The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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9 RAFAEL R.-G.1, ) NO. 8:25-cv-01346-KS
10 Plaintiff, )
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11 v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
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FRANK J. BISIGNANO, )
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Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant. )
15 ____________________________________ )
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17 On June 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking review of the Social Security
18 Administration’s denial of his application for a period of disability and disability insurance
19 benefits. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff filed a Brief in support of his Complaint on October 20, 2025.
20 (Dkt. No. 11.) Defendant filed an Opposition on December 18, 2025. (Dkt. No. 15.) Plaintiff
21 filed a Reply on December 30, 2025. (Dkt. No. 16.)
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23 The Court has taken the matter under submission without oral argument. Having
24 thoroughly considered the pleadings and the administrative record submitted to the Court, the
25 Court reverses the Commissioner’s decision and remands this matter for further proceedings.
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1 SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
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3 On January 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability
4 insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning February 20, 2021. (See Administrative
5 Record (“AR”), Dkt. No. 8 at 205-11.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially on February
6 15, 2023 (AR 69-75), and upon reconsideration on February 8, 2024 (AR 96-98). Plaintiff
7 thereafter requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (AR 106.)
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9 Administrative Law Judge Michael Radensky (“the ALJ”) conducted an in-person
10 hearing on August 22, 2024. (AR 35-68.) Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and an
11 impartial vocational expert (“VE”) both appeared and testified. (AR 35-68.) The ALJ
12 published an unfavorable decision on September 5, 2024. (AR 18-34.)
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14 Plaintiff requested an appeal of the ALJ’s decision on October 17, 2024. (AR 176-81.)
15 The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on May 20, 2025. (AR 1-6.)
16 Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint in this Court on June 23, 2025. (Dkt. No. 1.)
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18 SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
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20 The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether
21 an individual is disabled pursuant to 20 CFR § 416.920(a). (AR 21-30.) At step one, the ALJ
22 found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 20, 2021, the
23 alleged disability onset date. (AR 23.) At step two, the ALJ established that Plaintiff had the
24 following severe impairments: ankylosing spondylitis (“AS”) with osseous fusion at C3-4 and
25 C5-6, diabetes mellitus, and high blood pressure. (AR 23.) At step three, the ALJ determined
26 that none of these impairments (nor combination of impairments) meets or medically equals
27 the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AR
1 Next, the ALJ assessed that Plaintiff has the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)2 to
2 do light work3 with the following additional limitations: “occasional postural activities except
3 no climbing ladders, scaffolds or ropes; occasional overhead reaching bilaterally; avoid
4 concentrated exposure to extremes of temperatures and to pulmonary irritants; no work at
5 unprotected heights or with dangerous moving machinery.” (AR 24.) At step four, the ALJ
6 found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. (AR 28.)
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8 At step five, the ALJ resolved that there are still jobs in the national economy available
9 to Plaintiff given his age, education, work experience, and RFC. (AR 29.) Accordingly, the
10 ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability since February 20, 2021. (AR 30.)
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12 STANDARD OF REVIEW
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14 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether
15 it is free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Orn
16 v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere
17 scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
18 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 740
19 F.3d 519, 522-23 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
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21 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical
22 testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.
23 1995). “Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, we
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2 The RFC is the most a claimant can do despite any physical or mental limitations. 20 CFR § 404.1545(a)(1).
26 3 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to
10 pounds.” 20 CFR 404.1567(b). “Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it
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requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of
1 must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the
2 record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d
3 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Although this Court cannot substitute its discretion for the ALJ’s, the
4 Court must nevertheless review the record as a whole, “weighing both the evidence that
5 supports and the evidence that detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue,
6 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted); Desrosiers v.
7 Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988).
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9 The Court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in their decision “and may not
10 affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which [the ALJ] did not rely.” Orn, 495 F.3d at 630.
11 Additionally, the Court will not reverse the decision if it is based on harmless error, which
12 exists if the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination, or if despite
13 the legal error, the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806
14 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations and quotations omitted).
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16 DISCUSSION
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18 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred by not accounting for limitations related to Plaintiff’s
19 spinal fusion in the RFC assessment and by not providing clear and convincing reasons for
20 discounting Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. (Dkt. No. 11 at 4, 14.) The Court will
21 address each argument in turn.
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23 I. RFC Determination and Substantial Evidence
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25 A. Legal Standard
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27 The Residual Functional Capacity, or RFC, is what a claimant is still capable of doing
1 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing 20 CFR. § 404.1545). To determine a claimant’s
2 RFC, the ALJ must resolve conflicts in the medical testimony and translate the plaintiff’s
3 impairments into concrete functional limitations. Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807
4 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015); Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174-75 (9th Cir.
5 2008). However, an ALJ may not rely on lay knowledge to render a medical opinion or
6 independently assess clinical findings. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir.
7 1999); Miller v. Astrue, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Padilla v. Astrue, 541
8 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
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10 B. The ALJ’s Decision
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12 The ALJ assessed that Plaintiff has the following RFC:
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14 After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
15 claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in
16 20 CFR 404.1567(b), with the following additional limitations: occasional
17 postural activities except no climbing ladders, scaffolds, or ropes; occasional
18 overhead reaching bilaterally; avoid concentrated exposure to extremes of
19 temperature and to pulmonary irritants; no work at unprotected heights or with
20 dangerous moving machinery.
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22 (AR 24.)
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24 C. Analysis
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26 Plaintiff asserts that “[t]here is no question before this court as to whether a neck
27 limitation exists because the cervical spine is fixed and the ALJ agreed with this objective
1 demonstrates Plaintiff’s chronic neck pain and decreased range of motion, Plaintiff fails to
2 point to any opinion or record evidence regarding additional limitations related to Plaintiff’s
3 neck beyond the limitations already included in the RFC. See Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.
4 Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting challenge to RFC determination where
5 the claimant did not detail what other physical limitations follow from the evidence of his knee
6 and shoulder injuries besides the limitations already listed in the RFC).
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8 Plaintiff further asserts that the ALJ did not adequately account for Plaintiff’s standing
9 limitations in the RFC. (Dkt. No. 11 at 8.) The ALJ did consider the January 2023 opinion of
10 rheumatologist Andrew Hung Nguyen, D.O. that Plaintiff needed a one-minute stretch break
11 after 20 minutes of sitting or standing. (AR 28.) However, the ALJ found the opinion was
12 unpersuasive because “Dr. Nguyen did not explain why such an extreme limitation was
13 necessary as of January 2023” when Dr. Nguyen had not included any such limitation in his
14 April 2022 or August 2022 assessments and the documented objective findings had not changed
15 significantly over that period. (AR 28.) The ALJ thus provided an explanation supported by
16 substantial evidence for discounting Dr. Nguyen’s opined standing limitation.
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18 Finally, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ also failed to explain why he left out the
19 limitation assessed by Dr. Nguyen on the January 25, 2023 report that [Plaintiff] had a work
20 limitation of ‘no repetitive twisting of torso.’” (Dkt. No. 11 at 8.) The ALJ remarked that “Dr.
21 Nguyen specified that since January 1, 2023, the claimant is limited to lifting and carrying a
22 maximum of 20 pounds and precluded from repetitive bending at the spine and twisting of the
23 torso.” (AR 27.) The ALJ determined that “[t]he above-noted limitations on lifting, carrying,
24 repetitive bending, and twisting that Dr. Nguyen specified in January 2023 are persuasive
25 because the evidence as a whole . . . supports them.” (AR 27.) The ALJ then assessed that
26 Plaintiff could perform light work with the following nonexertional limitations: “occasional
27 postural activities except no climbing ladders, scaffolds, or ropes; occasional overhead reaching
1 no work at unprotected heights or with dangerous moving machinery.” (AR 24.)
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3 Although the ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Nguyen regarding a twisting limitation to be
4 persuasive, it is unclear to the Court how any such limitation was incorporated into the RFC.
5 See Green v. Saul, No. 1:19-cv-00058-BAM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44160, at *18 (E.D. Cal.
6 Mar. 13, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113269 (E.D.
7 Cal. June 29, 2020) (internal citations omitted) (“In his opinion, the ALJ stated that he
8 incorporated Dr. Bryan’s March 21, 2017 opinion that Plaintiff should avoid bending and
9 twisting of her low back into the RFC finding. However, the ALJ’s RFC finding did not include
10 any limitations on bending and twisting. This was error.”). Because the ALJ expressly
11 accepted Dr. Nguyen’s opined twisting limitation, “the ALJ was under an obligation to account
12 for the [limitation] identified irrespective of the broader reasoning in support of the RFC.”
13 Harrell v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-00614-GSA, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184794, at *11 (E.D. Cal.
14 Sep. 24, 2021).
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16 Defendant contends that the ALJ accounted for the opined twisting limitation in the RFC
17 by limiting Plaintiff to “occasional postural activities.” (Dkt. No. 15 at 7 (citing Nuno v. Astrue,
18 No. ED CV 10-00188-VBK, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117344, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2010)
19 (“The absence of the word ‘twisting’ in the discussion of postural limitations incorporated in
20 the ALJ’s RFC is of de minimis significance in view of its overall import.”).) That may be so,
21 but without further explanation, the Court is unable to reasonably discern the ALJ’s path in
22 determining that the limitation on postural activities adequately captures Dr. Nguyen’s opined
23 twisting limitation. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (citations and quotations omitted)
24 (finding harmless error only where the “the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned”).
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26 While the ALJ is not required “to explicitly transcribe the limitation in the RFC[,] . . .
27 he is required to account for it in his ‘translation.’” Wascovich v. Saul, No. 2:18-cv-659-EFB,
1 1006). “The question therefore is whether the RFC, or the ALJ’s alternative hypotheticals to
2 the VE, accurately captured all limitations supported by the record, including the limitations
3 identified in [Dr. Nguyen’s] opinion.” Harrell, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184794, at *12.
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5 Here, the ALJ presented the VE with a hypothetical based on a claimant with an RFC to
6 perform light work with limitations to occasional postural activities except no climbing ladders,
7 scaffolds, or ropes; occasional overhead reaching bilaterally; avoid concentrated exposure to
8 extremes of temperature and to pulmonary irritants; no work at unprotected heights or with
9 dangerous moving machinery. (AR 63-64.) The VE then testified that such an individual could
10 perform the following occupations: Marker (DOT 209.587-034), Routing clerk (DOT 222.687-
11 022), and Sub-assembler (DOT 729.684-054).4 (AR 63-64.) At step five, the ALJ relied on
12 this VE testimony to conclude there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
13 economy that the claimant can perform. (AR 29-30.) While it is possible the occupations of
14 Marker, Routing clerk, and Sub-assembler do not require twisting, “there is neither evidence
15 in the record nor argument from the Commissioner on which [the Court] could base that
16 conclusion.” Johnson v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-01149-KI, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85061, at
17 *10-11 (D. Or. June 18, 2013).
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19 Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ erred by not clearly accounting for the twisting
20 limitation opined by Dr. Nguyen in the RFC. Gary C. v. Dudek, No. 5:23-cv-01487-SP, 2025
21 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56671, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2025) (“By reaching an incomplete RFC
22 determination, posing an incomplete hypothetical to the VE, and then relying on the VE's
23 testimony at step five, the ALJ erred.”). Because further administrative review may remedy
24 the ALJ’s error, the Court concludes that remand is appropriate. Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d
25 587, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2004); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2000).
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1 II. Assessment of Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony
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3 A. Legal Standard
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5 Before determining that a claimant’s pain or symptom testimony is not credible, an ALJ
6 must make two findings. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th
7 Cir. 2014). “First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective
8 medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce
9 the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036). “Second,
10 if the claimant has produced that evidence, and the ALJ has not determined that the claimant is
11 malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the
12 claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of the claimant’s symptoms,” and those reasons
13 must be supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 1102 (citation omitted); see also
14 Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding a court
15 must determine “whether the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding . . . is supported by substantial
16 evidence under the clear-and-convincing standard”).
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18 The ALJ must “specifically identify the testimony [from the claimant that] she or he
19 finds not to be credible and . . . explain what evidence undermines the testimony.” Treichler,
20 775 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001)).
21 Indeed, “[g]eneral findings are insufficient.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493. Nevertheless,
22 “[t]he standard isn’t whether our court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is
23 clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir.
24 2022).
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26 B. The ALJ’s Decision
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1 At the hearing on August 22, 2024, the claimant testified that he had limited range
2 of motion throughout his spine, most significantly in his neck, such that he could
3 not turn his neck, he could stoop/bend at the waist only halfway, and he could
4 not crouch. He contended that he walked cautiously to avoid falling and that after
5 walking for approximately 20 minutes, he sat for two to three minutes, due to
6 pain. He alleged additional related limitations of having to change positions after
7 standing for approximately 15 to 20 minutes, having to reposition himself while
8 sitting, and being able to lift no more than approximately 10 pounds. He
9 confirmed that these symptoms and limitations were secondary to ankylosing
10 spondylitis (AS), for which he saw a rheumatologist every two to three months
11 and had infusions every six weeks.
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13 The claimant testified that the infusion process took two hours, though he
14 generally spent three to four hours total at the infusion center. He stated that he
15 primarily rested in bed the day after an infusion due to fatigue, and that he felt
16 more energetic two days after an infusion. He endorsed AS-related pain, mostly
17 in his neck; he denied having significant or more than occasional pain in his arms,
18 legs, and hands. He indicated that in addition to the infusions, he used a topical
19 cream and took over the counter Aleve as needed for pain. He asserted that he
20 took approximately seven prescribed medications, most of which were for
21 diabetes and hypertension. The claimant stated that he regularly had labs to
22 monitor his AS and his diabetes, and that his blood pressure was regularly
23 checked. He indicated that he did household tasks such as wiping countertops,
24 washing dishes, taking out trash, and using a microwave, and that his wife had
25 always done the cooking, laundry, and other household chores.
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27 (AR 25.)
1 Next, the ALJ applied the two-step process articulated above:
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3 The claimant’s allegations in various statements of record about his impairments,
4 activities, and the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms are
5 generally consistent with his testimony. After careful consideration of the
6 evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s medically determinable
7 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.
8 However, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
9 limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical
10 evidence and other evidence in the record, for the reasons explained in this
11 decision.
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13 (AR 25 (internal citations omitted).)
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15 Finally, the ALJ cited five examples in support of the decision to discount Plaintiff’s
16 subjective symptom testimony:
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18 [W]hile the medical record indicates that the claimant’s AS was newly diagnosed
19 in January 2022, he testified that he had had “ongoing” spinal issues since at least
20 2007. Consistent with this testimony, at a consultation with a specialist in
21 October 2020, the claimant stated that he had had neck pain with decreased range
22 of motion for 10 years. Moreover, the claimant testified that he stopped working
23 at the alleged onset date in February 2021 because his employer sold the business.
24 He further indicated that he continued to apply for work after the alleged onset
25 date, albeit unsuccessfully, and there are comparable statements elsewhere in the
26 record. Additionally, the claimant testified that his AS-related pain had worsened
27 over time; however, as discussed below, the medical record suggests that the pain
1 the claimant’s allegations is evidence of his ongoing noncompliance with
2 treatment, which is also discussed below. Further, there are inconsistencies in
3 some of the claimant’s statements; for example, he testified that his wife was the
4 main caregiver for their small dog, but various medical records indicate that he
5 reported walking the dog every day and otherwise taking care of the dog.
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7 (AR 25-26 (internal citations omitted).)
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9 C. Analysis
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11 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to provide any clear and convincing reasons for
12 rejecting Plaintiff’s subjective limitations. (Dkt. No. 11 at 14.) However, the Court finds the
13 ALJ did not err because he provided multiple clear and convincing reasons supported by
14 substantial evidence in the record to discount Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.
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16 The ALJ noted that although “the claimant testified that he stopped working at the
17 alleged onset date in February 2021 because his employer sold the business[, h]e further
18 indicated that he continued to apply for work after the alleged onset date, albeit unsuccessfully
19 . . . .” (AR 25-26.) Although Plaintiff was ultimately unsuccessful in obtaining employment
20 after February 2021, the ALJ was nevertheless entitled to “consider [the] plaintiff’s continued
21 search for employment after the alleged onset date in weighing plaintiff’s credibility.” Soto-
22 Marquez v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-00826-SKO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123832, at *50 (E.D.
23 Cal. July 23, 2018); see also Kahoonei v. Saul, 856 F. App’x 691, 693 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding
24 that an ALJ properly considered evidence that the claimant “both searched for and attempted
25 work after the alleged onset of her disability” in discounting the claimant’s testimony); Berry
26 v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that an ALJ properly considered a
27 claimant’s admission that “he left his job because his employer went out of business and
1 claimant’s testimony).
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3 Furthermore, the ALJ was permitted to rely on evidence suggesting Plaintiff’s
4 symptoms were managed with treatment. See Lapuzz v. Berryhill, 740 Fed. App’x 596, 597
5 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008)) (finding
6 that the effectiveness of medication is a clear and convincing reason to discredit claimant
7 testimony); Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]vidence of medical
8 treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of disability.”); Brown v.
9 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-cv-00721-SAB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170544, at *55 (E.D.
10 Cal. Sep. 8, 2021) (“The Court finds the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s pain was reported to be
11 well-managed and improved with medication to be a clear and convincing reason based on
12 substantial evidence in the record to reject the pain testimony.”). The ALJ stated that “the
13 claimant testified that his AS-related pain had worsened over time; however, [] the medical
14 record suggests that the pain was effectively managed with treatment.” (AR 26.) The ALJ
15 noted that “Dr. Nguyen’s and other medical records reflect that the claimant tolerated the
16 infusions well and felt that they were beneficial” and “that although his AS was advanced with
17 fixed spine and his pain complaints were at times inconsistent, the claimant’s pain was
18 ‘minimal’ or ‘not much’ and his functioning increased with the regular infusions.” (AR 27.)
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20 The Court therefore finds that evidence of Plaintiff seeking employment after his alleged
21 disability onset date and of the effectiveness of Plaintiff’s treatment were valid bases for the
22 ALJ to discount Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Thus, “[a]ny error in relying on
23 additional reasons was harmless because the ALJ properly provided several clear and
24 convincing reasons to discredit [Plaintiff’s] testimony.” Lapuzz, 740 F. App’x at 597 (citing
25 Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (“[S]everal of our cases have held that
26 an ALJ’s error was harmless where the ALJ provided one or more invalid reasons for
27 disbelieving a claimant’s testimony, but also provided valid reasons that were supported by the
1 ORDER
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3 For the reasons outlined above, IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner
4 |}is REVERSED and that this case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with but
5 limited to the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order.
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7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this
8 || Memorandum Opinion and Order and the Judgment on counsel for Plaintiff and for Defendant.
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10 LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
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13. || DATED: August 7, 2026 7 ) nen LZ : Piowsnson
HON. KAREN L. STEVENSON
14 CHIEF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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