing a cell assignment, such an allegation fails to state a claim.

See Wolff v. McDonnel, 418 U.S. 539, 564–71 (1974) (finding inmates possess no right to be free

from convictions for disciplinary offenses); Person v. Campbell, No. 98–5638, 1999 WL

454819, at *1 (6th Cir. June 21, 1999) (“[T]he filing of false disciplinary charges against an

inmate does not constitute a constitutional violation redressable under § 1983.”).

complaint, Plaintiff alleges only that he has a right to be free from IIED, “which is also hard to

endure and falls also under serious depression.” (Doc. 1, at 28–29), and that Defendants’

conduct “caus[ed] the plaintiff unnecessary emotional and physical pain and suffering” (id. at

47). These are conclusions of injury. And even though Tennessee employs a liberal pleading

standard, a plaintiff is still required “to state the facts upon which a claim for relief is founded.”

Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011). Here,

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that he has endured serious mental injury as a

result of any named Defendants’ allegedly outrageous conduct. Therefore, Plaintiff’s IIED claim

will be DISMISSED.

Second, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for violation of the Tennessee Constitution, as

it provides no private right of action. See, e.g., Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir.

1996); Wooley v. Madison Cnty., 209 F. Supp. 2d 836, 844 (W.D. Tenn. 2002). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s claims for a violation of his rights under the Tennessee Constitution will be

DISMISSED.

This leaves Plaintiff’s negligence claim. Inasmuch as the Court will permit certain

federal claims to proceed against Defendants Centurion, Dr. Jones, and Nurses Human, Wyrick,

and Hill, it will likewise permit Plaintiff’s state-law negligence claim to PROCEED against

these Defendants. Plaintiff has not, however, stated sufficient facts to render it plausible that any

remaining Defendant breached a duty of care owed to Plaintiff that was both the factual and legal

cause of injury to Plaintiff to state a negligence claim under Tennessee law. See Downs ex rel.

Downs v. Bush, 263 S.W.3d 812, 819 (Tenn. 2008). Therefore, Plaintiff’s negligence claim will

be DISMISSED against the remaining Defendants.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 6) is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00;

3. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit the

filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;

4. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel (Doc. 7) is DENIED;

5. Plaintiff’s motion to correct Defendants’ names (Doc. 9) is GRANTED, and the

Clerk is DIRECTED to update the docket to correctly reflect Nurse Deniece as

“Nurse Deniece Davis”; Nurse Beth as “Nurse Bethany Wyrick”; Nurse Elizabeth

as “Nurse Elizabeth Byrd”; Nurse Sharp as “Nurse Darla Sharp”; and Nurse

Amanda as “Nurse Amanda Hill”;

6. Plaintiff’s motion to re-file motions from his miscellaneous case (Doc. 10) is

DENIED as moot;

7. Plaintiff’s motion to effect service of process (Doc. 11) is GRANTED insofar as

the USMS will be directed to effect service in this case;

8. Plaintiff’s motion for a ruling on his pending motions (Doc. 13) is GRANTED by

entry of this Order;

9. The following claims are non-frivolous and will PROCEED: (1) Plaintiff’s

retaliation claim against Dr. Jones; (2) Plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claims

against Centurion, Dr. Jones, and Nurses Amanda Hill, Kristy Human, and

Bethany Wyrick; and (3) Plaintiff’s State-law negligence claims against

Defendants Centurion, Dr. Jones, and Nurses Amanda, Kristy, and Beth;

10. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff service packets (a blank summons and

USM 285 form) for Defendants Centurion, Dr. Jones, Nurse Amanda, Nurse

Kristy, and Nurse Beth;

11. Plaintiff is ORDERED to complete the service packets and return them to the

Clerk’s Office within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order;

12. At that time, the summonses will be signed and sealed by the Clerk and forwarded

to the U.S. Marshal for service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4;

13. Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that if he fails to timely return the completed service

packets, this action will be dismissed;

14. Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within twenty-one

(21) days from the date of service. If any Defendant fails to timely respond to the

complaint, it may result in entry of judgment by default against that Defendant;

15. All other claims and Defendants are hereby DISMISSED;

16. Plaintiff is ORDERED to immediately inform the Court and Defendant or her

counsel of record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule

83.13, it is the duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other

parties to the proceedings of any change in his address, to monitor the progress of

the case, and to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13.

Failure to provide a correct address to this Court within fourteen (14) days of any

change in address may result in the dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Travis R. McDonough

TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE