Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. 2:26-cv-00541-MCS-RAO Date August 18, 2026

Title Kaplan v. Bessent

Present: The Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, United States District Judge

Stephen Montes Kerr Not Reported

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):

None Present None Present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMIss (ECF NO. 67)

Plaintiff Charles Kaplan, a self-represented litigant, brings this action against

federal and state tax authorities. (FAC, ECF No. 28.) The Court previously dismissed

the claims against the state defendants. (Order, ECF No. 52.) The United States of

America, on behalf of itself and the named defendants sued in their official federal

capacities, Mr. Larochelle and Scott Bessent,! moves to dismiss the claims against

the federal defendants. (Mot., ECF No. 67.) Plaintiff filed a brief opposing the

motion, (Opp’n, ECF No. 68), and the United States filed a reply, (ECF No. 69).?

The Court deems the motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. R. 7-15.

Mr. Bessent was Acting Commissioner of the IRS, but his service in that capacity

ended in March 2026. Update on IRS Commissioner Position, Internal Revenue

Serv. (Mar. 13, 2026), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/update-on-irs-commissioner-

position [https://perma.cc/FK85-9XNX]. This development is immaterial to the

disposition of this Order.

The Court considers the parties’ briefs on the merits despite myriad procedural

deficiencies. E.g., C.D. Cal. R. 7-3 (requiring a movant to submit a declaration

confirming compliance with the prefiling motion requirement); (Initial Standing

Order § 9(b), ECF No. 7 (setting briefing deadlines departing from the local rules)).

Page 1 of 4 CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk SMO

I. BACKGROUND

According to the operative complaint, Plaintiff receives compensation from

nonparty Entertainment Partners, LLC, for creating digital artwork, but he is not

personally involved in commerce. (FAC ¶ 4.) As relevant to the federal defendants,

Plaintiff claims the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and its officer, Mr. Larochelle,

are wrongfully retaining Plaintiff’s compensation from Entertainment Partners. (Id.

¶¶ 3, 10.) Plaintiff demanded return of that compensation, and although the IRS

adjusted his account and returned some money for some tax years, it purportedly

failed to return all Plaintiff is owed. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6, 15.) Further, in November 2025, Mr.

Larochelle sent five letters to Plaintiff concerning tax years 2018–2022 warning of

penalties if Plaintiff failed to correct his returns. (Id. ¶ 18; see FAC Ex. I.) Plaintiff

asserts a claim for trespass against Mr. Larochelle, (FAC ¶ 30), and claims for

trespass and case against the IRS (although Mr. Bessent, not the IRS, is named as a

defendant), (id. ¶¶ 26, 32).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which is the only rule relevant to

the disposition here, authorizes a party to seek dismissal of an action for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. “Although sovereign immunity is only quasi-

jurisdictional in nature, Rule 12(b)(1) is still a proper vehicle for invoking sovereign

immunity from suit.” Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015). Rule

12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenges can be either facial or factual. Safe Air for

Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When, as here, a motion to

dismiss attacks subject-matter jurisdiction on the face of the complaint, the court

assumes the factual allegations in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.

2009). The proponent of jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing subject-matter

jurisdiction exists. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122

(9th Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

The United States first argues that only the United States, not the named

defendants Messrs. Larochelle and Bessent, is an appropriate defendant to this

lawsuit. (Mot. 1.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff identifies Messrs. Larochelle and

Bessent as defendants by reference to their capacity as officers of the IRS. (FAC

¶¶ 9–10.) “[A] suit against IRS employees in their official capacity is essentially a

suit against the United States.” Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir.

1985). Notably, Plaintiff names the IRS rather than Mr. Bessent in his statement of

the claims. (FAC ¶¶ 26, 32.) This further evinces that the United States is the proper

party to Plaintiff’s claims, as not even the IRS can be sued. See Devries v. IRS, 359

F. Supp. 2d 988, 991 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (“Federal agencies may not be sued in their

own name except to the extent Congress may specifically allow such suits. Congress

made no provisions for suits against . . . the IRS . . . . Where taxpayers are

authorized to sue on matters arising out of IRS actions, the United States is the proper

party defendant.” (citations omitted)).

Plaintiff argues that Messrs. Bessent and Larochelle operated ultra vires,

outside their official capacities, in undertaking the conduct alleged in the complaint.

(Opp’n 2, 5.) But Plaintiff pleaded no allegations in his complaint to support that

assertion. And even if Plaintiff had pleaded something to the effect that the IRS

officers “ignore[d] the laws,” (id. at 5), he would not raise an inference that their

conduct related to tax collection, even if wrongful, was unconstitutional or otherwise

exceeded the scope of their roles as federal officers, see Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230,

1235 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[W]e have never recognized a constitutional violation arising

from the collection of taxes.”); Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 F.2d 1235, 1239 (8th

Cir. 1993) (“An official does not act outside her jurisdiction simply because she

makes an unconstitutional or unlawful decision. Rather, the inquiry focuses on

whether the subject matter of the decision was within the official’s power, and

whether the official was acting in her official capacity at the time of decision.”).

The Court also credits the United States’ argument that it—and, by extension,

Messrs. Larochelle and Bessent—has sovereign immunity from this lawsuit. (Mot.

2–4.) “In sovereign immunity analysis, any lawsuit against an agency of the United

States or against an officer of the United States in his or her official capacity is

considered an action against the United States.” Balser v. DOJ, 327 F.3d 903, 907

(9th Cir. 2003). “[T]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it

consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that

court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Tobar v. United States, 639 F.3d 1191, 1195

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)). “[A]

waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed, in terms of its scope, in

favor of the sovereign.” Dunn & Black, P.S. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1084, 1088

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dep’t of Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999)).

The party suing the United States bears the burden to demonstrate an unequivocal

waiver of immunity. Id.

Plaintiff offers no cogent factual allegations or legal arguments indicating the

United States waived sovereign immunity from suits like this one. (See Opp’n 5–6

(relying on irrelevant California law and broad constitutional propositions divorced

from the immunity issue at bar).) Indeed, the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives

immunity for some tort claims against the United States, see Valadez-Lopez v.

Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2011), expressly excludes from its scope “[a]ny

claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty”

(with limited exceptions to the exclusion not relevant here), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).

This raises an inference that the United States is immune as a matter of law from tort

claims like the ones asserted here, where an individual seeks to recover from federal

tax authorities monetary compensation retained by the United States under the

auspices of the tax code. See Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions LLC v. United States,

859 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.) (“We have ‘broadly construed’ § 2680(c) to

encompass actions taken during the scope of the IRS’s tax assessment and collection

efforts.” (quoting Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1983))),

amended by, 868 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2017); (see also, e.g., FAC Ex. I, at 40 (“Based

on Internal Revenue Code Section 6702, Frivolous Tax Submissions, we determined

the information you filed as a purported tax return, on Aug. 19, 2021 is frivolous and

there is no basis in the law for your position.”)).

For these reasons, the claims against Messrs. Larochelle and Bessent are

dismissed.3 Leave to amend a dismissed complaint should be freely granted unless

the complaint clearly could not be saved by any amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);

Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

Here, “amendment would be legally futile in light of the government’s sovereign

immunity.” Halgat v. United States, No. 24-2771, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 22058, at

*4 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (affirming dismissal without leave to amend). The Court

denies Plaintiff leave to amend.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court grants the motion and dismisses the claims against Messrs.

Larochelle and Bessent without leave to amend. As all claims against all named

parties have been dismissed without leave to amend, the Court concurrently enters a

judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

3 The Court does not reach the United States’ other arguments for dismissal.