The opinion
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10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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Case No.: 2:25-cv-10652-MEMF-SSC
13 ALEX DADOURIAN, an individual,
14 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND, AND
15 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS
MACOMBER, CALIFORNIA
16 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
17 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS REHABILITATION, AND STATE OF
ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S CALIFORNIA’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL
18 DEPARTMENT; ROBERT G. LUNA, in his NOTICE [DKT. NOS. 30, 17-1]
official capacity as Los Angeles County Sheriff;
19 LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH SERVICES, CORRECTIONAL
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HEALTH SERVICES; DR. TIMOTHY
21 BELAVICH, PH.D., in his official capacity as
Director of Correctional Health Services;
22 STATE OF CALIFORNIA; CALIFORNIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
23 REHABILITATION; JEFF MACOMBER, in
his official capacity as Secretary of the
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California Department of Corrections and
25 Rehabilitation; and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive
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Defendants.
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1
2 Before this Court is a Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiff Alex Dadourian, Dkt. No. 30
3 (“Motion”), and a Request for Judicial Notice filed by Defendants Macomber, California
4 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and State of California (“State”)
5 (collectively, “State Defendants”), Dkt. No. 17-1 (“RJN”). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion
6 is GRANTED IN PART and the RJN is GRANTED.
7
8 I. Factual Allegations1
9 A. The Parties
10 i. The Plaintiff
11 Plaintiff Alex Dadourian is a sixty-five-year-old man with multiple serious medical
12 conditions, including severe immunodeficiency disorder, advanced osteoporosis, bilateral avascular
13 necrosis, and other chronic conditions requiring specialized medical care and protection from harm.
14 Compl. ¶ 9.
15 ii. The Defendants
16 Defendant County of Los Angeles (“County”) is a local government entity that operates the
17 Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail through the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, and
18 funds the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, which includes Correctional Health
19 Services. Id. ¶ 10. Defendant Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) is a County
20 agency that is the primary law enforcement agency for the County jail system. Id. ¶ 11. Defendant
21 Los Angeles County Department of Health Services, Correctional Health Services (“CHS”) is a
22 County agency responsible for providing medical care to persons incarcerated in County jails. Id. ¶
23 13. Defendant Robert G. Luna, in his official capacity, is the Sheriff of Los Angeles County. Id. ¶
24 12. And Dr. Timothy Belavich, in his official capacity, is the Director of CHS.2
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1 Except as otherwise indicated, the following factual background is derived from Dadourian’s Complaint.
27 Dkt. No. 1-2 (“Compl.”). The Court includes these allegations only as background and makes no finding on
whether they are true.
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2
1 Defendant State is a state government entity that operates the California Department of
2 Corrections and Rehabilitation. Id. ¶ 15. Defendant CDCR is a state agency responsible for operating
3 state prisons. Id. ¶ 16. And Defendant Jeff Macomber, in his official capacity, is Secretary of the
4 CDCR. Id. ¶ 17.3
5 B. The Conduct
6 Dadourian was incarcerated from December 7, 2022, to September 21, 2024. Id. ¶ 1. He was
7 held in County custody from December 7, 2022, to June 1, 2023, when he was then transferred to
8 State custody until his release on September 21, 2024. See id. ¶¶ 19-20, 23-26. Dadourian alleges
9 that despite knowing that he had no right hip joint and required immediate surgical intervention, the
10 County and State Defendants did not provide him with his scheduled hip-replacement surgery, which
11 subjected him to nearly two years of excruciating pain, and forced him to endure bone-on-bone
12 contact that resulted in permanent and irreversible disability. See id. ¶¶ 1-2, 18-21, 23-26, 29-31.
13 C. Procedural History
14 On March 11, 2025, Dadourian filed government tort claims with both the County and the
15 State within six months of his release from custody. Id. ¶ 7(a). On April 16, 2025, the County denied
16 the tort claims as untimely under California Government Code § 911.2. See Tashjian Decl. ¶ 5, Dkt.
17 No. 30-1. On September 29, 2025, Dadourian submitted an application to the County Board of
18 Supervisors for leave to present a late claim pursuant to California Government Code Section 911.4
19 Id. ¶ 6. On October 28, 2025, the County denied Dadourian’s application. Id. ¶ 7. On October 6,
20 2024, Dadourian then filed a petition for relief pursuant to Government Code Section 946.6 in Los
21 Angeles Superior Court. Id. ¶ 8. The petition is based on several grounds, including the continuing
22 violation doctrine, the discovery rule, excusable neglect under § 946.6(c)(1), and physical incapacity
23 under § 946.6(c)(4). Id. On October 16, 2025, the County filed an opposition to the petition. Id. ¶¶ 9-
24 10. On October 23, 2025, Dadourian filed a reply. Id. ¶ 11. There was a hearing set for November
25 21, 2025, on the petition. Id. ¶ 13. The State Defendants did not respond to Dadourian’s tort claims,
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3 The Court will refer to the State, CDCR, and Macomber as the “State Defendants.”
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1 which were timely filed within the six-month period following his September 32, 2024, release from
2 State custody. Id. ¶ 7(a).
3 On September 29, 2025, Dadourian filed a complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court
4 against the County and State Defendants, alleging: (1) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of
5 the California Constitution, Article I, Sections 7 and 17; (3) violation of the Americans with
6 Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (4) violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; (5) violation of
7 California Government Code § 11135; (6) violation of the Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1;
8 (7) violation of California Civil Code § 52.3; (8) violation of California Government Code § 845.6;
9 (9) violations of Titles 5 and 24 of California Code of Regulations; (10) Medical Negligence; (11)
10 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (12) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. See
11 generally id.
12 On November 5, 2025, with consent of the State Defendants, the County Defendants
13 removed this action to federal court under federal question and supplemental jurisdiction. See Dkt.
14 No. 1. On December 17, 2025, Dadourian re-filed this instant Motion. Dkt. No. 30 (“Motion”).
15 Dadourian also filed a supporting declaration. See Dkt. No. 30-1 (“Tashjian Decl.”). On November
16 20, 2025, the State Defendants filed an opposition to the Motion. Dkt. No. 17 (“State Opposition”).
17 On that same day, the State Defendants filed a Request for Judicial Notice. Dkt. No. 17-1 (“RJN”).
18 On November 24, 2025, the County Defendants filed an opposition to the Motion. Dkt. No. 21
19 (“County Opposition”). On December 23, 2025, Dadourian filed a reply to the State Opposition.
20 Dkt. No. 34 (“State Reply”). On that same day, Dadourian also filed a reply to the County
21 Opposition. Dkt. No. 35 (“County Reply”).4 On February 19, 2026, the Court held a hearing on the
22 Motion.
23 / / /
24 / / /
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26 4 After the initial filing of Dadourian’s Motion to Remand on November 14, 2025, see Dkt. No. 16, this case
got reassigned to this Court on November 24, 2025, see Dkt. No. 20. Moreover, a notice of deficiencies was
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issued on Dadourian’s Motion to Remand filed at Dkt. No. 16, see Dkt. No. 22, so Dadourian re-filed this
instant Motion at Dkt. No. 30 on December 17, 2025. The Motion to Remand filed at Dkt. No. 30 is treated as
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1 REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE (DKT. NO. 17-1)
2 I. Applicable Law
3 A court may judicially notice facts that: “(1) [are] generally known within the trial court’s
4 territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
5 cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Under this standard, courts may judicially
6 notice “undisputed matters of public record,” but generally may not notice “disputed facts stated in
7 public records.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other
8 grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002).
9 On a motion to dismiss, courts are generally prohibited from “consider[ing] any material
10 beyond the pleadings.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2011)
11 (quoting Lee, 250 F.3d at 688). Courts generally only consider the complaint and other materials
12 “submitted with and attached to the Complaint.” Id. at 999. Documents not attached to the
13 complaint—including documents that might otherwise be subject to judicial notice—may only be
14 considered if: “(1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff’s
15 claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the document.” Id. (citing Marder v. Lopez, 450
16 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir.2006)).
17 II. Discussion
18 A. The State Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is granted.
19 In support of their Motion, the State Defendants requests the Court judicially notice the fact
20 that Dadourian’s Petition for Relief from the Government Claims Act pursuant to California
21 Government Code Section 946.6 was on calendar for hearing in Department 52 of the Superior Court
22 of California, County of Los Angeles, on November 21, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. See RJN at 1.5 Dadourian
23 does not oppose this Court taking judicial notice of this fact and this fact is not in dispute. See id.;
24 Tashjian Decl. ¶ 13, Dkt. No. 30-1; Motion at 8. Because this Court can take judicial notice of the
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5 The Court notes that the November 21, 2025, hearing did not occur as the case was removed sixteen days
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1 “records of an inferior court in other cases,” this Court will grant the Request for Judicial Notice. See
2 United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980).
3 MOTION TO REMAND (DKT. NO. 30)
4 I. Applicable Law
5 A. Federal Court Jurisdiction
6 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and can only hear cases where there is a
7 valid basis for federal jurisdiction. Richardson v. United States, 943 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991).
8 One possible basis for jurisdiction is federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
9 which states that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
10 the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Another basis for jurisdiction is diversity
11 jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A defendant may remove a state action to federal court if the
12 federal court would have original subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441. A
13 defendant who removes a case from state court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.
14 Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 682-83 (9th Cir. 2006).
15 Moreover, when doubt regarding whether the right to removal exists, a case should be
16 remanded to state court. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090-91 (9th
17 Cir. 2003) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). If a district court finds at
18 any time before final judgment that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must remand the case back
19 to state court, rather than dismiss it. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Polo v. Innoventions Int’l,
20 LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d
21 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Remand is the correct remedy because a failure of federal subject-
22 matter jurisdiction means only that the federal courts have no power to adjudicate the matter.” Polo,
23 833 F.3d at 1196. Under Section 1447(c), “the federal court cannot hear [a] barred claim,” but the
24 court “can proceed to hear those other claims [in which it has jurisdiction].” Wisconsin Dep’t of
25 Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 392-93 (1998). So when “[t]he district court lacks jurisdiction to
26 decide only some, but not all, of [the plaintiff’s] claims; the court, therefore, could not have
27 remanded [the plaintiff’s] entire case.” Lee v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001).
28 / / /
1 II. Discussion
2 Dadourian moves to remand the entire case against the County Defendants and State
3 Defendants because this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims
4 against the County Defendants due to his pending Government Code Section 946.6 petition. See
5 generally Motion. The County Defendants contend that this Court has jurisdiction over Dadourian’s
6 federal claims and supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims, and the proper relief for the
7 state law claims with the pending Section 946.6 petition is dismissal, not remand of the entire case.
8 See generally County Opposition. For the reasons discussed below, this Court finds that (1) there is
9 no jurisdiction over the state law claims against the County Defendants, and (2) only the state law
10 claims against the County Defendants shall be remanded.
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A. This Court may not proceed with the state law claims against the County
12 Defendants because of the pending Section 946.6 petition for the state claims
against the County Defendants.
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California’s Government Claims Act requires a claim related to a cause of action
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against a California public entity or public employee for personal injury to be filed or
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presented to the public entity no later than six months after the cause of action accrues. See
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Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2(a). When a claim is not presented during the six-month period, a
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“written application may be made to the public entity for leave to present that claim.” Id. §
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911.4(a). The board can then grant or deny the application within forty-five days after its
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presentation. Id. § 911.6(a). And “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a
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public entity [or public employee] on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be
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presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has
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been acted upon [or rejected] by the board.” Id. § 945.4. Moreover:
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If an application for leave to present a claim is denied or deemed to be denied pursuant
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to Section 911.6, a petition may be made to the court for an order relieving the petitioner
from Section 945.4. The proper court for filing the petition is a superior court that
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would be a proper court for the trial of an action on the cause of action to which the
26 claim relates.
27 Id. § 946.6(a) (emphasis added). Under the plain text of Section 946.6, federal courts cannot
28 adjudicate Section 946.6 petitions. See id. The Ninth Circuit has not interpreted Section
1 946.6, but the text is clear, other federal courts agree, and the parties do not dispute that this
2 Court may not adjudicate the pending petition, or that the petition is necessary for the state
3 law claims against the County Defendants to go forward. See e.g., Elrawi v. Burgess, No.
4 517CV02463, 2018 WL 4223652, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018); Guerrero v. County of
5 Alameda, No. C 18-02379, 2018 WL 3646818, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2018); see also
6 Motion at 10-15; County Opposition at 5-6.
7 In addition, under the plain text of Section 946.6 and Section 945.4, claims against public
8 entities, where a Section 946.6 petition is necessary and pending cannot go forward.
9 Dadourian’s second, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth claims are
10 all state law claims against the County Defendants for Dadourian’s personal injury. See Compl. ¶¶
11 46-51, 64-103. There is no dispute that the requirements of the California Government Claims Act
12 apply. See Motion at 10-15; County Opposition at 5-6. And “a plaintiff must . . . allege in his
13 complaint that he has complied with the claim statute in order to state a cause of action against a
14 public employee [or entity].” Burgdorf v. Funder, 54 Cal. Rptr. 805, 808 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); see
15 also State of California v. Superior Ct., 90 P.3d 116, 122 (Cal. 2004). Dadourian’s state claims
16 against the County Defendants were not timely filed within six months of his June 1, 2023, release
17 from County custody under Section 911.2(a), see Compl. ¶¶ 19-20; Motion at 10-11, so he filed a
18 petition for relief under Section 946.6, see Motion at 10-11, Compl. ¶¶ 7(d), (e).
19 Accordingly, because the state law claims against the County Defendants cannot proceed
20 without a determination of his Section 946.6(a) petition, and this Court cannot adjudicate Section
21 946.6 petitions, the state claims against the County Defendants cannot proceed in this Court. See
22 Motion at 10-14; County Reply at 6.
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B. This Court is not persuaded to remand the entire case against both the County and
24 State Defendants, or dismiss, and not remand, only the state law claims against the
County Defendants.
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The question presented, therefore, is what should this Court do with the state claims against
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the County Defendants? Dadourian argues this Court should remand the entire case—even though
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the Court clearly has jurisdiction over—and the ability to adjudicate—all of the federal claims and
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1 Defendants argue that this Court should keep the entire case and merely dismiss the state law claims
2 against the County Defendants—even though federal courts must generally remand (and not dismiss)
3 claims over which they do not have jurisdiction. See County Opposition at 5-6; Polo, 833 F.3d at
4 1196 (citing Bruns, 122 F.3d at 1257) (“[T]he district court generally must remand the case to state
5 court, rather than dismiss it. Remand is the correct remedy because a failure of federal subject-matter
6 jurisdiction means only that the federal courts have no power to adjudicate the matter. State courts
7 are not bound by the constraints of Article III.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (if a district court finds at any
8 time before final judgment that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must remand the case back to
9 state court, rather than dismiss it); see also Motion at 14-15; County Reply at 4. The Court now
10 addresses Dadourian’s and the County Defendants’ arguments below.
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i. Dadourian has failed to persuade this Court that the entire case should
12 be remanded, as opposed to only the state law claims against the
County Defendants.
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Dadourian has failed to persuade this Court that it should remand the entire case. This Court
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unquestionably still has jurisdiction over the federal law claims, and Dadourian has not provided a
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persuasive reason for how review of the state law claims against the County or State Defendants will
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impact his federal claims.6
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First, Dadourian contends that current removal of the entire action is premature. See Motion
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at 17. However, the basis of this Motion only concerns the Section 946.6 petition for the state law
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claims against the County Defendants and not any other claim against the County Defendants or the
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State Defendants. See Motion; Compl. ¶¶ 32-45, 52-63. And Dadourian does not allege a failure to
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satisfy the statutory claim presentation requirements for his state claims against the State
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Defendants, nor do the State Defendants contend there is no jurisdiction over Dadourian’s state
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claims against them. See Motion at 17-18; State Opposition at 2-3. Thus, no matter how the Section
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946.6 petition gets resolved, the federal claims against all Defendants and state claims against the
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6 Neither the County Defendants nor the State Defendants in their oppositions respond to Dadourian’s
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1 State Defendants will still remain, and this Court has jurisdiction over them and the ability to
2 adjudicate them. See Motion at 17.
3 Second, Dadourian contends that it would be procedurally inefficient to grant the State
4 Defendants’ Motion to Sever, Dkt. No. 10, but deny remand, see Motion at 18. But this ignores the
5 other option—remanding only the state claims against the County Defendants, which does not
6 present the same inefficiencies or procedural concerns.
7 Third, Dadourian argues that his Section 946.6 petition is timely under a continuing violation
8 theory, which contradicts and will impact the State Defendants’ Motion to Sever, where the State
9 Defendants are arguing in their Motion to Sever that there is no “factual overlap” between the
10 County and State claims. See Motion at 19; County Reply at 12. However, a state court
11 determination regarding whether the continuing violation doctrine applies to adjudicate the Section
12 946.6 petition will not affect whether the County and State claims should be severed, or vice versa,
13 because the Motion to Sever is analyzed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, which is a
14 different legal standard than the standard for a continuing violation. See Willis v. City of Carlsbad,
15 262 Cal. Rptr. 3d 528, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Sols., Inc., 292 P.3d
16 871, 879 (Cal. 2013) (noting that for “the continuing violation doctrine to apply, a plaintiff must
17 show the defendant engaged in ‘a pattern of reasonably frequent and similar acts [that] may, in a
18 given case, justify treating the acts as an indivisible course of conduct actionable in its entirety,
19 notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside and partially inside the limitations
20 period’”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 (noting that “Persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if: (A) they
21 assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
22 same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or
23 fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action”).
24 Finally, Dadourian argues that his continuing violation theory shows how the State
25 Defendants are substantively liable for the merits of his federal Eighth Amendment deliberate
26 indifference claim against the State Defendants. See Motion at 19-20. But Dadourian does not show
27 how his “substantive liability theory against the State” regarding his federal Eighth Amendment
28 deliberate indifference claim or any other federal claim would be impacted by a state court ruling on
1 his continuing violation theory against the County Defendants. See id. at 19; Compl. ¶¶ 32-36. In
2 fact, Dadourian does not rely on a continuing violation theory to argue in his opposition to the State
3 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss why the State Defendants are liable for deliberate indifference under
4 the Eighth Amendment. See Dkt. No. 24 at 14. And again, like the different legal standards for a
5 misjoinder claim under Federal Rule 20 and a continuing violation theory, the legal standard for an
6 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim is different than the continuing violation standard.
7 Therefore, Dadourian can argue the State Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical
8 needs, regardless of how the state court determines his continuing violation theory against the
9 County Defendants.
10 In sum, because this Court has jurisdiction over Dadourian’s federal claims, and Dadourian
11 has not shown how review of the state law claims against the County Defendants will impact his
12 federal claims against both parties or state claims against the State Defendants, he fails to show that
13 this Court should remand the entire case. See Schacht, 524 U.S. at 392-93; Lee, 260 F.3d at 1006.
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ii. The County Defendants have failed to persuade this Court that the
15 state law claims against the County Defendants should remain in
federal court (and be dismissed).
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Next, the County Defendants have not demonstrated why this Court should keep (and
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dismiss) state law claims that it is unable to adjudicate.
18
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the cases the County Defendants cite to argue that
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the Section 946.6 petition should not be transferred or remanded to state court, see County
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Opposition at 6, are easily distinguishable because all those cases involve a plaintiff who filed in
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federal court and asked the federal court to adjudicate their Section 946.6 petition, see Garza v.
22
Alvara, No. 115CV00234DADSKO, 2016 WL 4899676, at *1-*2 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 14, 2016);
23
Morrison v. County of Riverside, No. 5:24-CV-01044, 2024 WL 3015304, at *2-*4 (C.D. Cal. June
24
13, 2024) (“Plaintiffs chose not to file their Section 946.6 petition in the Superior Court for the
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County of Riverside and, instead, have pursued Section 946.6 relief in federal court.”); Zelda B. v.
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City of Oakland, No. 21-CV-07078, 2022 WL 16556790, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2022). Because
27
Dadourian filed in state court with a pending Section 946.6 petition, see Compl. ¶¶ 7(d), (e); County
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1 Reply at 7-8, and the state law claims against the County Defendants cannot proceed until the
2 Section 946.6 petition is granted, see Cal Gov’t Code §§ 945.4, 946.6, these cases do not apply.
3 The Court notes that there is no jurisdiction for this Court and thus remand of the state law
4 claims against the County Defendants is required under Section 1447(c).7
5 Perhaps more important is the operation of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 42 U.S.C. §
6 1367. This statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental
7 jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the
8 litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” City of Chicago v.
9 Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ.
10 v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). A district court has supplemental jurisdiction over “all other
11 claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
12 of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. §
13 1367(a). However, district courts have the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
14 if:
15
(1) [T]he claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law;
(2) [T]he claim substantially predominates over the claim over which the district court
16
has original jurisdiction;
(3) [T]he district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction;
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or
(4) [I]n exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
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jurisdiction.
19
Id. § 1367(c). A district court declining supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to the section
20
1367(c)(4)’s “exceptional circumstances” provision must satisfy a two-part inquiry: (1) the “district
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court must articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional within the meaning of §
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23
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7 The State Defendants also filed an opposition to Dadourian’s Motion, arguing that removal was proper
25 because Dadourian’s Section 946.6 petition is a separate civil proceeding from the merits that is currently
pending and because Dadourian alleges federal claims. See State Opposition at 2-3. But it is not separate
26 because the merits of his state law claims against the County Defendants cannot be addressed until the state
court determines that he has timely filed his claims, and as discussed above, the federal court cannot
27
adjudicate the petition. See Burgdorf, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 808; Cal Gov’t Code §§ 945.4, 946,6(a). Moreover, the
state court “has vacated its hearing and will not proceed while the case remains in federal court,” so it is not a
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1 1367(c)(4);” and (2) “in determining whether there are compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction
2 . . . the court should consider what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and
3 comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.
4 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1210 (9th Cir.
5 2021) (describing the inquiry)).
6 Here, this case presents exceptional circumstances in which this Court should decline to
7 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against the County Defendants—even
8 though it might otherwise find that the state law claims are so related to the federal law claims that
9 they are part of the same case and controversy. In particular, the existence of the pending Section
10 946.6 petition and this Court’s inability to adjudicate it makes this case exceptional. It would best
11 serve the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity to permit the state court to
12 adjudicate the Section 946.6 petition and—assuming there is no further request to remove—any state
13 law claims against the County that remain.
14 C. Dadourian is not entitled to attorneys’ fees.
15 The Court will address whether Dadourian should be granted attorneys’ fees due to the
16 County Defendants’ removal. An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and
17 any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal. 28 U.S.C. §
18 1447(c). Absent unusual circumstances, attorneys’ fees should not be awarded under § 1447(c) when
19 the removing party has an objectively reasonable basis for removal. Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp.,
20 546 U.S. 132, 132 (2005). Courts in the Ninth Circuit apply “an objectively reasonable standard by
21 looking to the clarity of the law at the time of removal.” Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d
22 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Martin, 546 U.S. at 141). Removal is not objectively unreasonable
23 “solely because the removing party’s arguments lack merit, or else attorneys’ fees would always be
24 awarded whenever remand is granted.” Id. at 1065.
25 Although there was an active Section 946.6 petition in state court before removing on the
26 thirtieth day, and the petition was to be heard almost two weeks after this case was removed, see
27 Motion at 6, 9, the Court finds there was an objectively reasonable basis for removal since
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1 Dadourian alleges federal claims against the County Defendants, see Compl. 32-45, 52-63; see
2 | also County Opposition at 6. Accordingly, the Court will not award attorneys’ fees to Dadourian.
3 II. Conclusion
4 1. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's Motion (Dkt. No. 30) is GRANTED IN PART.
5 a. Dadourian’s state law claims (Claims Two, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten,
6 Eleven, and Twelve) against the County Defendants only ARE REMANDED to
7 the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles.
8 b. Dadourian’s state law claims against the State Defendants (Claims Two, Five,
9 Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, and Twelve) shall NOT be remanded to the
10 Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles.
11 c. Dadourian’s federal law claims against both the County and State Defendants
12 (Claims One, Three, and Four) shall NOT be remanded to the Superior Court of
13 California for the County of Los Angeles.
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16 IT IS SO ORDERED.
17 Af
18 | Dated: August 6, 2026
19 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG
20 United States District Judge
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