Opinion

Court: District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
Filed: Sep 1, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases

The opinion

United States District Court

for the Northern District of Oklahoma

Case No. 24-cv-504-JDR-JFJ

RJY Properties, LLC; RJY Construction, LLC; Robbi Jill

Young,

Plaintiffs,

versus

Energy One Federal Credit Union; Pearl District

Federal Credit Union; Unknown Members of the Board

of Directors of Energy One Federal Credit Union;

Unknown Members of the Board of Directors of Pearl

District Federal Credit Union,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Robbi Jill Young and her two real-estate investment compa-

nies, RJY Properties, LLC and RJY Construction, LLC, allege that Defend-

ant Energy One Federal Credit Union wrongfully forced her to refinance two

loans she held with Defendant Pearl District Credit Union. Dkt. 2 at 12-17.1

Two motions are pending. First, Energy One moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first

amended complaint. Dkt. 31. Plaintiffs then sought leave to file a second

amended complaint. Dkt. 35. The Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion to amend

their claims for tortious interference with contract, negligence and gross neg-

ligence, recission for duress, quiet title, and civil conspiracy and denies the

motion to amend all other claims. The Court directs Plaintiffs to file a second

1 All citations use CM/ECF pagination.

No. 24-cv-504

amended complaint including only the surviving claims by September 21,

2026.

Ms. Young is an attorney from Texas who owns two real-estate invest-

ment companies, RJY Properties and RJY Construction. Dkt. 35-2 at 2-3.

These companies own properties in Tulsa and Oklahoma City. Id. at 16. To

acquire and develop those properties, Ms. Young borrowed $1.2 million from

Pearl District in two loans in May of 2022. Id. at 6-7. The first loan was due

on May 5, 2023; the second on June 30, 2037. Id.

Pearl District’s president and board of directors approved both loans,

which were secured by life insurance policies on Ms. Young as part of “a com-

mon lending practice for Pearl District.” Id. at 7. After Pearl District issued

the loans, a third-party auditor conducted an audit of Pearl District’s loan

portfolio. Id. at 8. The auditor questioned Pearl District’s president about the

two loans but did not find any wrongdoing. Id. at 8-9. Later, the National

Credit Union Administration audited Pearl District and determined that the

two loans to Ms. Young were not permitted by Pearl District’s charter. Id. at

Energy One reached out to Pearl District in a bid to merge the credit

unions. Id. at 9-10. During merger negotiations, Pearl District disclosed Ms.

Young’s loans and provided Energy One with her private financial infor-

mation. Id. at 10-11. Plaintiffs allege that Pearl District’s officers and board

members then “abdicated their authority” to Energy One and permitted En-

ergy One’s CEO, Steve McNabb, to administer Pearl District before the mer-

ger concluded. Id. at 10.

2 The following section summarizes the allegations as stated in Ms. Young’s pro-

posed second amended complaint [Dkt. 35-2]. The Court accepts these facts as true solely

for purposes of this order. See Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010).

No. 24-cv-504

Mr. McNabb contacted Ms. Young and told her that her loans were

illegal, that Pearl District would not renew the loans, and that they had to be

“rewritten and collateralized by Ms. Young’s Oklahoma real estate portfolio”

before their maturity date. Id. at 11-12. Ms. Young responded that she would

not be able to find a new lender in that period. Id. at 12. Mr. McNabb replied

that the first loan was already in default “on his recommendation” and the

second would be accelerated and called due early “at his direction.” Id.

When Ms. Young responded that refinancing both loans would be im-

possible, Mr. McNabb offered to have Energy One refinance the loans and

secure them against Ms. Young’s real estate portfolio, but he warned that

consequences of a failure to refinance, including bankruptcy, “would be prob-

lematic for [Ms. Young’s] licenses and employment.” Id. Ms. Young deter-

mined that there was no option but to refinance with Energy One. Id. at 14-

15.

During the refinancing negotiation, Energy One accused Ms. Young

of committing fraud and deceiving Pearl District. Id. at 14. Energy One stated

that “if Ms. Young wanted to avoid issues with her law, insurance, and secu-

rities licenses, she had to move her personal loans to Energy One and collat-

eralize” them with her real estate assets. Id. It also informed Ms. Young that

her friend and Pearl District’s CEO, Linda Curtis, was under a fraud investi-

gation, and “the best way for Ms. Young to help her was to refinance both

personal loans with Energy One and agree to collateralize them against prop-

erties owned by her other companies.” Id.

Ms. Young believed that she would lose her law, securities, and insur-

ance licenses unless she refinanced her loans, and saw “no reasonable alter-

native” to doing so. Id. at 14-15. She refinanced the loans with Energy One in

two term notes for a total loan amount of $1.2 million. Id. at 15-16. These

loans were secured by sixteen properties owned by RJY Properties in Tulsa

and Oklahoma City and a life insurance policy on Ms. Young. Id.

No. 24-cv-504

The new loans carried higher interest rates than the original loans, and

Ms. Young’s payments increased by $6,651.71 a month. Id. at 18. Because

Energy One has refused collateral substitutions, Ms. Young has been forced

to sell 19 of her 26 properties. Id. at 18-19.

Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint.

Dkt. 31. Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint. Dkt. 35. Defendants op-

pose Plaintiffs’ amendment as being unduly delayed and futile. Dkt. 36.

Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend is governed by Rule 15(a)(2) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a party to file an

amended complaint with either leave of the Court or the opposing party’s

written consent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Although Energy One objects to Plaintiffs’

proposed amendment, Rule 15(a)(2) states that the Court “should freely give

leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” But Rule 15(a)(2) does not require

the Court to accept all amendments. It is within the Court’s discretion to

deny Plaintiffs leave to amend based on, among other reasons, “undue delay,”

“failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,” or “futility

of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Leave to amend

may be denied for futility and failure to cure deficiencies even when an

amendment restates a claim in the original complaint. LaFleur v. Teen Help,

342 F.3d 1145, 1154 (10th Cir. 2003).

The Court will address the motion to amend, treating Defendants’ re-

sponse in much the same way that it would a motion to dismiss. The Court

will accept allegations in the proposed second amended complaint as true,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and will consider

whether the amended allegations, if true, would state a claim for relief. The

Court will deny leave to amend any futile proposed claims.

Energy One argues that Plaintiffs’ motion to amend should be denied

because (a) the amendment is based on information that Plaintiffs “knew or

No. 24-cv-504

should have known” when they filed their previous complaint, (b) the pro-

posed amended complaint fails to appropriately identify the parties at fault

for each claim in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and that (c)

Plaintiffs’ claims are all futile for the reasons stated in Defendants’ motion to

dismiss. Dkt. 36. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ motion is timely and

comports with Rule 8. The Court agrees that portions of the proposed

amended complaint would be futile and grants the motion to amend [Dkt. 35]

only the claims for tortious interference with contractual relations, negli-

gence, recission for duress, quiet title, and civil conspiracy.

Energy One first argues that the motion to amend is untimely because

Plaintiffs “either knew or should have known” the new factual allegations

well before they requested to amend. Dkt. 36 at 4. Defendants argue that Ms.

Young “failed to exercise reasonable diligence in contacting [Ms. Curtis]” in

the seventeen months since the filing of her original complaint. Id. at 5. Plain-

tiffs respond that they sought the documents from Ms. Curtis after receipt of

Energy One’s motion to dismiss because those “nonpublic corporate govern-

ance records” were responsive to that motion. Dkt. 37 at 4. Plaintiffs argue

they had “no legal or practical means of obtaining them prior to their volun-

tary disclosure.” Id.

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. A plaintiff is not required to turn over

every rock in search of evidence before starting the discovery process. Plain-

tiffs obtained documents informing them of new facts in the course of discov-

ery, and there is no evidence that those documents could have been obtained

from a reasonably diligent search of records accessible to Plaintiffs. See Evans

v. McDonald’s Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting plaintiffs are

not required “to have every legal theory or fact developed in detail before the

complaint is filed and the parties have opportunity for discovery”). Procedur-

ally, the parties are still in the early stages of this lawsuit, and the Court will

No. 24-cv-504

not hold a delay in seeking voluntary information from a third party against

Plaintiffs because it implicates no prejudice or surprise against Energy One.

Second, Energy One argues that Plaintiffs’ proposed amended com-

plaint is a “shotgun pleading” prohibited by Rule 8, which requires a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Energy One argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to

adequately specify which facts apply to which claims and which parties. Dkt.

36 at 6 (citing Fawley v. Lucero, No. 22-2091, 2023 WL 2487323, at *2 (10th

Cir. Mar. 14, 2023)).

Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint satisfies Rule 8. It is entirely

unlike the complaint at issue in Fawley, where the court “could not discern,

either from the amended complaint or from the numerous filings that accom-

panied it, what statutes Mr. Fawley was relying on for relief, what role the

named defendants played, or even what relief he sought.” 2023 WL 2487323,

at *2. Plaintiffs’ claims are clear, specify which defendants they allege are li-

able for which claims, and clearly state the roles the defendants played. Dkt.

34-2. Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint is not a shotgun pleading and

does not violate Rule 8.

Finally, Energy One argues that Plaintiffs’ motion to amend should be

denied as futile. Dkt. 36 at 7-14. Amendment is futile when the amended com-

plaint “would be subject to dismissal” under Rule 12(b)(6). Mountain View

Pharmacy v. Abbott Lab’ys, 630 F.2d 1383, 1389 (10th Cir. 1980). To resolve

Plaintiffs’ motion to amend, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs’

proposed pleading sets forth sufficient factual allegations “to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007). “The allegations must be enough that, if assumed to be true, the

plaintiff plausibly (not just speculatively) has a claim for relief.” Robbins v.

No. 24-cv-504

Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008). In other words, the Court

must determine whether, taking all well-pleaded allegations as true, the com-

plaint provides a “reason to believe that [Plaintiffs] has a reasonable likeli-

hood of mustering factual support for [their] claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk,

L.L.C. v. Schnieder, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).3

Energy One argues that Plaintiffs’ proposed pleading fails to state a

claim for fraud or fraudulent inducement. Dkt. 36 at 6. To state a claim for

fraud, the proposed pleading must allege that (1) a Defendant made a false

material misrepresentation which (2) the Defendant either knew to be false

or made recklessly or without knowledge of the truth, (3) with intent that Ms.

Young act upon it, and (4) upon which Ms. Young relied to her own detri-

ment. T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Lincoln Elec. Automation, Inc., No. 21-cv-153-

GKF-JFJ, 2022 WL 16842907, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2022) (citing Bow-

man v. Presley, 2009 OK 48, ¶ 8, 212 P.3d 1210, 1217). Fraud must be pleaded

with particularity, and “must specify the source, time, place, manner and

content of allegedly fraudulent representations, and the consequences

thereof.” Id. at *7.

Plaintiffs allege two separate fraudulent acts. First, they allege that

“Pearl District . . . represented that Ms. Young’s personal and loan infor-

mation would be kept confidential and would not be disclosed or used except

as permitted by law and for her benefit.” Dkt. 35-2 at 19-20. But Plaintiffs do

not allege that Pearl District either knew the statement to be false or made it

recklessly or without knowledge of the truth, nor do they specify the source,

3 Energy One’s arguments largely restate those raised in its pending motion to dis-

miss. Dkt. 36 at 7-13; Dkt. 31. Plaintiffs respond that “futility warrants denial of leave to

amend only where the proposed amendment would be subject to dismissal as a matter of

law.” Dkt. 37 at 7 (citing Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc.,

175 F.3d 848, 859 (10th Cir. 1999)). But Jefferson County requires this Court to “consider

the sufficiency of the [amended] claims.” 175 F.3d at 859 (emphasis added). The Court must

therefore apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.

No. 24-cv-504

time, place, manner, or content of Pearl District’s allegedly fraudulent repre-

sentations. T.D. Williamson, 2022 WL 16842907, at *7.

Second, Plaintiffs allege that “Energy One, directly and through coor-

dinated conduct with Pearl District, represented by omission and implication

that its communications with Ms. Young were independent, voluntary lend-

ing discussions untainted by improper access to her confidential information”

and “failed to disclose material facts.” Dkt. 35-2 at 19-20. Although it is true

that concealment of material facts can constitute a basis for fraud, for a party

to conceal “there must be something more than mere silence, or a mere fail-

ure to disclose known facts.” Gibson v. Mendenhall, 1950 OK 276, ¶ 10, 224

P.2d 251, 254. Plaintiffs do not allege anything further than Energy One’s and

Pearl District’s silence about third-party access to her confidential infor-

mation. And Plaintiffs do not “specify the source, time, place, manner, and

content of [Pearl District’s or Energy One’s] allegedly fraudulent representa-

tions” or allege that they were known to be false at the time. T.D. Williamson,

2022 WL 16842907, at *7.

Plaintiffs did not plead sufficient facts to state a claim for fraud or

fraudulent inducement, and they did not plead their claims with particularity

as required by Rule 9. Plaintiffs’ fraud claims are subject to dismissal. Amend-

ment is thus futile.

Energy One argues that Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint fails

to establish a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Dkt. 36 at 7-8. Plaintiffs assert

two theories to support their claim: first, that 12 C.F.R. § 701.4 “required the

officers and directors of Energy One to uphold duties of care in guiding Ms.

Young,” and second, that Pearl District “owed fiduciary duties to the credit

union and, under these facts, special duties to a member-borrower whose

confidential financial information [it] controlled.” Dkt. 35-2 at 21-22.

No. 24-cv-504

The Court has already addressed and rejected Plaintiffs’ first theory

in its prior order to dismiss. Section 701.4 creates a fiduciary duty between

the directors of a credit union and the credit union membership as a whole.

It does not create a particularized fiduciary duty to individual credit union

members. Dkt. 26 at 9-11. Plaintiffs cannot state a claim for relief on this basis.

For Plaintiffs’ second theory, mere possession of another’s confiden-

tial financial information is not sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship.

Under Oklahoma law, a lender does not have a fiduciary relationship with its

debtors or customers unless the parties have expressly agreed in writing to

have that relationship. Okla. Stat. tit. 6, § 425. Accepting Plaintiffs’ theory

that Pearl District had a fiduciary responsibility over Ms. Young’s confiden-

tial financial information would mean that, despite Okla. Stat. tit. 6, § 425’s

broad prohibition on fiduciary duties, every lender in the state who has con-

trol over a debtor’s financial information would owe that debtor a fiduciary

duty. The Court does not read § 425 as permitting the everyday business of

lending to subject a creditor to a fiduciary responsibility with its debtors. Do-

ing so would run directly counter to the Legislature’s words. Ms. Young’s

proposed amended complaint does not state a claim for breach of any cog-

nizable fiduciary duty and is therefore futile.

Next, Energy One argues that Plaintiffs’ proposed pleading does not

state a claim for tortious interference with contract. Dkt. 36 at 7-8. To state

this claim, the Plaintiffs must allege facts to establish that Defendants inter-

fered with “an existing contractual or business right,” that “such interference

was malicious and wrongful,” that “the interference was neither justified,

privileged nor excusable,” and that the interference proximately caused dam-

ages to the Plaintiffs. Wilspec Techs., Inc. v. DunAn Holding Grp., Co., 2009

OK 12, ¶ 15, 204 P.3d 69, 74.

No. 24-cv-504

Energy One argues that Plaintiffs cannot show that it interfered with

Ms. Young’s loans by placing them in default because Ms. Young was already

in breach of those loans. Dkt. 31 at 18. But this is a factual argument relying

on evidence from outside the four corners of the complaint—namely, the al-

leged preexisting breach of the agreement. The Court cannot consider extrin-

sic evidence of Ms. Young’s alleged breach when determining whether she

has stated a claim for relief, and so this argument does not support futility.

Energy One also argues that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Energy

One’s “primary intent” was to interfere with Ms. Young’s contractual rights.

Dkt. 31 at 19 (citing Morrow Dev. Corp. v. Am. Bank & Tr. Co., 1994 OK 26, ¶

10, 875 P.2d 411, 417). In Morrow, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a

party’s justifiable efforts to protect its own economic interests rendered a re-

quest for additional security privileged and not improper because the intent

of the interference was for self-protection. Id. In this case, Plaintiffs have al-

leged that Energy One induced Pearl District to declare her loans in default

for its own benefit. Dkt. 35-2 at 16-17.

Morrow’s procedural posture was far afield from this case; it consid-

ered a denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, not a mo-

tion to dismiss. 1994 OK ¶ 5, 875 P.2d at 414. It held that because the plaintiff

was not able to show evidence of improper intent at trial, judgment notwith-

standing the verdict should have been granted. Id. ¶ 1, 875 P.2d at 412. Im-

proper intent is a factual determination best dealt with at summary judgment

or trial, not on a motion to dismiss. Considering only the four corners of the

complaint, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Energy One had the pri-

mary intent of interfering with Ms. Young’s contractual rights, and Energy

One’s fact-based defense could not support dismissal. This claim is thus not

futile.

No. 24-cv-504

Energy One argues that Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint does

not state a claim for “Wrongful Declaration of Default, Coercion, and Forced

Refinancing.” Dkt. 37 at 8. Plaintiffs admit that this is not a viable separate

cause of action. Dkt. 32 at 6. But the proposed amended complaint includes

the heading “E. Wrongful Declaration of Default, Coercion, and Forced Re-

financing” in the same style as Plaintiffs’ substantive claims. Dkt. 35-2 at 26.

For avoidance of doubt, the Court concludes, based on the parties’ state-

ments, that amendment to include this claim would be futile.

Energy One next argues that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for vio-

lations of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act. The OCPA “provides an

aggrieved consumer a private right of action against a person who engages in

an unlawful practice.” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Hill, 2023 OK 86, ¶ 22, 540

P.3d 1, 10. But “[a]ctions or transactions regulated under laws administered

by . . . any other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of

this state or the United States” are exempt from the OCPA. Okla. Stat. tit. 15,

§ 754.2. Energy One is a credit union subject to regulation by the National

Credit Union Administration. Pearl District was likewise regulated by the

NCUA. Pearl District’s loans to Ms. Young were regulated by both the

NCUA and the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1757 et seq. Plaintiffs’

claims therefore fall under the exemption in Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 754.2. The

OCPA thus does not apply to the facts of this case. Plaintiffs’ proposed

amended complaint is futile on this count.

Next, Energy One asserts that Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence and

gross negligence4 are futile because Energy One and Pearl District only owed

4 Under Oklahoma law, claims for negligence and gross negligence differ “only in

degree.” Mike v. Pro. Clinical Lab’y, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1204 n.8 (N.D. Okla.).

No. 24-cv-504

Ms. Young contractual duties and not a duty of care. Dkt. 36 at 10. Plaintiffs

respond that “Oklahoma law recognizes that a special relationship and corre-

sponding duty of care arise when a lender goes beyond arm’s-length trading

and undertakes to advise or guide a borrower’s financial decisions.” Dkt. 32

at 11 (citing Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 1988 OK 36, ¶ 12, 756 P.2d 1223, 1226).

But Oklahoma law does not extend “an implied duty to deal fairly and act in

good faith” to every commercial lending transaction because “[t]o impose

tort liability on a bank for every breach of contract would only serve to chill

commercial transactions.” Rodgers, 1988 OK ¶ 16, 756 P.2d at 1227. But even

so, “gross recklessness or wanton negligence on behalf of a party to a contract

may call for an application of the theory of tortious breach of contract.” Id.

(emphasis added).

Rodgers found no implied duty in an ordinary commercial lending

agreement with “arms-length negotiati[on]” and “relatively equal bargaining

capacity.” Id. ¶ 15, 756 P.2d at 1226. But Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that En-

ergy One and Pearl District placed Ms. Young and her companies on a short

timeline, put Ms. Young’s licenses on the line, denied her prior notice, and

gave her only a 40-day window to refinance over a million dollars’ worth of

loans. Dkt. 35-2 at 12-16. Assuming all of Plaintiffs’ allegations are true, as the

Court must when considering a motion to dismiss, a factfinder could deter-

mine that Defendants’ actions went so far beyond the mine-run of ordinary

commercial lending transactions that it created a duty of care, particularly in

light of the difference in “bargaining capacity” between them. Rodgers, 1988

OK ¶ 15, 756 P.2d at 1226. This is ultimately a factual question that cannot be

resolved on a motion to dismiss. Consequently, amendment to include this

claim is not futile.

Next, Energy One states that Plaintiffs’ amended pleading does not

state a claim under the Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act. Dkt. 36 at 10-11. To

state a claim under the OARA, a plaintiff must show that the defendant

No. 24-cv-504

engaged in anticompetitive conduct constituting an “unreasonable restraint

of trade.” Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1548

(10th Cir. 1996). That anticompetitive conduct “must have an effect greater

than its effect upon the plaintiff’s business” and thus a plaintiff “must show

that the challenged conduct adversely impacts competition in general.” Id.

The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs’ proposed amended

complaint does not assert allegations to indicate that Ms. Young tried to seek

or obtain third-party financing, that she was restrained from doing so, or that

Defendants’ actions had an anticompetitive impact greater than the scope of

Plaintiffs’ business. Plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint does not state an

OARA claim upon which relief could be granted.

Next, Energy One argues that Plaintiffs’ amended pleading does not

state a claim for recission of the loan agreement or to quiet title. The Court

disagrees. Plaintiffs argue recission is appropriate because Ms. Young’s con-

sent was obtained through fraudulent inducement, she was coerced into the

agreement, and the loan agreements were procured through conduct that vi-

olated Oklahoma statutory law and public policy. Dkt. 35-2 at 35.5 Ms. Young

therefore asserts that her consent is voidable.

Plaintiff’s coercion argument passes muster. For a contract to be re-

scindable for duress, a party must show that its consent was induced “under

circumstances depriving one of the exercise of a free will.” Centric Corp. v.

Morrison-Knudsen Co., 1986 OK 83, ¶ 9, 731 P.2d 411, 415. This requires “a

wrongful act” that was “sufficiently coercive to cause the [plaintiff], faced

5 The Court has already addressed why Plaintiffs’ fraud and state statutory law

claims are futile, see Sections II-C-1, II-C-5 and II-C-7, supra, and neither Plaintiffs’ pro-

posed amended complaint nor their response to the motion to dismiss make it clear what

public policy they allege supports their recission theory. Dkts. 32, 35-2. Consequently, the

Court only considers Plaintiffs’ coercion argument.

No. 24-cv-504

with no reasonable alternative, to succumb to the [defendant’s] pressure.” Id.

¶ 12, 731 P.2d at 415-16.

An act need not be “illegal” to be “wrongful” or “unlawful.” Id. ¶ 23,

731 P.2d at 419. It need only “present[] an unreasonable alternative to the

weaker party within a bargaining situation, . . . even if there was a legal right

to perform the threatened act.” What makes a coercer’s conduct wrongful is

that “the threatened party was forced to accept the contract.” Id. The act

must leave “no adequate legal remedy nor reasonable alternative available.”

Id. ¶ 14, 731 P.2d at 416. For a wrongful act to deprive a party of free will, it

must (a) be initiated by the coercing party, (b) be committed with knowledge

of the impact it would have, (c) be made for the purpose of and be reasonably

adequate to secure coercion, and (d) result in the coercing party obtaining

undue advantage over the other party. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that Energy One reviewed Ms. Young’s financial in-

formation, induced Pearl District to call her loans due early and classify one

as in default, and “design[ed] refinancing terms that effectively left Ms.

Young with no practical choice but to refinance with Energy One.” Dkt. 35-2

at 15. Taking all of these facts as true, a reasonable factfinder could find that

Energy One intentionally left Ms. Young without a reasonable alternative or

adequate legal remedy, and consequently that the new contract was formed

under duress. This claim is not futile, and, consequently, neither is Plaintiffs’

suit to quiet title.

Next, Energy One argues that Plaintiffs’ claim for civil conspiracy is

futile, arguing that without an underlying unlawful act, there cannot be a con-

spiracy. Dkt. 36 at 12 (citing Gaylord Entertainment v. Thompson, 1998 OK 30,

¶¶ 39-43, 958 P.2d 128, 148-49). But Gaylord Entertainment dealt with a situ-

ation where the civil conspiracy claim was based on a defamation claim that

was dismissed because of the protections granted by the First Amendment.

No. 24-cv-504

1998 OK ¶ 42, 958 P.2d at 148-49. But Plaintiffs have levied several claims

which can survive a motion to dismiss. See Sections II-C-3, II-C-6, and II-C-

8, supra. At the very least, tortious interference with contract alleges an un-

lawful act. Niemeyer v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 1990 OK 32, ¶ 4, 789 P.2d 1318,

1320 (holding that “[a]ny malicious interference . . . is an unlawful act and an

actionable wrong”). Plaintiffs’ claim for civil conspiracy is not futile.

Last, Energy One argues that Plaintiffs cannot assert a claim for a de-

claratory judgment. But as this Court has recently held, a court may not dis-

miss a request for declaratory judgment under Rule 12(b)(6) because “the

only issue on a motion [to] dismiss is whether the claim as stated would give

the plaintiff a right to any relief, rather than to the particular relief de-

manded.” Fralix v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Tulsa Cnty., Okla., No. 25-cv-633-

JDR-SH, 2026 WL 1694514, at *9 (N.D. Okla. June 11, 2026). Ms. Young’s

request for declaratory judgment is a part of her prayer for relief, not a sepa-

rate legal claim, and is thus not subject to a motion to dismiss. Ms. Young may

amend her complaint to include the request for declaratory judgment.

III

Ms. Young’s motion to amend [Dkt. 35] her claims for tortious inter-

ference, negligence, recission for duress, quiet title, and civil conspiracy is

granted. The Court denies the motion to amend all other claims. Although

only Energy One (which is Pearl District’s legal successor) has responded to

the claims, the opinions set forth in this opinion apply with equal force of the

unserved parties. Ms. Young is directed to file a new complaint containing

only the surviving claims against all Defendants by September 21, 2026. Once

Plaintiffs have done so, the Court will deny the pending motion to dismiss as

moot; if they do not file a new complaint by that date the Court will resume

consideration of the pending motion to dismiss.

No. 24-cv-504

DATED this 1st day of September 2026.

John D. Russell

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.