The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
TAKAYSIA COLLINS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00718-BL-SMD
)
STATE OF ALABAMA BOARD )
OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, )
)
Defendant. )
ORDER
Pending before the court is Defendant State of Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles’
(“Board”) Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 19). On July 9, 2026, the Magistrate Judge recommended
that the motion be granted as to Counts I, III, and V, and denied as to Counts II, IV, VI, VII, VIII,
and IX. (Doc. 24 at 23). The Board filed objections to the recommendation (doc. 25), and the
Plaintiff filed a partial objection to the recommendation (doc. 26).
I. Standard of Review
A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A district judge must
“make a de novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge’s] report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.”). A district court’s obligation to “make a
de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made” requires a district judge to “give fresh consideration
to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a party.” United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 673, 675 (1980) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in Raddatz).
II. Discussion
The Board objects to the Recommendation’s handling of the exhibits and its conclusions
with respect to the non-dismissed claims. The Plaintiff objects to the Recommendation’s dismissal
of Count I, her Title VII Sex/Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) Failure to Accommodate
claim.
A. The Board’s Exhibits
The Board argues that the “factual premise of the Recommendation completely ignores the
exhibits submitted by the Board without explanation.” (Doc. 25 at 2). The Board alleges that
those exhibits establish that Director Ward was the only person who could fire the Plaintiff, that
the Plaintiff was on probation and that that status impacts her claims, and that the Plaintiff’s named
co-workers had more seniority. The Board, relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(2), also
argues that the court “‘must’ take notice—particularly in light of [the] Plaintiff’s failure to make
an argument as to why they should not be subjected to such notice.” (Doc. 25 at 7).
“In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the district court may consider an extrinsic document
if it is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.” SFM Holdings,
Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010). Likewise, “a document
central to the complaint that the defense appends to its motion to dismiss is also properly
considered, provided that its contents are not in dispute.” Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802
n.2 (11th Cir. 1999). A properly considered document may be used “for the purpose of
determining what statements the documents contain and not to prove the truth of the documents’
contents.” Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999). Moreover, a
“court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
With its brief in support of its motion to dismiss, the Board attached an office lease
agreement, a lease concerning the parking deck, personnel records of two employees, and the
Plaintiff’s termination documents. (See Docs. 20-1, 20-2, 20-3, 20-4, 20-5). The termination letter
provides that the reason for the Plaintiff’s “separation is that [her] services [were] no longer
required.” (Doc. 20-5 at 2). However, the termination letter does not prove that this was the actual
reason for the Plaintiff’s termination. As stated by the Magistrate Judge, the Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint alleges that the Plaintiff “was informed that she was terminated for placing
her head on her desk, which violated policy.” (Doc. 24 at 3) (citing Doc. 17 at 9). Similarly, the
court finds that reliance on the Board’s remaining exhibits would create, rather than resolve,
disputes about seniority, qualification, or who influenced the termination decision.
The court notes that it has considered the Board’s exhibits and finds them to be non-
dispositive. Although the Magistrate Judge did not expressly discuss the Board’s exhibits, he
correctly stated that, at this stage, “the court must accept the complaint’s well-pleaded factual
allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” (Doc. 24 at 2
n.1). The court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly relied on the Second Amended
Complaint’s factual allegations and, as such, the Board’s objection is OVERRULED.
B. Administrative Exhaustion
The Board asserts that “[t]he most serious flaw in the Recommendation’s exhaustion
analysis is time.” (Doc. 25 at 12). The Board states that the EEOC Charge alleges that the harm
occurred on a single day, February 14, 2025, and that, if the Plaintiff was harmed at all, such harm
happened before February 14, 2025. (Doc. 25 at 12-13). The court is not persuaded.
As noted by the Magistrate Judge, “[a] plaintiff’s judicial complaint is limited by the scope
of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.” Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 589 n.8 (11th Cir. 1994). Still, “the
scope of an EEOC complaint should not be strictly interpreted.” Id. (citation omitted). “The facts
alleged in the charge matter most for determining what can reasonably be expected to grow out of
an EEOC charge” while “the legal theory the charging party articulates is far less important.”
Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 2022).
As noted by the Magistrate Judge, the EEOC Charge provides that the Plaintiff informed
the Board she was pregnant, requested that the Board provide her with a closer parking spot,
received a closer parking spot after speaking with another employee, was yelled at by Bradford for
going over his head, and was later investigated for laying her head on her desk despite having
permission to do so while on her scheduled break. (Doc. 24 at 7). The Magistrate Judge
determined that the “allegations contained within [the EEOC Charge] are sufficient to trigger an
EEOC investigation into whether the Board failed to accommodate [the Plaintiff’s] pregnancy-
related requests.” (Doc. 24 at 7). The court agrees. As stated above, the facts alleged in an EEOC
Charge “matter most for determining what can reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC
charge,” not how quickly the EEOC processed the Charge. Patterson, 38 F.4th at 1345 (emphasis
added). As such, the Board’s exhaustion objection is OVERRULED.
C. Qualification During Working-Test Period
The Board next argues that “[b]ecause [the] Plaintiff did not complete the working test
mandated by law, she was never qualified to be a pardons and parole specialist as a matter of law.”
(Doc. 25 at 6). Section 36-26-21 provides a working-test period which commences upon
appointment and continues not less than six months; during this test period, an appointing authority
may remove an employee if “the working test indicates that such employee is unable or unwilling
to perform his duties satisfactorily or that his habits and dependability do not merit his continuance
in the service.” Notably, Section 36-26-21 does not provide that an individual appointed to a
position is unqualified to hold or perform that position until the period ends.
The Board cites to Wright v. Southland Corporation for the proposition that “an individual
is qualified for a position if she meets the criteria the employer specifies for the position.” (Doc.
25 at 5) (citing Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1300 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999)). However,
the sentence associated with this footnote states “discrimination is possible despite the fact that the
person is not qualified for the relevant position.” Wright, 187 F.3d at 1300. Here, the Second
Amended Complaint alleges that the Board hired the Plaintiff as a Probation and Parole Specialist
and that the Plaintiff “was qualified for the position as she was already successfully performing
the position,” that she “was able to perform the essential functions of [her] job,” and that she was
told “there was nothing wrong with [her] work and that there were no missing files when [she]
turned her work in.” (Doc. 17 at 9, 13, 20). These allegations make it plausible that the Plaintiff
was at least somewhat qualified to perform the duties of a Probation and Parole Specialist, a job
for which she was hired by the Board. Moreover, the relevant working-test period statute
authorizes removal during the test period. It does not, however, establish that every employee
serving a working-test period is categorically unqualified. As such, the Board’s qualification
objections are OVERRULED.
D. Title VII/PDA Claims
1. Count I – Failure to Accommodate
The Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s analysis “under the McDonnell Douglas
evidentiary framework” rather than “the pleading standard as to whether the Plaintiff has alleged
a plausible claim.” (Doc. 26 at 2). The Plaintiff also asserts that “comparators are not required,
especially at the pleading stage, to allege Title VII violations.” (Doc. 26 at 3). While the Plaintiff
is correct, the PDA statute itself provides that pregnant employees “shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes … as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to the PDA statute,
the Plaintiff must allege facts that make the claim plausible. As the Magistrate Judge noted, the
Second Amended Complaint “fails to allege sufficient facts to show that the Board accommodated
non-pregnant employees ‘similar in their ability or inability to work,’ causing [the Plaintiff’s] Title
VII/PDA claim to fail.” (Doc. 24 at 10-11). The court agrees. Moreover, the court agrees with
the Magistrate Judge that the Plaintiff has failed to allege that other employees “had similar needs
for accommodation, requested accommodation for those needs, and were granted a parking
accommodation based on those needs.” As such, the Plaintiff’s objection is OVERRULLED.
2. Count II – Disparate Treatment
The Board argues that the Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to make it plausible that “the
Board’s disciplinary policies were applied differently to her.” (Doc. 25 at 20). Further, the Board
argues that the recommendation “imputes the lowest level supervisor’s animus onto the Board to
find that the [Second Amended Complaint] plausibly alleges intentional discrimination.” (Doc.
25 at 22). In her Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that Bradford “didn’t care [that
the Plaintiff] was pregnant,” denied her request for a closer parking spot, and told her to “get some
f**king work done since [she] want[ed] to go over [his] f**king head.” (Doc. 17 at 6-7). The
Plaintiff further alleges that after the incident, her “work started to be criticized, and she was
accused of files being missing,” and she was terminated after an investigation because “she
violated policy.” (Doc. 17 at 9-10). The Magistrate Judge found that this “sequence of events …
taken together, plausibly suggest intentional discrimination.” (Doc. 24 at 12). The court agrees.
The Supreme Court has held that “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by
[discriminatory] animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action,
and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable.”
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011) (emphasis in original). Likewise, “causation
may be established if the plaintiff shows that the decisionmaker followed the biased
recommendation without independently investigating the complaint against the employee.”
Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).
The Magistrate Judge noted that whether the Plaintiff “can ultimately establish intentional
discrimination is a question for summary judgment or trial.” (Doc. 24 at 12-13). The court finds
that the Plaintiff need not establish at the pleading stage that Bradford, or anyone else who
investigated the Plaintiff, caused Director Ward’s decision to terminate the Plaintiff. At the Rule
12(b)(6) stage, the court draws reasonable inferences from the Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint and whether Director Ward acted independently or relied on information provided to
him by Bradford is a factual question that remains a matter for discovery. The Magistrate Judge
found that the alleged sequence of events, “taken together, plausibly suggest[s] intentional
discrimination.” (Doc. 24 at 12). The court agrees. At this stage, the court will not determine
whether the Plaintiff will ultimately establish cat’s-paw liability, whether Bradford’s alleged
conduct proximately caused the termination, or whether Director Ward independently investigated
and made the termination decision. The Second Amended Complaint need only plausibly allege
a basis for relief at this stage. As such, the Board’s objection to Count II is OVERRULED.
E. Pregnancy Workers Fairness Act (“PWFA”) Claims
1. Count IV – Failure to Accommodate
The Board argues that “[a]s to the parking space, assuming there was a delay, it was far
shorter than the three-month delay approved by the Eleventh Circuit in the Rehabilitation Act
context” as discussed in Mullin v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 162 F.4th 1296,
1307-08 (11th Cir. 2025). (Doc. 25 at 23). The Board further states that “[i]t is unclear from the
Recommendation whether its conclusion regarding the sufficiency of the [Second Amended
Complaint]’s allegations relates to just the parking accommodation or the head-on-the-desk
accommodation.” (Doc. 25 at 23).
The PWFA makes it unlawful for an employer to “not make reasonable accommodations
to the known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions of a
qualified employee,” unless the employer demonstrates that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of its business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-1(1). “In assessing claims
of unreasonable delay, courts consider the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, whether
the employer has offered any alternative accommodations while evaluating a particular request,
and whether the employer has acted in good faith.” Mullin v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affs.,
162 F.4th 1296, 1307 (11th Cir. 2025) (internal citations omitted). The Mullin court found that a
three-month delay in granting a requested accommodation was not unreasonable because the
employer gave intermediate additional accommodations.
The court notes that Mullin does not make any delay shorter than three months reasonable
as a matter of law. In Mullin, the Eleventh Circuit evaluated a developed summary judgment
record and considered the length and reasons for the delay, interim accommodations, and the
employer’s good faith. Here, the Magistrate Judge found that “the fact that the parking
accommodation was ultimately granted after a delay does not necessarily defeat the claim.” (Doc.
24 at 16). The court agrees. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Plaintiff alleges that closer parking
spots were vacant, that Bradford denied her request, and no further interactive process occurred.
Thus, at this stage and on the alleged facts, the court will not determine the reasonableness of the
alleged delay as a matter of law.
The Plaintiff also alleges that she “asked her supervisor … if she could lay her head down
on her desk during her 15-minute breaks, to which she told her it was not a problem, it was her
break, and she could use her break how she wanted to.” (Doc. 17 at 5). The court notes that,
because the requested relief from the Plaintiff to rest her head on her desk was granted, it does not
support a failure-to-accommodate claim. Thus, the court finds that Count IV proceeds only on the
alleged delay in providing the Plaintiff with a closer parking spot. With that clarification, the
Board’s objection as to Count IV is OVERRULED.
2. Count VI – Retaliation
The Board argues that “Bradford did not and could not fire [the] Plaintiff as a matter of
law” and that the Second Amended Complaint “does not allege that Director Ward knew of [the]
Plaintiff’s pregnancy, her requested accommodations, or the actions of Bradford or anyone else
identified in the” Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 25 at 25). The Board relies on McCullough
v. Finley for the proposition that “[f]actual allegations, although consistent with a plaintiff’s
theory, may fail to state a plausible claim ‘given more likely explanations.’” 907 F.3d 1324, 1335
(11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)). The Board alleges that
Bradford cussed the Plaintiff because she went over his head and not because she requested an
accommodation. (Doc. 25 at 25).
The PWFA prohibits adverse action “on account of the employee requesting or using a
reasonable accommodation to the known limitations related to the pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions of the employee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000gg-1(5). The Magistrate Judge found that
the Second Amended Complaint “sufficiently alleges that [the Plaintiff] was terminated for
exercising the accommodation to lay her head on her desk and raises a reasonable inference that
she was terminated for requesting a parking accommodation.” (Doc. 24 at 17). The court agrees.
As stated above, the roles of Director Ward, Bradford, Hudson, and Ishman and who had influence
in the termination of the Plaintiff are factual questions that remain a matter for discovery. As such,
the Board’s objection to Count VI is OVERRULED.
F. Rehabilitation Act Claims
The Board alleges that “the Recommendation should have included in its analysis
Plaintiff’s status as a probationary employee in her working[-]test period” and that “the
Recommendation reached incorrect conclusions as to whether the [Second Amended Complaint]
pleads any Rehabilitation Act claims.” (Doc. 25 at 27). The Board argues that the Plaintiff must
allege her condition was “the sole reason” for the challenged termination and that the reasons for
the Plaintiff’s challenged termination cannot be imputed onto Director Ward. (Doc. 25 at 28-29).
As explained above, the court finds that the qualification argument fails.
1. Count VII – Failure to Accommodate
The Board states that it “raises an objection similar to the one it raised to the
Recommendation’s handing of the PWFA accommodation claim.” (Doc. 25 at 29). “[A]n
employer's failure to reasonably accommodate a disabled individual itself constitutes
discrimination under the ADA, so long as that individual is otherwise qualified, and unless the
employer can show undue hardship.” Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1262 (11th
Cir. 2007). Discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same standards
used in ADA cases. Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000).
For the reasons given in the court’s discussion of Count IV, the court finds that the alleged
parking delay states a plausible claim. Further, as stated above, because the requested relief from
the Plaintiff to rest her head on her desk was granted, it does not support a failure-to-accommodate
claim. Thus, the court finds that Count VII proceeds only on the alleged delay in providing the
Plaintiff with a closer parking spot. The Magistrate Judge found that the parking allegations were
“sufficient to plausibly allege the third element of a Rehabilitation Act failure-to-accommodate
claim.” (Doc. 24 at 20). The court agrees. Thus, with the clarification that Count VII proceeds
only on the alleged delay in providing the Plaintiff with a closer parking spot, the Board’s objection
as to Count VII is OVERRULED.
2. Count VIII – Disparate Treatment1
The Board “adopts and incorporates … its objection to Plaintiff’s Title VII/PDA disparate
treatment claim and the reasons therefore” for this objection. (Doc. 25 at 30). For this claim, the
Plaintiff must allege that she was terminated “solely by reason of” her disability. 29 U.S.C. §
794(a). Further, “[i]t is not enough for a plaintiff to demonstrate that an adverse employment
action was based partly on [her] disability.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.
2005). However, the court finds that the Plaintiff need not prove that she was terminated “solely
by reason of” her disability at the pleading stage.
In her Second Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Board “terminated [her]
because of her disability.” (Doc. 17 at 22) (emphasis in original). The Plaintiff alleges that this
1 As noted in the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the Second Amended Complaint “misidentifies
this claim as Count XI.” (Doc. 24 at 20 n.18). Thus, as the Magistrate Judge and the Board does, the court
will also refer to the claim by its correct numerical order as Count VIII.
termination was tied to her putting her head down in violation of a policy. To the extent that the
Board argues this claim should fail because the Plaintiff has failed to allege that she was terminated
solely due to her disability, the court disagrees. The Plaintiff’s request to put her head down during
breaks was directly related to her pregnancy, which was initially approved. The Magistrate Judge
found that the Second Amended Complaint alleges a sequence of events that “taken together,
plausibly suggests intentional discrimination because of her pregnancy-related disability.” (Doc.
24 at 21). The Magistrate Judge further found that, “[a]ccepting the [Plaintiff’s] allegations as true
and drawing all reasonable inferences in [the Plaintiff’s] favor, the court concludes that [the
Plaintiff] has plausibly alleged that the Board terminated her because of her alleged disability.”
(Doc. 24 at 21). Thus, the court agrees that, at this stage, the Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that
the Board terminated her because of her disability. As the Magistrate Judge further found, whether
the Plaintiff can ultimately establish sole causation “is a question better addressed on a developed
factual record at summary judgment or trial.” (Doc. 24 at 21). The court agrees. As such, the
Board’s objection to Count VIII is OVERRULED.
3. Count IX – Retaliation2
The Board again adopts and incorporates its objection to the Plaintiff’s PWFA retaliation
claim. (Doc. 25 at 30). To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) she engaged in
a statutorily protected expression, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there
was a causal link between the two.” Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2016).
“The first element may be met by a request for a reasonable accommodation.” Id.
2 As noted in the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the Second Amended Complaint “misidentifies
this claim as Count XII.” (Doc. 24 at 22 n.19). Thus, as the Magistrate Judge and the Board does, the court
will also refer to the claim by its correct numerical order as Count IX.
As stated previously, the Plaintiff alleges that she requested accommodations, that
Bradford became angry after he went over his head and obtained a closer parking spot, and, after
an investigation, the Plaintiff was terminated. (See Doc. 17 at 7-10). The Magistrate Judge found
that “[c]onstruing these allegations in the light most favorable to [the Plaintiff], the [Second
Amended Complaint] plausibly alleges a causal link between [the Plaintiff’s] requests for
accommodation and her termination.” (Doc. 24 at 22). The court agrees. Furthermore, as stated
previously, the court draws reasonable inferences from the Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
and whether Director Ward acted independently or relied on information provided to him by
Bradford is a factual question that remains a matter for discovery. As such, the Board’s objection
to Count IX is OVERRULED.
Because the Plaintiff and the Board failed to identify an error in the Magistrate Judge’s
factual findings or legal conclusions, the court OVERRULES the Plaintiff’s partial objection
(doc. 26) and the Board’s objections (doc. 25). However, as stated above, the court clarifies that
Counts IV and VII proceed only on the alleged delay in providing closer parking.
III. Conclusion
After careful review of the file and upon consideration of the recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge, the court ADOPTS the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and ORDERS
as follows:
1. The Plaintiff’s Partial Objection to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge (doc. 26) is OVERRULED.
2. The Board’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge
(doc. 25) are OVERRULED.
3. The Board’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 19) is GRANTED as to Counts I, III, and V.
Those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. The Board’s Motion to Dismiss is
further GRANTED as to the portions of Counts IV and VII to the extent that those
counts rely on the Plaintiff’s request to lay her head down during breaks, and those
portions are DISMISSED with prejudice. Counts ITV and VII otherwise remain
pending based on the alleged delay in providing closer parking.
4. The Board’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 19) is DENIED in full as to Counts II, VI, VIII,
and IX, as well as Counts IV and VII to the extent they allege a delay in providing
closer parking.
5. The Board’s Motion to Strike (doc. 28) is DENIED as moot.*
DONE and ORDERED on this the 31st day of August, 2026.
ZL
BILL LEWIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 The Board filed a Motion to Strike (doc. 28) the Plaintiff's Opposition to the Board’s Objection to the
Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation (doc. 27). The Board argues that “[n]ow, more than two weeks after
the deadline for filing objections, Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the Board’s Objections.” (Doc. 28 at
2). Further, the Board argues that “[i]n addition to failing to provide authority in the Opposition [permitting
the submission of such a filing], Plaintiff filed without leave of court, in the absence of expressed permission
from the Recommendation, and outside of the Recommendation-imposed deadline for filings related to the
Recommendation.” (Doc. 28 at 2). However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) provides that “[a]
party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.” Thus, the
Plaintiff was permitted to file a response to the Board’s objection pursuant to the Rules of Federal
Procedure. However, the court notes that the Plaintiff filed her response 15 days after the Board’s objection
was filed. Nevertheless, the court notes that it did not consider the Plaintiff?s Response in Opposition to
the Board’s Objection. The court’s determination of the Board’s Motion to Dismiss relies on the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the Board’s Objection to the Recommendation, the Plaintiff’s Partial
Objection to the Recommendation, and a de novo review of the record pursuant to Rule 72(b)(3), FED. R.
CIv. P.
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