Nguyen

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

NAM QUOC NGUYEN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) No. CIV-26-1110-HE

)

TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General, )

et al., )

)

Respondents. )

)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Nam Quoc Nguyen, a noncitizen,1 seeks a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.2 United States District Judge Joe

Heaton referred the case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial

proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 3. The Government

responded, Doc. 11, and Petitioner replied, Doc. 12. So, the matter is at issue.

1 This Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as

equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578

n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).

2 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation

and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless

otherwise indicated.

For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the Court

grant Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief, in part, and order his

immediate release subject to the terms of his prior Order of Supervision (OOS).

I. Factual background and procedural history.

Petitioner is a citizen of Vietnam who entered the United States “on or

about November 29, 1989, as a refugee.” Doc. 11, Ex. 1, at 2; Doc. 1, at 1. “On

December 28, 1990, Petitioner was granted lawful permanent resident status.”

Doc. 11, Ex. 1, at 2. In 1993, he was convicted of aggravated assault in Kansas

state court and sentenced to serve three to eight years in prison. Id. “On July

15, 1993, [the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)] issued a Notice to

Appear [(NTA)] to Petitioner,” charging him as removable under §

237(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Id.3

On December 15, 1993, an Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered Petitioner

removed to Vietnam and the removal order became administratively final on

3 These statutory provisions are codified in the United States Code at 8

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii). Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) provides that any

noncitizen “convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within

five years (or 10 years in the case of a[] [noncitizen] provided lawful permanent

resident status . . .) after the date of admission, and . . . is convicted of a crime

for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable.” Id.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) provides that any noncitizen

“convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.”

Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).

2

February 24, 1994. Id.; Doc. 1, at 2. “On or about July 11, 1995, [Enforcement

Removal Operations (ERO)] sought guidance and procedures for requesting

Travel Documents for Vietnamese [citizens] and a Travel Document request

[for Petitioner] was made.” Doc. 11, Ex. 1, at 2. “The Vietnamese Embassy

reported no status change on [the] request until May of 1998.” Id. In August of

1998, Petitioner was released from DHS custody on his own recognizance “with

instructions to report to [the] OKC Field Office.” Id. at 3.4

Respondents concede “Petitioner has consistently complied with check-

ins as directed by DHS,” albeit “with a few missed check-ins, from his release

in 1998 until his latest re-detention on April 30, 2026.” Id. Respondents note

that “on November 21, 2018, Petitioner was given 3 months to produce a copy

of a passport application and receipt showing that it was turned into the

Vietnamese Consulate.” Id. at 3. But “Petitioner failed to provide any proof of

compliance by February 20, 2020” or “any evidence of applications for travel

document under his own volition.” Id.

4 Petitioner states he was placed on an OOS “pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.5

and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 due to evidence in Petitioner’s file that demonstrated

there was no significant likelihood of his removal to Vietnam in the reasonably

foreseeable future.” Doc. 1, at 2. The parties have not provided a copy of

Petitioner’s OOS.

3

On April 30, 2026, Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained

Petitioner “at his regularly scheduled check-in appointment . . . despite

receiving no notice, [or a] chance to be heard.” Doc. 1, at 2; Doc. 11, Ex. 1, at 4.

Respondents state, “Petitioner was provided and signed a Notice of Revocation

of Release form.” Doc. 11, Ex. 1, at 4.5 Petitioner remains detained at the

Cimarron Correctional Facility in Cushing, Oklahoma. Doc. 1, at 4.

Respondents maintain that “[o]n April 16, 2026, the [Headquarters Post-

order Detention Unit (HQPDU)] determined that, because of the changed

circumstances, there was and is a significant likelihood that Petitioner may be

removed in the reasonably foreseeable future pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i).”

Doc. 11, Ex. 1, at 4.

II. Petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner raises four grounds for relief:

Ground One: Declaratory relief that he is detained pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1); he has “demonstrated to ICE’s satisfaction

that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future”; ICE did not rebut his

demonstration; and that he may not be re-detained until ICE

rebuts his demonstration.

5 Respondents have not provided the Court with a copy of the Notice of

Revocation form, but Petitioner does not dispute Respondents’ averment in his

reply. See Doc. 12, at 7 (“They further acknowledge that Petitioner was served

with a Notice of Revocation of Release issued pursuant to the post-final-order

detention regulations.”).

4

Ground Two: A violation of the INA by failure of Respondents to

comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(3) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g),

(i)(2)-(3).

Ground Three: Unlawful detention in violation of the Fifth

Amendment (Due Process).

Ground Four: Respondents violated the Administrative Procedure

Act (APA) by failing to provide an explanation for Petitioner’s re-

detention or comply with relevant regulations.

Doc. 1, at 25-29. Petitioner asks the Court to issue an emergency preliminary

order prohibiting Respondents from transferring him to Texas and requiring

Respondents to provide 72-hour notice of any intended movement of his person.

Id. at 28.6 Petitioner also requests an emergency preliminary order requiring

Respondents to provide him due process before removing him to a third

country. Id. at 28-29.

Petitioner asks the Court to order Respondents to immediately release

him subject to the conditions of his prior OOS; permanently enjoin

Respondents from re-detaining him unless they obtain a travel document for

his removal; and permanently enjoin Respondents from removing him to a

third country without due process. Id. at 29. Petitioner additionally seeks

attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5

6 The Court addressed Petitioner’s request in its Order for Response. Doc.

8, at 2.

5

U.S.C. § 504 and 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Id.

III. Standard of review.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in

custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of

the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.

475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are

properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d

1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88

(2001)); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687 (“[T]he primary federal habeas

corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts to

hear these cases.”).

IV. Analysis.

A. Respondents unlawfully revoked Petitioner’s OOS.

In Ground Two, Petitioner asserts that Respondents violated the INA

and its regulations when they re-detained him after his release pursuant to an

OOS. Doc. 1, at 26. The undersigned finds the Government failed to make the

proper finding that changed circumstances necessitated revoking Petitioner’s

OOS as required by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1).

6

ICE may revoke an OOS and “return the [noncitizen] to custody” when,

“on account of changed circumstances . . . there [becomes] a significant

likelihood [of] the [noncitizen’s] remov[a]l in the reasonably foreseeable

future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1). “These regulations clearly indicate that, upon

revocation of supervised release, it is the Government’s burden to show a

significant likelihood that the noncitizen may be removed.” Hall v. Nessinger,

2026 WL 18583, at *6 (D.R.I. Jan. 2, 2026).

Relying on the declaration of Deportation Officer Micheal L. Thompson,

Respondents maintain that:

For the fiscal year of 2024, ERO removed 58 Vietnamese Citizens

to Vietnam.

For the fiscal year of 2025, ERO removed 699 Vietnamese Citizens

to Vietnam, 102 of which were “pre-1995” aliens.

As of March 15, 2026, for the fiscal year of 2026, ERO has removed

632 Vietnamese Citizens to Vietnam, 110 of which were “pre-1995”

aliens.

The Government of Vietnam has issued every travel document

requested since February of 2025.

Doc. 11, Ex. 1, at 3. First, “Courts have found that such increase in frequency

of removals alone does not demonstrate significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Pham v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1157-SLP, 2025

WL 3243870, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025) (collecting cases). While “Courts

7

have recognized that Vietnam is now considering repatriation requests from

the United States,” it is still done “on a case-by-case basis.” Duong v. Tate, 2025

WL 933947, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2025). And “[t]he increase in removals to

Vietnam in the past year does not indicate Petitioner himself was significantly

likely to be removed at the time of his re-detention.” Nguyen v. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., No. CIV-26-87-R, 2026 WL 1506428, at *6 (W.D. Okla. May 29,

2026).

Respondents have not provided the Court with any information about

how ICE has “consider[ed] all the facts of the case including . . . the history of

the alien’s efforts to comply with the order of removal . . . and the alien’s

assistance with [ICE’s removal] efforts” under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f). The sole

justification for ICE’s revocation of Petitioner’s release appears to be that it

has submitted a travel document request to Vietnam, which is still pending.

See Doc. 11, Ex. 1, at 4. But “[t[he mere request of a travel document by ICE is

not a changed circumstance supporting re-detention under § 241.13.” Choy v.

Woosley, 2026 WL 324601, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 6, 2026).

Finally, Respondents rely on HQPDU’s conclusory finding of changed

circumstances, but Officer Thompson’s declaration does not explain what those

circumstances were. And Courts have rejected such conclusory statements as

insufficient to justify revocation of release. See Sarali A. v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp.

8

3d 775, 787 (D. Minn. 2025) (“Simply to say that circumstances had changed

or there was significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future is not

enough. Petitioner must be told what circumstances had changed or why there

was now a significant likelihood of removal in order to meaningfully respond

to the reasons and submit evidence in opposition, as allowed under §

241.13(i)(3).”).

The record before the Court establishes that ICE failed to find changed

circumstances necessitated the revocation of Petitioner’s release, and as a

result, violated its own regulations. See Qui v. Carter, 2025 WL 2770502, at *3-

4 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2025) (holding that ICE violated its regulations when

revoking existing OOS as it did not “provide[] any details or statistics or

evidence to support” a determination of changed circumstances). As a result of

the lack of apparent determination of changed circumstances necessitating

revocation, the undersigned finds that ICE’s revocation of Petitioner’s OOS

was unlawful. Id. at *4 (finding that failure to properly revoke the petitioner’s

OOS “pursuant to the applicable regulations” rendered revocation ineffective).

So, the Court recommends Petitioner’s immediate release subject to the same

OOS that governed his prior release.

B. Petitioner’s remaining claims.

9

The undersigned declines to address Petitioner’s APA claim and due

process claim as the Court can grant him the relief he seeks based on his

regulatory violation claim. Additionally, the undersigned declines to address

Petitioner’s request for declaratory relief as any declaratory relief will be

rendered moot by the adoption of this Report and Recommendation.

As for Petitioner’s requests for injunctive relief, the Court should deny

Petitioner’s requests for the Court to:

• Permanently enjoin Respondents from re-detaining him under 8 C.F.R.

§ 241.13(i)(2)-(3) unless and until Respondents have obtained a travel

document allowing for his removal from the United States;

• Permanently enjoin Respondents from re-detaining him under

§ 241.13(i)(2)-(3) for more than three days after receiving a travel

document; and to

• Permanently enjoin Respondents from deporting him to an allegedly safe

third country without first giving him due process in the form of a full

merits hearing for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of

removal under the convention against torture (CAT) before an IJ relating

to the proposed country of removal with a right to an administrative

appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals.

10

Doc. 1, at 29. “[F]uture decision[s] to detain . . . are appropriately committed

to the executive branch, which—subject to compliance with applicable law—

has substantial latitude in the execution of immigration enforcement decisions,

including as to noncitizens subject to orders of removal.” Funes v. Francis, 2025

WL 3263896, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2025) (first citing United States v.

Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 679 (2023); and then citing Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez,

596 U.S. 543, 546-48 (2022)).

V. Recommendation and notice of right to object.

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends the Court

grant Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, Doc. 1, and order his

immediate release from custody subject to the terms of his unlawfully revoked

OOS.7 The undersigned further recommends that the Court order

Respondents to certify compliance by filing a status report within five

business days of the Court’s order and to promptly provide a copy of the

Court’s order to counsel for the Warden of the Cimarron Correctional Facility.

7 As to Petitioner’s request for EAJA fees, Petitioner must seek those

separately after a final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B); see also Daley v.

Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025) (interpreting “EAJA’s broad

language to unambiguously authorize fees in habeas actions challenging

immigration detention”).

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The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to

this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by August 3,

2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 686 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

72.8 The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely

objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate

review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United

States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation

disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the

captioned matter.

ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2026.

hea “ered _

SUZANNE MITCHELL

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

8 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has

reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation to three

days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition

(noting that rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas

corpus petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings

under Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484

F. App’x 227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases

may be applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that

“while the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas

proceedings, they need not be in every instance — particularly where strict

application would undermine the habeas review process.”).

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