The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CLIFFORD BAKER, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 3:23-cv-01739-GCS
)
PERCY MYERS, )
CHRISTINE BROWN, )
and )
CHRISTEL CROW, )
)
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Pending before the Court are Defendant Percy Myer’s motion for summary
judgment, (Doc. 71, 72, 89), and Defendants Christel Crow’s and Christine Brown’s
motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 80, 88).1 Plaintiff opposes the motions. (Doc. 87).
Based on the reasons delineated below, the Court GRANTS the motions for summary
judgment.
Plaintiff Clifford Baker, an inmate with the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”), who is currently incarcerated in Danville Correctional Center, brings this
1 Along with the motions for summary judgment, Defendants filed the required
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 notices informing Plaintiff of the consequences of
failing to respond to the motions for summary judgment and what is required in
responding to motions for summary judgment. (Doc. 73, 81).
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his civil rights while housed at
Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”). (Doc. 1). His original Complaint
alleging deliberate indifference in the treatment of his broken finger was dismissed for
failure to state a claim. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff was granted leave to amend his pleading. On
September 19, 2023, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint. (Doc. 12). Baker alleges
Defendants acted with deliberate indifference in treating his broken finger, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.
On February 15, 2024, the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, conducted a
review of the Amended Complaint and allowed Plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Christine Brown, Christel Crow, and
Percy Myers for delaying treatment for his broken finger. (Doc. 13). As to his allegations
regarding Defendants Brown and Crow, Plaintiff alleges he spoke to Defendant Crow on
April 6, 2023, and he wrote a letter to Defendant Brown on March 22, 2023, requesting
care for his injured finger; they both failed to respond to his requests. (Doc. 12, p. 4). As
to his allegations regarding Defendant Myers, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that he was
directed to follow-up with Defendant Myers after his February 9, 2023, visit to the
emergency room, but Defendant Myers failed to examine him after his return.
Defendant Myers maintains he is entitled to summary judgment as Plaintiff cannot
set forth any evidence he was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.
Nor did Plaintiff suffer any injury caused by him. Likewise, Defendants Brown and Crow
argue the same. They further argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff
counters that the evidence shows Defendants Myers and Brown were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff also asserts he suffered unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain and suffering due to Defendants’ conduct. Based on the reasons
delineated below, the Court grants the motions for summary judgment.
UNDISPUTED FACTS2
The following facts are taken from the record and presented in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in
his favor. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009).
At all relevant times, Plaintiff Clifford Baker was incarcerated at Pinckneyville.
Defendant Percy Myers is a physician licensed in the state of Illinois. At all relevant times,
Defendant Myers worked as a physician at Pinckneyville. Defendant Christine Brown is
employed as the Healthcare Unit Administrator (“HCUA”) at Pinckneyville. She is also
a registered nurse, but does not treat patients in her current role as HCUA. At all relevant
times, Defendant Christel Crow was employed as the Warden at Pinckneyville.
2 These are the facts agreed to by the parties and/or are supported by the record.
The Court notes that in response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff
did not address/mention any of Defendant Crow’s and Defendant Brown’s assertions of
material facts in violation of Local Rule 56(b)(1). This is despite the fact that Defendants
provided Plaintiff with the required notices of the consequences for failing to respond.
(Doc. 81). Local Rule 56.(1)(g) also provides: “[a]ll material facts set forth in a Statement
of Material Facts or a Statement of Additional Material Facts shall be deemed admitted
for the purposes of summary judgment unless specifically disputed.” SDIL-LR 56.1(g).
Further, the Local Rule 56(j) states in part: “[t]his Local Rule applies equally to
represented and pro se parties. . . .” Thus, the opposing party must respond to the
movant’s statement of facts. See Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th
Cir. 2005). As Plaintiff did not respond/dispute Defendant Crow’s and Defendant
Brown’s material facts, the Court deems them admitted for the purposes of this motion
for summary judgment.
On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff injured the index finger on his left hand playing
basketball. He jammed it on the ball, and it “popped” and swelled so he was taken to
healthcare. Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Myers and transported to the Pinckneyville
emergency room that same day. Plaintiff was seen by Dr Walter Beusse. Dr. Beusse
charted, on physical examination, that Plaintiff was positive for second digit
metacarpophalangeal joint (middle joint of fingers) swelling, ecchymosis (bruising), and
limited range of motion. There was moderate digit tenderness. Plaintiff received x-rays
and was diagnosed with a broken finger (nondisplaced volar plate fracture of the index
middle finger phalanx and fracture involving the base of the index finger when counting
from the hand) and was told the hospital recommended an orthopedic surgeon. A
hospital nurse wrapped Plaintiff’s finger in an Ace bandage and a splint. He was
prescribed ibuprofen 600 mg. Plaintiff already had a prescription for Naproxen on file at
the prison. The discharge instructions from the emergency room included Plaintiff
following-up with Defendant Myers and calling Southern Illinois Orthopedic Center
(“SIOC”) at 8:00 a.m. the following morning for an appointment.
Plaintiff returned to the prison around 11:00 p.m., wherein he was seen by a nurse
in the health care unit. Plaintiff does not know if Defendant Myers was at the prison at
this time.
Plaintiff agreed with Defendant Myer’s decision to send him to the emergency
room. The first and only time Plaintiff saw Defendant Myers for an injury to his finger
was on February 9, 2023.
On February 10, 2023, Defendant Myers completed a Medical Special Services
Referral and Report for Plaintiff to be referred to orthopedics for evaluation for a
nondisplaced fracture of his left index finger. Defendant Myers marked the referral non-
urgent.
Plaintiff does not know what the process is to get referred out for an off-site visit.
He does not know what involvement Defendant Myers had in that process, but in his
case, Defendant Myers marked it non-urgent. Plaintiff does not know what happens after
Defendant Myers completes a referral request. He also does not know how his
appointment was scheduled.
On February 10, 2023, Plaintiff submitted an emergency grievance about his finger.
Plaintiff does not know if Defendant Myers ever reviewed his grievance or if anyone ever
spoke to him about the grievance.
Between February 10, 2023, and February 15, 2023, Plaintiff did not see anyone in
the healthcare unit about his finger. He testified that during this time, if he saw nurses
passing out medication, he would tell them about his situation. However, Plaintiff does
not know what the nurses would do with this information; he does not know if any of
the nurses ever spoke to Defendant Myers; and he does not know if Defendant Myers
was ever made aware of these conversations.
Also, during this time, Plaintiff had correctional officers, including correctional
officer Martin, call the health care unit. Plaintiff testified that officer Martin spoke with
Defendant Brown. However, he is not sure what Defendant Brown did with this
information. He also does not know if Defendant Brown spoke with Defendant Myers;
he does not know if officer Martin talked to anyone other than Defendant Brown; and he
does not know if Defendant Myers was made aware of his conversations with
correctional officers about his finger.
On or about February 15, 2023, Plaintiff was authorized to see an orthopedist for
evaluation of a nondisplaced fracture of his left finger. That same day, he saw Nurse
Practitioner Bobby Blum for follow-up. Plaintiff does not know who scheduled him to
see NP Blum. NP Blum charted that Plaintiff had an ACE wrap. NP Blum’s plan was for
Plaintiff to be seen by orthopedics, continue the splint, and acetaminophen 500 mg for 30
days.
Plaintiff testified that NP Blum told him he was on the list to see the orthopedics;
that he had no reason to doubt NP Blum; and that he does not know if NP Blum ever
spoke with Defendant Myers about him.
On February 24, 2023, Defendant Myers charted that Plaintiff was on his line for
the emergency room visit follow-up but noted Plaintiff had been seen in the health care
unit after the emergency room visit. So Defendant Myers’ plan was to cancel Plaintiff’s
visit with him. At this time, Plaintiff did not know he was scheduled to see Defendant
Myers, and he does not know why Defendant Myers canceled the visit.
On March 16, 2023, NP Blum charted an order for acetaminophen 500 mg for 30
days.
On March 22, 2023, Plaintiff wrote Defendant Brown about his finger. He does not
know what Defendant Brown did with his note or if she ever spoke to Defendant Myers
about it. He does not know if Defendant Myers was ever aware of any prisoner request
or sick call request Plaintiff submitted related to his finger.
NP Blum charted an order for naproxen 375 mg for 30 days on March 30, 2023.
On April 6, 2023, Plaintiff talked to Warden Crow about his finger. He does not
know what Defendant Crow did with this information or if she ever talked to Defendant
Myers.
Plaintiff was seen in nurse sick call for discomfort to his left index finger and lower
back on April 10, 2023. The nurse referred Plaintiff for chart review of his pain
medications, and to a physician or mid-level provider for his left index finger. The nurse
also gave Plaintiff Tylenol 325 mg. Two days later, on April 12, 2023, Plaintiff saw
Physician Assistant Ashini Desai for his left hand. Plaintiff also complained of back pain
with history of degenerative disk disease. NP Desai charted that Plaintiff had swelling
and decreased flexion at the metacarpophalangeal joint and proximal interphalangeal
joint. Her assessment was left hand second digit injury and degenerative disk disease.
She charted that orthopedics was pending. Her plan was for Plaintiff to have naproxen
500 mg and acetaminophen 500 mg for 6 months and for Plaintiff to be seen in nurse sick
call as needed.
Plaintiff does not know if PA Desai ever talked to Defendant Myers about him.
Plaintiff was told by Nurse Practitioner Ashini Desai that the appointment was set by
Defendant Brown.
On April 26, 2023, Plaintiff saw Dr. Ryan Patrick Calfee at Wahington University
Orthopedic Surgery (“Wash U”) for left index finger injury. Dr Calfee charted, on
physical examination, that there was no evidence of finger malrotation or scissoring; that
Plaintiff had full extension of all fingers, fingertip-to-distal palmar crease was 2 cm for
the index finger and 0 for all other fingers, and sensation was intact; that Plaintiff had
some tenderness to palpation over the volar aspect of the proximal interphalangeal joint
of the index finger; and that Plaintiff’s hand was warm and well perfused. Dr. Calfee
ordered, performed, and interpreted a fluoroscan of Plaintiff’s index finger, which
showed only a small avulsion fracture on the volar base of the middle phalanx of the
index finger. Dr. Calfee’s assessment was left index finger volar plate injury with avulsion
fracture at the base of the middle phalanx with residual stiffness. Dr. Calfee noted
Plaintiff’s finger alignment was very encouraging. He showed Plaintiff exercises he could
do at home to help the remaining flexion of his index finger using active and passive
stretching. He also noted he told Plaintiff that the finger can continue to ache for quite a
number of months but overall, everything was stable. In his Report of Referral, Dr. Calfee
noted findings of “left index finger small fracture healed, just some stiffness.” His
assessment was “left index finger stiff after injury.” Dr. Calfee’s plan was “stretching
active [and] passive with good full flexion, Tylenol or NSADs [as needed] for discomfort,
and no follow-up needed.”
Plaintiff does not know why it took until April 26, 2023, to see Dr. Calfee. He
contends it is because Defendant Myers marked non-urgent on the referral form. He does
not know Wash U’s patient schedule in February, March, and April, and he does not
know if Wash U had any earlier openings in February, March or April. Plaintiff does not
know if SIOC could have seen him sooner.
Plaintiff saw NP Blum after he returned from Dr. Calfee on April 26, 2023. NP
Blum discussed Dr. Calfee’s plan with Plaintiff.
Defendant Brown declared she does not schedule any outside appointments; such
appointments are made by facility schedulers. Defendant Brown believes she was
contacted regarding Plaintiff’s February 10, 2023 grievance. In response, Defendant
Brown would have reached out to the schedulers, who informed her that Plaintiff was
scheduled to see the orthopedist, and she relayed that information to the grievance
officer.
Plaintiff has no medical training. He does not know what the treatment is for his
finger injury. He does not know how long it takes for this type of injury to heal. He does
not know how long someone with this type of injury can still experience symptoms. He
does not know if it is unusual to have stiffness after three to four months.
Plaintiff still cannot fully make a fist, and his finger will not bend fully.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and affidavits “show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c); Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 997
(7th Cir. 2021) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). The movant
bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Quinn v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 8
F.4th 557, 567 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The
Court must consider the entire record, drawing reasonable inferences and resolving
factual disputes in favor of the non-movant. See Fletcher v. Doig, 145 F.4th 756, 764 (7th
Cir. 2025) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). See also Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Association
International, 5 F.4th 684, 693 (7th Cir. 2021) (stating that “we are not required to draw
every conceivable inference from the record . . . but ‘only those inferences that are
reasonable.’”) (internal citations omitted). Summary judgment is also appropriate if a
plaintiff cannot make a showing of an essential element of his claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322. While the Court may not “weigh evidence or engage in factfinding[,]” it must
determine if a genuine issue remains for trial. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 651
(7th Cir. 2007).
In response to a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant may not simply
rest on the allegations in his pleadings; rather, he must show through specific evidence
that an issue of fact remains on matters for which he bears the burden of proof at trial.
See Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2009); Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004,
1012 (7th Cir. 2018). No issue remains for trial “unless there is sufficient evidence favoring
the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party . . . if the evidence is
merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–250 (citations omitted). Accord Smith v. City of Janesville, 40 F.4th
816, 821 (7th Cir. 2022); Doxtator v. O'Brien, 39 F.4th 852, 860 (7th Cir. 2022). In other
words, “inferences relying on mere speculation or conjecture will not suffice.” DiPerna v.
Chicago School of Professional Psychology, 893 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal
citation omitted). See also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (finding that “[t]he mere existence of
a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there
must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]”).
Instead, the non-moving party must present “definite, competent evidence to rebut the
[summary judgment] motion.” Burton v. Kohn Law Firm, S.C., 934 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir.
2019) (internal citation omitted).
B. Deliberate Indifference
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, and the
deliberate indifference to the “serious medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain forbidden by the Constitution.” Donald v.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 457-458 (7th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). A
prisoner is entitled to “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm”—
not to demand specific care. Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). A prisoner’s
dissatisfaction with a medical professional’s prescribed course of treatment does not give
rise to a successful deliberate indifference claim unless the treatment is so “blatantly
inappropriate as to evidence intentional mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate the
prisoner’s condition.” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference, a prisoner who brings an Eighth
Amendment challenge of constitutionally deficient medical care must satisfy a two-part
test. See Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). The first
consideration is whether the prisoner has an “objectively serious medical
condition.” Johnson, 5 F.4th at 824. Accord Whitaker v. Dempsey, 144 F.4th 908, 916 (7th Cir.
2025) (citations omitted). “A medical condition is objectively serious if a physician has
diagnosed it as requiring treatment, or the need for treatment would be obvious to a
layperson.” Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1022-23 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). It
is not necessary for such a medical condition to “be life-threatening to be serious; rather,
it could be a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain if not treated.” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010).
Accord Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (violating the Eighth Amendment
requires “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Prevailing on the subjective prong requires a prisoner to show that a prison official
has subjective knowledge of—and then disregards—an excessive risk to inmate
health. See Johnson, 5 F.4th at 824. The plaintiff need not show the individual “literally
ignored” his complaint, but that the individual was aware of the condition and either
knowingly or recklessly disregarded it. Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir.
2016) (citations omitted). “Something more than negligence or even malpractice is
required” to prove deliberate indifference. Lockett, 937 F.3d at 1023. See also Hammond v.
Rector, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1086 (S.D. Ill. 2015) (stating that “isolated occurrences of
deficient medical treatment are generally insufficient to establish . . . deliberate
indifference”). Deliberate indifference involves “intentional or reckless conduct, not mere
negligence.” Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Gayton v. McCoy,
593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010).
Assessing the subjective prong is more difficult in cases alleging inadequate care
as opposed to a lack of care. Without more, a “mistake in professional judgment cannot
be deliberate indifference.” Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 688 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations
omitted). The Seventh Circuit has explained:
By definition a treatment decision that’s based on professional judgment
cannot evince deliberate indifference because professional judgment implies a
choice of what the defendant believed to be the best course of treatment. A
doctor who claims to have exercised professional judgment is effectively
asserting that he lacked a sufficiently culpable mental state, and if no
reasonable jury could discredit that claim, the doctor is entitled to summary
judgment.
Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Zaya v. Sood,
836 F.3d 800, 805-806 (7th Cir. 2016)). This is in contrast to a case “where evidence exists
that the defendant [ ] knew better than to make the medical decision[ ] that [he]
did[.]” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 964 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations
omitted). A medical professional’s choice of an easier, less efficacious treatment can rise
to the level of violating the Eighth Amendment where the treatment is known to be
ineffective but is chosen anyway. See Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 441 (7th Cir. 2010).
Non-medical prison staff, meanwhile, are generally “entitled to relegate to
the prison’s medical staff the provision of good medical care[.]” Burks v. Raemisch, 555
F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus, non-medical prison staff may be held liable under §
1983 only if they have “a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or
their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d
742, 755 (7th Cir. 2011). The relevant inquiry turns on the prison official’s subjective state
of mind. See Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
DISCUSSION
A. Defendant Myers
Defendant Myers argues he is entitled to summary judgment as Plaintiff cannot
establish that he exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff
counters that Defendant Myers was deliberately indifferent because Defendant Myers
did not cause him to be seen by an orthopedist on February 10, 2023, that Defendant
Myers marked his referral to an outside orthopedist as non-urgent, and that Defendant
Myers did not see Plaintiff on February 10, 2023. The Court agrees with Defendant Myers.
For the purposes of this motion, the Court finds that the injury to Plaintiff’s broken
finger is a serious medical condition. However, based on that same record and construing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds there is no evidence
in the record to show that Defendant Myers was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s
serious medical need regarding the treatment of Plaintiff’s finger and the delay in
treatment Plaintiff experienced.
Here, the record reveals Defendant Myers provided appropriate medical
treatment to Plaintiff. He saw Plaintiff only once on February 9, 2023. During that visit,
Defendant Myers examined Plaintiff’s finger and immediately sent Plaintiff to the
emergency room. Plaintiff was transported to the emergency room that day and returned
to the prison around 11:00 p.m. that night. The next day, February 10, 2023, Defendant
Myers reviewed Plaintiff’s discharge instructions from the emergency room doctor and
submitted a non-urgent referral for Plaintiff to be sent to an outside orthopedist. The
emergency room doctor did not recommend urgent surgery. Defendant Myers attested
he did not have a role in the scheduling of the orthopedist; he did not have knowledge of
the appointment delay; and he did not have any further contact with Plaintiff.
There is nothing to suggest that the treatment Plaintiff received from Defendant
Myers was “so blatantly inappropriate as to evidence intentional mistreatment.” Greeno
v. Daly, 414 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff has offered
no evidence to support his assertions that Defendant Myers personally should have
called the orthopedist for him on February 10, 2023; that Defendant Myers should have
seen Plaintiff on February 10, 2023; and that Defendant Myers should not have marked
the referral non-urgent. Although Defendant Myers marked the referral to the
orthopedist as non-urgent, an urgent referral would have only sped up the authorization
process, not the appointment scheduling process. Plaintiff’s injury was also a common
volar plate avulsion fracture that required standard treatment with splinting, rest and
pain medication. Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertions are insufficient to permit a reasonable
jury to find deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Snipes, 95 F.3d at 592. (stating that “[a]
prisoner's dissatisfaction with a doctor’s prescribed course of treatment does not give rise
to a constitutional claim.”).
Further, Plaintiff admitted he did not know if Defendant Myers saw his grievance
or heard about his complaints. He also did not know if Defendant Myers was told about
his worsening symptoms or if Defendant Myers knew about the appointment delay.
Additionally, Plaintiff stated he did not know why the appointment was delayed, and he
did not know who was responsible for the delayed appointment.
Lastly, Dr. Calfee, an orthopedist at Wash U, examined Plaintiff on April 26, 2023,
and determined his finger was stable, well-aligned and did not require surgery or
additional monitoring. Moreover, Plaintiff testified that he did not know whether earlier
treatment would have changed the outcome. He also does not know whether stiffness for
months is unusual and how long such injuries take to heal. No evidence indicates that
Plaintiff’s pain and suffering were exacerbated because of the appointment delay.
Nothing before the Court suggests that an earlier appointment with the orthopedic
surgeon would have decreased or alleviated Plaintiff’s alleged pain. Thus, Plaintiff
cannot establish harm from the delayed appointment.
Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court
finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Myers was deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs regarding his broken finger. Thus, the
Court finds that Defendant Myers is entitled to summary judgment.
B. Defendants Crow and Brown
Lastly, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Crow and Brown.
As to Defendant Crow, Plaintiff concedes he does not have a claim against her. (Doc. 87,
p. 33). Thus, the Court grants summary judgment in Defendant Crow’s favor.
As to Defendant Brown, Defendant Brown argues she lacks the personal
involvement to be liable for Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff counters that Defendant Brown
was responsible for scheduling his orthopedic appointment and her failure to do so
constitutes deliberate indifference. The Court agrees with Defendant Brown.
The Court, construing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as it must,
concludes it does not contain evidence that Defendant Brown was subjectively aware of
Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and ignored them. The evidence reveals Defendant
Brown was not personally involved in the delay of his medical treatment. She is the
Healthcare Unit Administrator, not a treating nurse; she does not schedule outside
appointments; and she never spoke to Plaintiff. It appears her only involvement was
responding to Plaintiff’s grievance by checking with the schedulers and confirming that
the appointment was set.
Moreover, the evidence does not reveal that Defendant Brown had subjective
knowledge of a substantial risk. Plaintiff’s own testimony shows that he does not know
why the appointment was delayed; he does not know whether Defendant Brown
received his kite; and he does not know whether Defendant Brown was aware of any
worsening of his symptoms.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s inability to connect Defendant Brown to the appointment
process or to produce evidence of Defendant Defendant’s Brown personal participation
is fatal to his claim. Plaintiff speculates that “Health Care Administrators and Medical
Directors are responsible for scheduling outside specialist treatment.” (Doc. 87, p. 30).
Then later in his brief, Plaintiff states that specialty medical referrals are handled by
“health care staff and medical directors.” Id. at p. 21. The Health Care Administrator and
health care staff are not one and the same. His speculation/belief does not create a
material fact. Unsupported speculation cannot defeat summary judgment. A Plaintiff
seeking to defeat summary judgment must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 and Federal Rule of Evidence 602. Both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4)and
Rule of Evidence 602 requires that testimony be based on personal knowledge. Personal
knowledge can include reasonable inferences, but it does not include speculating as to
someone else’s state of mind, or other intuitions, hunches, or rumors. See Payne v.
Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2003).
Lastly, as stated supra, Dr. Calfee, in April 2023, found normal alignment, stable
healing, and no need for surgery. Dr. Calfee also noted no follow-up was necessary and
stiffness was normal. In fact, Plaintiff admitted he did not know if earlier treatment would
have changed the outcome, whether the delay worsened the injury, or whether stiffness
was unusual. Thus, Plaintiff cannot show any harm caused by the delay in treatment.
Mostly, the evidence demonstrates that Defendant Brown was aware of Plaintiff’s
issue through Plaintiff’s grievance and that she inquired with healthcare staff about the
status of the outside appointment wherein she was told it was scheduled. The Court finds
that Plaintiff has not presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
that Defendant Brown was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs or turned
a blind eye towards Plaintiff’s medical situation. Thus, Defendant Brown is entitled to
summary judgment.3
3 As the Court finds that Defendant Brown is entitled to summary judgment, the
Court need not address the issue of qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motions for summary judgment (Doc. 71,
80). The Court FINDS in favor of Defendants Percy Myers, Christel Crow and Christine
Brown and against Plaintiff Clifford Baker. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court
to enter judgment reflecting the same and close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Digitally signed by Judge
- Sison
DATED: August 31, 2026. Aldieg ec. 22 Date: 2026.08.31
11:40:59 -05'00'
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge
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