Montzingo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

JAMIN LEVI MONTZINGO,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:26-cv-31-MSS-SPF

CITY OF LAKELAND, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court for consideration of Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss, (Dkt. 11), and Plaintiff’s response thereto. (Dkt. 16) Also before the Court

is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint, (Dkt. 26), and Defendants’ response

thereto. (Dkt. 28) Upon consideration of all relevant filings, case law, and being

otherwise fully advised, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion and GRANTS IN

PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of an administrative proceeding in connection with a

citation for a red-light violation. On January 7, 2026, Plaintiff Jamin Montzingo filed

a complaint against the City of Lakeland; Josh Brown, the hearing officer; Emma

Williams, the Clerk; Intersection Safety Program; and an unnamed police officer

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting claims for municipal liability (Count I) and a

violation of his due process rights (Count II). (Dkt. 1) In the Complaint, Plaintiff

contends that the City of Lakeland relied on video and photographic materials

generated and maintained by a private third-party vendor operating outside the State

of Florida. (Id. at 2) He further contends that the City “failed to present a custodian of

records, eyewitnesses, or any witness with firsthand knowledge of the creation,

custody, or reliability of the evidence.” (Id. at 2). Despite Plaintiff’s objections, the

hearing officer issued a conclusory ruling without written findings of fact. After this

happened, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Doe Police Officer # 254 entered

Plaintiff’s personal space and made contact with him. As a result of these alleged

violations, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting ongoing and

future enforcement actions based on the challenged practices.

With his Complaint, Plaintiff also filed a motion for temporary restraining order

and preliminary injunction. (Dkt. 3) Plaintiff requested that the Court enter an order

that enjoins “Defendant City of Lakeland, including its departments, programs,

agents, and contractors, from continuing any collection, enforcement, or penalty

actions arising from red-light camera Notice of Violation No. 1242500179509,

pending resolution of this action.” (Id. at 1) The Court denied the motion on

procedural grounds, but also advised Plaintiff that based on the allegations, abstention

appeared appropriate. (Dkt. 4)

Plaintiff then filed a second motion for temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction that corrected the procedural errors. The Court denied this

second motion on its merits, finding Plaintiff could not establish a likelihood of success

on the merits given the likelihood that abstention was appropriate. (Dkt. 14)

Undeterred, Plaintiff filed a third, nearly identical motion for a temporary restraining

order and preliminary injunction, (Dkts. 18–19), which Defendants moved to strike.

(Dkt. 20)

Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that the claims against

Defendants Brown and Williams are barred by absolute immunity and the claims

against the remaining Defendants fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Alternatively, Defendants request that the Court convert their motion to a

motion for summary judgment. With their response, Defendants submitted a video

recording of Plaintiff’s hearing.1 (Dkt. 15)

The video establishes that Plaintiff was provided with an extensive fulsome

hearing. Defendant Brown provided Plaintiff ample opportunity to raise his

evidentiary objections, which Plaintiff repeated multiple times. Defendant Brown

informed Plaintiff that he was overruling his objections, but those objections were

preserved to the extent Plaintiff wished to appeal. At the hearing, the prosecuting

officer testified that Plaintiff’s violation “was reviewed before being issued by myself,

a sworn police officer, and that the camera was tested before and after this violation

was issued and passed both, before and after.” (Id. at 12:55–13:10) At the end of the

1 The Court declines to convert Defendants’ motion into a motion for summary judgment.

The Court may consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss that are central to a

plaintiff’s claims and for which the authenticity cannot be disputed. Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d

1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). While Plaintiff’s response states that the exhibit is improper,

Plaintiff does not support this objection with any argument. (Dkt. 16) The Court finds the

exhibit central to Plaintiff’s claims and the authenticity of the document cannot be disputed;

thus, the Court considers it principally to provide context for the challenges asserted in the

complaint.

hearing, Defendant Brown asked Plaintiff multiple times whether he had anything else

to say. Only after Plaintiff failed to respond to this question did Defendant Brown

terminate Plaintiff’s hearing. (Id. at 16:28–17:04) The video does not show any

physical contact between the prosecuting officer and Plaintiff.

For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

dismiss.

While Defendants’ motion was pending, Plaintiff filed his motion for leave to

amend his complaint. (Dkt. 26) Plaintiff requests leave to amend his complaint to (1)

add claim for damages under § 1983; (2) add specific factual allegations regarding the

City’s policies that have caused the alleged violations; (3) add specific facts addressing

the availability of state remedies; (4) remove Defendant Emma Williams and the

“Intersection Safety Program” as named parties; and, (5) identify the private vendor

operating the Intersection Safety Program as a John Doe corporate defendant pending

identification. (Dkt. 26) Because the deficiencies identified below are not addressed by

Plaintiff’s proposed amended pleading, (Dkt. 26-1), the Court GRANTS IN PART

and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s motion. As discussed below, Plaintiff will be

permitted to file an amended complaint, though not the proposed amended complaint

included with his motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must meet an exceedingly low threshold of

sufficiency. Quality Foods de Centro Am., S.A. v. Latin Am. Agribusiness Dev.

Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 995 (11th Cir. 1983). A plaintiff must plead only enough

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560–64 (2007) (abrogating the “no set of facts” standard for

evaluating a motion to dismiss established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46

(1957)). Although a complaint challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does

not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff is still obligated to provide the

“grounds” for his entitlement to relief, and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action will not do.” Berry v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d

1361, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545). In light of a motion

to dismiss, to evaluate the sufficiency of a complaint a court must accept the well

pleaded facts as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Quality Foods, 711 F.2d at 994–95. However, the court should not assume that the

plaintiff can prove facts that were not alleged. Id. Thus, dismissal is warranted if,

assuming the truth of the factual allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint, there is a

dispositive legal issue that precludes relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326

(1989).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Absolute Immunity

Defendants first argue that the claims against Defendant Josh Brown, the

hearing officer, and Defendant Emma Williams, the Clerk, are barred by absolute

immunity. Plaintiff does not address this argument in his response to the motion to

dismiss, (Dkt. 16), though he does remove Ms. Williams as a defendant in his proposed

Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 26-1) The Court construes this as a stipulation to dismiss

Ms. Williams from this litigation. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is granted with

respect to Ms. Williams. The Court also finds that absolute immunity precludes the

claims against Mr. Brown.

“A judge enjoys absolute immunity from suit for judicial acts performed within

the jurisdiction of his court.” McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.

2018). “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from

suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10

(1991). Judicial immunity is not defeated by allegations of bad faith or malice. Pierson

v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). The absence of immunity would eviscerate the

constitutional independence of the judiciary. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31 (1980).

A plaintiff may overcome judicial immunity only by showing that the judge either

engaged in a non-judicial action or took actions where he acted in “clear absence of

all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978); Mireles, 502 U.S.

at 11.

Courts have recognized that judicial immunity extends to “hearing officers”

who conduct administrative hearings just as it does to those elected or appointed to

preside over judicial proceedings. Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir.

2001) (judicial immunity applied to state administrative law judge); McCall v.

Montgomery Housing Auth., 809 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1322 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (judicial

immunity applied to municipal housing authority’s hearing officer); Koger v. Keith,

No. 06-cv-61655, 2008 WL 299028, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2008) (stating that hearing

officers are “entitled to the same level of immunity as any other state court judge in

the State of Florida”) (citing Fla. Stat. § 318.36); see also Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474

U.S. 193, 201 (1985) (“Absolute immunity flows not from rank or title or location

within the Government, . . . but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual

official.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff alleges that Mr.

Brown “acted as the Municipal Hearing Officer and issued the signed final

administrative order,” (Dkt. 1 at 1), and that he “issued a conclusory ruling without

written findings of fact.” (Id. at 2) Because these allegations do not involve non-judicial

actions or acts taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, Mr. Brown is entitled to

absolute judicial immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57.

b. Due Process Claim

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for violation of his due process rights

must fail because he failed to avail himself of the state appellate process.2 To state a

viable claim actionable under § 1983 for a procedural deprivation, a plaintiff must

allege that “the state [has] refuse[d] to provide a process sufficient to remedy the

procedural deprivation.” Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000).

When a plaintiff fails to allege an absence of state remedies, dismissal is warranted.

See generally Hogan v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 817 F. App’x 717, 722 (11th Cir.

2 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s claim fails pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman and Heck

doctrines. Because the Court finds the first argument dispositive, it need not address these

arguments.

2020) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s § 1983 procedural due process claim where

plaintiff failed to plead lack of adequate state remedies);3 Ladd v. City of West Palm

Beach, 681 F. App’x 814, 818–19 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's §

1983 claim because plaintiff failed to allege an absence of adequate state remedies to

cure the failure to provide a name-clearing hearing).

When state remedies exist, but the plaintiff fails to avail himself of those

remedies, the plaintiff cannot later assert that he was deprived of due process. See 625

Fusion, LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, No. 19-cv-61308, 2021 WL 1022838, at *10

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2021) (stating that “failure to pursue appellate remedies is, of

course, fatal to [the] claim because, ‘[i]f adequate state remedies were available but the

plaintiff failed to take advantage of them, the plaintiff cannot rely on that failure to

claim that the state deprived him of procedural due process’”) (quoting Cotton, 216

F.3d at 1331); JERMC LTD v. Town of Redington Shores, No. 8:19-cv-688, 2020 WL

1974224, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2020) (dismissing procedural due process claim,

finding “it is unclear whether plaintiffs could make the necessary allegations since it

appears that they never actually pursued state remedies”); Clewison Commons, LLC

v. City of Clewison, No. 2:18-cv-339, 2019 WL6614220, *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2019)

(dismissing procedural due process claim, finding “[i]f a plaintiff fails to avail itself of

3 The Court notes that “[a]lthough an unpublished opinion is not binding on this court, it may

be considered as persuasive authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2.” United States v. Futrell, 209

F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000). Where cited herein, any unreported decision of a panel of

the Circuit is considered well-reasoned and is offered as persuasive, not binding.

adequate state remedies, that plaintiff cannot rely on that failure to claim that the state

deprived [it] of procedural due process”) (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable § 1983 claim because state law provided

an adequate remedy to the alleged deprivation of due process rights: an appeal to state

court. This remedy is an adequate post-deprivation procedure. See Club Madonna,

Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1370 (11th Cir. 2019) (the procedure of

appealing to state court “satisfies due process because the Florida Circuit Court has

the power to remedy any procedural deficiencies and cure violations of due process”).

Thus, Count II of Plaintiff’s complaint is due to be dismissed.

c. Municipal Liability Claim

Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint brings a claim for municipal liability and

alleges: “The conduct of Defendants was undertaken pursuant to the City of

Lakeland’s official policies, practices, and customs governing automated traffic

enforcement. The City delegated substantial enforcement authority to the Private

Third-Party Vendor and relied on its evidence, notices, and administrative processing

as part of a unified enforcement scheme.” (Dkt. 1 at 3) Defendants argue that the claim

for municipal liability is due to be dismissed because it involves the adjudication of a

state-law traffic offense and Defendant Brown was not acting as a policymaker for the

City (which had no control over Brown’s actions).

Plaintiff responds that the Complaint challenges the City’s procedures and

practices governing the Intersection Safety Program, including the use of third-party

processing and enforcement mechanisms without constitutionally adequate

safeguards. The Court finds that dismissal of Count I is appropriate. First, Plaintiff

fails to explain how the reliance on third parties (for gathering evidence or sending

notices) is constitutionally improper.4

Even if Plaintiff could establish that this was constitutionally impermissible,

Count I would be subject to dismissal for the reason cited by Defendants. On this point,

the Court finds instructive the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Teagan v. City of

McDonough, 949 F.3d 670 (11th Cir. 2020). In Teagan, the plaintiff sued the City of

McDonough, Georgia after she was jailed for her failure to pay a municipal traffic

ticket. The district court granted summary judgment on her Monell claim, finding the

city’s municipal court was acting pursuant to “its limited state judicial power” to

enforce state misdemeanor laws. Thus, because the court was not acting on behalf of

the city, the city could not be liable. Id. at 674. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed:

Ms. Teagan was charged with driving without insurance, which

constitutes a state-law misdemeanor offense. See Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-

10(a). Under Georgia law and the rationale of Familias Unidas, Chief

Judge Patten was acting on behalf of the state when he presided over her

case, found her guilty, sentenced her, signed a warrant for her arrest,

issued a $100 “contempt charge” for her failure to pay the fine, and

ordered her to serve the 60-day sentence that had been suspended. See

Familias Unidas, 619 F.2d at 404. And because a conviction in a Georgia

municipal court for a state-law misdemeanor traffic offense is appealable

to the superior court, see Ga. Code Ann. § 40-13-28, we cannot say that

under Georgia law the City had “control over” Chief Judge Patten or the

McDonough municipal court with respect to the adjudication of Ms.

Teagan’s state-law misdemeanor traffic offense. See McMillian, 520 U.S.

4 Notably, the Florida Supreme Court has held that Florida law authorizes third parties to

“review information from red light cameras for any purpose short of making the probable

cause determination as to whether a traffic infraction was committed.” Jimenez v. State, 246

So. 3d 219, 230 (Fla. 2018).

at 785, 117 S.Ct. 1734 (“Our cases on the liability of local governments

under § 1983 instruct us to ask whether governmental officials are final

policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or a particular

issue.”); Grech, 335 F.3d at 1332 (“[T]he appropriate § 1983 inquiry under

federal law is whether ... Clayton County, under Georgia law, has control

over the Sheriff in his law enforcement function, particularly for the entry

and validation of warrants ... and the training and supervision of his

employees in that regard.”). We therefore affirm the district court’s grant

of summary judgment to the City on Ms. Teagan’s § 1983 claims.

Id. at 677–78.

At least one decision from the Middle District of Florida finds Teagan’s

rationale applicable to the City of Lakeland’s municipal traffic proceedings. See

Mathis v. City of Lakeland, No. 8:21-cv-235-SDM-SPF, 2021 WL 11644468 (M.D.

Fla. Aug. 2, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 11644473 (Aug.

17, 2021). In Mathis, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s municipal liability claim,

explaining that the hearing officer defendants were not the final policymakers of the

City or controlled by the City with respect to the plaintiff’s case:

Plaintiff was charged with state-law misdemeanor traffic offenses under

Fla. Stat. §§ 316.074(1), and 316.075(1)(c)(1). Florida law confers

jurisdiction on municipalities to designate hearing officers to interpret

Florida’s Uniform Traffic Control Law within the municipality’s

boundaries. See Fla. Stat. §§ 316.008, 318.30. Under Florida law, “Any

Civil Traffic Infraction Hearing Officer Program established in a county

under ss. 318.30-318.38 shall be subject to the supervision of the Supreme

Court.” Fla. Stat. § 318.30. And a municipality, “through its duly

authorized officers, shall have nonexclusive jurisdiction over the

prosecution, trial, adjudication, and punishment of violations of this

chapter when a violation occurs within the municipality and the person

so charged is charged by a municipal police officer.” Fla. Stat. §

316.008(2). Because Defendants Vaughn and Brown adjudicated

Plaintiff’s state-law misdemeanor traffic offense, and their decisions were

appealable to circuit court, the undersigned cannot find that the hearing

officers were the final policymaker for the City or that the City had

“control over” them concerning Plaintiff’s case. See Teagan, 949 F.3d at

678. For this reason, the City is not liable under § 1983 for Vaughn’s and

Brown’s administrative decisions.

2021 WL 11644468, at *5.

The Court finds Mathis persuasive and adopts its reasoning here. As such,

Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.

IV. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

As set forth above, Plaintiff also moves for leave to amend his complaint to (1)

add claims for damages under § 1983, (2) add specific factual allegations regarding the

City’s policies that have caused the alleged violations; (3) add specific facts addressing

the availability of state remedies; (4) remove Defendant Emma Williams and the

“Intersection Safety Program” as named parties; and (5) identify the private vendor

operating the Intersection Safety Program as a John Doe corporate defendant pending

identification. (Dkt. 26) Because the deficiencies discussed above are not ameliorated

by Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 26-1), the Court finds the motion

should be granted in part and denied in part. The motion is denied to the extent that

Plaintiff’s due process and municipal liability claims are dismissed without leave to

amend. Those claims may not be raised in any amended complaint. Plaintiff’s may, as

set forth below, attempt to plead a First Amendment and Fourth Amendment claims

in an amended complaint if he has a good faith basis for asserting such claims.

a. Due Process

In his proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff adds additional allegations as to

inadequacy of state procedures to address the alleged due process violations. In

particular, Plaintiff states that an appeal under Florida Statute § 162.11 is limited to

appellate review of the record created before the hearing officer. Because the final order

contained no findings of fact and Plaintiff was not otherwise provided with a transcript

or recording of the proceeding, any appeal could not meaningfully review the defects

he alleges. This argument fails, as the Eleventh Circuit has already held that an appeal

pursuant to § 162.11 “satisfies due process because the Florida Circuit Court has the

power to remedy any procedural deficiencies and cure violations of due process.” Club

Madonna, 924 F.3d at 1379; see also Holiday Isle Resort & Marina Assoc. v. Monroe

Cnty., 582 So. 2d 721, 721–22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (stating that “constitutional claims

such as those raised by the petitioners herein are properly cognizable on an appeal to

the circuit court from a final order of an enforcement board taken pursuant to Section

162.11, Florida Statutes”); Laskar v. Peterson, 771 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2014)

(“In other words, even if a plaintiff suffered a procedural deprivation at his

administrative hearing, there is no procedural due process violation if the state makes

available a means to remedy the deprivation.”).5

b. Unreasonable Seizure and Excessive Force

Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint also adds a claim for unreasonable

seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to

5 Moreover, the video of the hearing plainly contradicts Plaintiff’s assertions. Plaintiff was

permitted to present his objections, he was asked several times prior to concluding whether

he had anything else to say, and Ms. Williams informed Plaintiff that the evidence Plaintiff

submitted had been received and uploaded to the case file. Mr. Brown also informed Plaintiff

that the proceeding was being recorded and he could request a copy of the video. (Dkt. 15)

the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff alleges that, by “intentionally putting his hands on

Plaintiff after being told not to touch him, restraining Plaintiff’s freedom of movement,

and physically moving him while additional officers stood behind Plaintiff in a show

of force, Officer Doe # 254 seized Plaintiff within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment, without a warrant, probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or any lawful

justification.” (Dkt. 26-1 at ¶ 37) The Court will allow Plaintiff to file an amended

complaint that includes this claim.

The Court finds it prudent to caution Plaintiff that if he brings a frivolous claim

that is inconsistent with the evidence, he could face sanctions in the form of attorney’s

fees or other monetary sanctions. The Court has reviewed the video of the hearing,

(Dkt. 15), which, in the parts that are viewable, contains no indication that the

prosecuting officer ever put his hands on Plaintiff. The Court encourages Plaintiff to

review the video before filing any amended complaint.

c. Violation of the First Amendment

Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint also adds a new claim for violation of

the First Amendment. On this point, he alleges that the statements he made at the

hearing are protected speech under the First Amendment. He then alleges that

Defendants “silenced” him, “terminated the hearing mid-speech, and made physical

contact with him and physically moved him because of the content of his protected

speech and his objections, and not pursuant to any reasonable viewpoint-neutral rule

of order.” (Dkt. 26-1 at ¶ 41) The Court will allow Plaintiff to file an amended

complaint that includes this claim.

Again, the Court cautions Plaintiff that bringing a frivolous claim could subject

him to monetary sanctions. The Court has reviewed the video of the hearing, (Dkt.

15), which appears to show that Plaintiff was not prevented from speaking. While

Defendant Brown often had to advise Plaintiff to “wait his turn” given his frequent

interruptions of both Defendant Brown and the prosecuting officer, Plaintiff was

permitted to speak in turn. At the end of the hearing, Defendant Brown asked Plaintiff

more than once whether there was “anything else” he wanted to say. The Court again

encourages Plaintiff to review the video before filing any amended complaint.

d. Municipal Liability

Finally, Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint adds additional allegations to

his municipal liability claim. Plaintiff alleges constitutional violations that he suffered

that were caused by the City’s official policies, customs, and practices, including the

policy of relying on unauthenticated vendor-created evidence without custodian

testimony, without addressing evidentiary objections, and without issuing written

findings of fact. First, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections were

addressed (and overruled) at the hearing. Regardless, Plaintiff’s new allegations do not

alter the conclusion that here. As in Mathis, Defendant Brown was not the final

policymaker of the City, nor was he controlled by the City with respect to the plaintiff’s

case. Thus, permitting Plaintiff to amend his complaint with this claim would be futile

V. CONCLUSION

Upon consideration, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. 11), is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiffs Complaint, (Dkt. 1), is DISMISSED. Counts I and II are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint, (Dkt. 26), is GRANTED IN

PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff may file a new amended

complaint that brings claims for violations of the First and Fourth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution if Plaintiff believes there is a

factual basis to do so. Any amended complaint should be directed only

against those Defendant(s) who allegedly violated Plaintiff's First and

Fourth Amendment rights.

4. Plaintiff must file any amended complaint within fourteen (14) days of

the date of this Order. Failure to comply with this directive will result in

the Court closing this matter without further notice.

5. Defendants shall thereafter have fourteen (14) days to respond to

Plaintiff's amended complaint.

6. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Reply in Support of His Motion for

Leave to File First Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 28), is DENIED AS

MOOT.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 28th day of August 2026.

Copies furnished to: 4 ~ f | /

Counsel of Record / hit/ tf rn

Any Unrepresented Party MARY\S_SGRIVEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16