Doe

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JOHN DOE through parent and next friend, :

JANE DOE, :

: Case No. 1:25-cv-00792

Plaintiffs, :

: Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins

v. :

:

OAK HILLS LOCAL SCHOOL

:

DISTRICT, et al.,

:

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants Oak Hills Local School District, Daniel Boles, and Kristi Murphy

(together, “Defendants”) move to set aside the Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 31) (the

“Motion”) issued on January 14, 2026 (Doc. 24). Plaintiff John Doe through parent and next

friend, Jane Doe (“Plaintiffs”), oppose the Motion. For the reasons provided below and for

good cause shown, Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 31)

is GRANTED. Defendant Canup’s unopposed Motion to Set Aside Default (Doc. 33) is also

GRANTED. Accordingly, the Clerk’s Entries of Default (Docs. 24, 26) are VACATED and

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 27) is DENIED AS MOOT.1 This matter will

be set for a preliminary pre-trial conference by separate entry.

1 The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ briefing repeatedly characterizes the relief at issue as setting aside a “default

judgment.” See Doc. 34, PageID 195–200, 203 (“On January 14, 2026, the Clerk entered default judgment as

to all Defendants . . . Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court deny School Defendants’ Motion to Set

Aside Default Judgment”) (emphasis added). But no default judgment has been entered in this case. The Clerk

entered an entry of default under Rule 55(a) (Doc. 24), and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 27)

remains pending. That distinction materially impacts the analysis. Because the Court has not entered a

default judgment, the question is whether Defendants have shown “good cause” to set aside the Clerk’s Entry

of Default under Rule 55(c), as opposed to the stricter standard under Rule 60(b). See Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty,

454 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting O.J. Distrib., Inc. v. Hornell Brewing Co., Inc., 340 F.3d 345, 352 (6th

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) provides that the Court “may set aside an entry

of default for good cause.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). Three considerations guide the Court’s

analysis: “(1) [w]hether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default, (2) [w]hether the

defendant has a meritorious defense, and (3) [w]hether the plaintiff will be prejudiced.”

Waifersong, Ltd. Inc. v. Classic Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir.1992); $22,050.00 U.S.

Currency, 595 F.3d at 324. The Court here considers all three factors in its analysis but

prejudice and meritorious defense are paramount. See $22,050.00 U.S. Currency, 595 F.3d at

324–25. Where those two factors favor relief, only a “willful failure . . . to appear and plead”

justifies denying a Rule 55(c) motion. Id.

1. Prejudice

First, Plaintiffs cannot show prejudice. Here, Plaintiffs maintain that all Defendants in

this action were served in December 2025 but did not appear in the litigation until July 10,

2026—roughly seven months later. Doc. 34, PageID 195–96. Plaintiffs contend that the case

would have proceeded into discovery had Defendants appeared on time, and that their delay

deprived Plaintiffs of the opportunity to promptly seek relevant documents, electronic

communications, and witness testimony while those materials and witness memories were

still fresh. Doc. 34, PageID 200 (“School Defendants have now had nine months since notice

of this suit to alter or destroy evidence or otherwise lose discoverable materials, such as

electronically stored information, that would help Plaintiffs prove their case.”).

Cir. 2003)) (“[I]t is important to distinguish between an entry of default and a default judgment. That is, a

stricter standard of review applies for setting aside a default once it has ripened into a judgment . . . as

reflected in Rule 60(b).”); United States v. $22,050.00 U.S. Currency, 595 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[O]ur

cases discussing motions to set aside default under Rule 55(c) are extremely forgiving to the defaulted party

and favor a policy of resolving cases on the merits instead of on the basis of procedural missteps.”).

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants’ delay has affected their related administrative

due-process proceeding with the Ohio Department of Education & Workforce filed on

October 15, 2025, involving Oak Hills, one of the named Defendants in this case. Doc. 34,

PageID 196, 200; Leader Aff., Doc. 34-1. Plaintiffs assert that they cannot resolve that

administrative proceeding while this federal action remains pending, and that Plaintiffs have

been unable to resolve or settle the matter principally due to Defendants’ delay in this action.

Doc. 34, PageID 196, 200. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that they relied on the Clerk’s Entry of

Default in this case, incurred costs on obtaining service and pursuing default judgment, and

now must incur additional costs opposing the Motion to Set Aside Default, which has

substantially prejudiced them. Doc. 34, PageID 201 (“Plaintiffs’ litigation strategy, allocation

of resources, and preparation for default judgment were undertaken in reliance on School

Defendants’ complete failure to appear or seek relief.”).

None of these circumstances establish prejudice under Rule 55(c). The Sixth Circuit

has routinely expressed that “delay alone is not a sufficient basis for establishing prejudice.”

INVST Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 1987) (citation

omitted). “Rather, it must be shown that delay will ‘result in the loss of evidence, create

increased difficulties of discovery, or provide greater opportunity for fraud and collusion.’”

Id. Here, Plaintiffs have identified only generalized categories of evidence that may have been

lost during the seven-month period between service and Defendants’ appearances on July 10,

2026, which is insufficient. Plaintiffs have not identified the name of a witness who may have

become unavailable, a video or an electronic record that may have been deleted, or a

discovery request that may no longer be pursued. Nor has a discovery deadline expired in this

case; no scheduling order has even been issued.

The parties’ ongoing administrative proceeding, which apparently only involves

Plaintiffs and Defendant Oak Hill, does not establish prejudice either. Plaintiffs attribute the

delay in this action, and the resulting delay in the related administrative proceedings, to

Defendants. Doc. 34, PageID 200. Indeed, Plaintiffs submitted email correspondence, copied

to Defendants’ counsel, to show that he was aware that the current federal proceedings had

been initiated and were ongoing. For instance, on January 20, 2026, Plaintiffs’ counsel,

Attorney Carla Leader, stated in an email that a pending federal case prevented settlement of

the parties’ administrative matter, requested an extension of the matter, and copied

Defendants’ counsel, William M. Deters (“Mr. Deters”). Leader Aff., Ex. A, Doc. 34-1,

PageID 208 (explaining that settlement of the administrative action could not occur because

of “a federal case”).

Yet, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Default Judgment in this action on January 20,

2026, the same day that email was sent—after the Clerk’s Entry of Default had already been

entered. Docs. 24, 26, 27. At that point, Plaintiffs were no longer awaiting Defendants’

participation before moving this case forward because they asked the Court to resolve the

action on default judgment. See also Leader Aff., Exs. B-C, Doc. 34-1 (discussing further

extensions after motion for default judgment was filed). The administrative proceeding

therefore remained extended because this federal action was pending, not simply because

Plaintiffs were unable to obtain Defendants’ participation in the action.

Plaintiffs’ default-related expenses likewise do not establish prejudice. Plaintiffs cite

the costs of obtaining service, seeking default, preparing their default-judgment motion, and

opposing the present motion as establishing prejudice. The Sixth Circuit, however, has

rejected that logic. See 22,050.00 U.S. Currency, 595 F.3d at 325 (“[I]t does not make intuitive

sense that simply claiming an increase in litigation cost should be sufficient to establish

prejudice. Setting aside default will always increase litigation cost to the plaintiff because the

plaintiff will actually have to litigate the case. Yet, this Court encourages setting aside default

to allow for resolution on the merits, which will necessarily drive up litigation costs.”);

Dassault Systemes, SA v. Childress, 663 F.3d 832, 842 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiff’s] concern

about legal fees is similarly unpersuasive. It goes without saying that further proceedings

would have such an impact.”). Here, Plaintiffs identify no costs incurred beyond the ordinary

costs of litigation. Plaintiffs have therefore not established prejudice.

2. Meritorious Defenses

Second, Defendants have identified potentially meritorious defenses. Importantly,

“the key to the meritorious defense inquiry is the determination of ‘whether there is some

possibility that the outcome of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to the result achieved

by the default.’” S. Elec. Health Fund v. Bedrock Servs., 146 F. App’x 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2005)

(citation omitted and emphasis added). This is a relatively low bar. See Dassault Systemes, SA,

663 F.3d at 843. Here, Defendants have filed an Answer (Doc. 35) to Plaintiffs’ Complaint

that both admit or deny many of Plaintiffs’ allegations and asserts twenty-one affirmative

defenses including negligence, qualified immunity, the Political Subdivision Immunity

Doctrine, failure to mitigate damages, and many more. Even if those defenses can be

characterized as too generalized as stated, the Sixth Circuit has made clear that “even

conclusory assertions may be sufficient to establish the ‘hint of a suggestion’ needed to present

a meritorious defense.” Id. Accordingly, Defendants have made the minimal showing

required to establish potentially meritorious defenses.

3. Culpability

Third, the record does not show that Defendants acted with the culpability required to

deny Rule 55(c) relief. The Court agrees that service was made to Defendants in December

2025, Docs. 16, 17, 19, and Defendants did not appear in the action until July 10, 2026. Doc.

30. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ attorney, Mr. Deters,2 knew about the litigation based

upon his correspondence regarding the related administrative action that has been stayed

during the pendency of the federal action. Doc. 34, PageID 199 (stating that “Attorney Leader

did in fact inform Attorney Deters of this federal lawsuit on January 20, 2026, through email,

in which she stated ‘due to a federal case filed by different attorneys, we are not able to settle

this case at this time . . . ’ to which Attorney Deters responded, ‘We have no problem with

that’”).

The record shows that Mr. Deters was copied on the January 20, 2026, email which

references the need for an extension of the administrative action “[d]ue to a federal case.”

Leader Aff., Ex. A, Doc. 34-1, PageID 208. He was also copied on the March 12, 2026, email

where the next day he agreed to a further extension of the deadline for the administrative

proceedings. Leader Aff., Ex. B, Doc. 34-1, PageID 212–14. And finally, on June 10, 2026,

Mr. Deters again agreed to extend the administrative deadline. Leader Aff., Ex. C, Doc. 34-

1, PageID 216–19. Those communications clearly gave Mr. Deters notice of a related pending

federal action in one of his cases, and at the very least, reasons to investigate the matter

further.

2 It should be noted, however, that Mr. Deters represents only Defendants Oak Hills Local School District,

Daniel Boles, and Kristi Murphy but does not represent Defendant Jason Canup. See Doc. 30. Mr. Canup is

represented separately by Attorney Scott A. Sollmann. See Doc. 32. Mr. Canup filed a separate Motion to

Set Aside Default Entry (Doc. 33), which is unopposed.

Still, the culpability inquiry demands more than evidence that Defendants should have

acted sooner. Indeed, “mere carelessness is not enough; rather, there must be ‘either an intent

to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect of its conduct on those

proceedings.’” S. Elec. Health Fund, 146 F. App’x at 777 (quoting Shepard Claims Serv., Inc. v.

William Darrah & Assocs., 796 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir.1986)). Though the culpability factor

does present a closer question for Defendants, nothing in the record indicates that Mr. Deters

or any Defendant attempted to evade service, conceal their whereabouts, ignore an order of

the Court, or gain a tactical advantage by allowing default to occur. Plaintiffs point to

correspondence from Mr. Deters in the related administrative proceeding, which appears to

concern only Defendant Oak Hills, as evidence that all Defendants had reason to know of the

action. But based on Plaintiffs’ exhibits, the first email identifying the federal case (which

copied Mr. Deters) was sent on January 20, 2026, the same day Plaintiffs moved for default

judgment. See Doc. 27. That correspondence therefore does not establish that Mr. Deters

actually knew of this action during the period for responding to the Complaint or that he

deliberately chose not to respond during that timeframe.

At most, the record here supports only carelessness, lack of professionalism, or a

failure to act diligently; it does not, based on the exhibits provided, establish the high standard

of an intent to thwart this action or engage in reckless disregard for this Court’s proceedings.

S. Elec. Health Fund, 146 F. App’x at 777. And as the Sixth Circuit has instructed, any

remaining doubts must “be resolved in favor of the petition to set aside” the clerk’s entry of

default so that the litigation can be decided on its merits. Dassault Systemes, SA, 663 F.3d at

844 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Set Aside Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 31) is

GRANTED. Defendant Canup’s unopposed Motion to Set Aside Default (Doc. 33) is also

GRANTED. Accordingly, the Clerk’s Entries of Default (Docs. 24, 26) are VACATED.

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 27) is DENIED AS MOOT. This action will

proceed in the ordinary course, and the Court will set this matter for a preliminary pre-trial

conference by separate entry.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 1, 2026 Pariyeg !iphesan

Je P/Mopkins

United States District Judge