Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 HECTOR MANUEL ESTRADA Case No. 1:26-cv-00640-KES-CDB (HC)

CERVANTES

12 (A-Number: 089-956-863), FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DENY PETITIONER’S EMERGENCY

13 Petitioner, PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND MOTION TO ENFORCE

14 v.

(Docs. 19, 20)

15 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE

ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 14-Day Objection Period

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Respondents.

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18 Pending before the undersigned is Petitioner Hector Manuel Estrada Cervantes’s

19 (“Petitioner”) emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion to enforce. (Docs. 19, 20).1

20 On July 23, 2026, the presiding district judge referred the emergency petition and motion to enforce

21 to the undersigned for the preparation of findings and recommendations. (Doc. 21). Although

22 Respondents’ are within the time permitted to file a response, the undersigned deems a response

23 unnecessary.

24 I. Relevant Background2

25 On April 9, 2026, the Court granted in part Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus

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1 The undersigned notes that Petitioner’s filings are duplicative.

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2 The undersigned adopts and incorporates the factual background of this action

28 summarized in the April 2, 2026, findings and recommendations. See (Doc. 10 at 2-4).

1 and ordered Respondents to release Petitioner unless they proved by clear and convincing evidence

2 at a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker that Petitioner was a flight risk or danger to the

3 community. (Doc. 12 at 3-4). Respondents were ordered to provide Petitioner with 48 hours’

4 written notice before the bond hearing. Id. at 4.

5 Although he acknowledges that a bond hearing in fact was held, on April 30, 2026,

6 Petitioner filed a pleading in which he asserts that he was not provided with 48 hours’ notice prior

7 to his bond hearing as required by the Court’s April 9, 2026, order. (Doc. 14). On June 22, 2026,

8 the Court construed Petitioner’s filing as a motion to enforce the judgment and set a briefing

9 schedule on the construed motion, with Respondents’ response due by June 29, 2026, and

10 Petitioner’s reply thereto by July 6, 2026. (Doc. 16).

11 After finding Respondents’ failure to timely file a response constituted a non-opposition,

12 on July 6, 2026, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion to enforce judgment and ordered

13 Respondents to release Petitioner from custody unless they provide him with a new bond hearing

14 within seven (7) days, and to hand-deliver written notice of the new bond hearing 48 hours prior to

15 the hearing. (Doc. 17).

16 Thereafter, Respondents filed a notice of compliance in which they represented that

17 Petitioner was provided with a bond hearing on July 13, 2026, and was personally served notice of

18 the bond hearing on July 10, 2026, pursuant to the Court’s order. (Doc. 18 at 1) (citing Docs. 18-

19 1 (“Ex. 1”), 18-2 (“Ex. 2”)). Respondents represent that Petitioner was denied release on bond

20 because the immigration judge (“IJ”) found that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)

21 had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is both a danger and a flight

22 risk. Id. (citing Doc. 18-3 (“Ex. 3”) at 1-4). Respondents further represent that Petitioner has until

23 August 12, 2026, to appeal the denial of bond to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id.

24 (citing Ex. 3 at 4).

25 II. Governing Authority

26 “When a district court issues a conditional habeas writ, it retains jurisdiction to determine

27 compliance.” Rose v. Guyer, 961 F.3d 1238, 1246 (9th Cir. 2020); e.g., Loba L.M. v. Andrews, No.

28 1:25-CV-00611-JLT-SAB, 2026 WL 710307, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2026) (citing Leonardo v.

1 Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011)). This includes the authority to review the IJ’s

2 decision for an abuse of discretion and to evaluate whether the standard imposed by the Court’s

3 prior order was properly applied at the bond hearing. Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 784–85

4 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding that district courts have habeas jurisdiction to review whether an IJ “erred

5 by applying the wrong burden of proof”); see Kumar v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-01148-DJC-AC, 2026

6 WL 983129, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2026) (“[T]he Court's analysis [on a motion to enforce

7 judgment] is grounded in the legal standard for reviewing IJ detention determinations.”). “[A]buse

8 of discretion” review does not involve “reweigh[ing] evidence” but instead determining whether

9 the IJ “applied the correct legal standard.” See Martinez, 124 F.4th at 785 (citation omitted).

10 “Generally, in the absence of any red flags,” the Court will credit an IJ’s statement that she

11 applied the correct burden of proof. Id. “But when there is an indication that something is amiss,”

12 the Court will “not credit [the] use of a ‘catchall phrase’ to the contrary.” Id. “[T]he Court’s review

13 is effectively limited to whether the [immigration judge’s] decision reflects clear legal error or is

14 unsupported by sufficient evidence.” Kumar, 2026 WL 983129, at *2 (citations omitted)); see

15 Benipal v. Rokosky, No. CV 26-01306 PHX RM (CDB), 2026 WL 1355010, at *9 (D. Ariz. Apr.

16 24, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV-26-01306-PHX-RM, 2026 WL 1352061

17 (D. Ariz. May 14, 2026) (“[T]he issue is whether the IJ relied upon proof that—as a matter of law—

18 could not establish that conclusion.”).

19 III. Discussion

20 A. Exhaustion

21 “Section 2241 … ‘does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before

22 filing petitions for habeas corpus.’” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing

23 Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Ninth Circuit, however, requires

24 that, “as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative

25 remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez, 239 F.3d at 1047 (citing United

26 States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Under the doctrine of exhaustion, ‘no one is

27 entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed ... remedy has been

28 exhausted.’” Laing, 370 F.3d at 997-98 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)).

1 “Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required. If exhaustion is required by statute, it

2 may be mandatory and jurisdictional, but courts have discretion to waive a prudential requirement.”

3 Id. at 998 (citing El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d

4 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1991); Stratman v. Watt, 656 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1981)). “Although

5 courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when it is prudentially required, this

6 discretion is not unfettered…. Lower courts … [must] first determin[e whether] the exhaustion

7 requirement has been satisfied or properly waived.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see Murillo v.

8 Mathews, 588 F.2d 759, 762, n.8 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Although the application of the rule requiring

9 exhaustion is not jurisdictional, but calls for the sound exercise of judicial discretion, it is not lightly

10 to be disregarded.”).

11 As a preliminary matter, the undersigned finds that the prudential exhaustion requirement

12 should be waived for the limited purpose of determining whether the IJ complied with the Court’s

13 July 6, 2026, order granting Petitioner’s initial motion to enforce and ordering Respondents to

14 provide proper notice, to hold a bond hearing, and detain Petitioner only if Respondents meet their

15 burden to demonstrate that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community by clear and

16 convincing evidence. (Doc. 16); (Doc. 12 at 4); see Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 998 (9th

17 Cir. 2017) (“[A] court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative remedies

18 are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture,

19 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.’”) (quoting Laing,

20 370 F.3d at 1000). To the extent Petitioner newly complains that he was deprived of counsel based

21 on his allegations he did not “have enough time” to hire an immigration attorney for the bond

22 hearing noticed for July 13, 2026 (Doc. 20 at 3), the undersigned finds that exhaustion should not

23 be waived as to that claim given Petitioner has until August 12, 2026, to appeal to the BIA in the

24 first instance on these grounds. Castro-Cortez, 239 F.3d at 1047; Laing, 370 F.3d at 997-98.

25 B. Motion to Enforce

26 In his motion to enforce, Petitioner contends he was denied bond based on the IJ’s finding

27 that he is a danger to the community while that determination was “made without constitutionally

28 required safeguards” such that the denial of bond “cannot support continued detention.” (Doc. 20

1 at 2).

2 “To determine whether a [noncitizen] is a danger to the community or a risk of flight, an IJ

3 weighs nine factors under BIA precedent.” Martinez, 124 F.4th at 783 (citing Matter of Guerra,

4 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (Sept. 28, 2006)). “The nine factors an IJ ‘may’ consider ‘include any or all of

5 the following:’ (1) whether the [noncitizen] has a fixed address in the United States; (2) the

6 [noncitizen's] length of residence in the United States; (3) the [noncitizen's] family ties in the United

7 States, and whether they may entitle the alien to reside permanently in the United States in the

8 future; (4) the [noncitizen's] employment history; (5) the [noncitizen's] record of appearance in

9 court; (6) the [noncitizen's] criminal record, including the extensiveness of criminal activity, the

10 recency of such activity, and the seriousness of the offenses; (7) the [noncitizen's] history of

11 immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the [noncitizen] to flee prosecution or otherwise escape

12 from authorities; and (9) the [noncitizen's] manner of entry to the United States.” Id.

13 In his order, the IJ denied bond to Petitioner because DHS “has shown by clear and

14 convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is both a danger and a flight risk.” Ex. 2 at 1. As to danger,

15 the IJ found Petitioner’s 2023 conviction in federal court—of conspiracy to distribute and possess

16 with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute

17 methamphetamine—“to be both serious and recent[,]” and that the sentence of imprisonment “to

18 be indicative of the seriousness of his conviction.” Id. at 2-3. The IJ reasoned Petitioner is a flight

19 risk based on his “long history of violating” federal immigration laws. Id. at 3. The immigration

20 therefore concluded that DHS has established by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is

21 “such a significant flight risk that no bond or release conditions … could sufficiently mitigate that

22 risk[.]” Id.

23 The Court need not consider the IJ’s findings with respect to flight risk in order to uphold

24 the detention order because, here, the undersigned finds that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in

25 properly finding that Petitioner is a danger to the community based on clear and convincing

26 evidence. See Ex. 3. The IJ reasonably explained that Petitioner is a danger to the community

27 based on his “serious and recent” 2023 drug conviction and sentence of imprisonment and cited to

28 relevant authorities to demonstrate the seriousness of that conviction. Cf. Singh v. Warden, Golden

1 State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:26-CV-01973-DAD-CSK, 2026 WL 1328588, at *6 (E.D. Cal.

2 May 13, 2026) (“[A]n immigration judge abuses [his] discretion when [he denies] release on bond

3 without any explanation of [his] reasoning in doing so.”) (collecting cases). The IJ found Petitioner

4 is a danger after considering Petitioner’s argument that he was “entrapped by the government”

5 because, as the IJ explained, the “possible reason for his transgression does not negate the

6 dangerousness of his conduct[.]” Ex. 3 at 2 (citing Matter of Siniauskas, 27 I&N Dec. 207, 209

7 (BIA 2018)).

8 Separately, the undersigned finds no error as to Petitioner’s notice of the hearing. The IJ

9 acknowledged the Court’s order for Respondents to provide Petitioner with a new bond hearing

10 within seven days (i.e., by July 13, 2026) with hand-delivered, written notice of the new bond

11 hearing 48 hours prior to the hearing. Ex. 3 at 1. The IJ set forth in his order, consistent with

12 Respondents’ representations in its notice of compliance (see Doc. 18), that the immigration court

13 served the notice of the hearing on July 7, 2026, for the bond hearing set for July 13, 2026, that a

14 deportation officer hand-delivered the notice to Petitioner over 48 hours prior to the hearing, and

15 that proof of service was filed with the Court (see Docs. 18-1, 18-2). Id. Additionally, the IJ noted

16 that the applicable burden of proof rested on the government and that DHS met its burden. Id.

17 In sum, the undersigned finds that Respondents complied with the Court’s order as

18 Petitioner was properly notified and provided a compliant bond hearing at which the IJ properly

19 found that Petitioner is a danger to the community based on clear and convincing evidence such

20 that bond was denied. Therefore, the undersigned will recommend Petitioner’s emergency petition

21 and motion to enforce be denied.

22 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

23 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s emergency petition for

24 writ of habeas corpus and motion to enforce (Docs. 19, 20) be DENIED.

25 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

26 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after

27 being served with these findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections with

28 the Court. Any objections filed should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

1 | and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave of Court and good cause

2 | shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party

3 | wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF

4 | document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity.

5 | Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when

6 | reviewing these findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(C). Failure to file

7 | objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v.

8 | Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th

9 | Cir. 1991)).

10 | ITIS SO ORDERED.

'l | Dated: _ July 27, 2026 | Word by

12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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