Arroyo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICOLE ARROYO, Case No. 25-cv-10706-RFL

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

v. COMPEL ARBITRATION AND

STAYING CASE

GOOGLE LLC,

Re: Dkt. Nos. 26, 27, 36

Defendant.

Plaintiff Nicole Arroyo brings this action against Defendant Google LLC asserting a

single claim under the Arizona Telephone, Utility and Communication Service Records Act,

Arizona Revised Statutes § 44-1376 et seq. (“TUCSRA”), related to the alleged use of Google

Cloud Contact Center AI (“CCAI”) during calls she placed to Verizon’s customer service line.

(Dkt. No. 1-1.) Google moves to compel Arroyo to arbitrate her claim pursuant to her arbitration

agreement with non-party Verizon. (Dkt. No. 26.) For the reasons explained below, Google’s

Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED and the case is STAYED pending resolution of the

arbitration proceedings.1 This order assumes that the reader is familiar with the facts of the case,

the applicable legal standards, and the parties’ arguments.

Alternative Estoppel. There is no dispute that Arroyo and Verizon entered into a valid

and binding arbitration agreement on December 16, 2024. (Dkt. No. 30.) Arroyo does not

dispute that she acknowledged and accepted Verizon’s Customer Agreement, and thereby agreed

to arbitrate “any dispute that in any way relates to or arises out of” the Customer Agreement,

1 Google has also filed a Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 27) and an associated Request for Judicial

Notice (Dkt. No. 36). Because the Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted, the remaining

motions are DENIED, without prejudice, in light of the stay.

including claims for “invasion of privacy.” (Dkt. No. 30-2 at 7.)2 There is also no dispute that

she acknowledged and accepted Verizon’s Privacy Policy, which is incorporated by reference in

the Customer Agreement. (Dkt. Nos. 30-1 at 6; 3-2 at 2; 30-3.); see also Weatherguard Roofing

Co. v. D.R. Ward Constr. Co., 152 P.3d 1227, 1229 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (describing the

incorporation by reference doctrine under Arizona law). The only dispute between the parties is

whether Google, who is not party to the arbitration agreement, can enforce the arbitration

agreement against Arroyo. Applying Arizona’s alternative estoppel doctrine, the Court finds that

Google may compel Arroyo to arbitrate her claim.

“A non-signatory may compel arbitration when ‘each of a signatory’s claims against a

nonsignatory makes reference to or presumes the existence of the written agreement,’ such that

‘the signatory’s claims arise out of and relate directly to the written agreement.’” Shivkov v.

Artex Risk Sols., Inc., 974 F.3d 1051, 1070 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Sun Valley Ranch 308 Ltd.

P’ship ex rel. Englewood Props., Inc. v. Robson, 294 P.3d 125, 135 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012)).

Where “the trier of fact will be required to consider the underlying agreements in resolving

plaintiffs’ claims, and the non-signatory’s conduct is intertwined with that of other defendants

who signed the underlying agreement,” the non-signatory may compel arbitration. Id. (cleaned

up, citing Sun Valley, 294 P.3d at 135).3

Arroyo’s claim meets this test. As pled in the Complaint, to state a claim Arroyo must

establish, among other things, that Google, “lacked ‘authorization of the customer’” or otherwise

“acted in a fraudulent, deceptive, or false manner” when it allegedly sought to procure

information via its CCAI services on her Verizon customer service call. (Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 53

(citing TUCSRA § 44-1376.01).) In support of this element of her claim, Arroyo alleges that

“[n]either [Google] nor Verizon informs customers who call the support center that []CCAI is

2 Citations to page numbers refer to ECF pagination.

3 Arroyo argues that Arizona law also requires a close relationship between the non-signatory

and a signatory for estoppel to apply. (Dkt. No. 34 at 8–10.) This is an independent test for

establishing estoppel, Shivkov, 974 F.3d at 1070 n. 14, which this order does not reach.

listening to and recording information about their call,” and customers “expect the conversation

is only between themselves and the human customer service agent.” (Id. ¶¶ 21, 34.) The

Complaint further asserts that “[n]either Verizon nor Google received Plaintiff’s prior consent,

express or otherwise, to allow [Google] to procure her telephone record from Verizon.” (Id. ¶

42 (emphasis added).)

Given these allegations, it is evident that Arroyo must rely on the content of Verizon’s

Customer Agreement and the incorporated Privacy Policy to support Google’s lack of

authorization to allegedly procure her information. The Privacy Policy describes Verizon’s data

collection, discloses that it “may use . . . artificial intelligence” to deliver services and that it

shares information with service providers and third parties. (Dkt. No. 30-3 at 2–3.) Therefore,

Arroyo’s claims rely upon the absence of authorization in the agreements, such that the Court

would be required to consider the underlying agreements in resolving her claims, and Google’s

conduct is intertwined with that of Verizon, which signed the underlying agreements and

allegedly procured Google’s services to help it operate its customer service line. See, e.g., Atkins

v. Amplitude, Inc., No. 24-cv-04913-RFL, 2025 WL 2521732, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2025),

motion to certify appeal denied, No. 24-cv-04913-RFL, 2026 WL 821052 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25,

2026). Arroyo argues that estoppel is inapplicable because consent is only an affirmative

defense to her claim, for which Google would have the burden of proof. However, this argument

is inconsistent with the statutory language cited in the Complaint, which states that lack of

authorization is something Arroyo must establish under the TUCSR. (Dkt. No. 1-1 ¶ 53);

TUCSRA § 44-1376.01 (unlawful to take certain actions “without the authorization of the

customer”). Arroyo does not identify any case law or other authority for treating this component

of her claim as an affirmative defense.

Finally, Arroyo cites Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.

2017), where the Ninth Circuit held that consent is an affirmative defense to certain claims under

the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). Id. at 1044. However, Van Patten’s holding

is based on a Federal Communications Commission order, which itself interprets specific

language in the TCPA in light of that act’s legislative purpose and history. See id. (citing In the

Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 23 FCC Red.

559, 565 (Jan. 4, 2008)). Arroyo raises no basis to import this analysis into the TUCSRA.

Conclusion. For the reasons stated above, Google’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is

GRANTED and the case is STAYED pending resolution of the arbitration proceedings.

Google’s Motion to Dismiss and Request for Judicial Notice is DENIED, without prejudice, in

light of the stay. The parties shall file a joint status report every 180 days to update the Court on

the arbitration proceedings and shall file a status report within 14 days of the completion of

arbitration proceedings. The parties’ first status report is due by February 16, 2027.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 20, 2026

RITA F. LIN

United States District Judge