Dixon

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-00393-KDB-DCK

ANDREW WILSON DIXON,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JACKSON BUFFINGTON AND

JOSEPH MARESCO,

Defendants.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. No. 10), to

Strike the Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 17), and for Sanctions (Doc. No. 19). The Court has

carefully considered the motions, and the parties’ briefs and exhibits in support and opposition.

For the reasons discussed below, the Court will GRANT the motion to dismiss and DENY the

motions to strike and for sanctions.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for “failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted” tests whether the complaint is legally and factually

sufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th

Cir. 2010), aff’d, 566 U.S. 30 (2012). A court need not accept a complaint’s “legal conclusions,

elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Nemet

Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).

The Court, however, accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable

inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. See Conner v. Cleveland Cnty., N. Carolina, 22 F.4th 412, 416 (4th

Cir. 2022); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011).

In so doing, the Court “must view the facts presented in the pleadings and the inferences to be

drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.

v. Beach Mart, Inc., 932 F.3d 268, 274 (4th Cir. 2019). Construing the facts in this manner, a

complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 520 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678).

When deciding a motion to dismiss, “a court considers the pleadings and any materials

‘attached or incorporated into the complaint.’” Fitzgerald Fruit Farms LLC v. Aseptia, Inc., 527

F. Supp. 3d 790, 796 (E.D.N.C. 2019) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 448).

Further, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-

specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common

sense.” Id. (citation omitted). Ultimately, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) determines only

whether a claim is stated; “it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim,

or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992).

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Court will briefly summarize the procedural history of Plaintiff Andrew Dixon’s prior

lawsuits, which, as explained below, are relevant to the issues now before the Court. In January

2025, Dixon filed a Complaint in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. He alleged that police

officers violated his rights under the North Carolina and United States Constitutions, and

maliciously prosecuted him following a May 2, 2020, incident in which his then-girlfriend reported

that he had assaulted her and possessed a firearm at an address on Panthersville Drive. See 3:25-

cv-110 Doc. No. 1-1. After Defendants removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss,

Dixon voluntarily dismissed it.

Several months later, in June 2025, Dixon refiled the same Complaint in the same state

Superior Court. Defendants again removed the matter and moved to dismiss for lack of service.

See 3:25-cv-512, Doc. No. 9. Dixon acknowledged that he had not served all defendants and

requested additional time to do so. Doc. No. 11. Rather than dismiss the case, the Court granted

Dixon an extension of time to complete service. See Doc. No. 15. When Dixon failed to provide

proof of service within the extension period, Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss. Doc.

No. 23. Dixon did not respond, and the Court dismissed the action. Doc. No. 25.

In March 2026, Dixon filed a materially identical Complaint directly in federal court. See

3:26-cv-250, Doc. No. 1. Before Defendants responded, however, Dixon again voluntarily

dismissed the matter. Doc. No. 6.

In the present litigation, Dixon departs from the May 2, 2020, allegations that formed the

basis of his prior lawsuits and instead asserts claims arising from events occurring on or about May

13, 2020. According to the Complaint and Amended Complaint, at some point prior to the May

13, 2020, events, Dixon’s girlfriend obtained a Domestic Violence Protective Order (“DVPO”)

requiring him to stay away from her and/or the home on Panthersville Drive. See Doc. Nos. 1, 15.

In the Amended Complaint, Dixon alleges that on or about May 13, 2020, the girlfriend contacted

police and reported that he was interfering with her control of the Panthersville residence. See

3:26-cv-393, Doc. No. 15 ¶¶ 7–8. After a warrant was issued for his arrest for violating the DVPO,

Dixon turned himself in. Id. ¶¶ 3, 18.

With respect to the claims in this action, Dixon again brings claims under § 1983 and the

North Carolina and United States Constitutions. As in his prior lawsuits, Dixon alleges that

Defendants, Officers Buffington and Maresco, lacked probable cause to arrest, charge, and

prosecute him, and that they failed to conduct an adequate investigation when they relied on the

girlfriend’s report to obtain an arrest warrant. Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 19–20. He further alleges that the

charges were ultimately dismissed, but that he suffered harm by having to surrender himself on

the arrest warrant. Id. ¶¶ 3, 21.

Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint, Dixon has filed an opposition, and the

matter is now ripe for this Court’s ruling.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motions to Strike and for Sanctions

As a threshold matter, the Court will deny Defendants’ Motions to Strike (Doc. No. 17)

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and for Sanctions (Doc. No. 19). Under Rule 15(a), a plaintiff may

amend their complaint once “as a matter of course” no later than “21 days after service of a motion

under Rule 12(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Dixon filed his Amended Complaint well within

this timeframe. And, because the salient facts underlying the claims in the Amended Complaint

are the same,1 the Court will exercise its discretion and apply the Motion to Dismiss, to which

Dixon has responded, to the later filed and now operative Amended Complaint.2

1 Although Dixon has withdrawn his legally frivolous Bivens claim, the Amended

Complaint asserts no new causes of action, and the originally asserted constitutional claims remain.

2 See U.S. ex rel. Constructors, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 593, 596 (E.D. Va.

2004) (applying a motion to dismiss to an amended complaint filed while the motion was pending

rather than requiring a new motion to be filed); Byers v. City of Richmond, 746 F. Supp. 3d 275,

299 n.14 (E.D. Va. 2024) (explaining that because a previously filed motion to dismiss was “fully

responsive” to the Amended Complaint, and did not impact the Complaint’s substantive

allegations, it would not require new pleadings in response to the Amended Complaint); Buechler

Further, although Defendants characterize Dixon’s repeated filings as vexatious litigation,

for the reasons discussed below, the current matter involves a distinct set of events occurring on a

different date than Dixon’s previous three lawsuits, and the Court therefore finds insufficient

reason to impose sanctions under Rule 11 at this time.

B. Res Judicata

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants contend that Dixon’s claims are barred by res

judicata because this action represents his fourth lawsuit arising from the same underlying facts.

The Court acknowledges that Dixon’s prior filings reflect substantial duplication—often

verbatim—across complaints. Even so, the Court concludes that the present action is not

precluded.

The Court agrees with Defendants that any claims arising from the events of May 2, 2020,

are barred by res judicata. Those allegations have already been the subject of multiple prior suits,

each culminating in either a voluntary or involuntary dismissal, the sum of which carries preclusive

effect. However, Dixon’s Amended Complaint now asserts claims based on events occurring on a

different date and involving different officers. Although the May 13, 2020, encounter is factually

related to the May 2 incident, and although Dixon again asserts the same constitutional theories he

has previously attempted to litigate, the operative pleading rests on a distinct set of events—

namely, the conduct of officers on May 13, 2020. Because these allegations concern a separate

v. Your Wine & Spirit Shoppe, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 406, 415 (D. Md. 2012) (explaining that to

deny the motion to dismiss without prejudice to refile would be a “useless exercise and contrary

to the notion of judicial economy”); see also Keith v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 692, 693

n.1 (M.D.N.C. 1998) (“The court will not require Defendant to file a new motion to dismiss

repeating its arguments simply because Plaintiff has introduced an amended pleading while the

motion was pending. Because the defects raised in the original motion remain in the amended

complaint, the court may consider the motion as being addressed to the amended pleading.”).

transaction and different defendants, they are not barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the Court

proceeds to consider Defendants’ remaining arguments under Rule 12(b)(6).

C. Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution and Fourth Amendment Claims

Dixon first asserts a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. However, “there is no such thing

as a ‘§ 1983 malicious prosecution’ claim.” Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2000)

(citing Brooks v. City of Winston–Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996)). Put simply, it is “not

an independent cause of action.” Id. Rather, a malicious prosecution theory under § 1983 is

“properly understood as a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates

certain elements of the common law tort.” Id. See also Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th

Cir. 2012). Because Dixon also alleges violations of the Fourth Amendment, the Court will

consider his allegations under that framework. See Brooks, 85 F.3d at 181–84 (analyzing a § 1983

malicious prosecution claim as a Fourth Amendment seizure claim where the plaintiff alleged that

his arrest was not supported by probable cause).

To state a Fourth Amendment § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, “a plaintiff must

show that a government official charged him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable

seizure of his person.” Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, 602 U.S. 556, 558 (2024) (citing

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43, and n.2 (2022)). In addition, although a plaintiff need not

demonstrate an “affirmative indication of innocence,” he must show that the criminal proceedings

terminated “without a conviction.” Thompson, 596 U.S. at 49.

Here, Dixon implicitly acknowledges the existence of a DVPO between himself and his

then-girlfriend, Jennifer Fontana, who he alleges contacted police to report that he was interfering

with her “control” of the home on Panthersville Drive. Doc. No. 153 ¶¶ 3, 7 (“Defendants violated

3 The Amended Complaint does not have paragraphs numbered 4–6, 9. See Doc. No. 15.

the Plaintiff[‘s] … constitutional rights by instituting charges of [DVPO] Violation ….”). He

contends that officers improperly arrested, charged, and prosecuted him on these allegations.4 Id.

¶ 15. Although Dixon asserts that “there was no evidence of Plaintiff’s presence [at the home when

police arrived] or involvement of the alleged crime,” Id. ¶ 20, Ms. Fontana’s testimony to police

provided sufficient probable cause to investigate and arrest Dixon for violation of the DVPO.5

The Fourt Circuit has long held that a judicial determination of probable cause supporting

an arrest warrant “does not involve any adversarial rights, and can be based entirely on hearsay

….” Darling v. Falls, 236 F. Supp. 3d 914, 924 (M.D.N.C. 2017) (quoting King v. Jones, 824 F.2d

324, 326–27 (4th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotations omitted). Probable cause requires only “enough

evidence to warrant the belief of a reasonable officer that an offense has been or is being

committed; evidence sufficient to convict is not required.” Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367

(4th Cir. 2002). Moreover, probable cause does not “demand any showing that such a belief be

correct or more likely true than false.” United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1313 (4th Cir. 1994)

(quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)). Courts assess probable cause based on the

totality of circumstances known to the officer at the time. Id. And where, as here, an arrest is made

pursuant to a warrant, “[p]robable cause for [the] arrest is presumed valid unless plaintiff presents

4 Police officers do not charge or prosecute defendants, however. See Greene v. Putnam

Cnty. Comm’n, No. CV 3:21-0520, 2022 WL 16857014, at *7 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 10, 2022) (“A

law enforcement officer is authorized, and indeed compelled, to draft criminal complaints and

conduct arrests (or decline to arrest) as necessary.”). “Prosecutors alone are responsible for

determining the charges they will bring [and prosecute] against any defendant.” United States v.

Kidwell, No. 5:19-CR-00025-002, 2023 WL 5751476, at *5 (W.D. Va. Sept. 6, 2023).

5 North Carolina law makes it a class A1 misdemeanor to knowingly violate a valid DVPO,

and officers must arrest when they have probable cause to believe a respondent has violated an

exclusion from residence provision or where a party subject to the DVPO is required to refrain

from (a) “[t]hreatening, abusing, or following the other party”; (b) “[h]arassing the other party,

including by telephone, visiting the home or workplace, or other means”; or (c) “[o]therwise

interfering with the other party” and fails to comply. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 50B-4.1(a)–(b); 50B-

3(9)(a)–(c).

‘allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations

must be accompanied by an offer of proof.’” Caraway v. City of Pineville, 639 F. Supp. 3d 560,

588 (W.D.N.C. 2022), aff’d, 111 F.4th 369 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Beeson v. Palombo, 220 N.C.

App. 274, 727 S.E.2d 343, 348 (2012)).

On Dixon’s own allegations, a warrant was issued for his arrest after his girlfriend

contacted police to claim that he was interfering with her possession of their home while subject

to a DVPO. The fact that Dixon was not present when officers arrived does not negate probable

cause. Beyond that, Dixon has not plausibly alleged any facts to suggest that the warrant was

improperly obtained or otherwise defective. The Court therefore concludes that although the

charges against Dixon were ultimately dismissed, officers had probable cause to arrest him and

investigate Ms. Fontana’s allegations. Accordingly, Dixon’s Fourth Amendment malicious

prosecution claim must be dismissed.

For the same reason, the Court will dismiss Dixon’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

claim, which it construes as a repackaged Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution theory of

liability. See Richards v. City of Virginia Beach, No. 2:09CV75, 2009 WL 10731078, at *3 (E.D.

Va. June 15, 2009) (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) and explaining that an arrest

without probable cause does not violate substantive due process and must instead be analyzed

under the Fourth Amendment); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 181–82 (4th

Cir. 1996) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) and holding that allegations of arrest

without probable cause are most analogous to the common law tort of malicious prosecution).

D. North Carolina Constitutional Claim

Finally, Dixon asserts a violation of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina

Constitution. This claim is premised on the same theory underlying his federal claims—namely,

that officers lacked probable cause to arrest him based solely on his girlfriend’s report. But as

noted above, Dixon’s own allegations establish that a judicial officer issued a warrant for his arrest.

Probable cause is presumed when a valid warrant is issued, and Dixon pleads no facts suggesting

that the warrant was defective. Because the challenged arrest was supported by lawful probable

cause, and Dixon offers no plausible allegations to rebut it, he fails to state a constitutional

violation under Article I, Section 19, and this claim must also be dismissed.

IV. ORDER

NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 10) is GRANTED;

2. Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 17) is DENIED;

3. Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. No. 19) is DENIED; and

4. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order.

SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED.

Signed: August 30, 2026

Kenneth D. Bell

United States District Judge AEA