Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 CARLOS WHITE EAGLE, Case No.: 24-cv-1083-BJC-SBC

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

14 CITY OF ESCONDIDO, et. al.,

JUDGMENT

15 Defendants.

16 [ECF No. 23]

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19 Defendants City of Escondido, Officer Adrian Garcia, and Officer Jacob Glennie

20 move for summary judgment of the action in its entirety or, in the alternative, for partial

21 judgment. Plaintiff opposes the motion. After a thorough review of the parties’

22 submissions and for the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and

23 DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion.

24 BACKGROUND

25 On March 29, 2021, Defendants Garcia and Glennie were dispatched to an apartment

26 building to respond to a 911 emergency call relating to a domestic violence incident

27 involving Ixchel Rodriguez and her boyfriend Josue Quiroz. ECF No. 1 ¶ 19; ECF No. 23-

28 4 ¶¶ 6-7; ECF No. 23-5 ¶ 6. Ms. Rodriguez informed dispatch that Mr. Quiroz suffered

1 from depression and anxiety, grabbed knives, stated he wanted to kill himself or others,

2 and broke the apartment building’s fire alarm. ECF No. 1 ¶ 19; ECF No. 23-4 ¶ 7; ECF

3 No. 23-5 ¶¶ 6-7. Dispatch informed Defendants that Mr. Quiroz left the apartment and was

4 wearing a black hooded sweatshirt and black jeans. ECF No. 23-4 ¶ 9; ECF No. 23-5 ¶¶

5 6-7. Plaintiff, who was visiting his daughter at the complex, was approached by

6 Defendants as he was walking outside, wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt and dark jeans.

7 ECF No. 1 ¶ 20; ECF No. 23-4 ¶ 22; ECF No. 23-5 ¶ 7; ECF No. 26 at 2. Defendant Garcia

8 activated his emergency lights on his patrol car, and ordered Plaintiff to sit on the ground.

9 ECF No. 1 ¶ 9; ECF No. 23-4 ¶ 24; ECF No. 23-5 ¶ 7. Plaintiff asked why he was being

10 detained. ECF No. 23-4 ¶ 24; ECF No. 23-5 ¶ 9. Defendant Garcia handcuffed and

11 detained Plaintiff. ECF No. 1 ¶ 24; ECF No. 23-4 ¶ 25; ECF No. 23-5 ¶ 9. After confirming

12 Plaintiff was not the subject of the domestic violence incident, Defendant Garcia arrested

13 Plaintiff for resisting under California Penal Code § 69 and possession of a controlled

14 substance under California Health and Safety Code § 11377(a). ECF No. 23-4 ¶¶ 29, 33,

15 35; ECF No. 23-5 ¶ 11. The criminal court dismissed the criminal charge for resisting.

16 ECF No. 1 ¶ 34; ECF No. 26 at 3.

17 Plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of Escondido, the Escondido Police

18 Department, Officer Garcia and Officer Glennie on June 22, 2024, asserting claims for

19 unlawful seizure, excessive force, deliberate fabrication of evidence, malicious

20 prosecution, and municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New

21 York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). ECF No. 1. Defendants filed an answer on September 4, 2024,

22 and filed the instant motion for summary judgment on September 8, 2025. ECF Nos. 4,

23 23. Plaintiff filed an opposition on October 9, 2025, and Defendants filed a reply on

24 October 14, 2025. ECF Nos. 26, 28.

25 LEGAL STANDARD

26 Summary judgment is properly granted when “there is no genuine issue as to any

27 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.

28 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of establishing an absence of a genuine issue of

1 material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Material facts are those

2 that may affect the “outcome of the suit” under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

3 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence

4 is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Id. If the

5 movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion, who “must set

6 forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.

7 When addressing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all inferences

8 drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

9 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The

10 court makes no credibility determinations and weighs no evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

11 255; Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007).

12 DISCUSSION

13 Defendants seek summary judgment or, in the alternative, partial summary

14 judgment. They argue there are no genuine issues of material fact, and they are entitled to

15 judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, Defendants argue Escondido Police Department

16 is not a proper party, the Defendant Officers did not violate Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

17 rights, the Defendant Officers did not fabricate evidence, the malicious prosecution claim

18 fails, the Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity, the claims brought under

19 Monell have no merit, and the action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

20 Plaintiff opposes the motion. He argues the action is timely, and there are disputed

21 material facts. In reply, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s opposition should be disregarded

22 because it was untimely, and Plaintiff fails to dispute the material facts.

23 I. Plaintiff’s Untimely Response

24 Defendants request this Court disregard Plaintiff’s untimely opposition and grant the

25 motion for summary judgment as unopposed. See ECF No. 28. The Local Rules authorize

26 the Court to construe a failure to timely file a response to a motion as a consent to granting

27 the motion. S.D.Cal. CivLR 7.1.h.3.c. However, a court “may properly exercise this

28 discretion and grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue of material fact

1 and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Aragon v. Hollywood

2 Presbyterian Hosp., 85 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 1996).

3 Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion ten days late without seeking leave. The

4 opposition contains very little nonconclusory argument and cites to no evidence, with the

5 exception of a reference to Defendants’ body worn camera footage submitted by

6 Defendants in support of the motion. However, the Court considers the arguments

7 contained therein, to the extent they assist the Court in determining whether Defendants

8 are entitled summary judgment. As such, Defendants’ request to disregard the opposition

9 is DENIED.

10 II. Merits of Defendants’ Motion

11 A. Statute of Limitations

12 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s action is barred because it was not brought within the

13 applicable two-year statute of limitations. ECF No. 23 at 29-30. Plaintiff argues the claims

14 are timely because his criminal proceedings tolled the limitations period. ECF No. 26 at

15 6. He maintains the charges were dismissed on June 6, 2024, less than two years before

16 filing this action. Defendants do not dispute this contention. Id.

17 For actions brought under § 1983, courts apply the forum state’s statute of limitations

18 for personal injury and the forum state’s tolling laws. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927

19 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1999)). Under California

20 law, the limitations period for personal injury is two years. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 335.1.

21 Therefore, a timely § 1983 action is brought within two years of the accrual date. “A claim

22 accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should know, of the injury which is the basis of the

23 cause of action.” Fink, 192 at 914.

24 Here, the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred on March 29, 2021. He

25 filed his action on June 22, 2024, beyond the two-year period. However, “[i]n California,

26 the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions is tolled by Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.3 while

27 criminal charges are pending.” Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir.

28 1995). Plaintiff asserts, and Defendants do not dispute, that the charges were dismissed

1 less than two years prior to Plaintiff filing the action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s action is not

2 time-barred.

3 B. Escondido Police Department

4 Defendant argues the Escondido Police Department is not a separate and distinct

5 entity against which a suit may be maintained and, therefore, the Escondido Police

6 Department should be dismissed from this action. ECF No. 23 at A police department is

7 a separate entity that may be sued in federal court. Shaw v. State of California Dep’t of

8 Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, Defendants

9 request to dismiss the Escondido Police Department is DENIED.1

10 C. Fourth Amendment Claims

11 Defendants argue they are entitled to judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against the

12 Defendant Officers because the stop of Plaintiff was supported by reasonable suspicion

13 and was reasonable under the circumstances. ECF No. 23 at 16-18. They contend the

14 officers received information that the domestic violence suspect was wearing a dark

15 hooded sweatshirt and dark jeans, had recently departed the apartment, and had a habit of

16 hiding at stores near the apartment building. Id. at 17-18. They maintain Plaintiff was

17 wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt and dark jeans, and he was in the parking lot of the

18 apartment building. Id. Additionally, they contend the suspect was reported as a threat to

19 himself and others, and he was potentially armed with a knife. Id.

20 Defendants further argue the use of force was “minimal, measured, and brief, and

21 reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 19. Defendants contend the

22 officers observed Plaintiff’s body language, demeanor, and noncompliance with officers’

23 commands. Id. In addition, they maintain Plaintiff pulled, or attempted to pull, his right

24 arm away from Defendant Garcia, resulting in the officers using hands-on force to bring

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1 While police departments may be dismissed as duplicative when the claims against the department and

27 the city are premised on the same facts, Defendants set forth no such argument here. Mann v. City of

Chula Vista, 2020 WL 5759749, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2020) (collecting cases dismissing claims as

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1 Plaintiff to the ground and handcuff him. Id. at 19-20. They further maintain the force

2 was stopped as soon as Plaintiff’s resistance ceased. Id. at 20. Additionally, they contend

3 Plaintiff knew that he was being detained by uniformed police officers who were on scene

4 in marked patrol cars. Id. Defendants further argue the minor nature of Plaintiff’s injuries,

5 which consisted of pain under his right eye that healed within eight days, demonstrates the

6 amount of force applied was minimal. Id. at 22. Defendants also argue the Officers had

7 probable cause to arrest Plaintiff because his resistance delayed and obstructed their

8 investigation of the domestic violence incident to which they were responding. Id.

9 Plaintiff argues the generalized match of a person wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt

10 does not justify the seizure because dark hooded sweatshirts are common articles of

11 clothing. ECF No. 26 at 3. He further alleges the camera footage demonstrates “an

12 unnecessary takedown and facial injury.” Id. at 4. He further argues probable cause was

13 lacking because pulling away is not willful resistance, and the unconstitutional seizure

14 cannot justify the later discovery of narcotics. Id.

15 The Fourth Amendment protects against the unreasonable seizure of persons. U.S.

16 Const. amend. IV. “Even if a seizure is reasonable in a particular circumstance, how that

17 seizure is carried out must also be reasonable.” Estate of Strickland v. Nevada Cnty., 69

18 F.4th 614, 619 (9th Cir. 2023) (emphasis in original). The amount of force used in a seizure

19 or arrest must be “objectively reasonable” under the facts and circumstances. Graham v.

20 Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). “In assessing the objective reasonableness of a

21 particular use of force, we consider: (1) the severity of the intrusion on the individual’s

22 Fourth Amendment rights by evaluating the type and amount of force inflicted, (2) the

23 government’s interest in the use of force, and (3) the balance between the gravity of the

24 intrusion on the individual and the government’s need for that intrusion.” Lowry v. City of

25 San Diego, 858 F.3d 1248, 1256 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citations

26 omitted).

27 Defendants contend, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the officers received

28 information that the domestic violence suspect was in the area, could be armed with knives

1 and was wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt and dark jeans. The parties also agree that

2 Defendant Garcia flashed his lights at Plaintiff and told him to get on the ground, but

3 Plaintiff did not comply. The body worn camera footage, however, does not necessarily

4 discredit Plaintiff’s version of events surrounding how the seizure was conducted. Both

5 parties agree, and the footage demonstrates, Plaintiff questioned why he was being

6 detained, an officer grabbed Plaintiff’s arm and quickly took Plaintiff to the ground. ECF

7 No. 27. It is difficult to discern what occurred after Plaintiff was immediately on the

8 ground. However, there appears to have been a struggle, an officer yelled at Plaintiff to

9 stop reaching and kicking, and Plaintiff repeatedly yelled that he was not doing anything.

10 Id. While the officers were holding Plaintiff down, one officer places him in handcuffs.

11 Id.

12 A jury, who will properly make credibility determinations and draw reasonable

13 inferences from the facts, is better suited to weigh the gravity of the intrusion on Plaintiff’s

14 right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure against the government’s need for the

15 intrusion, in light of the surrounding circumstances. See Torres v. City of Madera, 648

16 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the reasonableness standard nearly always

17 requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences

18 therefrom, we have held on many occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a

19 matter of law in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.”). Accordingly,

20 Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to the Fourth Amendment claims against the Defendant

21 Officers based on the reasonableness of the seizure.

22 D. Fourteenth Amendment Claim for Fabrication of Evidence

23 Defendants argue the Defendant Officers did not fabricate evidence in their reports.

24 ECF No. 23 at 26. They maintain Plaintiff asserts they fabricated evidence by accusing

25 him of resisting and committing Vehicle Code violations, then submitting the allegedly

26 fabricated reports to the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office. Id. Defendants

27 contend the evidence demonstrates Plaintiff resisted when they attempted to detain him.

28 Id. Additionally, they contend neither report mentions any Vehicle Code violations, and

1 the reports were not sent to the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office. Id. Plaintiff

2 argues that the officers misstated his actions and injuries in the reports, and they

3 mischaracterized the substance found when they searched him. ECF No. 26 at 5.

4 “The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the deliberate fabrication of evidence by a

5 state official.” Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Devereaux v.

6 Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001)). “To prevail on a § 1983 claim of

7 deliberate fabrication, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant official deliberately

8 fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the plaintiff’s deprivation of

9 liberty.” Id. at 798.

10 As discussed above, there is a genuine issue as to whether Plaintiff resisted.

11 Accordingly, there is a dispute as to whether Defendants’ statements in the reports that

12 Plaintiff resisted amount to fabrication of evidence. However, Plaintiff does not dispute

13 that the reports contain no information regarding the Vehicle Code or the Riverside County

14 District Attorney’s Office. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

15 claim relies on statements regarding the Vehicle Code or the Riverside County District

16 Attorney’s Office, it is subject to dismissal. The motion is otherwise DENIED as to the

17 claim for fabrication of evidence.

18 E. Fourteenth Amendment Claim for Malicious Prosecution Claims

19 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s arrest was supported by probable cause, regardless of

20 whether or not he was ultimately convicted, and that there is no basis for Plaintiff to claim

21 that evidence was fabricated with malice. ECF No. 23 at 27. Plaintiff argues that he asserts

22 in the complaint that the officers misstated his actions and injuries in the reports, and they

23 mischaracterized the substance found on his person. Id. at 5.

24 To prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show

25 that the defendants prosecuted him with malice and without probable cause, and that they

26 did so for the purpose of denying him equal protection or another specific constitutional

27 right.” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Freeman

28 v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir.1995)).

1 As discussed above, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether there was

2 probable cause to support the arrest for resisting. However, Plaintiff’s conclusory

3 argument that a jury could find deliberate fabrication is insufficient to demonstrate a

4 dispute as to whether Defendants acted with malice. “[M]ere allegation and speculation

5 do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment. Nelson v. Pima Cmty.

6 Coll., 83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 266

7 (9th Cir.1995)). Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to the malicious prosecution

8 claim.

9 F. Qualified Immunity

10 Defendants argue the Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity because

11 they did not violate any of Plaintiff’s rights, or clearly established law. ECF No. 23 at 28.

12 Plaintiff argues it was clearly established that seizing and tackling an unarmed, non-

13 threatening individual violates the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 26 at 5.

14 Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages

15 insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

16 of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

17 818 (1982). When evaluating whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, a court

18 must determine (1) whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional

19 right; and, if so, (2) whether that right was clearly established. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S.

20 286, 290, 119 S. Ct. 1292, 1295, 143 L. Ed. 2d 399 (1999). A right is clearly established

21 if “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

22 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

23 Plaintiff alleges while looking for the suspect involved in the domestic violence

24 incident, Defendant Garcia flashed his lights at him and told him to get on the ground, he

25 tried to explain he was visiting his daughter but left the building because of the fire alarm.

26 ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 21-22. He alleges Defendant Officers forced him to the ground and placed

27 him in handcuffs. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff sufficiently alleges Defendants violated his Fourth

28 Amendment rights by using unreasonable force when detaining him.

1 In support of his contention that the right was clearly established, Plaintiff points to

2 Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007). In Blankenhorn, three

3 officers “gang-tackled” an individual suspected of having committed a misdemeanor

4 trespass after he pulled his arm away from an officer and refused to kneel down to be

5 handcuffed. 485 F.3d at 478. The court reasoned it is clearly established that “force is

6 only justified when there is a need for force.” Id. at 477.

7 Here, it is undisputed that Defendant Garcia flashed his lights at Plaintiff and ordered

8 him to the ground, but Plaintiff did not comply. The body warn camera footage shows the

9 interaction but does not resolve all factual disputes surrounding the officer’s seizure of

10 Plaintiff, including the amount of force used and whether Plaintiff was resisting. Viewing

11 the disputed facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the two officers immediately

12 forced Plaintiff to the ground as he was trying to explain who he was and why he was there,

13 and they continued to use force while he was on the ground even though he was not

14 resisting. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (When addressing

15 qualified immunity on summary judgment, the court considers the plaintiff’s version of the

16 facts.). The Court finds a reasonable officer would realize using force against an individual

17 who is calm and not resisting would violate that person’s rights. Accordingly, the right

18 was clearly established, and the Defendant Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity.

19 G. Monell Claim

20 Defendant argues the Monell claim fails because the officers did not violate

21 Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. ECF No. 23 at 29. They further argue Plaintiff provides

22 no admissible evidence to support the Monell causes of action. Id. In opposition, Plaintiff

23 argues liability exists under Monell for failure to train or supervise when the failure results

24 in deliberate indifference. ECF No. 26 at 5. He further argues that repeated

25 misidentification detentions and the lack of deescalation training raise triable issues. Id.

26 A municipality cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of its employees under

27 § 1983, but may be held liable for a civil rights violation caused by a policy, custom or

28 practice. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To prevail on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must

1 ||demonstrate: “(1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2)

2 || that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’

3 || to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the

4 ||constitutional violation.’” Oviatt By & Through Waugh vy. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474

5 || (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389-91 (1989)); see also

6 || Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. A policy amounts to “deliberate indifference” when the need

7 more or different action “is so obvious, and the inadequacy [of the current procedure]

8 likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policy makers of the city

9 reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton,

10 USS. at 389.

11 Generally, a Monell claim based upon failure to train or supervise requires “[a]

12 ||pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Connick v.

13 || Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). Plaintiff's conclusory statement of repeated

14 || misidentification detentions and lack of deescalation training is insufficient to demonstrate

15 dispute of fact. As such, Defendants are entitled to judgment as to the Monell claims.

16 CONCLUSION AND ORDER

17 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

18 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The motion is GRANTED as to the

19 || Fourteenth Amendment claim for fabrication of evidence to the extent it is based upon

20 ||statements regarding the Vehicle Code and the Riverside County District Attorney’s

21 || Office, the Fourteenth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution, and the Monell claims.

22 || The motion is otherwise DENIED.

23 IT IS SO ORDERED.

24 Dated: August 28, 2026

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26 b ep (4 fe Co

27 Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks

28 United States District Judge

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