The opinion
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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7 ERLINDA ABIBAS ANIEL, Case No. 25-cv-06335-JST
8 Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
9 v. INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL,
MOTION TO AMEND, AND MOTION
10 SAN MATEO COUNTY, et al., TO STAY PENDING APPEAL
11 Defendants. Re: ECF No. 41
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13 Before the Court are Plaintiff Erlinda Abibas Aniel’s motions for certification of
14 interlocutory appeal, to amend order, and to stay proceedings. ECF No. 41. She seeks to appeal
15 the portion of the Court’s August 20, 2026 order dismissing her Fourth Amendment claims and
16 her claims against Defendant San Mateo Sheriff’s Office without leave to amend. She also seeks
17 to amend that order to add a statement that those claims have been certified for interlocutory
18 appeal. Finally, she asks that the remaining claims be stayed pending appeal. For the following
19 reasons, the Court will deny the motions.
20 The final judgment rule provides that courts of appeal shall ordinarily have jurisdiction
21 only over “final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However,
22 “[w]hen a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable under this
23 section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which
24 there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
25 may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in
26 such order.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). “The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an
27 appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
1 that all three § 1292(b) requirements are met.” Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th
2 Cir. 2010).
3 In dismissing Aniel’s Fourth Amendment claim, the Court found that the complaint did not
4 plausibly allege that Defendants acted without legal authority, given that they acted pursuant to a
5 court-issued writ of possession, and dismissed the claim with prejudice because the Defendants
6 were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. ECF No. 40 at 11 (citing Coverdell v. Dep’t of
7 Soc. & Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 764–765 (9th Cir. 1987)). Aniel argues that an appeal of that
8 ruling is required because the Court failed to consider the “United States Supreme Court’s
9 decision in Saucier” where the Supreme Court found “that the ruling on qualified immunity
10 requires an analysis separate from the question of whether a constitution violation occurred.” ECF
11 No. 41 at 4–5. Aniel argues that, had this Court considered Saucier, it would not have concluded
12 that because the “Sheriff Defendants acted pursuant to a court order, they were automatically
13 entitled to immunity even if those officers violated Plaintiff’s civil rights.” Id. at 5.
14 It appears that Aniel is relying on Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). In that case, the
15 Supreme Court addressed the question of “whether the requisite analysis to determine qualified
16 immunity is so intertwined with the question whether the officer used excessive force in making
17 the arrest that qualified immunity and constitutional violation issues should be treated as one
18 question, to be decided by the trier of fact.” Id. at 197. Saucier did not address the doctrine of
19 absolute quasi-judicial immunity that this Court relied on in dismissing Aniel’s Fourth
20 Amendment claim. The two doctrines are distinct. See Williams v. Cnty., No. 2:15-CV-01760-
21 SU, 2016 WL 4745179, at *3 (D. Or. Sept. 12, 2016) (noting that the “Supreme Court has drawn a
22 clear distinction between absolute immunities, such as sovereign immunity, and qualified
23 immunity.”). “An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official’s actions
24 were within the scope of the immunity. The fate of an official with qualified immunity depends
25 upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established by the evidence at trial.”
26 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). Thus, Saucier provides no basis for an
27
] interlocutory appeal.!
2 Aniel then repeats her arguments about the validity of the warrant, which the Court
3 conclusively addressed in its order on the motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 40 at 5 (“Thus, to the
4 || extent Aniel’s claims rest on the contention that the writ of possession was improperly issued or
5 invalid, those claims are not cognizable in this Court.”). In finding that the Officer Defendants
6 || were entitled to absolute immunity, this Court relied on settled Ninth Circuit precedent. /d. at 11.
7 || Notwithstanding Aniel’s contention to the contrary, she therefore fails to present a “controlling
8 question of law” that would justify an interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, her motion to certify an
9 || interlocutory appeal is denied.
10 Aniel’s motion to amend the Court’s prior order and her request for a stay pending appeal
11 are premised on her motion to certify an interlocutory appeal. ECF No. 41 at 10-11. As the Court
12 || denies her § 1292(b) motion, it denies those motions as well.
13 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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14 || Dated: September 1, 2026
©
15
JON S. TIGA
A 16 nited States District Judge
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26 ' Aniel also did not present this argument in her opposition to the motion to dismiss, which is an
97 || independent reason for rejecting it. “This Court agrees with colleague courts that reject attempts
to use motions for an interlocutory appeal to raise arguments that were never before the Court.”
9g || Zravanian v. Transperfect Translations Int'l, Inc., 2026 WL 2547046 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28,
2026).