Bakaturski

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PATRICK BAKATURSKI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-03609-GCS

)

DARREN GALLOWAY, )

LATOYA HUGHES, )

AMANDA SMITH, )

and )

MELVIN HINTON, )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the

issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Doc. 84, 87).1 Defendants argue Plaintiff

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he failed to exhaust any grievances

related to the allegations contained in the amended complaint against them. Plaintiff filed

an opposition to the motion. (Doc. 86). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the

motion. Plaintiff, John Houseman, and Margaret Madole testified, and the Court took the

1 Defendants filed the required Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 notice informing

Plaintiff of the failure to respond to the motion for summary judgment. See (Doc. 85).

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matter under advisement. (Doc. 90). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS

in part and DENIES in part the motion.

On November 7, 2023, Plaintiff Patrick Bakaturski, an inmate of the Illinois

Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at Shawnee Correctional Center

(“Shawnee”). (Doc. 1). The original complaint alleged systemic lockdowns, denial of

mental health care, and the failure to accommodate a known mental illness. Id. Plaintiff

sought both injunctive relief and monetary damages. Id.

The Court conducted an analysis of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and

issued a screening order on May 7, 2024. (Doc. 10). Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on

two counts:

Count 1 – Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against

Galloway, Hughes, and the Director of the Office of Health for

implementing policies that resulted in repeated and excessive lockdowns

and limited yard and out of cell time.

Count 5 - Americans with Disabilities Act/Rehabilitation Act2 claim

against Hughes for failing to accommodate Plaintiff’s mental disability.

(Doc. 10, p. 13).

On September 3, 2024, Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint.

2 Plaintiff did not mention the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), in his

complaint, but the Seventh Circuit has cautioned that claims of discrimination on account

of a disability, especially those from pro se prisoner litigants, should be analyzed by the

district court in light of both the ADA and RA, whether or not the plaintiff has asserted a

claim under the latter statute. See Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2012).

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(Doc. 43). On May 22, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part the motion,

allowing Plaintiff’s amended claims: Count 1, Eighth Amended Conditions of

Confinement claim against Defendant Galloway, Defendant Smith, Director of Mental

Health at Shawnee in her official capacity, and Defendant Hinton, Director of Mental

Health at IDOC, in his official capacity for injunctive relief, alleging that Plaintiff was

denied meaningful yard access and out-of-cell time for extended periods despite no

misconduct on his part; Count 3, First Amendment Retaliation claim against Defendant

Galloway alleging that Defendant Galloway ordered the closure of yard access in

response to Plaintiff filing this lawsuit; and Count 5, ADA/RA claim against Defendant

Hughes in her official capacity, alleging that Plaintiff was improperly removed from the

mental health case load, denied out-of-cell time, and access to treatment based on his

mental illness, constituting discrimination. (Doc. 63). Further, the Court specifically

ordered: “Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).” Id. at

p. 19.3

FACTS

The following facts are taken from the record and presented in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in

his favor. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).

3 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g) pertains to the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

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The parties agree that following are the relevant grievances to the allegations in

Plaintiff’s amended complaint. The record reveals that five of these grievances were

appealed to the ARB, and that out of these five, 4 grievances were fully exhausted, and

one was returned for not following Department Rule 504.

Grievance #2022-8-62

On August 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed grievance #2022-8-62. As to the nature of this

grievance, Plaintiff checked medical treatment and the “other” box and specified no gym

or yard and quarantine. Plaintiff requested that he to go to the yard and gym and that

the Covid medical quarantine be lifted. On August 10, 2024, the grievance counselor

responded: “[p]er the yard schedule all yard times are subject to change and cancellation

at any time.” The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) received this grievance on

September 22, 2022, and on November 2, 2022, the ARB denied it finding the facility

appropriately addressed the issue. (Doc. 84-1, p. 13-16). Plaintiff does not name any of

the individual Defendants in this grievance.

Grievance #2022-8-286

On August 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed grievance #2022-8-286, complaining about his

yard and gym being canceled due to Covid and about his cell conditions. He requested

to be tested for Covid 19 every time he is “locked down,” to receive cleaning supplies,

and to receive his one hour out of the cell. On August 31, 2022, the grievance counselor

responded: “IDOC follows the guidelines of OHS and IDPH. Shawnee has a cleaning

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schedule in place, as well as hot water. Shawnee has been checked for and does not have

black mold problem.” The grievance officer responded to the grievance on February 15,

2023, recommending that the grievance be denied, and the CAO concurred on February

17, 2023. Plaintiff appealed to the ARB on February 26, 2023. The ARB received the

grievance on March 1, 2023, and denied it on May 1, 2023, finding the facility

appropriately addressed the issue. (Doc. 84-1, p. 6-12). Plaintiff does not name any of the

of individual Defendants in this grievance.

Grievance #2022-11-22

Thereafter, on November 28, 2022, Plaintiff submitted grievance #2022-11-22. As

to the nature of the grievance, Plaintiff checked the “other” box and specified Covid

lockdown and phone access. The grievance counselor responded to the grievance on

December 5, 2022, stating: “[p]er Covid Protocol ‘All individuals on medical quarantine

wing are allowed 1 30 minute dayroom period to access the phone. Individual in custody

is currently housed in receiving which is under medical quarantine . . .’” The grievance

officer, on March 1, 2023, recommended that the grievance was moot, and the CAO

concurred on March 3, 2023. Plaintiff appealed to the ARB on March 7, 2023. The ARB

received the grievance on March 13, 2023, and denied it on May 31, 2023, finding the

facility appropriately addressed the issue. (Doc. 84-1, p. 2-5). Plaintiff does not name any

of the individual Defendants in this grievance.

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Grievance #K19-0524-0815

Plaintiff filed grievance #K19-0524-0815 on April 27, 2024. As to the nature of this

grievance, Plaintiff checked the “ADA” box and the “other” box and noted no yard. In

toto, the summary of the grievance stated:

The second shift night yard on 4-26-2024 was cancelled. The first shift yard on

4-27-2024 1 pm, was cancelled. Of the 11 yards approved for April close to 50%

of the yards were cancelled. This is a violation of the Mental Health Settlement

which say each S.M.I. inmate is supposed to get 10 hour of yard per week and

20 hour out-of-cell time. I am only getting less the 17 hours. Shawnee reports

to be a 18 and 6, but it is a 22.5 and 2.5.

Plaintiff requested equal access to yard. On May 6, 2025, the grievance counselor

responded: “[p]er monthly yard schedule approved by AWP Walker, ‘All times are

subject to change or cancellation.’” The grievance officer recommended that this

grievance be denied on May 13, 2024, and the CAO concurred on May 17, 2024. Plaintiff

appealed to the ARB on May 29, 2024. The ARB received the grievance on June 3, 2024,

and denied it on July 10, 2024, finding the facility appropriately addressed the issue. (Doc.

84-2, p. 2-5). Plaintiff does not name any of the individual Defendants in this grievance.

Grievance #K19-0524-0947

On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff submitted grievance #K19-0524-0947. As to the nature

of this grievance, Plaintiff marked the “ADA” box and the “other” box and noted mental

health. In the summary of the grievance, Plaintiff stated:

I filed a federal Civil Suet [sic] Against Shawnees for no Yard and Mental

health programs. Bakaturski v. Director et al 3-23-03609-SPM. . . . Since

Coming to Shawnee I have only filed three types of Grievances. NO Yard, No

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Right to Work or take part in Programs and issues over my elbow which is

broke. Mental Health is refusing to reply to my request. [sic] and address the

fact that more than half of my Mental Health care file was lost. My 1983 cited

this issue, which is why I am filing this. The Court said that my 8th

Amendment rights maybe being violated due to the endless restrictions. But

that I needed to file another motion outlining who from Mental Health has

refused me programs. And who is the Director of mental Health.

FORWARD to GRIEVANCE OFFICE.

Grievance office 6-1-2024

I am not requesting educational classes. I am requesting access to

mental Health programs. Please contact mental Health.

On May 30, 2024, the grievance counselor responded, and on June 4, 2024, the grievance

officer recommended the grievance be denied finding: “Mr. Bakaturski is not on the

mental health caseload; therefore, he would not meet the criteria for the current group

sessions and the yard gets canceled due to institutional needs.” The CAO concurred on

June 6, 2024. Plaintiff appealed to the ARB on June 12, 2024. The ARB received the

grievance on June 17, 2024, and on June 28, 2024, the ARB returned Plaintiff’s grievance

for not meeting DR504.810, which requires dates to be provided. Plaintiff did not include

the names of the individual Defendants in this grievance. (Doc. 84-2, p. 6-9).

Grievance #K19-0824-1460

On August 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed grievance #K19-0824-1460 complaining about

staff conduct, out-of-cell time, work and yard restrictions, and ADA issues. He requested

that he be allowed out of his cell for 6 hours a day. On August 9, 2024, the grievance

counselor responded: “[p]er DR 504 all dayroom and Rec time are subject to change.”

There is nothing in the record to show that this grievance was sent to the ARB or that it

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was fully exhausted. Defendant Galloway is the only Defendant named in this grievance.

(Doc. 84-3, p. 1, 2).

Grievance #K19-1224-2467

Plaintiff filed grievance #K19-1224-2467 on December 29, 2024, complaining about

not being able to work as a porter from December 1, 2024, to December 29, 2024. As to

the nature of the grievance, Plaintiff marked “other” and noted “work restriction.” On

January 3, 2025, the grievance counselor responded: “[p]er AD 420.30: All job

assignments are subject to review and approval by the CAO.” On January 24, 2025, the

grievance officer recommended mixed action on this grievance: “Bakaturski got an

assignment change to the Dietary but out of cell time can be canceled or changed at any

time do [sic] to operational needs. No individual is guaranteed the same amount of time

everyday.” The grievance officer noted this was also the response to grievance K19-0125-

0015. The CAO concurred on January 24, 2025. (Doc. 84-3, p. 3-5). There is nothing in the

record to indicate that this grievance was appealed to the ARB or that it was fully

exhausted. Plaintiff does not name any of the individual Defendants in this grievance.

This grievance was filed after Plaintiff submitted his amended complaint.

Grievance #K19-0125-0015

Plaintiff filed grievance K19-0125-0015 on January 1, 2025, complaining of staff

conduct and out-of-cell time. He again requested to be out of his cell 6 hours a day. A

week later, the grievance counselor responded: “[a]ll times are subject to cancellation for

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gym and yard and at SCC no porter is barred from working nor is being a porter a reason

not to be hired as a dietary worker. (Doc. 84-3, p. 6, 7). On January 24, 2025, the grievance

officer recommended mixed action on this grievance: “Bakaturski got an assignment

change to the Dietary but out of cell time can be canceled or changed at any time do [sic]

to operational needs. No individual is guaranteed the same amount of time everyday.”

The CAO concurred on January 24, 2025. Id. at p. 3-5. There is nothing in the record to

indicate that this grievance was appealed to the ARB or that it was fully exhausted.

Defendant Galloway is the only Defendant named in this grievance. This grievance was

filed after the Plaintiff submitted his amended complaint.

Plaintiff filed suit on November 7, 2023. (Doc. 1), and he submitted his amended

complaint on September 3, 2024. (Doc. 43).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary Judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)); FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(a). Lawsuits

filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The statute states, in pertinent part, that “no action

shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any

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other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. (emphasis added).

The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. See,

e.g., Williams v. Rajoli, 44 F.4th 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 2022) (noting that “[w]e take a strict

compliance approach to exhaustion.”) (citations omitted). Exhaustion must occur before

the suit is filed. See Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 981 (7th Cir. 2020); Williams, 44 F.4th

at 1043. A plaintiff cannot file suit and then exhaust his administrative remedies while

the suit is pending. Id.

Moreover, “[t]o satisfy the exhaustion requirement, an inmate must take each of

the steps prescribed by the state's administrative rules governing prison grievances.”

Chambers, 956 F.3d at 983; Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948, 956 (7th Cir. 2024). Consequently,

if a prisoner fails to use a prison’s grievance process, “the prison administrative authority

can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim can be indefinitely unexhausted.”

Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The purpose of

exhaustion is to give prison officials an opportunity to address the inmate’s claims

internally, prior to federal litigation. See Hacker v. Dart, 62 F.4th 1073, 1084 (7th Cir. 2023).

Under Pavey, the Seventh Circuit held that “debatable factual issues relating to the

defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies” are not required to be decided by

a jury but are to be determined by the judge. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-741 (7th

Cir. 2008); Jones v. Lamb, 124 F.4th 463, 469 (7th Cir. 2024). Thus, where failure to exhaust

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administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative defense, the Court set forth the

following procedures:

The sequence to be followed in a case in which exhaustion is contested is

therefore as follows: (1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion

and permits whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems appropriate.

(2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust his administrative

remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the plaintiff has failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must go back and exhaust; (b)

or, although he has no unexhausted administrative remedies, the failure to

exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials prevent a prisoner from

exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given another chance to exhaust

(provided that there exist remedies that he will be permitted by the prison

authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being given a runaround); or (c) the

failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in which event the case is over. (3)

If and when the judge determines that the prisoner has properly exhausted his

administrative remedies, the case will proceed to pretrial discovery, and if

necessary a trial, on the merits; and if there is a jury trial, the jury will make

all necessary findings of fact without being bound by (or even informed of)

any of the findings made by the district judge in determining that the prisoner

had exhausted his administrative remedies.

Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742 (7th Cir. 2008); Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 2015).

As an inmate confined within the Illinois Department of Corrections, Plaintiff was

required to follow the regulations contained in the Illinois Department of Correction’s

Grievance Procedures for Offenders (“grievance procedures”) to exhaust his claims. See

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. The grievance procedures require inmates to file

their grievance with the counselor within 60 days of the discovery of an incident. See 20

ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The grievance form must:

contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,

including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is

the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision

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does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of

individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much descriptive

information about the individual as possible.

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through

routine channels are then sent to the grievance officer. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

§ 504.820(a). The Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written

response to the inmate. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). “The Grievance Officer shall

consider the grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to

the Chief Administrative Officer within two months after receipt of the grievance, when

reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). “The

Chief Administrative Officer shall review the findings and recommendation and advise

the offender of his or her decision in writing. Id.

If the inmate is not satisfied with the Chief Administrative Officer’s response, he

or she can file an appeal with the Director through the ARB. The grievance procedures

specifically state, “[i]f, after receiving the response of the Chief Administrative Officer,

the offender still believes that the problem, complaint[,] or grievance has not been

resolved to his or her satisfaction, he or she may appeal in writing to the Director. The

appeal must be received by the Administrative Review Board within 30 days after the

date of the decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The inmate shall attach copies of

the Grievance Officer’s report and the Chief Administrative Officer’s decision to his

appeal. Id. “The Administrative Review Board shall submit to the Director a written

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report of its findings and recommendations.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d). “The

Director shall review the findings and recommendations of the Board and make a final

determination of the grievance within 6 months after receipt of the appealed grievance,

when reasonably feasible under the circumstances. The offender shall be sent a copy of

the Director’s decision.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(e).

The grievance procedures allow for an inmate to file an emergency grievance. To

file an emergency grievance, the inmate must forward the grievance directly to the CAO

who may “[determine] that there is a substantial risk of imminent personal injury or other

serious or irreparable harm to the offender” and thus the grievance should be handled

on an emergency basis. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(a). If the CAO determines the

grievance should be handled on an emergency basis, then the CAO “shall expedite

processing of the grievance and respond to the offender” indicating to him what action

shall be taken. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(b). If the CAO determines the grievances

“should not be handled on an emergency basis, the offender shall be notified in writing

that he or she may resubmit the grievance as non-emergent, in accordance with the

standard grievance process.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(c). When an inmate appeals

a grievance deemed by the CAO to be an emergency, “the Administrative Review Board

shall expedite processing of the grievance.” 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(f).

A prisoner can amend the complaint to add a new claim or defendant, if he fully

exhausts his administrative remedies before seeking leave to amend. See, e.g., Cannon v.

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Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 719-720 (7th Cir. 2005); Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir.

2005); Getty v. Santos, Case No. 3:18-CV-1134-MAB, 2020 WL 2832465, at *4-6 (S.D. Ill.

May 31, 2020). This exception does not allow a plaintiff to file an amended complaint to

replead previously unexhausted claims and thereby circumvent the PLRA’s exhaustion

requirement. Rather, it allows a plaintiff to raise one or more new, properly exhausted

claims against new defendants, if he has fully exhausted all available remedies before

hailing the new defendants into court. See Barnes, 420 F.3d at 678. In this respect, an

amended complaint serves as the functional equivalent of a new complaint, marking the

point in time when exhaustion as to those new claims and/or new defendants must be

complete. Id. at 678 (citation omitted). Under this exception, Plaintiff’s deadline for

exhausting his administrative remedies as to all new claims and defendants was

September 3, 2024, the date he submitted the amended complaint.

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that none of the grievances submitted by Plaintiff properly

exhaust any of the three claims asserted in the amended complaint. Plaintiff opposes the

motion, maintaining that he did, in fact, exhaust his administrative remedies. The Court

addresses each claim in turn, along with the corresponding exhaustion issues.

At the outset, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants’ earlier

withdrawal of their affirmative defense regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies

bars them from seeking summary judgment. The Court disagrees. As previously

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explained, when the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s motion for leave

to amend, it directed Defendants to respond to the complaint and not to waive their right

to file a reply under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). (Doc. 63, p. 19). Accordingly, the Court finds

Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive.

Eighth Amendment Claim – Count 1

As to the Eighth Amendment claims, Defendants maintain none of the grievances

mention confinement by administrative policies; confinement that aggravated his mental

health; confinement based on security or behavior, or contain any description of

Defendants Gallway, Smith or Hinton.4 Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s

grievances only mention Covid lockdowns, yard cancellations, or general lack of exercise.

The Court does not agree with Defendants and finds that grievances K19-0524-0815, 2022-

8-286, 2022-08-62 and 2022-11-22 all serve to exhaust administrative remedies to this

claim.

Grievance K19-0524-0815 complains about the yard being cancelled 50% of the

time, references mental-health settlement requirements, and complains about out-of-cell

time. This grievance squarely matches the contents of Plaintiff’s claims in Count 1.

Likewise, grievances 2022-8-286, 2022-08-62, and 2022-11-22 all complain about yard

cancellations which relate to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims. While these

4 In the reply brief, Defendants concede that because they were sued in their official

capacities, there was no need to name or describe Defendants Hughes, Hinton, or Smith

in the grievances. (Doc. 87, p. 7).

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grievances do not name Defendant Galloway, Defendant Galloway signed off on

grievances 2022-8-286, 2022-11-222, and K19-0524-0815. Thus, Defendant Galloway was

part of the grievance process and participated in denying his grievances. Thus, he may

be liable for deliberate indifference as Plaintiff’[s] requests fell on “deaf ears”. Perez v.

Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015). Further, Plaintiff is not required to file

successive grievances raising the same issues if the conduct continues. See Turley v.

Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013). Defendants fails to cite to any case law requiring

an inmate to file an additional grievance against the grievance officials who reviewed his

grievance. As Defendant Galloway reviewed these grievances, Plaintiff did not need to

file separate, additional grievances against him. Defendants Smith and Hinton are being

sued for policy-based confinement issues related to the grievances and claims in this case.

These grievances repeatedly served to alert the prison to the nature of the wrong

for which Plaintiff was seeking redress, i.e., prolonged confinement with lack of yard

time, lack of out-of-cell time, and mental health restrictions. The prison had notice, had

the opportunity to investigate, and had the opportunity to correct the problem. Thus, the

Court concludes that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies against Defendants

on this claim.

First Amendment Retaliation claim, Count 3

As to the First Amendment retaliation claim, Defendants argue that none of

Plaintiff’s grievances allege retaliation, none identify Defendant Galloway in any

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manner, and none connect the yard closure to the filing of this lawsuit. Even viewing the

record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court agrees. A review of the grievances

shows that none assert that Defendant Galloway retaliated against Plaintiff, nor do they

mention or link the yard closure to this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies against Defendant Galloway on Count 3. Defendant Galloway

is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Accordingly, the First Amendment

Retaliation claim against Defendant Galloway is dismissed without prejudice for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies.

ADA/Rehabilitation Act claim

Defendants argue that the ADA/Rehabilitation Act claim fails because none of

Plaintiff’s grievances assert that he was denied out-of-cell time due to a disability, none

allege that he was removed from the mental-health caseload for discriminatory reasons,

and none identify Defendant Hughes or describe disability-based mistreatment. The

Court rejects these arguments.

The Court concludes that grievance K19-0524-0815 adequately notified the prison

of a disability-related denial of out-of-cell time. In that grievance, Plaintiff reported that

yard time had been canceled “close to 50%” of the time in April 2024 and specifically cited

the “mental health settlement,” which requires 10 hours of yard time and 20 hours of

out-of-cell time for SMI inmates. Plaintiff further stated he was receiving fewer than 17

hours. This grievance therefore connects the lack of out-of-cell time to

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mental-health-related obligations. Count 5 alleges that Plaintiff was removed from the

mental-health caseload, denied out-of-cell time, and denied access to treatment because

of his mental-health condition, amounting to discrimination. The grievance provided

sufficient information for prison officials to understand and investigate the issue.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies for this

claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the

motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies

filed by Defendants (Doc. 84). The Court DENIES that motion as to Count 1, Eighth

Amendment Conditions of Confinement claim and as to Count 5, the

ADA/Rehabilitation claim. The Court GRANTS the motion as to Count 3, the First

Amended Retaliation claim. The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Plaintiff's Count

3. Lastly, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment reflecting the

same at the end of the case.

This matter will proceed on Count 1 and Count 5 of the Amended Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 1, 2026. Gilbert C Epes ined by Sibert

Sison te 2026.09.01 14:12:02

GILBERTC.SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

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