Walls

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

NIRIN WALLS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 26-cv-00334-SPM

v.

DR. KHAN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

This case is before the Court on several motions filed by Plaintiff Nirin Walls. For the

following reasons, all motions are denied.

I. Motions to Reconsider (Doc. 16, 19)

Plaintiff has filed two Motions to Reconsider asking the Court to reconsider the Merit

Review Order (Doc. 14). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the Court may revise any

order adjudicating fewer than all the claims at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating

all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Motions to reconsider an order under

Rule 54(b) are judged largely by the same standards as motions to alter or amend a judgment under

Rule 59(e), “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.”

Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).

“Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or

arguing matters that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.” Caisse

Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff first seeks reconsideration of the dismissal of Count 6 against Dr. Boose, Director

Hughes, Warden Brown, and Dr. Reister. (Doc. 16). In the Merit Review Order, the Court

delineated Count 6 as an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Khan, Boose,

Hughes, Brown, Wexford, and Reister for failing to provide Plaintiff adequate mental health care

while he was at Lawrence Correctional Center. (Id. at p. 5). Count 6 was only allowed to proceed

against Dr. Khan based on Plaintiff’s assertions that he has schizophrenia and that Dr. Khan

disregarded a serious risk to his health by failing to ensure that he received food with the Geodon

medication and/or by failing to prescribe an alternative treatment when Dr. Khan discovered that

Plaintiff had stopped taking the Geodon medication because it hurt Plaintiff’s stomach. (Id. at p.

8). The Court dismissed Count 6 against the other Defendants and against Dr. Khan regarding

Plaintiff’s assertion that he was denied group therapy sessions. (Id.).

Plaintiff argues that the Court incorrectly dismissed Count 6 against Defendants Dr. Boose,

Director Hughes, Warden Brown, and Dr. Reister. He states that when he was transferred from

Joliet Treatment Center to Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence), he signed a document

stating that he would receive continued care in a “step down fashion.” (Id.). Once at Lawrence,

however, he received no mental health care, and someone needs to be held liable. (Id.).

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Court committed an error of fact or law in dismissing

Count 6 against Dr. Boose, Director Hughes, Warden Brown, or Dr. Reister. Although Plaintiff

alleges in the Complaint that Dr. Reister, “Dr. Boose, Dr. Khan, Director Latoya Hughes, Warden

Brown are liable for [providing] zero mental health care,” (see Doc. 1, p. 11, 13, 14), this

conclusory statement is too “sparse to plausibly support a finding that the [Defendants] acted

recklessly or intentionally disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.” Messel v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., No. 25-2191, 2026 WL 2114509, at *2 (7th Cir. 2026). It is not sufficient for

Plaintiff to allege that Director Hughes is “in charge” or that he was “under the care of” Dr. Boose

to plead liability under Section 1983. Id. (finding that the phrase “while under the care of the

defendants” insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim). Plaintiff does not describe any of

Defendants’ actual conduct in relation to his mental health care, which makes it impossible to

determine from the body of the Complaint which of the Defendants had sufficient knowledge and

personal involvement to support a claim that they were deliberately indifferent. As mentioned in

the Merit Review Order, an upper-level official cannot be liable simply because he or she was in

a supervisory position. (Doc. 14, p. 9). Additionally, an upper-level official does not have “a free-

floating obligation to put things to rights.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009).

Thus, the Court did not misapply the facts or law in finding that Plaintiff had failed to state an

Eighth Amendment claim against Hughes, Reister, Boose, and Brown, and the request to

reconsider the dismissal of Count 6 is DENIED.

Plaintiff also argues that the Court wrongfully dismissed claims against Dr. Cole and

HCUA Cunningham for failing to ensure he received needed medications, specifically blood

pressure and seizure medication, when he arrived at Lawrence. (Doc. 20). While it is true that

Plaintiff clearly alleges in the Complaint that he went without needed medication for four days

after he was transferred to Lawrence (see Doc. 1, p. 10, 12), he does not sufficiently assert these

allegations against either Dr. Cole or HCUA Cunningham. Again, the Court cannot plausibly infer

liability solely based on their positions as medical staff at the facility. Deliberate indifference

requires a showing of personal involvement. See Burks, 555 F.3d at 596. Plaintiff’s assertion that

he sent several request slips to Dr. Cole and HCUA Cunningham “requesting wheelchair, cane,

and pain medication,” (Doc. 1, p. 10), is not sufficient to state a claim against Dr. Cole and HCUA

Cunningham for the denial of seizure and blood pressure medication for the four days following

his transfer. He has not shown an error of fact or law in the Court’s Merit Review Order and the

second Motion to Reconsider is DENIED. (Doc. 19).

In the first Motion to Reconsider (Doc. 16), Plaintiff also seeks to amend his request for

preliminary injunctive relief. He states that now that he had been transferred from Lawrence to

Menard Correctional Center (Menard), not only has he been denied wheelchair access, but he also

is not housed in an ADA cell, he is not receiving Tramadol for back pain, and he is not receiving

a snack bag with Geodon medication. (Doc. 16, p. 4). The request is DENIED.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that following his transfer to Lawrence in 2025, he was

mistreated, he received constitutionally inadequate medical care, and he was denied ADA

accommodation, specifically mobility assistant. He is proceeding on the following claims:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Hundley, Yates, and Streeter for

the use of excessive force against Plaintiff on May 25, 2025.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against White for the use of excessive

force against Plaintiff sometime around May 26 or 27, 2025.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim against Hundley, Yates, and Streeter for

subjecting Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment by leaving

Plaintiff on the floor of his cell unassisted for hours on May 25,

2025.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment claim against White, Wilson, Hundley, and

Reid for subjecting Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment by

leaving Plaintiff on the floor of his cell unassisted sometime around

May 26 or 27, 2025.

Count 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Simpson,

Hundley, Yates, and Streeter for failing to provide Plaintiff access

to a mobility device.

Count 6: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Khan for

failing to provide Plaintiff with adequate mental health care,

specifically medication to treat his schizophrenia.

Count 8: ADA/RA claim against Director Hughes for denying Plaintiff access

to mobility assistance from May 25, 2025, through June 7, 2025.

(Doc. 14). While there are commonalities between conditions Plaintiff experienced at Lawrence

and what he is again currently experiencing at Menard, Plaintiff’s new assertions are outside the

scope of this lawsuit. Plaintiff cannot use a preliminary injunction motion to amend allegations in

the Complaint concerning his medical care, which currently are limited to events that occurred at

Lawrence. See Chi. Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 644 F.3d 353, 356 (7th

Cir. 2011) (a plaintiff “must still ground its right to relief on events described in the complaint, not

on matters that arise later”). The Court has allowed Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction

concerning his ADA and lack of mobility assistance to be briefed because, as pled, it appears to

stem from a system-wide policy and so his transfer has not mooted his ADA claim. See Lehn v.

Holmes, 364 F.3d 862, 871–72 (7th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff request to

order Director Hughes to respond to assertions that he is currently being denied adequate medical

and mental health care now that he has been transferred to Menard.

II. Motion to Intervene (Doc. 20)

Plaintiff asserts that at Menard, he continues to be assaulted and thrown from his

wheelchair and subjected to excessive force. (Doc. 20, p. 1). He states that a correctional officer

named Rickleman spit on his face and told him that Director Hughes told “us” to kill Plaintiff.

(Id.). Plaintiff asks the Court for help. (Id.).

The Motion to Intervene is DENIED. As stated above, the Court will not issue a

preliminary injunction based on facts that are separate and distinct from the claims Plaintiff is

prosecuting in this case. Plaintiff’s assertions that he is being mistreated now that he is housed at

Menard are not related to the claims at issue in this litigation. The request to intervene is denied.

III. Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 32)

Plaintiff’s request for default judgment against Defendant Director Hughes is DENIED.

(Doc. 32). Hughes successfully returned her waiver of service on August 31, 2026, and despite

Plaintiff’s assertions, there is no evidence that she is acting intentionally to delay this case.

IV. Motion for a Hearing on Request for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 34)

The Motion for a Hearing is DENIED. (Doc. 34). As Plaintiff was previously informed,

once Director Hughes has been successfully served and filed a response to the request for a

preliminary injunction, the Court will then determine the need for a hearing. (Doc. 14, p. 14).

The Court understands that Plaintiff is unhappy with the speed at which this case is

progressing. Plaintiff, however, has chosen to pursue litigation in federal court to resolve his

dispute with Defendants, which often progresses slowly. Plaintiff is to refrain from continuing to

file unnecessary filings, as they waste scarce judicial resources and only serve to delay the

resolution of his claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 31, 2026

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge