Emrit

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

RONALD SATISH EMRIT, a/k/a )

President Candidate Number )

P60005535, et al., )

)

Plaintiff, ) No.: 3:26-CV-106-TAV-DCP

)

v. )

)

FORMER PRESIDENT BARACK )

HUSSEIN OBAMA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER & REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Rules of this

Court on Plaintiff’s Complaint [Doc. 1] and his Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis With

Supporting Documentation (“Application”) [Doc. 2]. For the reasons more fully stated below, the

undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application [Doc. 2] but RECOMMENDS that the District

Judge DISMISS the Complaint [Doc. 1].

I. DETERMINATION ABOUT THE FILING FEE

Plaintiff has filed an Application [Doc. 1] with the required detailing of his financial

condition. Section 1915 allows a litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court

without paying the administrative costs of the lawsuit. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27

(1992). The Court’s review of an application to proceed without paying the administrative costs of

the lawsuit is normally based solely on the affidavit of indigence. See Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co.,

915 F.2d 260, 262–63 (6th Cir. 1990) (observing that “the filing of a complaint is conditioned

solely upon a person’s demonstration of poverty in his affidavit and the question of frivolousness

is taken up thereafter”). To proceed without paying the administrative costs, the plaintiff must

show by affidavit the inability to pay court fees and costs—it is a threshold requirement. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1). One need not be absolutely destitute, however, to enjoy the benefit of proceeding in

the manner of a pauper, or in forma pauperis. Adkins v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 335

U.S. 331, 342 (1948). An affidavit to proceed without paying the administrative costs is sufficient

if it states that the plaintiff cannot, because of poverty, afford to pay for the costs of litigation and

still pay for the necessities of life. Id. at 339.

The Court finds the Application is sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiff has little income

and few assets. Considering Plaintiff’s Application, it appears to the Court that his economic status

is such that he cannot afford to pay for the costs of litigation and still pay for the necessities of life.

The Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed in the manner of a pauper. The Court DIRECTS the

Clerk to file the Complaint in this case without payment of costs or fees; however, the Clerk

SHALL NOT issue process at this time as the undersigned recommends dismissal of the

Complaint.

II. RECOMMENDATION AFTER SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen complaints

and shall, at any time, sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a

claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Benson v.

O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1015–16 (6th Cir. 1999).1 Courts also have a continuing duty to ensure

1 Despite the reference to prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires the Court to screen complaints

filed by non-prisoners seeking in forma pauperis status. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F. 3d 601,

608 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Unlike prisoner cases, complaints by non-prisoners are not subject to

that jurisdiction exists to hear the case. Answers in Genesis, Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd.,

556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter

jurisdiction in regard to every case and may raise the issue sua sponte.” (citations omitted)). To

survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Where a plaintiff

is proceeding pro se, courts are to liberally construe the complaint and hold it to a less stringent

standard than a formal pleading drafted by an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520

(1972); Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 715 (6th Cir. 1999).

A. Summary of the Complaint

On October 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit naming Former President Barack Obama,

Michelle Obama, Former President Joe Biden, Jill Biden, Hunter Biden, Justice Kentaji Brown

Jackson, “Prince Andrew of the Windors”, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer as defendants

[Doc. 1 p. 1].2

He requests “punitive, compensatory, treble, actual, presumed, and special damages in the

amount of $500,000,000,000 for the commission of the aforementioned torts involving Federal

Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Restatement (Third) of Torts,” “expectation, reliance, restitution,

screening process required by § 1915A. However, the district court must still screen the complaint

under § 1915(e)(2).”), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).

2 Plaintiff Emrit identifies another Plaintiff in the caption of his Complaint: “Presidential

Committee/Political Action Committee/Separate Segregated Fund (SSF) Number C00569897

d/b/a United Emrits of America” [Doc. 1 p. 1]. He does not provide any information about this

Plaintiff [See id. at 1–8]. To the extent this entity exists, it cannot proceed without an attorney. See

Hilton I. Hale & Assocs., LLC v. Gaebler, No. 2:10-CV-920, 2011 WL 308275, at *1 (S.D. Ohio

Jan. 28, 2011) (explaining that all artificial entities must have representation).

incidental, and consequential damages for the commission of tortious interference with business

relations/contacts which is substantially similar to material breach of contract despite the Gist of

the Action Doctrine separating tort issues and contract issues for purposes of litigation,” as well as

“a preliminary injunction as an equitable remedy pursuant to Rule 65 of Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure (FRCP) precluding and/or enjoying the defendants from advertising to the plaintiff on

Cable TV broadcasts” and a “declaratory judgment pursuant to Rule 57 of Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure (FRCP) as a statement of the law that with artificial intelligence (AI) and algorithms to

spy on consumers for purposes of increasing the company’s stock price in over-the-counter

markets (OTC) or federal stock exchange (NYSE) or driving smaller companies out of business is

an Antitrust violation perhaps involving the misdemeanors of trespass, stalking, harassment, and

maybe voyeurism if these companies have employees conducting surveillance on consumers” [Id.

at 6–7].

Plaintiff’s “Nature of the Case” and “Statement of Facts” sections are unclear, with many

of the alleged facts not having any connection to any of the four stated causes of action he lists as

“Counts,” which include defamation, public nuisance, industrial espionage and tortious

interference with business relations/contracts. [Id. at 5]. For example, Plaintiff relates how he was

interviewed by Craig Tomashoff, the “senior producer of the Kelly Clarkson Show,” and that he

showed Mr. Tomashoff a “document uploaded to PACER on a public computer indicating that

Secretary of State Ken Detzner and Kristi Reid-Bronson from his office at the RA Gray Building

in Tallahassee sent the plaintiff a letter indicating that he would be placed on the ballot in Florida

for the 2016 election” [Id. at 4–5].

As for his claims against Former President Obama, Plaintiff contends that he is defaming

President Donald J. Trump by “appearing in interviews and podcasts when most former presidents

try to stay out of the spotlight based on a sense of professional courtesy” [Id. at 5]. He contends

that “companies which feature [President Obama] on their podcasts or through interviews are

committing the tort of industrial espionage,” and that those that feature President Obama “on their

channels’ interviews and/or podcasts are committing the tortious interference with business

relations/contracts under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)” [Id.].

Plaintiff seemingly acknowledges that this Court does not have “personal or subject matter

jurisdiction over this issue” and instead posits that “the U.S. District Court for the District of New

Jersey (as an Article III court) has jurisdiction because there is complete diversity of jurisdiction

between the Plaintiff and the four defendants given that the plaintiff lives in Sarasota, Florida and

no longer in Fort Worth, Texas” [Id. at 3]., He further posits that “the U.S. District Court for the

District of Connecticut also has subject matter jurisdiction over the present case at bar because this

proceeding involves a discussion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans with

Disabilities Act of 1990, Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, Fourth Amendment, and

Privileges and Immunities Clause” [Id.]. The Court notes, however, that there is no mention of

these statutes in this Complaint.

B. Screening of the Complaint

Plaintiff’s Complaint suffers from several deficiencies. First, Plaintiff alleges no facts to

exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants. “When conducting a screening pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), it is appropriate for the Court to consider whether it has personal

jurisdiction over the defendants in the action and whether venue is proper.” Smith v. White,

No. 121CV00190, 2022 WL 2708762, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. June 21, 2022) (citations omitted), report

and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-190, 2022 WL 2706157 (E.D. Tenn. July 12, 2022)).

As part of the screening process, “a court may dismiss an action without prejudice if it has no

personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). “A plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing that a court may properly exercise jurisdiction over a defendant.” Bulso v. O’Shea,

730 F. App’x 347, 349 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). To assert personal jurisdiction, “a

defendant generally must have certain ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state.” Id. (quoting

Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014)). Exercising personal jurisdiction over a defendant

must comport with due process. Id. As the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has

explained:

To satisfy due process, the plaintiff must show that (1) the

defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of

acting in the forum state, (2) the cause of action arises from the

defendants’ activities in the forum state, and (3) the defendants’ acts

or consequences “have a substantial enough connection with the

forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant[s]

reasonable.”

Id. (quoting Miller v. AXA Winterthur Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 675, 680 (6th Cir. 2012)) (alteration in

original).

Here, Plaintiff has pleaded no facts demonstrating that the cause of action arises from

Defendants’ activities in Tennessee or that Defendants’ acts or consequences have a substantial

connection to Tennessee. The undersigned therefore finds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction

over Defendants.3

Second, even if there were jurisdiction, venue is not proper. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391:

A civil action may be brought in--

3 “When a plaintiff seeking IFP status files a complaint lacking any allegations supporting

personal jurisdiction over the defendants, a district court may dismiss the case sua sponte or, in the

alternative, find that the action should be transferred to a district where personal jurisdiction might

exist.” Jackson v. Rosenburg, No. CV 19-2329, 2019 WL 6702702, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 25, 2019)

(citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 19-2329, 2019 WL 6698427 (D.

Minn. Dec. 6, 2019). The undersigned recommends dismissal sua sponte, see part II section C.

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all

defendants are residents of the State in which the district is

located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or

omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial

part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be

brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in

which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal

jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Because there are no allegations that Defendants reside in this judicial district

and Plaintiff does not allege that a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to his

claims occurred in this judicial district, the undersigned finds that venue in this Court is improper.

Third, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint is frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B). Even construing Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, it does not meet basic pleading

requirements or state a claim upon which relief may be granted. “The U.S. Constitution limits the

exercise of federal judicial power to live cases and controversies.” Reynolds v. Talberg, No. 1:18-

CV-69, 2020 WL 6375396, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2020) (citation omitted). This means that

the court can only hear cases that are justiciable, and “[a] critical component of justiciability is

standing.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Mitchell v. BMI Fed. Credit Union, 374 F. Supp. 3d 664,

668 (S.D. Ohio 2019) (“Standing is an Article III principle: without standing, a federal court cannot

exercise jurisdiction because there is no case or controversy.” (citations omitted)). In order to have

standing, a plaintiff's injury must be (1) “concrete and particularized,” and (2) “actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (cleaned

up). In other words, a “generalized grievance” is not sufficient. Reynolds, 2020 WL 6375396, at

*2.

It is Plaintiff’s burden to establish standing. See Bradley v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 3d

398, 403 (N.D. Ohio 2019) (dismissing the case during the screening process because the plaintiff

had failed to allege standing). Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered an “actual” injury, nor has

he alleged any injury that is “imminent.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61.

And as noted by the Massachusetts District Court, “[a]ll the claims against [Former]

President Obama are based on ‘indisputably meritless’ legal theories because the alleged conduct

by [Former] President Obama (or companies broadcasting his interviews and podcasts) does not

constitute defamation, public nuisance, industrial espionage, tortious interference with business

relations/contracts, or any other tort.” Emrit v. Obama, 26-CV-11216, 2026 WL 1127357, at *2

(D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2026), report-recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 1125091 (D. Mass. Apr. 24,

2026).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s claims lack any arguable basis in fact or law, they are

frivolous and may be dismissed. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33.

C. Amending the Complaint

The Court has considered whether to allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint but declines

to do so. As acknowledged by the Northern District Court of New York, “Plaintiff has filed the

same claims against the same defendants in at least twenty-seven other federal districts.” Emrit v.

Obama, No. 1:26-CV-393, 2026 WL 2210045, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 31, 2026) (citing Emrit v.

Obama, 3:26-CV-03010, 2026 WL 1021173, at *1 n.1 (D.S.D. Apr. 15, 2026)). District and circuit

courts have already dismissed his claims against these same defendants. See Emrit v. Obama, 26-

1060,2026 WL 1138752, at *2-4 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2026) (“[T]he complaint does not allege that

any of the named defendants committed the alleged acts of industrial espionage and tortious

interference.”), report-Recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 1135974 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2026);

Emrit, 2026 WL 1021173, at *1 (“‘A well-documented “serial pro se filer” since approximately

2013, Plaintiff Ronald Satish Emrit . . . has initiated more than three hundred civil actions in district

courts nationwide, from Maine to Hawaii[]’ and has been ‘deemed a vexatious litigant or subjected

to prefiling requirements in multiple district courts across the country.’”) (citing Emrit v. Cent.

Intel. Agency, No. 3:22-CV-35, 2022 WL 1575999, at *1 (N.D.W. Va. Apr. 1, 2022)); Emrit v.

Obama, No. 26-CV-3083, 2026 WL 690452, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2026) (“Plaintiff’s

allegations ‘make no rational argument in law or facts to support his claim for relief.’”) (quoting

Jones v. Morris, 777 F.2d 1277, 1279–80 (7th Cir. 1985)); Emrit v. Obama, 26-CV-180, 2026 WL

967926, at *2 (D.N.H. Mar. 24, 2026) (“As plaintiff has filed the same claims in a number of

different federal districts, and the courts that have screened his pleadings upon preliminary review

have all dismissed the Complaint as frivolous or for failure to state a claim, the interests of justice

are not served by transferring this case elsewhere.”), report-recommendation adopted, 2026 WL

967395 (D.N.H. Apr. 9, 2026); Emrit v. Obama, No. 26-1648 (8th Cir. Apr. 8, 2026) (affirming

dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint raising identical claims against the same defendants as in the

case at bar for “lack of jurisdiction as premature.”)

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s litigiousness is well documented. Most recently, it was

noted in the Eastern District of New York that as of November 2025, “Plaintiff has filed over one

thousand cases in the federal courts across the country.” Presidential Candidate No. P60005535

v. Burnett, No. 25-CV-2873, 2025 WL 3268247, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025). Plaintiff “is a

classic example of a litigant who abuses the privilege of proceeding IFP.” Emrit v. Experian, Inc.,

No. 18-cv-311-BAS-AGS, No. 3, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2018). Plaintiff has filed “over two

hundred civil cases and appeals in the federal court system,” id., and has been sanctioned by the

Western District of Texas, determining that he “abuses the in forma pauperis process and clogs the

federal district courts with meritless litigation.” See Emrit v. Nat’l Academy of Recording Arts

& Sciences, No. 1:14-cv-00392-SS, 2015 WL 518774, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2015) (listing

cases). Plaintiff also has been barred from filing suits without leave of court in at least three federal

district courts. See Emrit v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (CMS), No. 2:14-cv-1761-

GMN-PAL, 2016 WL 164992 (D. Nev. Jan. 14, 2016); Emrit v. Na’'l Academy of Recording Arts

& Sciences, 2015 WL 518774, at *4; Emrit v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00314-LAP, ECF

No. 13 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2014).

Accordingly, the Court finds justice does not require granting him an opportunity to amend.

The Court recognizes that with this submission, Plaintiff has filed five complaints within the past

three years––two of which the Court dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a claim and one that

the Court transferred. Emrit v. The Grammys Awards on CBS, No. 1:23-cv-205 [Doc. 9] (E.D.

Tenn. Dec. 8, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff’s case for failure to state a claim and warning that further

frivolous filings will result in sanctions); Emrit v. Musk, No. 3:25-cv-7 [Doc. 14] (E.D. Tenn. April

30, 2025); Emrit v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., No. 3:25-cv-412 [Doc. 8] (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 8,

2025) (transferring to the East District of Louisianna). The Court notes that Plaintiff has already

been warned “that further frivolous filings . . . in this district will result in sanctions.” Emrit v. The

Grammys Awards on CBS, No. 1:23-cv-205 [Doc. 9 p. 2] (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2023).4 Given that

Plaintiff has previously received warning about further frivolous filings, this may warrant a review

of whether a filing injunction is appropriate.

4 At the time of entry of the referenced order, SO-18-04 delegated authority to the Chief

District Judge to enter injunctions limiting filings from individuals who had abused the legal

process. The Court has since abrogated SO-18-04. See SO-24-15.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff’s Application to

Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs [Doc. 2]. The Court DIRECTS the

Clerk to file the Complaint in this case without prepayment; however, no process shall issue until

the District Judge has ruled upon this Report and Recommendation,5 because the undersigned

RECOMMENDS that the Complaint [Doc. 1] be DISMISSED in its entirety.6

Respectfully submitted,

_________________________

Debra C. Poplin

United States Magistrate Judge

5 This matter is to be presented to the District Judge pursuant to this Report and

Recommendation under the authority of Gibson v. R.G. Smith Co., 915 F.2d 260, 263 (6th Cir.

1990), wherein the Court of Appeals states that such matters proceed automatically to a district

judge for examination of the complaint after a magistrate judge has granted the petition to proceed

without prepayment of costs.

6 Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served and filed within

fourteen (14) days after service of a copy of this recommended disposition on the objecting party.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Such objections must conform to the requirements of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 72(b). Failure to file objections within the time specified waives the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153–54 (1985). “[T]he district court need

not provide de novo review where objections [to the Report and Recommendation] are ‘[f]rivolous,

conclusive or general.’” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982)). Only specific objections are reserved for

appellate review. Smith v. Detroit Fed. of Tchrs., 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).