Wallace

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

MALIK A. WALLACE PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 4:24-cv-00795-KGB

JIMMY COLEMAN, et al. DEFENDANT

ORDER

Before the Court is the Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) submitted by

United States Magistrate Judge Edie R. Ervin (Dkt. No. 65). Plaintiff Malik Wallace responded

with objections to the Recommendation (Dkt. Nos. 66; 67). After careful consideration of the

Recommendation and Wallace’s objections, and after a de novo review of the record, the Court

adopts the Recommendation as this Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in all respects

(Dkt. No. 65).

The Court writes separately to address Wallace’s objections. Wallace is an inmate with

the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”) who brings claims for violations of his constitutional

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt. No. 65, at 1). Wallace’s claims arise from a July 16, 2024,

attack against Wallace by inmate Zebarrious Hawkins (Id., at 2).1 Wallace claims that defendant

Corporal Xavier Sutton allowed Hawkins to enter Wallace’s barracks, where Hawkins attacked

Wallace. Wallace asserts a failure to protect claim against Sutton (Id.). Wallace also claims that

the medical treatment he received after the attack from defendant LPN Kimberly Chambers

constitutes medical deliberate indifference (Id.). Wallace sues both defendants in their official and

individual capacities, and he seeks monetary and injunctive relief as to both defendants.

1 Wallace’s complaint and amended complaint do not mention inmate Westbrook, but

the Recommendation and underlying motion for summary judgment suggest that inmate

Westbrook may have also been involved in the attack.

Wallace objects to the Recommendation’s determination that defendant Xavier Sutton is

entitled to qualified immunity (Dkt. No. 66). Wallace argues that he has record evidence that

demonstrates that Sutton frequently worked in the barracks he was supervising on the day of the

attack (Id., at 1). Wallace argues that Sutton’s failure to follow policy allows for the reasonable

inference that Sutton and Hawkins conspired to perform the attack or that Sutton intended for the

attack to occur (Id., at 1–4). Wallace also questions the veracity of Sutton’s deposition testimony

and suggests that Wallace has no way to know whether Sutton is telling the truth (Id., at 5–7).

The Court overrules Wallace’s objections. First, regardless of whether Sutton worked

previously or regularly in the barracks at issue, Wallace has failed to come forward with record

evidence to establish that Sutton knew or should have known of any information or concerns

sufficiently specific to create a reasonable inference that Hawkins would attack Wallace. While

assignment to a barrack is one element that can go towards whether a guard knew or should have

known of a safety concern associated with Hawkins’s presence in Wallace’s barracks, familiarity

with the inmates assigned to a set of barracks by itself is not enough to demonstrate that Sutton

knew or should have known that Hawkins was a threat to Wallace.

Second, as the Recommendation explained, Wallace cannot bring a separate constitutional

claim against Sutton for failure to follow ADC procedure (Dkt. No. 65, at 10). While failure to

follow procedure may be indicative of constitutionally inadequate protection or care, it is not, in

and of itself, a constitutional violation.

Third, while Wallace is allowed to question the veracity of Sutton’s testimony, at summary

judgment, Wallace must meet proof with proof. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Torgerson v. City of

Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). Wallace has offered no proof in the form of

record evidence that Sutton knew or should have known that Hawkins posed a threat to Wallace.

As such, even if there are questions about the veracity of Sutton’s testimony, Wallace has failed

to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his failure to protect claim against Sutton.

Wallace also objects to the Recommendation’s deliberate indifference claim analysis (Dkt.

No. 67). Wallace argues that he exhausted his administrative remedies by completing a grievance

form (Dkt. No. 67, at 4). Wallace also cites his responses to interrogatories (Dkt. No. 67, at 2–4).

The Court struggles to understand Wallace’s objections but construes them as general

disagreement with the course of medical treatment he received, a question about the authenticity

of medical records, and an allegation that Chambers did not follow her supervisor’s medical

recommendations. The Court overrules Wallace’s objections. First, Wallace’s claims regarding

the adequacy of his medical treatment are not supported by record evidence. Like Judge Ervin

explained in the Recommendation, Wallace’s argument against summary judgment are based upon

“conclusory and speculative statements regarding his medical treatment and the validity of medical

records.” (Dkt. No. 65, at 12). Without record evidence to support his claims at the summary

judgment stage, Wallace cannot prevail on a deliberate indifference claim. Likewise, even if

Wallace disagrees with the Chambers’s conduct, Wallace has failed to present record evidence that

Chambers’s course of action was so inappropriate as to constitute deliberate indifference.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules Wallace’s objections. After a de novo

review of the record, the Court adopts the Recommendation as this Court’s findings of fact and

conclusions of law in all respects (Dkt. No. 65). The Court grants defendants’ motions for

summary judgment (Dkt. No. 42; 52). The Court dismisses with prejudice Wallace’s claims

against defendants Sutton and Chambers. The Court dismisses Wallace’s complaint consistent

with the terms of this Order.

It is so ordered this 28th day of August, 2026.

Kristine G. Baker

Chief United States District Judge