Casey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

DARRELL CASEY,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 25-cv-01537-SPM

v.

LATOYA HUGHES,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Class Certification (Doc. 20) filed by

Plaintiff Darell Casey pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and a Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 41) filed by Defendant Latoya Hughes pursuant to Federl Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Darrell Casey commenced this action pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for

violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1). At the time he initiated this lawsuit,

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Vandalia Correctional Center, and he asserted that he was being held

beyond the length of his sentence. Plaintiff retained counsel and filed the Amended Complaint on

September 11, 2025. (Doc. 19). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that he was convicted

in 2023 for violating an order of protection and driving on a revoked or suspended license. Because

of a past conviction for aggravated battery to a child, Plaintiff is required to register as a Murderer

or Violent Offender Against Youth pursuant to 730 ILCS 154/1, et seq. Plaintiff asserts that he

completed his sentence of incarceration on June 4, 2024, and he was released from the custody of

the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) on mandatory supervised release (MSR). Plaintiff

states that he became homeless in February 2025, and he was taken back into IDOC custody due

to the loss of his host site on February 3, 2025.

After a revocation hearing, the Prisoner Review Board entered an order resuming

Plaintiff’s MSR on March 17, 2025. According to Plaintiff, this means that his MSR was not

revoked and he was legally entitled to continue his MSR in the community, contingent on him

being able to find a host site.

At the time of filing the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that remains imprisoned

solely because he is unable to meet the host site requirement.1 He states he is indigent, and he has

no family members who are willing or able to assist him with obtaining housing. Additionally,

Plaintiff claims that IDOC’s parole reentry group has not identified any halfway house that will

accept him due to his status as a registrant. Plaintiff argues that unless he can find housing, he will

be forced to remain in prison until he “maxes out” his four-year MSR term, which will occur on

December 18, 2026. Plaintiff contends that it violates the Constitution to imprison people beyond

the time they are sentenced solely because they are unable to obtain housing. He states he does not

want to remain in prison during his MSR term and seeks release into the community to complete

his period of supervision. Plaintiff sues IDOC Director Latoya Hughes in her individual and

official capacities for violations of the Eighth Amendment (Count 1) and the Equal Protection

Clause and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count 2). He requests

declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, and damages.

Plaintiff also moves to certify this case as a class action. (Doc. 20). As defined in the

Amended Complaint and the Motion for Class Certification, the proposed class includes:

All individuals currently or in the future detained in the Illinois Department of

Corrections who are required to register on the Murderer or Violent Offender

Against Youth Registry who have completed their sentences of incarceration and

1 Since filing the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has been released from prison onto MSR. (Doc. 42, 43).

are entitled to release from prison on to Mandatory Supervised Release (MSR) but

remain imprisoned because they are unable to secure an approved host site at which

to live while on MSR.

(Doc. 20, p. 1; Doc. 19, p. 7). Defendant opposes class certification solely on the grounds that

Plaintiff is not an “adequate” class representative. (Doc. 42). Plaintiff filed a Reply brief. (Doc.

43). On December 11, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, which has also been fully

briefed. (Doc. 41, 44). Both Motions are now before the Court.

MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

A plaintiff seeking to certify a class must satisfy the four requirements of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. See,

e.g., Harper v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 581 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2009). In addition to meeting the

threshold requirements of Rule 23(a), a plaintiff also must satisfy the requirements of at least one

subsection of Rule 23(b). Here, Plaintiffs seek to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2), and therefore

he must show that “a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each

member of the class.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 621 (2011). Finally, the

Seventh Circuit has “long recognized an implicit requirement under Rule 23” that a class must be

ascertainable, meaning “the class must be defined clearly and that membership be defined by

objective criteria.” Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015).2

“Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a proposed class satisfies the Rule 23

requirements, but they need not make that showing to a degree of absolute certainty.” Messner v.

Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal citation omitted). “It is

sufficient if each disputed requirement has been proven by a preponderance of evidence.” Messner,

2 Because Defendant does not dispute that the class is ascertainable or raise objections to the proposed class definition,

the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied this requirement.

669 F.3d at 811 (citing Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546

F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2008)).

II. RULE 23(A) REQUIREMENTS

a. Numerosity

The first requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the proposed class “be so numerous that joinder

of all members is impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). “Although there is no ‘bright line’ test

for numerosity, a class of forty is generally sufficient.” McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 210 F.R.D.

631, 643 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (citations omitted). See also Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cty., 850

F.3d 849, 859 (7th Cir. 2017). A plaintiff is not required to specify the exact number of persons in

the class, nor is a plaintiff required to establish the exact identity of the class members. See Marcial

v. Coronet Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 954, 957 (7th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). In addition to class size,

courts consider “the geographic dispersion of the class members, the type of relief sought, and the

practicability of relitigating the common core issue, when determining whether joinder would be

practicable.” Murry v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 240 F.R.D. 392, 396 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (citations

omitted).

Plaintiff states that based on data available from IDOC and the Illinois State Police, there

are currently 112 persons who are imprisoned in IDOC on “technical violations” of their MSR and

who are on the Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registry. (Doc. 20, p. 4; Doc. 20-

1). Plaintiff asserts that without discovery it is not possible to determine the exact number of people

within this group who currently meet the class definition. Plaintiff argues, however, that it is

reasonable to assume that there are currently more than 40 persons from this group of 112 who are

still imprisoned because they are unable to secure a host site, and “a class including more than 40

members generally meets [the numerosity] standard.” (Doc. 20, p. 3) (citing Streeter v. Sheriff of

Cook Cnty., 256 F.R.D. 609, 612 (N.D. Ill. 2012)). Plaintiff also argues that the proposed class

meets the numerosity requirement because there are an unknown number of future class

members—those who will be required to register as a Murderer or Violent Offender Against Youth

and will be detained in IDOC past their release date in the future due to their inability to secure

housing.

Plaintiff has demonstrated the numerosity requirement. The Court recognizes that “the

number of individuals subject to the challenged policy at any one time [may be] small[.]” Kramer

v. Caruana, No. 25-cv-50166, 2026 WL 1101306, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2026). Joinder,

however, remains impracticable given “the inherent difficulty in joining future class members and

the transitory nature of the class.” Id. (certifying class action against a county for jail transfer

policies that resulted in inmates being held beyond the expiration of their sentences). See also Ind.

Prot. and Advocacy Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., No. 8-CV-01317-RLYJMS,

2010 WL 1737821 *1 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 27, 2010) (“both the transient nature of the inmate population

and the request for injunctive relief that will also inure to the benefit of future, currently

unknowable, class members likewise support a finding that joinder is impracticable”). Defendant

does not put forth any arguments contesting the numerosity requirement or otherwise disputing

Plaintiff’s estimation that the number of individuals encompassed in the proposed class is more

than 40. The Court therefore finds that the number of individuals who are and will be subjected to

the challenged host-site policy is sufficiently numerous for the purposes of Rule 23(a)(1).

b. Commonality

The second requirement of Rule 23(a) is that there is at least one question of law or fact

common to the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). “Although a court need only find a single common

question of law or fact, the mere occurrence of all plaintiffs suffering as a result of a violation of

the same provision of law is not enough. The claim must depend upon a common contention that

is capable of class-wide resolution.” Chi. Tchrs. Union, Local No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi.,

797 F.3d 426, 434 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). “Where the same conduct or practice by the

same defendant gives rise to the same kind of claims from all class members, there is a common

question.” Lippert v. Baldwin, No. 10-c-4603, 2017 WL 1545672 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2017)

(quoting Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014)).

Plaintiff has also satisfied this requirement. Plaintiff asserts that IDOC has a standard,

department-wide policy of not releasing individuals from prison on to MSR unless and until they

are able to obtain housing that meets IDOC approval. Furthermore, Plaintiff claims “all individuals

falling within the class definition are subject to the same policy and are at risk of suffering the

same harms—i.e., being incarcerated beyond the time they were sentenced to serve in prison.”

(Doc. 20, p. 6). The common question of whether such policy violates the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments is applicable to each member of the proposed class, and “the resolution of that issue

is central to the claims of all class members.” Barnes v. Jeffreys, No. 20 C 2137, 2020 WL

8093500, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2020). See also Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 499 (7th Cir. 2020)

(finding that the common question of “whether the specified policies and practices to which all

IDOC inmates are subjected expose them to a substantial risk of harm” met the commonality

requirement). Again, Defendant does not put forth any arguments disputing commonality, and

Plaintiff has met the requirement.

c. Typicality

The third requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the claims of the presentative parties are typical

of the claims of the class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3). The typicality requirement is meant to ensure

that there is “enough congruence between the named representative’s claim and that of the

unnamed members of the class to justify allowing the named party to litigate on behalf of the

group.” Spano v. The Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2011). In other words, the named

representative’s claims must have “the same essential characteristics as the claims of the class at

large.” Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 514 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting De La Fuente v.

Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983)). It is well-established that typicality

is satisfied if the named representative’s claim “arises from the same event or practice or course

of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and . . . [the] claims are based on

the same legal theory.” Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514 (quoting Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013,

1018 (7th Cir. 1992)); De La Fuente, 713 F.2d at 232.

Plaintiff challenges an IDOC policy that resulted in his imprisonment beyond his release

date because he was unable to secure an approved host site, and the proposed class challenge and

are harmed by the application of the same policy. Plaintiff’s claims are no different than any other

class member. Defendant does not oppose Plaintiff’s assertions regarding the typicality

requirement, and the Court finds the typicality requirement satisfied.

d. Adequacy

Adequacy is a two-part inquiry: “(1) the adequacy of the named plaintiffs as representatives

of the proposed class’s myriad members, with their differing and separate interests, and (2) the

adequacy of the proposed class counsel.” Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 649 F.3d 583, 592

(7th Cir. 2011). Defendant does not challenge the adequacy of class counsel, and the Court has no

reason to believe they are not qualified. Therefore, the Court will only analyze whether the named

Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class.

Defendant opposes the Motion for Class Certification solely based on Plaintiff’s failure to

establish that he is an adequate representative of the proposed class. (Doc. 42, pp. 3–4). Defendant

states that Plaintiff was released from Vandalia Correctional Center on MSR on September 25,

2025. (Id. at p. 4). She argues that because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated, his requests for

equitable relief are moot, and he no longer shares the same interests as the class he seeks to

represent. (Id. at p. 4, 7). Defendant concludes that since Plaintiff’s interests and the proposed

classes’ interests are no longer aligned, he is not an adequate class representative. Plaintiff, in his

reply brief, argues that he remains an adequate class representative despite his release because of

the inherently transitory exception. (Doc. 43, p. 1). The Court agrees.

“Normally a class action would be moot if no named class representative with an unexpired

claim remained at the time of class certification.” United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381,

386 (2018) (citations omitted). There is, however, an “exception to the mootness doctrine in class

actions for claims that are ‘so inherently transitory that the trial court will not have even enough

time to rule on a motion for class certification before the proposed representative’s individual

interest expires.’” Hawkins v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. Of Wisc., No. 20-cv-352-jdp, 2021 WL

2443741, at *6 (W.D. Wisc. June 15, 2021) (quoting U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.

388, 399 (1980)). This inherently transitory exception applies where “(1) it is uncertain that a claim

will remain live for any individual who could be named as a plaintiff long enough for a court to

certify the class; and (2) there will be a constant class of persons suffering the deprivation

complained of in the complaint.” Westmoreland v. Hughes, 144 F.4th 952, 955 (7th Cir. 2025)

(quoting Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2010)). “If both these criteria are met, a

named plaintiff who was a member of the class at the time the complaint was filed will be ‘related

back’ to the class.” Robillard v. Knutson, No. 24-cv-1077-JPS, 2026 WL 710947, at *8 (E.D. Wisc.

Mar. 13, 2026) (citing Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Smyczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 n. 2 (2013)).

The request for injunctive relief based on the alleged unconstitutional host-site policy

meets both elements. Plaintiff initiated this case pro se by filing his Complaint in the Central

District of Illinois on July 28, 2025. (Doc. 1). The case was transferred to this District in August.

On September 11, 2025, counsel entered an appearance on his behalf, filed the Amended

Complaint, and the Motion for Class Certification. At the time, Plaintiff was still incarcerated at

Vandalia Correctional Center, and over five months had passed since the Prisoner Review Board

had entered an order indicating that he could continue his MSR in the community, contingent on

his finding a host site. (Doc. 19, p. 6). Fourteen days after counsel filed the Motion for Class

Certification, IDOC released him from prison onto MSR. (Doc. 43, p. 3 n. 1).

Plaintiff’s request for permanent injunctive relief was live at the time of filing his Motion

for Class Certification, and he had no knowledge of or control over when his request for a

permanent injunction would become moot due to his release. See Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 11 C

5452, 2012 WL 5995820, at * (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing Olson, 594 F.3d at 582)). The

“duration of his claim was at the discretion of [IDOC],” and the uncertainty regarding whether or

when IDOC will release an indigent person subject to the host-site policy from prison is an

unpredictable factor that makes the “inherently transitory exception applicable” in this case. Olson,

594 F.3d at 582, 83. See also Jonathan R. by Dixon v. Justice, 41 F.4th 316, 326 (4th Cir. 2022)

(“courts find the exception particularly fitting when defendants create a significant possibility that

any single named plaintiff would be dismissed prior to certification”) (citations omitted). Because

a proposed class member may be released for reasons that he cannot anticipate and at the discretion

of IDOC, it is uncertain that any member of the class would maintain a live controversy long

enough for a judge to certify a class.

As to the next element, there will be a “constant class of persons suffering the deprivation

complained of in the complaint.” Olson, 594 F.3d at 582. Assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are true,

the Court has little trouble concluding that there will be more individuals required to register as a

Murderer or Violent Offender Against Youth who will remain incarcerated passed their sentence

because they cannot secure an approved host site. Thus, the claim is likely to recur as to other

members of the proposed class, and the proposed class’s constitutional claims for declaratory and

injunctive relief are not moot. Plaintiff has demonstrated both elements of the inherently transitory

exception, and “the case is not moot for the purpose of class certification.” Olson, 594 F.3d at 580.

Because the inherently transitory exception applies, the mootness of Plaintiff’s claims for

equitable relief cannot establish his inadequacy as a representative. J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291,

1313 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“the very existence of the inherently-transitory exception disproves any

suggestion that the mootness of a plaintiff’s claims necessarily demonstrates her inadequacy as a

representative”). The “Supreme Court has specifically recognized that a plaintiff with a moot claim

may serve as a class representative.” Id. (citing Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404). Besides mootness,

Defendant does not put forth any other argument establishing that Plaintiff is unable to adequately

protect the interests of the proposed class members. Plaintiff asserts that he has been harmed by

the same host-site policy as the other members of the proposed class, and there is no evidence that

Plaintiff has any antagonistic or conflicting claims with the members. The Court therefore finds

that Plaintiff Darrell Casey will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 23(a)(4). See also Sparger-Withers v. Taylor, 628 F.Supp.3d 821, 832 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 14,

2022) (“Adequacy does not require that [the] claim remain live.”).3

III. RULE 23(B)(2) REQUIREMENTS

Plaintiff seeks to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2), which allows for certification upon a

finding that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally

to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate

respecting the class as a whole[.]” “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or

declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class

certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or

declaratory judgment against the defendant.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 360.

3 Because the Court finds that this case remains live under the inherently transitory exception, and therefore, the

mootness of Plaintiff’s equitable relief claims does not render him an inadequate representative, the Court need not

address Plaintiff’s other argument concerning his adequacy and whether his claims fall within the capable of repetition

yet evading review exception.

The class action satisfies Rule 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(2) is the appropriate rule “to enlist

when the plaintiffs’ primary goal is not monetary relief, but rather to require the defendant to do

or not do something that would benefit the whole class.” Chi. Tchrs. Union, 797 F.3d at 441. The

Amended Complaint seeks a class-wide injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the host-site

policy for indigent individuals required to register on the Murder and Violent Offender Against

Youth Registry. (Doc. 19, p. 10). Granting a single injunction or declaratory relief would provide

relief to each member of the class. Class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is therefore appropriate,

and the Motion for Class Certification is GRANTED. See Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 688

(7th Cir. 2014).

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant Director Hughes has moved to dismiss this case on the following three grounds:

(1) Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a cause of action against her in her individual

capacity based on her personal involvement; (2) Plaintiff’s suit for money damages against her in

her official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and (3) Plaintiff’s release from IDOC

precludes him from obtaining the equitable relief he seeks. (Doc. 41). Plaintiff opposes the Motion.

(Doc. 44).

I. Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure is to decide the adequacy of the complaint. Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510,

1520 (7th Cir. 1990). The federal system of notice pleading requires only that a plaintiff provide a

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 8(a)(2). However, the allegations must be “more than labels and conclusions.” Pugh v. Tribune

Co., 521 F.3d 686, 699 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). This requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to

give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests; and

(2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); EEOC v. Concentra Health

Servs., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

District courts are required by the Seventh Circuit to review the facts and arguments in

Rule 12(b)(6) motions “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all well-

pleaded facts alleged and drawing all possible inferences in her favor.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich,

526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). “The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency

of the complaint, not to decide the merits.” Gibson, 910 F.2d at 1520. A complaint “should not be

dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Sanders v. Melvin, 25

F.4th 475, 483 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

II. Individual Capacity Claims

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff fails to plead facts establishing that she was personally

involved in the alleged constitutional violations. (Doc. 41, pp. 3–4). She states that there are no

allegations connecting her to any illegal actions, and it is not sufficient for Plaintiff to simply assert

that a policy was in place that violated the Constitution. (Id. at p. 3). Defendant therefore concludes

that Plaintiff fails to state claim for relief against her, and the individual capacity claims should be

dismissed. (Id. at pp. 3–4).

“It is well-established that a plaintiff only may bring a § 1983 claim against those

individuals personally responsible for the constitutional deprivation.” Doyle v. Camelot Care

Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2002). This means that to recover damages against a

state actor, “a plaintiff must plead that each Government official defendant, through the official’s

own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009).

As Director Hughes argues, there is no vicarious or supervisory responsibility under Section 1983,

and “liability depends on each defendant’s knowledge and actions, not the knowledge or actions

of the persons they supervise.” (Doc. 41, p. 3) (quoting Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th

Cir. 2009). Direct participation, however, is not necessary. “A showing of personal involvement

requires only ‘a causal connection between (1) the sued officials and (2) the alleged misconduct.’”

Tucker v. Jeffreys, No. 18 C 3154, 2021 WL 4439405, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2021) (quoting Colbert

v. City of Chi., 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017)). See also Jones v. City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985,

992 (7th Cir. 1988) (to be personally responsible an official must “know about the conduct and

facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye…”). Plaintiff has met this requirement.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts, “IDOC’s policy and practice of not releasing

individuals who have completed their terms of imprisonment and been approved by the PRB for

release on to MSR but who cannot obtain housing violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

. . . .” (Doc. 19, p. 2). He claims that it is because of this host-site policy that he remains imprisoned

and has not been released. (Id. at p. 7). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, as the director, has final

authority to set IDOC “policies with regard to MSR and host sites.” (Id. at p. 3). He further asserts,

based on the Northern District Court decisions in Murphy v. Raoul, 380 F. Supp. 3d 731 (N.D. Ill.

2019), Barnes v. Jeffreys, 529 F. Supp. 3d 784 (N.D. Ill. 2021), and Stone v. Jeffreys, No. 21-cv-

5616, 2022 WL 4596379 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2022):

Hughes knows or should know that it violates the constitution to imprison people

beyond the time they are sentenced to serve solely because they are unable to obtain

housing. Nonetheless, the IDOC still maintains a policy of refusing to release from

custody individuals who cannot obtain their own host sites when halfway house

placements are unavailable.

(Doc. 19, p. 5). These allegations are sufficient to plausibly infer personal involvement on the part

of Defendant.

As Plaintiff points out, this is the fourth class action lawsuit filed in this Circuit “directed

toward IDOC host-site policies for individuals that remain imprisoned beyond the completion of

their sentence of incarceration.” Stone, 2022 WL 4596379, at *1 (citing to Murphy v. Raul and

Barnes v. Jeffreys). In Murphy, the class of plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the host-

site requirement as applied to individuals with sex offense convictions who had completed their

terms of imprisonment and were sentenced to an indeterminate term of MSR, a range of “three

years to life.” Murphy, 380 F. Supp. at 738. The Northern District Court observed that because the

“clock on these [MSR] terms does not start ticking until sex offenders are out of prison” and the

“State demands that they first secure a qualifying host site before it will release them,” many of

the offenders “successfully complete their entire court-ordered terms of incarceration yet remain

detained indefinitely because they are unable [to] find a residence due to indigence and lack of

support.” Id. 737–38. The court framed the issue as “whether the state unconstitutionally deprived

the plaintiffs of their liberty by keeping them in prison, instead of supervising them on release,

because they are indigent and homeless.” The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment was

granted, and the court found that because IDOC’s “application of the host-site requirement permits

the indefinite detention of the plaintiffs” and discriminates against the plaintiffs based on poverty,

the requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 755, 766.

According to Plaintiff, pursuant to the permanent injunction in Murphy:

[IDOC] created a transitional housing program called the Intensive Community

Reintegration Program (“ICRP”) for person with sex offense convictions so that

members of the class would not be detained in prison beyond the completion of

their court-ordered sentences of imprisonment due to an inability to meet the host

site requirement.

(Doc. 19, p. 4).

Next, in Barnes, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of an Illinois statute that

precluded a sex offender from living at the same address or within the same apartment complex as

another sex offender. Barnes, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 788 (citing 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6)). This “One-

per-Address” statute was a mandatory condition to be released on MSR. Id. at 789. The class of

plaintiffs was broader than the class identified in Murphy and included those with determinate and

indeterminate sentences of MSR. Again, the Northern District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion

for summary judgment finding that the statute operated “to keep indigent and homeless sex

offenders incarcerated beyond their term of imprisonment,” in violation of the Eighth Amendment

and the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 795, 799.

And finally, in Stone, the plaintiffs again contested the constitutionality of the host-site

requirement as applied to individuals with sex offense convictions. The class in Stone differed

from the class in Murphy in that the individuals had determinate terms of MSR, rather than

indeterminate MSR sentences. The Northern District Court issued preliminary injunctive relief

enjoining the host-site policy. Stone, 2022 WL 4596379. The court found that the plaintiffs had

some “likelihood of success on the same claims the Murphy class [had] already succeeded on.”

Stone, 2022 WL 459679, at *3. IDOC expanded the ICRP program to accommodate persons with

determinate MSR sentences, and the case settled. Stone, No. 21-cv-05616, Doc. 145 (N.D. Ill. Aug.

16, 2024).

According to Plaintiff, Defendant has the final authority to set IDOC policies with regard

to MSR and host sites. And based on the three class action lawsuits discussed above, Defendant

knew or should have known of the constitutional issues of implementing a policy or practice of

refusing to release from incarceration individuals who have served their sentence but are unable

to secure an approved site because of homelessness or indigency. See Randle v. Baldwin, No. 16-

cv-1191-NJR, 2020 WL 1550638, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 2020) (“[a]n official may be found to have

been put on notice, however, by contemporaneous proceedings that allege similar constitutional

violations” (citing Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2013))). The “Seventh Circuit

has found that officials ‘responsible’ for an unconstitutional policy are ‘answerable’ for it under

§1983.” Tucker v. Jeffreys, No. 18 C 3154, 2021 WL 4439405, at * (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2021)

(citing Harris v. Greer, 750 F.2d 617, 618 (7th Cir. 1984)). See also Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304,

309 n. 2 (7 Cir. 2015) (“the personal involvement of senior jail officials…can be inferred at the

motion to dismiss stage, where, as here, the plaintiff alleges ‘potentially systemic,’ as opposed to

‘clearly localized,’ constitutional violations”). Thus, the facts alleged are sufficient to establish

plausible personal involvement on the part of Defendant at the pleading stage. The individual

capacity claims against Defendant will not be dismissed.

III. Mootness of Injunctive Relief

Defendant next argues that because Plaintiff has been released from IDOC custody, his

requests for equitable relief are moot and should be dismissed. (Doc. 41, pp. 4–5). Plaintiff disputes

this contention and asserts that his claim for equitable relief is not moot under the inherently

transitory and capable of repetition exceptions to the mootness doctrine. (Doc. 44, pp. 9–11).

Although the Court found that the proposed class’s claims for injunctive and declaratory

relief are not moot under the inherently transitory exception, this exception cannot save Plaintiff’s

personal claims for equitable relief. As explained by the Sixth Circuit, the inherently transitory

doctrine “is simply a strain of the capable-of-repetition doctrine as it is applied to a class-action

claim.” Patton v. Fitzhugh, 131 F.4th 383, 394 (6th Cir. 2025). The exception allows a plaintiff

“asserting a class-action claim . . . to pursue claims on behalf of the class even though the named-

plaintiff’s claims were moot.” Id. at 393 (citing Gerstein v. Puch, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n. 11 (1975);

Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-401 (1975)). The exception recognizes that the “controversy is

no longer live as to the [plaintiff but] it remains very much alive for the class of persons [he] has

been certified to represent.” Id. at 394 (quoting Sosna, 419 U.S. at 400-01). Thus, the purpose of

the inherently transitory exception is to keep the class “claim alive beyond [the] individual claim

to certify the class.” Olson, 594 F.3d at 583. The Court, therefore, finds that the inherently

transitory exception cannot be invoked to keep Plaintiff’s personal claims for equitable relief alive.

As for the second exception to mootness argued by Plaintiff, the capable of repetition, yet

evading review exception applies only in “exceptional situations,” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,

17 (1998), when the plaintiff can show that “the claim is capable of repetition as to the named

plaintiff,” Olson, 594 F.3d at 583 (emphasis added). Two conditions must be met: “(1) the

challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration,

and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the

same action again.” United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381, 391 (2018) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff argues that there is a reasonable expectation that he will be again subject to the

challenged host-site policy, and his risk of reincarceration is not speculative. (Doc. 44, p. 10). He

points out that he has already been returned to custody once while on MSR solely because he lost

his host site, and IDOC statistics show that in fiscal year 2025, technical violators of MSR account

for 11 percent of admissions to IDOC, totaling 1,678 admissions.

The Court disagrees that these facts establish a reasonable expectation of reoccurrence as

to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court has “consistently refused to conclude that the case-or-controversy

requirement is satisfied by the possibility that a party will be prosecuted for violating valid criminal

laws.” Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. at 391 (citations omitted). Although 11 percent of those in IDOC

custody are there because of MSR violations, MSR violations are not exclusively host site related.

Plaintiff does not argue or present any evidence that due to his financial situation he will be unable

to sustain an approved host site until the completion of his MSR in December, and the Court

assumes that he will conduct himself “within the law and so avoid” other MSR violations that are

not at issue in this case. Id. See also Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632–33, n.13 (1982)

(concluding that case was moot where the challenged parole revocation could not “affect a

subsequent parole determination unless respondents again violate state law, are returned to prison,

and become eligible for parole”). Because Plaintiff does not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood

that he will again be rearrested and remain imprisoned because he is unable to secure an approved

host site at which to live while on MSR, his individual claims for equitable relief must be dismissed

as moot. See Kress v. CCA of Tenn., LLC, 272 F.R.D. 222, 228 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 1, 2010) (noting

that while the “Plaintiffs’ claims are not moot for purposes of serving as class representatives,

release from Jail II renders Plaintiffs’ individual claims moot” (citing Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d

789, 804 (7th Cir. 2008))).

IV. Official Capacity Claims for Money Damages

Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant’s argument that monetary damages against her in her

official capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Doc.41, p. 4; Doc. 44, p. 7). Plaintiff

states that he seeks damages against Defendant only in her individual capacity. (Id.). The Court

grants the Motion to Dismiss to the extent the Amended Complaint asserts a claim for monetary

damages against Defendant in her official capacity. See Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592

(7th Cir. 2001) (Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money

damages).

DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification

(Doc. 20) and CERTIFIES a class defined as, “All individuals currently or in the future

detained in the Illinois Department of Corrections who are required to register on the

Murderer or Violent Offender Against Youth Registry who have completed their sentences

of incarceration and are entitled to release from prison on to Mandatory Supervised Release

(MSR) but remain imprisoned because they are unable to secure an approved host site at

which to live while on MSR.”

The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

(Doc. 41). Plaintiff’s personal request for equitable relief is DISMISSED, and any request for

monetary damages against Defendant in her official capacity is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 1, 2026

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge