Crawford

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

AT BECKLEY

RUTH CRAWFORD

Executrix of the estate of

MARTIN H. CRAWFORD,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-cv-00729

RALEIGH COUNTY COMMISSION and

CORPORAL ROY MCDANIEL, JR. and

DEPUTY JACOB ELLER and

CORPORAL JASON REDDEN and

CORPORAL BO GARRETT and

SERGEANT GARY EPLING,

in their individual capacities.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending is Defendant Raleigh County Commission’s (“RCC”) Motion to Partially

Dismiss [ECF 13], filed January 19, 2026. Plaintiff Ruth Crawford (“Ms. Crawford”), executrix

of the estate of Martin H. Crawford (“Mr. Crawford”), responded in opposition [ECF 17] on

February 2, 2026, to which RCC replied [ECF 18] on February 9, 2026. The matter is ready for

adjudication.

I.

A. Factual Background

On December 12, 2023, Mr. Martin Crawford was allegedly suffering from an

“obvious and serious medical and mental health emergency.” [ECF 1 ¶¶ 33, 35–36]. Sherri

Webster, a friend of Mr. Crawford, concerned with his safety, “called 911 to report [his] mental

health emergency and request a welfare check.” [Id. ¶ 36]. “The transcript of the call confirms that

Ms. Webster clearly stated the nature of the mental health crisis.” [Id.]. She reported (1) he

“recently disposed of his television sets because he believed someone was watching everything he

did,” (2) he believed “someone has stolen his identity,” and (3) he was “not acting like himself; he

was inebriated; had barricaded himself in his home; would not answer the door; was ‘trying to gas

himself to death,’ and was ‘talking out of his head’ about Russia invading the United States.” [Id.].

Corporal Roy McDaniel, Jr., Corporal Bo Garrett, Deputy Jacob Eller, Lieutenant Jason Redden,

and Sergeant Gary Epling (collectively “the Officers” or “Deputy Defendants”), employed by

RCC, were dispatched to Mr. Crawford’s home following Ms. Webster’s 911 call. [Id. ¶¶ 7, 37].

“[D]ispatch gave [the Officers] the reason for the welfare check: Mr. Crawford was ‘talking about

being suicidal’” and “had turned the propane gas on in his home because he believed that Russia

had invaded the United States.” [Id. ¶ 37].

Corporal McDaniel “was the first to arrive” to Mr. Crawford’s home. [Id. ¶ 38].

Corporal McDaniel “was familiar with Mr. Crawford and his history of prior arrests . . . as well as

his history of erratic behavior and mental health issues.” [Id. ¶ 39]. Corporal McDaniel “had been

to Mr. Crawford’s home in August 2021 when [he] was arrested after allegedly shooting a firearm

while intoxicated[, which] . . . resulted in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County ordering Mr.

Crawford to be evaluated for competency.” [Id.].

Corporal McDaniel “observed a heavy odor of gas coming out of the . . . residence

and smoke coming from the chimney.” [Id. ¶ 41]. Upon his arrival, Ms. Webster reiterated to

Corporal McDaniel her concerns regarding Mr. Crawford’s mental wellness and safety. [Id. ¶ 42].

Mr. Crawford refused to come outside or answer the door. [Id. ¶¶ 43, 51]. Thereafter, Corporal

Garrett, Deputy Eller, Lieutenant Redden, and Sergeant Epling arrived to assist Corporal

McDaniel. [Id. ¶ 44]. Two family friends also arrived at Mr. Crawford’s home and attempted to

assist the Officers in enticing Mr. Crawford outside and deescalating the situation. [See id. ¶¶ 44,

54–57]. One of the family friends broke the glass door to enter Mr. Crawford’s home, and “Mr.

Crawford was heard shouting, ‘I don’t care, light it.’” [Id. ¶¶ 50–51]. Mr. Crawford “indicated, in

his confused and mentally ill state, that he intended to light the propane tank” in the bathroom. [Id.

¶ 57]. The family friends on scene discussed with the officers “prior incidents involving Mr.

Crawford’s erratic behavior,” and Corporal McDaniel allegedly discussed either friends and family

or law enforcement “getting a mental hygiene order for the involuntary hospitalization of Mr.

Crawford.” [Id. ¶¶ 53–54].

Mr. Crawford was subsequently detained by the Officers and evaluated by Ghent

Emergency Medical Services for gas inhalation. [Id. ¶¶ 58–61]. “Audio and video recording from

the [Officers’] body cameras . . . reflect . . . [at the time of his arrest, the Officers] agree[ed] that

Mr. Crawford needed to be evaluated for mental health given his presentation.” [Id. ¶ 62]. “The

[Officers] continued to direct bystanders that ‘someone needed to leave like ten minutes ago and

get a mental hygiene [order].’ . . . The [Officers] discussed which Magistrate was on call and how

long it would take to get a mental hygiene order.” [Id.].

The on-scene Emergency Medical Technician (“EMT”) was concerned about Mr.

Crawford’s mental condition. [Id. ¶ 63]. But before the EMT could complete his medical

evaluation and before the mental hygiene process commenced or completed, the Officers (1)

informed the EMT that Mr. Crawford would “‘be going with them,’” and (2) “arrested and charged

Mr. Crawford with obstruction and assault and placed him in the rear of [Corporal] McDaniel’s

cruiser . . . despite direct knowledge of Mr. Crawford’s need for medical treatment.” [Id. ¶¶ 64–

65]. “[Corporal] McDaniel . . . transported Mr. Crawford to the Raleigh County Sherriff’s Office .

. . .” [Id. ¶ 69]. During transport, “Mr. Crawford directly asked [Corporal McDaniel] if he could

go to the hospital . . . [but] [Corporal] McDaniel never responded to Mr. Crawford’s request.” [Id.

¶ 70].

Corporal McDaniel “placed [Mr. Crawford] in a locked holding cell at 16:19

hours.” [Id. ¶ 71]. Corporal McDaniel did not remove Mr. Crawford’s shoestrings or

jacket/sweatshirt hoodie string before locking Mr. Crawford in the cell “notwithstanding . . . actual

knowledge that [Mr.] Crawford was experiencing suicidal ideations[.]” [Id. ¶ 72]. Further, neither

the Officers nor any other agent or employee of RCC called for medical care at the time of placing

Mr. Crawford in the cell. [Id. ¶¶ 72, 74]. Although two workstations were located directly across

from Mr. Crawford’s cell, Corporal McDaniel worked in a separate patrol room outside of the line

of sight of Mr. Crawford’s cell. [Id. ¶¶ 75–76]. The patrol room nevertheless housed monitors with

a view of Mr. Crawford’s cell from the “camera located on the upper right corner” of the cell. [Id.

¶¶ 75–77].

“Shortly after being placed in the cell, Mr. Crawford went to the restroom area

behind [a] privacy partition” outside of the line of sight of the security camera. [Id. ¶ 77]. Mr.

Crawford removed either his shoestrings or a hoodie string, “tied the[m] around his neck, tied them

to the handrail used for toilet seating assistance, and hung himself.” [Id. ¶ 85]. The video footage

of Mr. Crawford’s holding cell details the events of his suicide. [Id. ¶¶ 78–80]. For 62 minutes --

from “16:19 hours to 17:21 hours” -- none of the Officers “or staff at the Sherriff’s Office

monitored, observed, supervised or otherwise checked on Mr. Crawford in his cell.” [Id. ¶¶ 80,

82]. While “Mr. Crawford was left unattended in the cell,” Corporal McDaniel contacted another

officer to confirm the mental hygiene order procurement. [Id. ¶ 81]. The officer confirmed and

stated Corporal “McDaniel could take Mr. Crawford to the Magistrate Office when . . . ‘he wanted

to.’” [Id.].

B. Procedural History

On December 10, 2025, Ms. Crawford, on behalf of the estate of Mr. Crawford,

instituted this action against the RCC and the individual officers who responded to the scene on

December 12, 2023, including Corporal McDaniel, Deputy Eller, Corporal Redden, and Corporal

Garrett. [See id.].

Counts I and II of the Complaint allege the Deputy Defendants exhibited deliberate

indifference when they failed to protect Mr. Crawford from harm, [id. ¶¶ 105–29], and deliberate

indifference to his medical needs by failing to provide adequate medical care, [id. ¶¶ 130–53]. Ms.

Crawford further alleges six claims against RCC under both state and federal law, to-wit: negligent

training (Count III), negligent supervision (Count IV), negligent retention (Count V), failure to

train and widespread and persistent practice pursuant to § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (Count VI), negligence (Count VII), and violation of the West

Virginia Human Rights Act (Count VIII). [See id. ¶¶ 154–273].

On January 19, 2026, RCC moved to partially dismiss the claims asserted against

it. [ECF 13]. RCC contends dismissal is warranted inasmuch as the claims fail to plausibly allege

it was negligent in its training, supervision, and retention of the Officers. [ECF 14 at 6]. RCC

further argues the general negligence claim should be dismissed as duplicative. [Id. at 6].

Respecting the Monell claim for violation of § 1983, the RCC asserts Ms. Crawford’s Complaint

is “devoid of the requisite factual allegations concerning how [RCC] was negligent,” and Ms.

Crawford “makes no factual allegations at all about the [RCC]’s supervision, training, or retention

of the individual [Officers].” [Id. at 9–15]. Respecting the alleged violation of the West Virginia

Human Rights Act, RCC contends Ms. Crawford fails to allege specific facts which would indicate

RCC committed direct conduct for the purpose of causing physical harm or economic loss and

instead “merely relies on conclusory allegations that such acts occurred.” [Id. at 15–16].

In response, Ms. Crawford maintains she has pled sufficient facts which state

plausible claims for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision by establishing RCC “was on

notice of Mr. Crawford’s mental health issues” and “their deputies’ improper responses to him in

the past.” [ECF 17 at 5]. Ms. Crawford contends she has pled specific factual allegations showing

RCC had persistent, improper practices regarding arrests and medical care during mental health

crises concerning her Monell claim. [Id. at 6–8]. Ms. Crawford further contends dismissal of the

West Virginia Human Rights Act claim is improper inasmuch as the law does not require plaintiffs

to demonstrate RCC’s conduct was done with the purpose of committing harm. Instead, she need

only show there was discrimination based on disability which caused harm. [Id. at 9–10].

II.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleader provide “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing . . . entitle[ment] to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Rule 12(b)(6) correspondingly permits a defendant to challenge

a complaint when it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).

The required “short and plain statement” must provide “fair notice of what the . . .

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), overruled on other grounds, Twombly, 550

U.S. at 562–63); McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582,

585 (4th Cir. 2015). Additionally, the showing of an “entitlement to relief” amounts to “more than

labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. It is now settled that “a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555; McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585;

Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2008).

The complaint need not “forecast evidence sufficient to prove the elements of [a]

claim,” but it must “allege sufficient facts to establish those elements.” Wright v. North Carolina,

787 F.3d 256, 270 (4th Cir. 2015); Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (cleaned

up). Stated another way, the operative pleading need only contain “[f]actual allegations . . .

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting the opening pleading “does not require ‘detailed

factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation.”). In sum, the complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

The decision in Iqbal provides some additional markers concerning the plausibility

requirement:

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability

requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a

defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility

of ‘entitlement to relief. . . .’”

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the

Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-

pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader

is entitled to relief.”

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose

to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and

then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently interpreted the Rule

12(b)(6) standard to require a court to “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the

complaint.” Pardus, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also S.C. Dep’t of Health

& Env’t Control v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 245, 255 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Franks v.

Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2002)). The court is required to “draw[] all reasonable . . .

inferences from those facts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231,

244 (4th Cir. 1999).

III.

A. Common Law Negligence Claims (Counts III, IV, V, and VII)

1. Negligent Training (Count III)

A negligent training claim focuses on whether “the employer was on notice of the

employee’s propensity (creating a duty) yet unreasonably failed to take action (manifesting a

breach), resulting in harm to a third-party from the employee’s tortious conduct.” Myers v. City of

Charleston, No. 2:19-CV-00757, 2020 WL 4195005, at *14 (S.D. W. Va. July 21, 2020) (cleaned

up) (quoting S.R. v. Fayette Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:15-cv-13466, 2016 WL 6886868, at *6 (S.D.

W. Va. Nov. 21, 2016)) (granting motion to dismiss negligent training, supervision, and/or retention

claims because “[p]laintiffs have not alleged whether the officers had prior complaints against

them for excessive force or for failing to ‘properly deal’ with others with mental illness . . . [or]

whether the [Defendant] was aware of the abusive conduct”).

Count III alleges RCC “had a legal duty to properly train its employees . . . to

monitor, observe, and supervise detainees so that their rights would not be violated.” [ECF

1 ¶ 156]. Further, Ms. Crawford alleges “RCC improperly tolerated and implicitly approved prior

acts of misconduct by its officers, including failing to protect detainees and providing appropriate

medical care.” [Id. ¶ 160]. This allegation is a legal conclusion insufficient to support a plausible

claim for negligent training without further factual support. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While

legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual

allegations.”). As highlighted by RCC, “Plaintiff does not allege any facts to infer that any of its

employees had committed similar [improper] practices in the past.” [ECF 14 at 7]. The standard

for a negligent training claim is whether the employer was on notice of its Officers’ propensity to

act tortiously, and while lower than its § 1983 counterpart, Ms. Crawford’s claim remains

implausible without further facts indicating notice.

Ms. Crawford alleges RCC “was on notice [Mr. Crawford’s] calls were not being

handled correctly” from Corporal McDaniel’s previous interactions with Mr. Crawford in August

2021. [ECF 17 at 4]. But RCC correctly points out Ms. Crawford “fails to indicate in any fashion

how prior interactions with [Mr. Crawford] were insufficiently handled” during a prior instance in

2021. [ECF 18 at 2–3]. Ms. Crawford’s reply brief urges: “[u]pon information and belief, Mr.

Crawford’s need for a mental hygiene or other health care was not addressed on that [previous]

incident, just as they were not on December 12, 2023.” [ECF 17 at 4]. Beyond the mere mention

of Corporal McDaniel’s previous interaction with Mr. Crawford resulting in a competency

evaluation by the state court, no corresponding factual allegations are pled. [See ECF 1 ¶ 39

(alleging Corporal McDaniel “was familiar with Mr. Crawford and his history of prior arrests . . .

as well as his history of erratic behavior and mental health issues,” and that Corporal McDaniel

“had been to Mr. Crawford’s home in August 2021 when [he] was arrested after allegedly shooting

a firearm while intoxicated[, which] . . . resulted in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County ordering

Mr. Crawford to be evaluated for competency”)]. This allegation is insufficient. Nor can the further

allegations in the reply brief support the claim. See Hierholzer v. Guzman, 125 F.4th 104, 115 (4th

Cir. 2025) (first quoting S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at

Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2013)) (concluding “parties may not ‘amend their

complaints through briefing’”); and then quoting U.S. ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am.,

Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 459 n.8 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A plaintiff] cannot cure pleading deficiencies in the

amended complaint with later-filed supporting documentation.”)).

Accordingly, Ms. Crawford has not plausibly alleged a claim for state-law negligent

training against RCC. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Count III is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE to repleading on or before September 15, 2026.

2. Negligent Supervision and Retention (Counts IV and V)

“[F]or a negligent supervision claim to succeed [under West Virginia law], the

employer must have a duty to . . . supervise its employee.” Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp. Corp. v.

Marietta Area Healthcare, 252 W. Va. 324, 329, 922 S.E.2d 324, 329 (2025). “The question of

whether the employer’s duty to supervise the employee exists and extends to the plaintiff focuses

on ‘a connection between the employer’s knowledge of the employee’s dangerous propensities and

the harm caused.’” Id. (citation omitted); see also Tolliver, 2021 WL 5056081, at *3 (“A negligent

hiring, retention, and supervision claim focuses on an employer’s liability for hiring, supervising,

or retaining an employee ‘whom the employer knew, or should have known, posed a risk to third

parties.’”) (citation omitted). “However, the extent to which an employer has a duty to a plaintiff

to supervise its employee is fact-dependent and includes considerations ‘such as the work

performed, the employees performing it, the size of the business, the type of work, and the

employer’s clientele, among others.’” Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 252 W. Va. at 329, 922

S.E.2d at 329 (citation omitted); see also Weigle v. Pifer, 139 F. Supp. 3d 760, 785 (S.D. W. Va.

2015) (“The risk to third parties posed by police work is considerable.”). A claim of negligent

retention requires the following inquiry:

When the employee was hired or retained, did the employer conduct a reasonable

investigation into the employee’s background vis a vis the job for which the

employee was hired and the possible risk of harm or injury to co-workers or third

parties that could result from the conduct of an unfit employee? Should the

employer have reasonably foreseen the risk caused by hiring or retaining an unfit

person?

Id. at 784 (cleaned up) (quoting McCormick v. W. Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 202 W. Va. 189, 193,

503 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1998) (per curiam)). In the correctional context, the “relatively

straightforward question” is: “[d]id the [employer] know, or should it have known that [the

employee] posed a risk to inmate safety but fail to fire him or properly supervise him?” Radford v.

Hammons, No. 2:14-CV-24854, 2015 WL 738062, at *8 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 20, 2015).

Count IV of the Complaint alleges RCC “failed to properly supervise its

employees . . . to ensure they did not violate the Constitutional or statutory rights of detainees.”

[ECF 1 ¶ 191]. Count V of the Complaint alleges RCC is “liable for its negligent retention of such

employees, the negligent acts and omissions of such employees, and for their violations of clearly

established duties.” [Id. ¶ 202]. Ms. Crawford has not alleged “facts from which the Court can

reasonably infer that [RCC] was on notice of [the Officers’ alleged] propensity or how it

unreasonably failed to take action, either through training or other disciplinary measures.” Tolliver,

2021 WL 5056081, at *3 (citing Westfall v. Osborne, No. 2:20-CV-00118, 2020 WL 627145, at *6

(S.D. W. Va. Oct. 26, 2020)) (granting dismissal of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision

claims when plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts indicating the employer knew of an officer’s

propensity to act tortiously or the employee’s own propensity to act tortiously).

Ms. Crawford’s negligent supervision claim fails for many of the same reasons the

negligent training claim fails. Ms. Crawford fails to allege any facts which would indicate RCC

knew or should have known the Officers posed a risk to third parties, such as Mr. Crawford, prior

to the December 2023 incident. Ms. Crawford’s negligent retention claim fares no better. Ms.

Crawford alleges the RCC “had a policy and/or custom of inadequately and improperly

investigating instances of its police officers failing to provide safety, protection, and medical care

to detainees who exhibited symptoms of medical or mental health issues. . . .” [ECF 1 ¶ 214]. The

legal conclusion is devoid of factual underpinnings. Further, the Complaint cites no prior incidents

regarding these officers and hence no indication RCC should have reasonably foreseen the risk

caused by retaining an unfit person or improperly investigating.

Accordingly, RCC’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Counts IV and V are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to repleading on or before September 15, 2026,

inasmuch as Ms. Crawford has not plausibly alleged a claim for state-law negligent supervision

and retention.

3. General Negligence (Count VII)

RCC contends Ms. Crawford’s Count VII negligence claim is ultimately duplicative

of her previous state law negligent training, supervision, and retention claims, and, as a result, the

general negligence claim should be dismissed for the same reasons. [ECF 14 at 6]. Ms. Crawford

responds the claim “encompasses broader allegations of negligence beyond just training,

supervision, and retention.” [ECF 17 at 8]. It is apparent, however, the negligence claim asserts

RCC breached a duty by (1) failing to screen, supervise, and train its agents, (2) failing to

implement supervisory measures for detainees, and (3) “negligently managing and/or operating its

premises . . .” among other similar allegations. [ECF 1 ¶¶ 253–54]. Inasmuch as Ms. Crawford’s

claim for general negligence is ultimately a recitation of her previous state-law claims, Defendant’s

motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Count VII is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to

repleading on or before September 15, 2026.

B. Monell Liability for Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VI)

RCC next contends Ms. Crawford fails to sufficiently allege a Monell claim. [ECF

14 at 9].

In Count VI, Ms. Crawford alleges the RCC “developed and maintained policies or

customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons . . . ” and “had a

pattern of practice of customs and policies that were inadequate and reckless in several aspects,

including the failure to properly train. . . .” [ECF 1 ¶¶ 210, 212]. Also, “by failing to train its

officers to detect common, obvious, and emergent medical and mental health situations of detained

citizens, the RCC adopted a policy of deliberate indifference. . . .” [Id. ¶ 212]. Further, Ms.

Crawford alleges the failure to “properly monitor and supervise police officers who previously

failed to provide . . . mental health assistance to detainees suffering from medical or mental health

issues. . . .” inasmuch as “a result of the above-described policies and customs, deputy sheriff

officers of RCC, including Deputy Defendants, believed that their actions would not be properly

monitored by supervisory officers. . . .” [Id. ¶¶ 212, 221].

1. Governing Standard

“42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides an avenue for plaintiffs to file suit against any person

who ‘subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.”

Johnson v. Baltimore City, Md., 163 F.4th 808, 821 (4th Cir. 2026) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

“‘[M]unicipalities and other local government units’ are ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983

and thus amenable to suit under the statute.” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690). However,

“municipal liability attaches only when the decision maker is the municipality’s governing body,

a municipal agency, or an official possessing final authority to create official policy.” Howard v.

City of Durham, 68 F.4th 934, 952 (4th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up) (quoting Semple v. City of

Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 712 (4th Cir. 1999)).“ This policymaker involvement is required

because, as the Supreme Court has made clear, Monell liability is not respondeat superior liability

under a different moniker.” Id.

“To hold a municipality liable for a constitutional violation pursuant to Monell, a

plaintiff must establish ‘the existence of an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable to

the municipality and that proximately caused the deprivation of their rights.’” Johnson, 163 F.4th

at 821–22 (quoting Howard, 68 F.4th at 952). As summarized by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, “[a]n official policy or custom may be expressed in four ways,”

including:

(1) Through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through

the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an

omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that manifest[s] deliberate

indifference to the rights of citizens; or (4) through a practice that is so persistent

and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.

Id. at 822 (quoting Howard, 68 F.4th at 952) (cleaned up).

2. Persistent and Widespread Practice Amounting to a Custom

“To prove a custom or practice . . . [the plaintiff] must show that ‘a pattern of

comparable practices has become actually or constructively known to responsible policymakers.’”

Howard, 68 F.4th at 952 (quoting Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1391 (4th Cir. 1987)). Thus,

a plaintiff may assert “custom or usage” Monell liability “only if its continued existence can be

laid to the fault of municipal policy-makers, and a sufficient causal connection between the

‘municipal custom and usage’ and the specific violation can then be established.” Id. at 952–53

(cleaned up) (quoting Randall v. Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188, 210 (4th Cir. 2002)).

Accordingly, “a plaintiff must point to a ‘persistent and widespread practice of municipal officials,

the duration and frequency of which indicate that policymakers (1) had actual or constructive

knowledge of the conduct, and (2) failed to correct it due to their deliberate indifference.’”

Johnson, 163 F.4th at 822 (quoting Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379,

402 (4th Cir. 2014)).

“[P]roof of a single incident of the unconstitutional activity charged is not sufficient

to prove the existence of a municipal custom.” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Semple, 195 F.3d at 713–

14) (granting dismissal where “the only specific instances [the plaintiff] allege[d] in support of her

Monell claim are her own”); see also Misjuns v. City of Lynchburg, 139 F.4th 378, 386 (4th Cir.

2025) (“[T]here must be numerous particular instances of unconstitutional conduct to establish a

custom or practice.”) (cleaned up). “Sporadic or isolated violations of rights will not give rise to

Monell liability; only ‘widespread or flagrant’ violations will.” Johnson, 163 F.4th at 822 (quoting

Owens, 767 F.3d at 403)).

Ms. Crawford alleges the RCC “had actual knowledge through prior incidents and

internal communications about detainees in need of medical or mental health treatment, who

threatened suicide, and presented a danger to themselves or others.” [ECF 1 ¶ 235]. Further, Ms.

Crawford alleges the RCC “through patterns and customs, allowed improper conduct by its agents

and employees, including Deputy Defendants, that resulted in the deliberate indifference to Mr.

Crawford. . . .” [Id. ¶ 211]. However, in support of these allegations, Ms. Crawford cites only two

specific incidents, both of which involve Mr. Crawford: (1) a previous arrest in 2021 where Mr.

Crawford’s conviction resulted in a need for a competency determination, and (2) the underlying

incident in December 2023.

Further, Ms. Crawford alleges (1) Corporal McDaniel’s choice to not utilize the

monitoring room in front of Mr. Crawford’s cell, and (2) the Officers intervening while the EMS

technicians were evaluating Mr. Crawford indicate “ample evidence that this was how the group

as a whole handled arrestees in mental health crises.” [ECF 17 at 6]. While our Court of Appeals

has acknowledged the “recitation of facts need not be particularly detailed,” isolated incidents are

insufficient to provide plausibility in a Monell claim. Compare Owens, 767 F.3d at 403 (allowing

a Monell claim to proceed because plaintiff alleged “the existence of ‘reported and unreported

cases’ and numerous ‘successful motions’—which, if true, . . . buttress[ed] his legal conclusion”),

with Johnson, 163 F.4th at 823 (denying a Monell claim because allegations providing a general

accusation of a custom or practice of “routinely suspend[ing] officers for extended periods . . . is

insufficient to cross the plausibility threshold”).

In attempting to plead RCC was constructively or actually aware of improper

conduct by its employees or the Officers, Ms. Crawford alleges only that “Defendant RCC had

knowledge . . . that the constitutional and statutory violations as alleged herein were to be

committed . . .” by virtue of having “access to records of prior investigations, arrests, and

incarcerations involving Mr. Crawford.” [ECF 1 ¶ 40]. Cf. Fields v. King, 576 F. Supp.3d 392,

409–10 (S.D. W. Va. 2021) (concluding the plaintiff had adequately alleged the Defendant had

actual or constructive notice of improper conduct and denying motion to dismiss because plaintiff

alleged multiple specific incidents which resulted in multiple citizen complaints and lawsuits).

3. Failure to Train/Supervise

“For a municipality to be liable under § 1983 for failing to properly train police, the

failure to train must ‘amount[ ] to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the

police come into contact.’” Est. of Jones by Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661, 671 (4th

Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388

(1989)). “If the City’s failure to train reflects such a deliberate or consciously indifferent ‘policy,’

then its failure can fairly be said to be the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.’”

Id. at 671–72 (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 389) (alteration in original). “Additionally, the training

deficiency ‘must be closely related to the ultimate injury,’ meaning it must cause the incident.” Id.

at 672 (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 389). “Because Monell liability cannot be predicated on a

theory of respondeat superior, a single incident is almost never enough to warrant municipal

liability.” Id. (citing Semple, 195 F.3d at 713–14).

Moreover, “[a] supervisor may be held personally liable under [§] 1983 for a

constitutional violation committed by a subordinate state or local government official where the

supervisor’s ‘indifference or tacit authorization’ was ‘a causative factor’ in enabling the violation.”

Bolick v. Anderson, 169 F.4th 528, 541 (4th Cir. 2026) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798–

99 (4th Cir. 1994)). Our Court of Appeals has articulated the following elements required to

demonstrate a cause of action for supervisory liability under § 1983: (1) “the supervisor had actual

or constructive knowledge that her subordinate’s conduct ‘posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk

of constitutional injury,’” (2) “the supervisor exhibited ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit

authorization’ of the constitutionally injurious conduct,” and (3) “some ‘affirmative causal link’

existed between the supervisor’s inaction and the plaintiff’s constitutional injury.” Id. at 541

(quoting Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014)).

Ms. Crawford argues her failure to train and supervise claims are plausible for many

of the same reasons as she alleges there is a custom, but her claim fails for many of the same

reasons. Ms. Crawford has not successfully pled her Monell claim based on an alleged widespread

practice. Ms. Crawford claims the Complaint adequately alleges “[RCC] . . . failed to require

appropriate in-service training or retaining [sic] of officers who were known to have deprived

detainees of safety, protection, and adequate medical care.” [ECF 17 at 8]. Yet, outside of the

allegations regarding the December 12, 2023, incident being mishandled by the Officers, the

Complaint does not allege any improper conduct or complaints that would give rise to RCC having

actual or constructive notice.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and Count VI is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to repleading on or before September 15, 2026.

C. WV Human Rights Act Violations (Count VIII)

Section 16B-17-9(7)(A) of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, under which Ms.

Crawford has asserted her claim, states:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . .

(7) For any person, employer, employment agency, labor organization, owner, real

estate broker, real estate salesman, or financial institution to:

(A) Engage in any form of threats or reprisal, or to engage in, or

hire, or conspire with others to commit acts or activities of any

nature, the purpose of which is to harass, degrade, embarrass or

cause physical harm or economic loss or to aid, abet, incite, compel

or coerce any person to engage in any of the unlawful discriminatory

practices defined in this section;

W. Va. Code § 16B-17-9(7)(A) (2025). RCC argues Ms. Crawford failed to allege facts

“attributable to” it acting “with a purpose to cause Mr. Crawford harm.” [ECF 18 at 7]. Ms.

Crawford further asserts she does not need to allege “proof that the defendant’s conduct was done

with the specific purpose of harassing, degrading, or causing harm.” [ECF 17 at 9]. She asserts the

West Virginia Human Rights Act “prohibits discrimination based on disability that results in

harm.” [Id.]. Ms. Crawford is correct in her belief inasmuch as the Act intends to proscribe

discriminatory practices which cause harm, but the Act also details what “unlawful discriminatory

practice” entails, which includes the specifically cited provision within the Complaint, § 16B-17-

9(7)(A). See generally § 16B-17-9. Thus, to assert a discriminatory practice under the

aforementioned section, Ms. Crawford must allege with particularity facts which indicate “any

person . . . engage[d] in, hire[d], or conspire[d] with others to commit acts or activities of any

nature, the purpose of which is to degrade, embarrass, or cause physical harm or economic loss. .

. .” § 16B-17-9(7)(A) (emphasis added). It is thus incumbent upon Ms. Crawford to allege facts

supporting the claim that RCC acted with purpose in its alleged discriminatory practices.

Ms. Crawford alleges “Deputy Defendants, as employees [of] Defendant RCC,

engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices and ultimately caused the death of [Mr.] Crawford .

. .” and “[t]he acts of [RCC], through the Raleigh County Sherriff’s Department and its agents and

employees created a hostile environment. . . .” [ECF 1 ¶ 264]. Ms. Crawford contends the Deputy

Defendants acted with purpose, so RCC is liable for those purposeful acts.

RCC asserts Ms. Crawford failed to plead facts attributable to RCC. In answering

a certified question, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia concluded plaintiffs brought

a claim under the West Virginia Human Rights Act directly against an insurance company when

plaintiffs alleged: the “[Defendant] by and through its agents, employees and representatives . . .

failed to properly, fairly and reasonably evaluate . . . because of [the plaintiffs’ protected class].”

Michael v. Appalachian Heating, 226 W. Va. 394, 398, 701 S.E.2d 116, 120 (2010) (emphasis

added) (concluding an insurance company is a “person” for purposes of the Act). Further, the

Supreme Court of Appeals subsequently recognized a claim alleging an entity “allowed or created

an environment that was severely or pervasively hostile to its . . . residents based on their

disabilities— . . . [came] within the conduct prohibited by [West Virginia Human Rights Act].”

Potomac Comprehensive Diagnostic & Guidance Ctr., Inc. v. L.K. by Young, 250 W. Va. 102, 115,

902 S.E.2d 434, 447 (2024).

In support of Ms. Crawford’s West Virginia Human Rights Act claim, she alleges

“Deputy Defendants, as employees [of] Defendant RCC, engaged in unlawful discriminatory

practices and ultimately caused the death of [Mr.] Crawford . . .” and “[t]he acts of [RCC], through

the Raleigh County Sherriff’s Department and its agents and employees created a hostile

environment. . . .” [ECF 1 ¶ 264]. Treating all factual allegations as true, Ms. Crawford has failed

to state a plausible claim for which a violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act can be

sustained. She has not pled any facts which would indicate the RCC acted with purpose to

discriminate against Mr. Crawford and others based on their disabilities. Ms. Crawford has

insufficiently pled facts indicating RCC aided or abetted the Officers in perpetuating

discriminatory acts. Finally, Ms. Crawford has not alleged facts which indicate the environment

permitted by RCC was severely or pervasively hostile, largely for the same reasons Ms. Crawford’s

other claims against the RCC fail inasmuch as one singular incident does not establish

pervasiveness. Cf. Potomac Comprehensive Diagnostic & Guidance Ctr., Inc., 250 W. Va. at 114,

902 S.E.2d at 446 (concluding specific allegations alleging (1) repeated “‘ridicule’ of children[,

(2)]. . . violence against children, and . . . [(3) that] ‘almost every child expressed fear . . . of staff

members’” was sufficient to establish facts indicating severe and pervasive hostile environment).

Accordingly, Ms. Crawford has not plausibly alleged a claim for a violation of the

West Virginia Human Rights Act against RCC. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and

Count VHI is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to repleading on or before September 15,

2026.

IV.

Based upon the foregoing discussion, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Partially

Dismiss [ECF 13] the Complaint and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Counts III, IV, V,

VI, VII, and VIII to repleading in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on or

before September 15, 2026. Failure to re-plead by this date will result in the entry of a show cause

order by this Court.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this written opinion and order to all

counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.

ENTER: August 31, 2026

“tems” Chief United States District Judge

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