Neisler

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

AMANDA NEISLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Case No. 26-cv-1263

)

LIVINGSTON COUNTY, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is now before the Court on Defendant Livingston County’s [9] Motion to

Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow,

Livingston County’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART as set forth herein.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff Amanda Neisler worked as a correctional officer for the Livingston County

Sheriff’s Office from approximately June 9, 2025, until her termination on October 29, 2025. (D.

1, p. 2). As a correctional officer, Neisler’s duties included conducting headcounts, patrolling

cellblocks, maintaining discipline, and escorting or transporting inmates to court, medical

facilities, or other correctional institutions. Id. at pp. 2–3.

Neisler has narcolepsy, which she alleges causes loss of sleep and lack of concentration,

which substantially limits her neurological and brain function. Id. at p. 3. Despite this condition,

Neisler alleges that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without

reasonable accommodation. Id. After being hired, Neisler completed field training on a rotating

schedule with both day and night shifts without issue. Id. After field training, Neisler was

1 The following factual allegations are drawn from the Complaint. (D. 1). At this stage, the Court accepts all well-

pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true. See Sung Park v. Ind. Univ. Sch. of Dentistry, 692 F.3d 828, 830 (7th

Cir. 2012).

permanently assigned to the night shift, which she attempted to work despite the impact the

overnight schedule had on her medical condition. Id. Shortly thereafter, another correctional

officer, Brianna Osenga, reportedly informed Defendant’s management that she wished to switch

her day shifts with Neisler’s night shift. Id. at p. 4. Livingston County, however, denied the

requested shift change. Id.

As her symptoms worsen due to her overnight schedule, Neisler requested assignment to

the day shift as a reasonable accommodation to perform her job while managing her disability. Id.

In support, Neisler provided documentation from her neurologist. Id. Livingston County

repeatedly sought additional medical documentation supporting the accommodation request, and

Neisler provided updates. Id. Ultimately, the neurologist opined that Neisler could perform her job

duties, work twelve hours per day and five days per week, and required only a day-shift restriction.

Id.

Livingston County rejected the medical documentation from Neisler’s doctor and instead

focused on whether her neurologist would certify her ability to carry and use a firearm. Id. at p. 5.

The neurologist declined to make such a determination because it was outside her specialty. Id.

Livingston County offered no alternative reasonable accommodation and required Neilser to use

accrued leave while the accommodation process remained unresolved. Id. Neilser alleges that

similarly situated correctional officers, including Brianna Osenga and Emily Miller, received

reasonable accommodations, and that Officer Gregory McNeil and Sergeant Handegan were

permitted to work with restrictions. Id.

On October 20, 2025, Neilser followed up on her accommodation request. Id. Despite the

medical documentation and her alleged ability to perform essential duties, her accommodation

request was denied. Id. at p. 6. On October 27, 2025, Neisler submitted another accommodation

request to work the day shift, which Livingston County rejected without further engaging “in a

good-faith interactive process.” Id. Livingston County then terminated Neisler’s employment on

October 29, 2025. Id. The termination letter cited the permanence of Neisler’s medical condition

and asserted that accommodating her day shift restriction would create an undue hardship. Id.

Neisler alleges that her termination was based on her disability, and her engagement in a protected

activity, and that Livingston County failed to engage in an interactive process as required by the

ADA.

After filing an EEOC charge and receiving a right to sue letter, (D. 1-2; D. 1-3), Neisler

filed this case under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,

(“ADA”) for failure to accommodate, disability-based discrimination, disability-based

harassment, and retaliation. (D. 1, p. 1). Livingston County now moves to dismiss the Complaint

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because the Sheriff, not the County, is Neisler’s

employer. The matter is fully briefed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the factual

allegations must be sufficient to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon

which it rests and must contain sufficient factual allegations, accepted as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007);

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion a court will

treat all allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable factual inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor. Kahn v. Walmart Inc., 107 F.4th 585, 593–94 (7th Cir. 2024). This standard is

met when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Bilek v.

Fed. Ins. Co., 8 F.4th 581, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2021).

III. DISCUSSION

At issue whether Neisler has named the correct defendant. It is Livingston County’s

position that it should be dismissed because the Livingston County Sheriff’s Office, not the

County, was Neisler’s employer. Livingston County argues the relevant statutory and case law

framework establishes that the Sheriff operates independently of the County and has exclusive

control over the Sheriff’s Office’s personnel. (D. 9, p. 3). Therefore, the Sheriff makes the

employment decisions regarding its correctional officers, and Livingston County cannot be held

liable as Neisler’s employer. Id. at pp. 3–4 (citing Young v. Peoria County, 2017 WL 3741551

(C.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2017)).

According to Livingston County, under Illinois law a sheriff is responsible for operating

the county jail and controlling the internal operations of his office. (D. 9, p. 3) (citing 730 ILCS

125/3 and 55 ILCS 5/3-6018). Livingston County also argues that Seventh Circuit precedent

repeatedly recognizes that Illinois’ sheriffs are independently elected officials not subject to county

control, and that counties cannot be held liable for a sheriff’ decisions or its personnel. Id. (citing

Ryan v. County of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995), Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682,

686 (7th Cir. 1998), and Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir. 1989)).

In response, Neisler argues that multiple entities can qualify as an employer, and an entity’s

control over the challenged act is central. (D. 12, p. 1) (citing Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d

1074, 1088–89 (7th Cir. 2008)). Neisler contends that she has sufficiently claimed that Livingston

County had such control over the above conduct and highlights her allegations that Livingston

County controlled: the challenged shift assignments, accommodation request process, her removal

from work, and then termination. Id. at pp. 2, 5. She argues that at this stage the Court must accept

those allegations as true and therefore dismissal is unwarranted.

Neisler also asserts that the cases relied on by Livingston County are inapposite because

they involve respondeat superior or municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and do not govern

the ADA’s employer analysis. Id. at p. 2. She argues she does not seek to impose ADA liability

based solely on a principal–agent or funding relationship, but on alleged direct control over the

challenged acts; thus, she argues, dismissal should be denied.

Alternatively, if the Court finds that Livingston County is not the proper employer under

the ADA, Neisler requests the Court grant her leave to amend the Complaint to add the Livingston

County Sheriff under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15 and 21. Neisler points to the EEOC

charge in support of allowing leave to amend because it states that she was a correctional officer

for Livingston County Sheriff’s Office and uses the Sheriff’s Office address and phone number,

and describes the same accommodation request and termination. She also notes that Livingston

County acknowledged that it may still be a necessary indemnifying party in its Motion to Dismiss.

(D. 9, fn. 1). Therefore, Livingston County should not be removed from this action entirely.

A. Employer under the ADA:

Title I of the ADA prohibits a “covered entity” from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified

individual on the basis of disability in regard to…discharge of employees, employee

compensation…and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. §

12112(a). A “covered entity” is defined as “an employer, employment agency, labor organization,

or joint labor-management committee.” Id. at § 12111(2). The Seventh Circuit has held that only

those who meet the ADA’s definition of “employer” can be held liable under the ADA. U.S.

E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Inc., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279 (7th Cir. 1995). “This is a pure

question of law.” Id.

The ADA defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who

has 15 or more employees for each working day…and any agent of such person.” 42 U.S.C. §

12111(5)(A) (emphasis added). The ADA’s definition of “employer” is the same as Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s definitions, and

courts “routinely apply arguments regarding employer liability to all three statutes

interchangeably.” AIC Sec. Investigations, Inc., 55 F.3d at 1279–80. Under those statutes, the

definition of “employer” includes the employer’s agents and, therefore, general common law

agency principles apply. See Mateau–Anderegg v. Sch. Dist. of Whitefish Bay, 304 F.3d 618, 623

(7th Cir.2002) (“Courts are to interpret Title VII “based on agency principles.”).

Here, the EEOC charge states that Neisler worked as a correctional officer for the

Livingston County Sheriff’s Office. (D. 1-2). The Complaint and EEOC charge both state that

Defendant’s address is 844 W. Lincoln Street, Pontiac, Illinois, 61764, which is the address for the

Livingston County Sheriff’s Office. (D. 1, ¶ 9); (D. 1-2).2 Thus, Neisler may only bring an ADA

claim against Livingston County only if she sufficiently alleges an agency relationship between

the County and the Sheriff’s Office. Neisler argues that she sufficiently alleged in the Complaint

that the County, rather than the Sheriff, had control over the discriminatory conduct and, at this

stage, the Court must accept those allegations as true. The Court disagrees.

“The federal courts look to state law to determine if a defendant is amenable to suit.”

DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County, 209 F.3d 973, 976 n. 2 (7th Cir.2000). The Illinois County

Jail Act and related statutes grant control of the internal operations of the Sheriff’s Office to the

2 Neisler initially attempted service on Livingston County at the Livingston County Sheriff’s Office, 844 W. Lincoln

Street, Pontiac, Illinois, 61764, (D. 7); and later effected service on Livingston County at 112 W. Madison Street,

Pontiac, Illinois, 61764. (D. 10). The later address is not mentioned in the EEOC charge or the Complaint.

Sheriff. See 55 ILCS 5/3–6018; 730 ILCS 125/2. The Sheriff is an independently-elected

constitutional officer who answers only to the electorate and is not subject to the control of the

county. See Ill. Const. Art. VII, § 4(c); see also Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180, 1187 (7th Cir.

1989); Ryan v. Cnty. of DuPage, 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995). Here, there are no allegations

that the County and the Sheriff jointly controlled the Sheriff’s internal operations, or that an

employment relationship existed between them to support respondeat superior. See Moy v. County

of Cook, 640 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ill.1994); see also Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682, 685–86 (7th

Cir. 1998) (explaining Moy “distinguished county employees, who are closely controlled by the

county board, from county officers, like the sheriff, over whom the county board has little control.

Thus, the county’s liability extended only to county employees and not to independent county

officers.”).

Thus, the Court dismisses Neisler’s ADA claims against the County because they are

unsustainable absent an employment or agency relationship between the County and the Sheriff.

B. Leave to Amend and Add Party:

Alternatively, Neisler asks for leave to amend to substitute the Livingston County Sheriff

as the proper defendant without altering any claims or facts, and to add a claim for indemnification

against Livingston County under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B) and 21. Rule

15(a)(1)(B) provides that a plaintiff may file an amended complaint as matter of law within “21

days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule

12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A)–(B). Neisler, however, did not

file an amended complaint within that time period. Neisler may still amend her Complaint with

the Court’s leave under Rule 15(a)(2), which the Court “should freely give leave when justice so

requires.” Id. at 15(a)(2). Additionally, the Seventh Circuit Court has repeatedly held that a

plaintiff should be given at least one opportunity to amend her complaint before dismissal with

prejudice. See Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago & Nw. Indiana, 786

F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015).

As Neisler pointed out, the EEOC charge was addressed to the Livingston County Sheriff’s

Office, indicating it was put on notice of this charge. Livingston County’s Motion to Dismiss also

acknowledges that it may be a necessary party as an indemnifier. (D. 9, p. 4, fn.1). Accordingly,

the Court grants Neisler leave to amend to substitute the Livingston County Sheriff as the proper

defendant for her ADA claims and to add a claim for indemnification against Livingston County.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Livingston County’s [9] Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend is also GRANTED. The Complaint is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within

twenty-one (21) days to substitute the Livingston County Sheriff as defendant and to add a claim

for indemnification against Livingston County, consistent with this Order.

ENTERED September 1, 2026.

/s/ Michael M. Mihm

United States District Judge