The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 24-1920T
(Filed: September 1, 2026)
)
MICHAEL GOLDMAN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
THE UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendant. )
Michael Goldman, New York, NY, pro se.
Jacqueline Muallem, United States Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC,
for Defendant. With her on the briefs was Michael Thomas Collins, United States
Department of Justice, Tax Division, Washington, DC.
OPINION AND ORDER
SOLOMSON, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff, Mr. Michael Goldman, seeks a refund of an income tax overpayment for
the 2017 tax year, after the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and the IRS Independent
Office of Appeals (“IRS Appeals”) denied his administrative refund claim. Defendant,
the United States, moves to dismiss Mr. Goldman’s claim pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) for,
respectively, lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. For the reasons explained
below, this Court dismisses Mr. Goldman’s complaint pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. While this Court is sympathetic to Mr. Goldman’s predicament,
this Court is ultimately bound by the statutes Congress has enacted. Here, those laws —
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, and our appellate court, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit — preclude Mr. Goldman’s tax
overpayment claim here as a matter of law.
1
I. FACTUAL, PROCEDURAL, AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 1
In November 2017, Mr. Goldman was diagnosed with major depressive disorder
(“medical condition”). ECF No. 1-3 (“Pl. Ex.”) at 53. 2 With the onset of his medical
condition, Mr. Goldman — who typically managed both his and his wife’s financial
matters — became “severely impaired and was unable to manage” those matters. Id.; see
also ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 3. This impairment lasted until at least February 2022. See
Pl. Ex. at 53.
Prior to and during the 2017 tax year, Mr. Goldman retained an accountant
“responsible for all bookkeeping and the filing of Corporate and Personal Tax Returns
[sic].” Compl. at 3. Despite filing Mr. Goldman’s 2017 corporate tax return (plus various
state and local returns), Mr. Goldman’s accountant failed to file Mr. Goldman and his
wife’s joint 2017 personal income tax return. 3 Id. The prepared, but unfiled, return
included a claim for a refund in the amount of $7,977.00, due to a previous overpayment.
Id.
Sometime in 2023, Mr. Goldman noticed that his 2017 personal income tax return
had never been filed. Compl. at 4. On October 24, 2023, Mr. Goldman late-filed his 2017
personal income tax return, which included a claim for a refund in the amount of
$7,977.00. Id.; see also Pl. Ex. at 40. The IRS, however, denied his refund claim. Id. Mr.
Goldman appealed to IRS Appeals, which ultimately upheld the denial of his claim.
Id. at 46-47, 61.
The central problem with Mr. Goldman’s refund claim — according to the IRS —
was that it was late pursuant to § 6511(b)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). 4
Pl. Ex. at 40, 61. As discussed further below, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A) limits the amount of
refund for a timely-filed administrative claim to the portion of the overpayment, if any,
1 As discussed in further detail below, this Court assumes all of the facts — but not legal
conclusions — alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint (including its attachments) are true for the purpose
of resolving the government’s pending motion to dismiss. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
2 Page number citations are to the ECF-designated page number electronically stamped on the
top of each page of a filed document.
3 All references to Mr. Goldman’s 2017 personal income tax return herein refer to Mr. Goldman’s
and his wife’s joint return.
4 Title 26 of the United States Code is the I.R.C.
2
made within the three years “immediately preceding the filing of the claim[.]” I.R.C.
§ 6511(b)(2)(A). Here, Mr. Goldman’s 2017 income tax was “deemed paid” on April 15,
2018, see I.R.C. § 6513(b)(2) — more than five years before he filed his 2017 refund claim.
On November 20, 2024, Mr. Goldman, proceeding pro se, filed suit for a tax refund
in this Court. See Compl. Mr. Goldman alleges that both the IRS and IRS Appeals
improperly denied his 2017 refund claim. Id. at 5. Specifically, Mr. Goldman contends
that he was “legitimately financially disabled during the period from November 2017
through February 2022.” Id. Thus, Mr. Goldman contends that he is entitled to tolling of
I.R.C. § 6511(b)’s limitation period pursuant to I.R.C. § 6511(h)’s “financial disability”
exception, discussed infra. 5 On February 20, 2025, the government filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) and, in the
alternative, for failure to state a claim, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6). ECF No. 13 (“Def.
Mot.”). On March 21, 2025, Mr. Goldman filed his response in opposition to the
government’s motion. ECF No. 16. The government filed its reply in support of its
motion to dismiss on April 3, 2025. ECF No. 17.
On January 21, 2026, this Court issued an order to show cause, requiring
Mr. Goldman to explain why this Court should not dismiss this case for failure to state a
claim. Goldman v. United States, 2026 WL 183812, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 21, 2026). Specifically,
this Court explained to Mr. Goldman that even setting aside the government’s arguments
for why Mr. Goldman’s claim should be dismissed, “a critical piece of information [was]
missing both from Mr. Goldman’s submission to IRS Appeals — and again to this Court
— pertaining to his financial disability claim.” Id. at *2. Pursuant to this Court’s order,
id. at *6, Mr. Goldman filed his response to the order on March 9, 2026. ECF No. 20 (“Pl.
Supp. Br.”). The government filed its response on March 30, 2026. ECF No. 21.
II. JURISDICTION
A. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Decide Tax Refund Claims
This Court’s jurisdiction is primarily defined by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491,
which grants the Court “jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
5 Mr. Goldman also raised a financial disability claim with IRS Appeals. Pl. Ex. at 61. Mr.
Goldman did not, however, raise a financial disability claim with his initial IRS claim. See id. at 55.
3
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“The jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is defined by the Tucker Act,
which gives the court authority to render judgment on certain monetary claims against
the United States.” (citation omitted)). Thus, the Tucker Act vests this Court with
jurisdiction and waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for “actions
pursuant to contracts with the United States, actions to recover illegal exactions of money
by the United States, and actions brought pursuant to money-mandating statutes,
regulations, executive orders, or constitutional provisions.” Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d
1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Illegal exaction claims involve “money that was ‘improperly paid, exacted, or
taken from the claimant in contravention of the Constitution, a statute, or regulation.’”
Norman, v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp.
v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). To properly plead an illegal exaction
claim, a plaintiff need not point to a money-mandating source of law. Boeing Co. v. United
States, 968 F.3d 1371, 1382-84 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding jurisdiction over a statutory illegal
exaction claim without regard to whether the statute is money-mandating); Perry v.
United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 1, 32 (2020) (“[T]here is no basis to engraft money-mandating
requirements onto illegal exaction claims . . . [A] plaintiff need not identify a money-
mandating provision of law to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction for an illegal exaction
claim.” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 2021 WL 2935075 (Fed. Cir. July 13, 2021). Instead, a
claim must simply allege that “the Government has the citizen’s money in its pocket.”
Eastport, 372 F.2d at 1008 (quoting Clapp v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 505, 512 (1954), cert.
denied). “The classic illegal exaction claim is a tax refund suit alleging that taxes have
been improperly collected or withheld by the government.” Norman, 429 F.3d at 1095
(citation omitted).
The statutory grant of jurisdiction to the district court to decide tax refund claims
confirms our Court’s jurisdiction over such cases. In that regard, Chapter 85 of Title 28
of the United States Code addresses the jurisdiction of the United States district courts.
Within that chapter, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 provides the district courts with “original
jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States Court of Federal Claims” over “[a]ny civil
action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any
manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)
4
(emphasis added). Section 1346 thus reinforces that the Court of Federal Claims has
jurisdiction to decide tax refund suits. See Tonasket v. United States, 590 F.2d 343 (Ct. Cl.
1978) (describing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) as “the District Court analogue, for tax refund
cases, of our jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1491”); S. Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading
Corp. v. United States, 334 F.2d 622, 626 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (explaining that “[t]ax refund suits
are the most common” illegal exaction claims pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(citations omitted)); John Muir Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 221 Ct. Cl. 843, 846 (1979)
(“Where Congress wishes to preserve jurisdiction in the Court of Claims when later
consenting to suits elsewhere, it is careful to say that Court of Claims jurisdiction
survives, as in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (tax refund claims).”); but see Roman v. United States, 61
F.4th 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“In short, § 1346(a)(1) gives the Court of Federal Claims
jurisdiction to hear tax refund cases[.]” (emphasis added)).
B. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Decide Mr. Goldman’s Tax Refund Claim
As an initial matter, Mr. Goldman alleges that the government has his “money in
its pocket,” Eastport, 372 F.2d at 1008; Mr. Goldman alleges that the IRS erroneously
refused to return his 2017 personal income tax overpayment. Compl. at 5. Thus, Mr.
Goldman’s tax refund claim is as an illegal exaction claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1).
Although the Court of Federal Claims generally has jurisdiction to hear and decide
tax refund claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), like Mr. Goldman’s, Congress has
imposed several jurisdictional prerequisites to filing such a suit here via various I.R.C.
provisions. RadioShack, 566 F.3d at 1360 (citing United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining
Co., 553 U.S. 1, 4 (2008)).
First, a plaintiff must have paid any disputed taxes in full prior to bringing a
refund suit for the claimed sum at issue; that rule applies to tax refund suits in this Court
just as it does in district court:
The Claims Court, concurrently with the United States
District Courts, has jurisdiction over suits for the refund of
taxes. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1), 1491 (1988). The
jurisdictional grant, however, has been construed by the
Supreme Court as requiring full payment of the assessed tax
liability before suit can be commenced. In Flora v. United
5
States, 357 U.S. 63, 78 S.Ct. 1079, 2 L.Ed.2d 1165 (1958), aff’d on
reh’g, 362 U.S. 145, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960), a tax
refund suit was initiated in the district court before full
payment of the tax had been made. The Supreme Court held
that Ҥ 1346(a)(1), correctly construed, requires full payment
of the assessment before an income tax refund suit can be
maintained in a Federal District Court.” Flora, 362 U.S. at 177,
80 S.Ct. at 647. The full payment rule of Flora has long been
applied by the Claims Court, and before that by the Court of
Claims, to dismiss tax refund suits against the United States
when the assessment has not been paid in full prior to
commencement of the action.
Rocovich v. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). In other
words, “[t]he Flora full payment rule requires that taxpayers prepay the tax principal
before the Court of Federal Claims will have subject matter jurisdiction over their tax
refund action[.]” Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
In this case, Mr. Goldman fully paid his 2017 personal income tax via estimated
tax payments throughout that year, see Pl. Ex. at 21, prior to initiating his tax refund suit
on November 20, 2024. See Compl. Mr. Goldman thus satisfied the Flora full payment
rule.
Second, I.R.C. § 7422(a) “require[es] a taxpayer to file [an] administrative claim
[with the IRS] before seeking a refund in court.” EC Term of Years Tr. v. United States, 550
U.S. 429, 431 n.2 (2007). I.R.C. § 7422(a), in relevant part, provides:
No suit [] shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of
any internal revenue tax alleged to have been . . . excessive . . .
until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the
Secretary, according to the provisions of law in that regard,
and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance
thereof.
I.R.C. § 7422(a). Accordingly, “[i]n order for a plaintiff’s suit for a refund of federal taxes
to fall within the Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff must meet the
jurisdictional threshold for filing a refund claim under I.R.C. § 7422(a).” Koopmann v.
6
United States, 2022 WL 1073340, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 11, 2022) (citing Clintwood,
553 U.S. at 4). In essence, then, I.R.C. § 7422(a) “limits a taxpayer’s right to bring a refund
suit.” United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 601 (1990).
Third, “[b]ased on this jurisdictional pre-requisite for a refund claim,” the Federal
Circuit “derived the ‘substantial variance’ doctrine[,]” pursuant to which “a taxpayer
may not substantially vary either the factual or the legal basis of any claim for refund in
court from those presented in its administrative claim before the IRS.” W. Co. Of N. Am.
v. United States, 323 F.3d 1024, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United
States, 210 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); see also Devine v. United States, 155 Fed. Cl. 193,
207 (2021) (explaining that the substantial variance doctrine precludes a taxpayer from
“maintain[ing] a refund suit based on factual or legal grounds not raised in the
[administrative] claim for a refund” (emphasis added)) (citing Computervision Corp. v.
United States, 445 F.3d 1355, 1364 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In essence, a suit in this Court
based on different grounds than those previously asserted in an administrative claim to
the IRS is simply a new claim (i.e., where the administrative claim prerequisite has not
been satisfied). 6
Here, Mr. Goldman met these jurisdictional requirements: First, he included an
administrative claim for a refund with his late-filed 2017 personal income tax return.
Compl. at 4; Pl. Ex. at 40. Moreover, the ground for Mr. Goldman’s claimed refund in his
claim before this Court is the same as that set out in his initial administrative refund
claim; Mr. Goldman asserted — and continues to assert — that he is entitled to a refund
due to his pervious overpayment of taxes. Pl. Ex. at 21; Compl. at 5. Indeed, the IRS
conceded that Mr. Goldman overpaid his 2017 income tax but nevertheless denied
Mr. Goldman’s claim solely “because [he] filed [his] return more than 3 years after [his]
most recent payment.” Pl. Ex. at 40. Thus, Mr. Goldman properly submitted an
6 As noted supra, I.R.C. § 7422(a) requires “a taxpayer [to] have timely filed a refund claim in the
manner prescribed by regulation.” Lua v. United States, 843 F.3d 950, 957 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis
added) (discussing § 7422(a)). “The Secretary by regulation requires that claims for refund ‘set
forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise
the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof.’” Computervision, 445 F.3d at 1363 (quoting 26 C.F.R
§ 301.6402–2(b)(1) (2005)). The Federal Circuit has “interpreted this statute and regulation as
stating a ‘substantial variance’ rule that bars taxpayers from bringing new claims or facts not
alleged in the refund application to a court in which suit for refund is sought.” Lua, 843 F.3d at
957 (citing Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1352, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). “The doctrine
benefits the IRS by limiting ‘any subsequent litigation to those grounds that the IRS had an
opportunity to consider and is willing to defend.’” Devine, 155 Fed. Cl. at 207 (quoting Lockheed
Martin, 210 F.3d at 1371).
7
administrative claim for a refund to the IRS and his claim in this Court does not
substantially vary from his administrative claim.
The government attempts to persuade this Court that Mr. Goldman’s tax refund
claim here “substantially varies” from his initial administrative refund claim because, as
noted above, Mr. Goldman did not assert “financial disability” — to avoid limitation
periods — until initiating his IRS appeal. Def. Mot. at 10-12. The government’s argument
is without merit, however, because financial disability does not relate to facts and legal
arguments underlying a putative refund claim and, thus, are irrelevant to questions of
substantial variance. This is evident from the fact that had Mr. Goldman not made a
financial disability claim before the IRS, the government would not have invoked the
substantial variance doctrine at all; rather, a plaintiff cannot raise a financial disability
claim before this Court for the first time given the “form and manner” requirements of
I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A). That section provides that “[a]n individual shall not be considered
[financially disabled] unless proof of the existence thereof is furnished in such form and
manner as the Secretary may require.” I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The
Secretary of the Treasury, via Revenue Procedure 99-21, sets forth the “form and
manner,” I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A), in which a taxpayer must furnish proof of financial
disability to qualify for that exception pursuant to I.R.C. § 6511(h), and thus toll the
limitation “periods” in I.R.C. § 6511. Rev. Proc. 99-21, 1999-1 C.B. 960. Furthermore,
Revenue Procedure 99-21 requires these two statements “be submitted with the
taxpayer’s claim for credit or refund of tax,” id. § 1, and emphasizes that 6511(h)(2)(A)
requires the statements “be furnished to the [IRS,]” id. § 2. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has explained, for example, “[t]he limited waiver of
sovereign immunity in § 6511(h) does not grant [] courts power to decide de novo that a
taxpayer was financially disabled.” Abston v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2012).
The substantial variance doctrine is thus inapposite to a financial disability claim
pursuant to I.R.C. § 6511(h).
Fourth, in addition to the baseline requirement to file an administrative refund
claim, the Supreme Court, in Dalm, held that I.R.C. § 7422(a) encompasses a jurisdictional
requirement for a plaintiff to have filed a timely administrative refund claim pursuant to
I.R.C. § 6511(a). 7 Dalm, 494 U.S. at 601-02. I.R.C. § 6511 prescribes several time limitations
7 In Dougherty Electric, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.4th 963 (Fed. Cir. 2026), the Federal Circuit
recently declined to decide whether noncompliance with any of § 7422(a)’s various administrative
requirement remains a jurisdictional defect, reasoning that even if compliance is unnecessary to
a court’s jurisdiction, it remains necessary to a taxpayer’s refund claim — so that noncompliance
warrants dismissal either way: if not under RCFC 12(b)(1), then under RCFC 12(b)(6). Id. at 970.
8
that apply to taxpayer refund claims. 8 In particular, I.R.C. § 6511(a) provides that a
taxpayer must file an administrative refund claim with the IRS within three years of the
filing of a tax return for the period of the overpayment. The Federal Circuit has
interpreted that provision to permit a taxpayer to file a refund claim within three years
of the taxpayer’s filing of a tax return, irrespective of whether such return was filed on time, or
late. Boeri v. United States, 724 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Sections 6511(a) and
6511(b)(1) require that a taxpayer bring a refund claim within three years of filing a
return, regardless of the return’s actual due date.”). 9
Here, because Mr. Goldman’s 2017 personal income tax return — filed on October
24, 2023 — included a claim for a refund, Compl. at 3, Mr. Goldman’s filing of his 2017
personal income tax return simultaneously constituted the filing of a (timely)
administrative refund claim. See Wertz v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 443, 446 (2002).
Fifth, a plaintiff must file suit in this Court within the prescribed statute of
limitations. 26 U.S.C. § 6532; Taha v. United States, 757 F. App’x 947, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(noting that 26 U.S.C. § 6532 “establishes jurisdictional time limitations on tax refund
suits”). “Section 6532(a) states two rules for the timing of the action in court. First, no
The court in Dougherty explained that the precise characterization of the proper dismissal lens
matters only where the taxpayer offers some excuse for noncompliance that would be unavailable
were the requirement jurisdictional. Id. Until — and unless — the Federal Circuit decides that
§ 7422(a)’s administrative requirements do not implicate this Court’s jurisdiction, this Court
views these administrative claim issues as jurisdictional. This Court further notes that other
circuits continue to treat noncompliance with § 7422(a)’s various requirements as jurisdictional
defects. See, e.g., Jeanmarie v. Rettig, 836 F. App’x 335, 336 (5th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of
plaintiff’s § 7422 claim for lack of jurisdiction because it was not perfected); Crouch v. Internal
Revenue Service, 2025 WL 2048732, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2025) (uncontested noncompliance with
§ 7422(a) would deprive the district court of jurisdiction), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 233 (2025); Cobai
v. United States, 2026 WL 208338, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2026) (affirming dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds where the taxpayer alleged no facts showing exhaustion, and where the submission did
not specify each ground for refund as Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) requires), cert. denied, 2026
WL 1513322 (U.S. June 1, 2026).
8 I.R.C. § 6511 provides for two sets of administrative time limitations — one governing the case
where a taxpayer filed a tax return for the period at issue, and a second for a taxpayer who did
not file a tax return. Because Mr. Goldman filed a 2017 personal tax return, see Compl. at 4; Pl.
Ex. at 40, this Court only addresses the limitation periods in I.R.C. § 6511 governing the case
where a taxpayer filed a tax return.
9 This would seem to create a bizarre anomaly in which a taxpayer who timely files his or her
return would have an untimely refund claim, but a late filed return may render the refund claim
timely. But that is a problem for another day.
9
such suit ‘shall be begun before the expiration of 6 months from the date of filing the
claim required under such section unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon within
that time.’” Dixon, 67 F.4th at 1160 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1)). Second, “[a] tax
refund suit must be brought within two years from the date the IRS mails the first notice
of disallowance for a refund claim.” Taha, 757 F. App’x at 951 (citing 26 U.S.C.
§ 6532(a)(1)).
With respect to Mr. Goldman’s 2017 administrative refund claim, the IRS mailed
its first notice of disallowance to Mr. Goldman on February 16, 2024. Compl. at 3;
Pl. Ex. at 40. Mr. Goldman filed his refund suit in this Court on November 20, 2024.
Accordingly, Mr. Goldman’s suit before this Court is well within the statute of limitations
of I.R.C. § 6532(a).
In sum, because Mr. Goldman met all the jurisdictional preconditions to the
government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, and because his claim before this Court
does not substantially vary from his administrative refund claim pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 7422(a), this Court has jurisdiction to decide Mr. Goldman’s tax refund claim. The
government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) is,
accordingly, DENIED.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR RCFC 12(B)(6)
When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim on
which the Court may grant relief pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all
factual allegations — but not legal conclusions — contained in a plaintiff’s complaint. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. For a plaintiff’s complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the
Court — viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff — must conclude
that “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A plaintiff may not simply plead “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The Court must dismiss a complaint “when the facts
asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy.” Lindsay v. United States,
295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
10
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Mr. Goldman’s Refund Claim Must Be Dismissed Pursuant to the “Look-
Back” Provision in I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)
I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2) limits the amount of refund for a timely-filed claim to the portion
of the overpayment, if any, made within the three years “immediately preceding the
filing of the claim[.]” I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A). The Supreme Court treats I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)
as a “look-back” provision, explaining that “it is not a [jurisdictional] ‘statutory time . . .
limitation[ ]’ but rather a ‘substantive limitation[ ] on the amount of recovery.’” Boeri,
F.3d at 1369 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Brockamp,
519 U.S. 347, 348, 352 (1997)). Accordingly, even if a taxpayer filed a timely refund claim
pursuant to I.R.C. § 6511(a), he or she would be ineligible for a refund if the claim was for
sums paid to the government outside the look-back period defined in I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2).
Boeri, F.3d at 1370-71; see also Martinez v. United States, 2013 WL 3940958, at *4 (Fed. Cl.
July 25, 2013) (explaining that “even when a plaintiff has satisfied the timeliness
requirement in § 6511(a), no recovery is possible unless that plaintiff has also paid taxes
during the relevant ‘look-back’ period” (citing Doyle v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 314, 321–
22 (2009))).
Thus, a refund claim seeking sums paid that are outside the look-back period must
be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Schallmo v. United States, 825 F. App’x 826,
828-29 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (affirming trial court’s decision granting the government’s motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim where plaintiff’s taxes were paid more than three years
prior to the filing of his otherwise timely refund request — thus running afoul of I.R.C.
§ 6511(b)(2)).
Although Mr. Goldman’s administrative refund claim was timely, in general — as
was his suit in this Court — his recovery is limited to taxes paid during the three-year
look-back period, as provided in I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2). See, e.g., Martinez, 2013 WL 3940958,
at *4. Here, that means Mr. Goldman may obtain a money judgment for, at most, taxes
paid on or after October 24, 2020. This is where Mr. Goldman’s tax refund claim
flounders.
In determining whether a taxpayer remitted taxes to the IRS within the look-back
period, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2), courts consider when taxes were “deemed paid” pursuant to
I.R.C. §§ 6513(b). See Baral v. United States, 528 U.S. 431, 434-35 (2000). Because
Mr. Goldman fully paid his 2017 personal income tax via estimated tax payments
11
throughout that year, see Pl. Ex. at 21, his 2017 personal income tax was “deemed paid”
on April 15, 2018. See I.R.C. § 6513(b)(2). The fatal problem, then, for Mr. Goldman’s tax
refund claim is that he only first filed his administrative refund claim on October 24, 2023
— more than five years after he paid his 2017 income tax, and well beyond the three-year
look-back period, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2). In other words, Mr. Goldman paid no taxes within
the look-back period for which Mr. Goldman seeks a refund.
Thus, absent a specific exception to, or tolling of, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2)(A)’s look-back
period, Mr. Goldman’s potential recovery is reduced “to zero dollars,” and, therefore, his
suit “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Murdock v. United States,
103 Fed. Cl. 389, 396 (2012). One such possible exception is financial disability, a subject
to which this Court turns next.
B. I.R.C. § 6511(h)’s “Financial Disability” Exception Does Not Save Mr.
Goldman’s Claim
As noted above, I.R.C. § 6511(h) provides for the suspension of all limitation
“periods” in § 6511(a) and § 6511(b) “while a taxpayer is unable to manage financial
affairs due to disability.” I.R.C. § 6511(h). This provision is often referred to as the
“financial disability” exception. See, e.g., Ruebsamen v. United States, 2022 WL 2315722, at
*1 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 15, 2022). For the reasons explained below, Mr. Goldman cannot rely
upon I.R.C. § 6511(h) to avoid the look-back period.
To avoid the consequences of the look-back provision, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2),
Mr. Goldman invokes the “financial disability” exception of I.R.C. § 6511(h) before this
Court — just as he previously did before IRS Appeals. Compl. at 5; Pl. Ex. at 46-47.
Specifically, Mr. Goldman contends that he was “legitimately financially disabled during
the period from November 2017 through February 2022.” Compl. at 5. Thus,
Mr. Goldman effectively argues that his look-back period was tolled from April 2018
through March 2022, and thus his refund claim seeks a sum well within the three-year
look-back, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2). Id. Relying on I.R.C. § 6511(h), Mr. Goldman argues that
IRS Appeals improperly denied his 2017 refund claim. Id. The fatal problem for Mr.
Goldman’s financial disability claim, however, is that his accountant was authorized to file
Mr. Goldman’s 2017 personal income tax return; the accountant’s failure to do so is not
relevant to the period of financial disability. 10
10 Whether Mr. Goldman may have a claim against his accountant for breach of some contract or
12
While I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A) sets forth general conditions for a taxpayer to be
considered financially disabled, § 6511(h)(2)(B) provides that “[a]n individual shall not
be treated as financially disabled during any period that such individual’s spouse or any
other person is authorized to act on behalf of such individual in financial matters.” I.R.C.
§ 6511(h)(2)(A)-(B) (emphasis added). Simply put, the plain text of the financial disability
provision contemplates that even though a taxpayer may be financially disabled in
general, the taxpayer will “not be treated” as such, so long as there is another “person []
authorized to act on behalf of [that taxpayer] in financial matters.” I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B)
(emphasis added). Thus, for any part of an otherwise bona fide period of financial
disability during which a taxpayer has authorized another person to transact on the
taxpayer’s behalf, the taxpayer cannot take advantage of the tolling in I.R.C. § 6511(h).
Accordingly, Mr. Goldman may toll the three-year look-back period in I.R.C.
§ 6511(b)(2) via the financial disability exception in I.R.C. § 6511(h) for whatever period
Mr. Goldman was both financially disabled and did not authorize a third-party to act on
his behalf in financial matters. 11 As an initial matter, Mr. Goldman alleges he was
financial disabled only from November 2017 until February 2022, Pl. Ex. at 53; on October
24, 2023, Mr. Goldman filed his 2017 personal income tax return, Compl. at 4. Thus, for
approximately a year and nine months (i.e., from February 2022 through October 24,
2023), there is no question that Mr. Goldman, by his own admission, was not financially
disabled.
That leaves Mr. Goldman with only approximately a year and three months of the
three-year look-back period during which he may potentially qualify as financially
disabled. Mr. Goldman’s 2017 personal income tax was “deemed paid” on April 15, 2018.
See I.R.C. § 6513(b)(2). Therefore, absent tolling, the three-year look-back period of I.R.C.
fiduciary duty, this Court cannot say.
11 Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B), the critical question is whether a taxpayer authorized a third-
party to file his or her administrative refund claim (which is oftentimes included with a taxpayer’s
tax return, as was the case here with Mr. Goldman’s refund claim). Broad authority to act in all
other financial matters of the taxpayer is not required. See Plati v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 634,
640 (2011) (concluding that because taxpayer granted her son authority to file her tax return
(which included a refund claim due to a pervious overpayment), taxpayer did not qualify for the
§ 6511(h) financial disability exception given its explicit “carve out,” I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B)); see
also Pull v. I.R.S., 2015 WL 1439948, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2015) (concluding that retaining a
certified public accountant to file a taxpayer’s tax returns “qualif[ies] as a third person with
authority to act on behalf of [a taxpayer plaintiff] in financial matters” for purposes of I.R.C. §
6511(h)(2)(B)).
13
§ 6511(b)(2) would begin to run on April 15, 2018. But Mr. Goldman would be entitled
to I.R.C. § 6511(h) tolling — such that he could take advantage of whatever remains of
the three-year look-back provision, see § I.R.C. 6511(b)(2) — if and only if Mr. Goldman’s
relationship with his accountant terminated less than approximately a year and three
months after April 15, 2018. This is particularly relevant, because while Mr. Goldman
alleges that his accountant had worked for Mr. Goldman during previous tax years, and
that at some point the two “parted ways” due to Mr. Goldman’s financial issues, his complaint
omitted the exact date their professional relationship terminated. See Compl. at 3. 12
Accordingly, this Court issued an order to show cause, to provide Mr. Goldman
with an opportunity to clarify the record on this point. See Goldman, 2026 WL 183812, at
*3. Specifically, this Court explained that because Mr. Goldman’s complaint, “nowhere
indicates the precise date of when he and his accountant terminated their professional
relationship[,]” this Court “[was] unable to determine if Mr. Goldman qualifies for tolling
pursuant to I.R.C. § 6511(h) such that he could take advantage of whatever little (or much)
remains of the three-year look-back provision, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2).” Goldman, 2026 WL
183812, at *3. This Court further explained that, given the uncertainty, “this Court [was]
inclined to conclude that Mr. Goldman fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted because his recovery of any overpaid tax at issue is completely precluded by the
look-back provision, I.R.C. § 6511(b)(2).” Id. Accordingly, this Court ordered
Mr. Goldman to show cause why this Court should not “dismiss [his] case for failure to
state a claim pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) because [] Mr. Goldman, in his complaint, did
not note the exact date he and his accountant terminated their professional relationship.”
Id. at *5. This Court further ordered Mr. Goldman’s response to “indicate the precise date,
if any, Mr. Goldman and his accounted terminated their professional relationship.” Id.
While, in response, Mr. Goldman provided some indication of when Mr. Goldman
and his accountant terminated their professional relationship, see Pl. Supp. Resp. at 3-4,
Mr. Goldman also — albeit likely unintentionally — confirmed that he cannot take
advantage of I.R.C. § 6511(h)’s tolling in any event. Mr. Goldman explained that, in
addition to providing his accountant with e-file authorization to file Mr. Goldman’s 2017
personal income tax return, Mr. Goldman also provided his accountant with
authorization to late-file Mr. Goldman’s 2018 tax returns on April 25, 2022. Pl. Supp.
Resp. at 3. However, when Mr. Goldman’s accountant refused to file the 2018 returns
12 Mr. Goldman’s submission to IRS Appeals does not mention either that Mr. Goldman and his
accountant eventually parted ways, or that Mr. Goldman had a working relationship with his
accountant in previous years. See Pl. Ex. at 55.
14
“subsequent to [that] date[,] . . . [Mr. Goldman’s] accountant became [his] former
accountant, and she did no further work for [Mr. Goldman].” Id. at 4. That is, by
Mr. Goldman’s own admission, he and his accountant only parted ways sometime after
April 25, 2022. Because Mr. Goldman contends that his relationship with his accountant
terminated more than approximately a year and three months after April 15, 2018 (indeed,
more than four years after that date), Mr. Goldman cannot take advantage of I.R.C.
§ 6511(h)’s tolling. See I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(B). 13
In sum, because Mr. Goldman cannot invoke I.R.C. § 6511(h)’s tolling provision,
Mr. Goldman fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as his recovery of
any overpaid tax at issue is completely precluded by the look-back provision, I.R.C.
§ 6511(b)(2). See Schallmo, 825 F. App’x at 828-29; Murdock, 103 Fed. Cl. at 396; Martinez,
2013 WL 3940958, at *4. 14 While this Court is sympathetic to Mr. Goldman’s predicament,
as the undersigned recently explained, “this Court ‘lack[s] any discretion to suspend the
13 The government’s motion to dismiss failed to adequately identify this specific deficiency in
Mr. Goldman’s financial disability claim. In that regard, the government moved to dismiss
Mr. Goldman’s claim pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) because Mr. Goldman’s accountant was
authorized to file Mr. Goldman’s 2017 personal income tax return at some point. Def. Mot. at 12-
15. The government apparently reads I.R.C. § 6511(h) as meaning that Mr. Goldman cannot
invoke financial disability if, during the period of such disability, someone else is authorized to
transact financial business on his behalf even for a moment. This argument borders on frivolous
and is inconsistent with the plain text of I.R.C. § 6511(h). As explained in this opinion, and in the
order to show cause, Mr. Goldman’s authorization of his accountant during a broad period of
financial disability does not preclude Mr. Goldman from invoking I.R.C. § 6511(h), per se. Because
this Court gave Mr. Goldman the opportunity to correct the record with respect to the precise
duration of his accountant’s authorization, see Goldman, 2026 WL 183812, at *3, *5, the Court’s
dismissal decision here is not a sua sponte dismissal. In any event, a sua sponte dismissal for failure
to state a claim is permissible “when no additional proceedings would allow the plaintiff to prove
additional facts entitling them to relief, especially when the facts asserted by the plaintiff do not,
under the law, entitle him to a remedy.” Ruebsamen, 2022 WL 2315722, at *4 (citing Georgeff v.
United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 598, 601 (2005)). Because Mr. Goldman clearly cannot invoke I.R.C.
§ 6511(h)’s tolling, by his own pleadings and factual admissions, “the Court finds that no
additional proceedings in this case would entitle [Mr. Goldman] to relief.” Ruebsamen, 2022 WL
2315722, at *4.
14 This Court’s order to show cause further addressed a second, unrelated issue potentially created
by Mr. Goldman’s failing to indicate to IRS Appeals the precise date Mr. Goldman and his
accountant terminated their professional relationship. See Goldman, 2026 WL 183812, at *3-*5.
That second issue concerned “form and manner” requirements in submitting a financial disability
claim to the IRS. Id. at *3 (discussing I.R.C. § 6511(h)(2)(A)). This Court will not address the latter
issue in this opinion because this Court concludes that Mr. Goldman cannot qualify for I.R.C.
§ 6511(h)’s financial disability exception given Mr. Goldman’s accountant’s now-known date of
termination.
15
[I.R.C. § 6511 limitation periods] for a reason other than financial disability’ of the
taxpayer.” Suvarna v. United States, 2026 WL 1947908, at *5 (Fed. Cl. July 1, 2026) (quoting
Redondo v. United States 542 F. App’x 908, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (discussing Brockamp, 519
U.S. at 350-54)). “Moreover, ‘[s]ympathy by the court for plaintiff’s situation is not a basis
to supersede the limited waiver of sovereign immunity under § 6511(h).’” Suvarna, 2026
WL 1947908, at *5 (quoting Meconi v. United States, 2014 WL 2590925, at *6 (D. Del. June
6, 2014)).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby DENIES the government’s motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1) but GRANTS the government’s
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant
to RCFC 12(b)(6). The Clerk of this Court directed to enter JUDGMENT for the
government, dismissing this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Matthew H. Solomson
Matthew H. Solomson
Chief Judge
16