RHILES

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

EDDIE LEE RHILES, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 4:23cv457-RH-MAF

EDWARD LEE and

DR. A. CORTES,

Defendants.

___________________________/

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a prisoner civil-rights case. The first amended complaint asserts

claims against a correctional officer who allegedly used force against the plaintiff

for no reason and a doctor who the plaintiff asserts rendered insufficient medical

care. The plaintiff and each defendant have moved for summary judgment. The

motions are before the court on the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,

ECF No. 114, and the correctional officer’s objections, ECF No. 117. I have

reviewed de novo the issues raised by the objections.

On a summary-judgment motion, disputes in the evidence must be resolved,

and all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn, in favor of the

nonmoving party. The moving party must show that, when the facts are so viewed,

the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);

see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A summary-judgment

motion cannot be used to resolve in the moving party’s favor a “genuine dispute as

to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The report and recommendation correctly concludes that the doctor,

identified as “Dr. A. Cortes,” is entitled to summary judgment. There have been no

objections to that part of the report and recommendation. This order grants

summary judgment for Dr. Cortes. Because a pending lawsuit sometimes affects a

defendant’s ability to obtain credit or has other unwarranted effects, I expressly

determine that there is no just reason for delay and direct the clerk to enter

judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) as provided below.

The result is different for the correctional officer, Edward Lee. The plaintiff

Eddie Lee Rhiles, Jr. and other prisoners have testified that Mr. Lee struck or

strangled Mr. Rhiles for no reason. Mr. Lee has testified it didn’t happen. This is

the very paradigm of a disputed factual issue that cannot be resolved on summary

judgment.

In asserting the contrary, Mr. Lee notes that the testimony of Mr. Rhiles and

other prisoners is not completely consistent: “the record does not establish a single,

undisputed account of the nature or extent of the alleged force used.” ECF No. 117

at 4. But this of course is not a basis for summary judgment. A jury need not reject

all eyewitness accounts of the force used just because the accounts are not

completely consistent.

A defendant is entitled to summary judgment when there is insufficient

evidence that, if believed, would entitle the plaintiff to prevail. It is not

disqualifying that the evidence is disputed; quite the contrary. Evidentiary disputes

are resolved through trials, not summary-judgment motions. Indeed, rare is the

case in which all a party’s witnesses agree on every detail of what happened. If

disagreement among a party’s own witnesses was a basis for summary judgment,

there would be many more summary judgments and very few trials. The

inconsistencies here may be more extensive than in some cases, perhaps most, but

resolving the inconsistencies remains the role of a jury after a trial, not the role of

the court on summary judgment.

Mr. Lee also says there is no evidence from which a jury could find that he

acted maliciously and sadistically for the purpose of causing harm. But there is

evidence from which a jury could find that Mr. Lee struck or strangled Mr.

Rhiles—or both—for no reason. Mr. Lee says a jury could draw an inference—

contrary to his own testimony—that his use of force against Mr. Rhiles was

“mistaken, startled, reactive, or unnecessary” but not “malicious and sadistic.”

ECF No. 117 at 18. But on Mr. Lee’s summary-judgment motion, disputed

inferences cannot be drawn in his favor, especially when inconsistent with his own

testimony. This and other factual disputes presented by this record are the stuff of

which jury trials are made.

Finally, Mr. Lee asserts he has qualified immunity and thus cannot be held

liable even if he used constitutionally excessive force and injured Mr. Rhiles as

alleged. Qualified immunity applies to damages claims against public officers

acting within their discretionary authority and protects “all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.

335, 341 (1986). See generally Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13 (2014); Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Thus a

public officer may be held individually liable only if the officer’s conduct violated

clearly established law. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018).

In applying this standard on a summary-judgment motion, a court must

“consider the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, eliminating all

issues of fact.” Wate v. Kubler, 839 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2016); see also

Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848 (11th Cir. 2010). Once the facts are properly

viewed, “the reasonableness of an officer’s actions is a pure question of law.”

Penley, 605 F.3d at 848–49 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).

The law has long been clearly established that an officer cannot use

substantial force against a prisoner for no reason. See Skrtich v. Thorton, 280 F.3d

1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223 (2009); see also Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947, 955 (11th

Cir. 2019) (collecting cases). Thus, for example, deliberately striking or strangling

a prisoner for no reason violates clearly established law. The jury could find that is

what happened here.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The report and recommendation is accepted and adopted as the court’s

further opinion.

2. Mr. Rhiles’s summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 86, is denied.

3. Mr. Lee’s summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 95, is denied.

4. Dr. Cortes’ summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 82, is granted.

5. The clerk must enter judgment stating, “This judgment is entered under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The plaintiff Eddie Lee Rhiles, Jr.’s claims

against the defendant Dr. A. Cortes were resolved on a summary-judgment motion.

It is adjudged that Mr. Rhiles recover nothing on his claims against Dr. Cortes. The

claims are dismissed on the merits.”

SO ORDERED on August 30, 2026.

s/Robert L. Hinkle

United States District Judge