Cobb

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Murray Cobb,

Plaintiff, NO. 1:24-CV-03707

v. Judge Edmond E. Chang

Lake County Sheriff’s Office, Lake County,

Illinois, John D. Idleburg in his official ca-

pacity, Richard Clouse in his official and per-

sonal capacity, Nicholas Kalfas, Timothy

Reidy, Jahaira Lopez, Wellpath, LLC, Nicho-

las Papanos, Kerry Ehlert-Donovan, Caro-

line Paull, Taryn Weiler, Ryan Sciame, Nich-

olas Fontana, and Baby Than,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Murray Cobb alleges that his due process rights were violated when he re-

ceived inadequate medical care as a pretrial detainee at Lake County Jail and

McHenry County Jail. R. 123, Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5, 118–57.1 Defendant Ryan

Sciame, Chief of Corrections for the McHenry County Jail, moves to dismiss the

claims against him. R. 131, Def.’s Mot. Because Cobb fails to plausibly allege that

Sciame acted objectively unreasonably, and in any event Sciame is alternatively en-

titled to qualified immunity, the motion is granted.

1Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,

a page or paragraph number. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case under

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343.

I. Background

For the purposes of these motions, the Court accepts as true the factual alle-

gations in Cobb’s Second Amended Complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in

his favor. McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 90 (2007) (per curiam)). The Court recites only the facts relevant

to Sciame.

In October 2022, Cobb suffered severe second-degree burns on approximately

10% of his body, his left arm, and the left side of his stomach and chest; the fire hap-

pened when Cobb was not in custody (it happened in his kitchen). Second Am. Compl.

¶ 49. He went to Vista Medical Center East for treatment, which referred him to Loy-

ola University Medical Center Burn Clinic. Id. ¶ 50. At the Burn Clinic, he received

skin grafts and had multiple follow-up appointments. Id. ¶ 51. Cobb initially experi-

enced severe, debilitating pain and discomfort from his burn wounds, and continues

to feel pain, itchiness, and discomfort. Id. ¶ 52.

In January 2023, Cobb was taken into custody and detained in Lake County

Jail. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 54. In December 2023, Cobb was taken to the Burn Clinic,

where he was treated by Nurse Paula Peterson. Id. ¶ 53, 91. She prescribed him pain

medication, lotions, and creams, and ordered that he receive laser treatment for ke-

loid scarring on his chest. Id. ¶ 91.

A couple of weeks later, in January 2024, Cobb was transferred to McHenry

County Jail. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 94. In April 2024, Cobb sent requests through the

detainee portal—called Medical Kites—asking the Jail to schedule his laser

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treatment. Id. ¶ 96; R. 123-5, Pl.’s Exh. 5, First 04/09/2024 Kite; R. 123-6, Pl.’s Exh.

6, Second 04/09/2024 Kite. Jail nurses responded that Cobb should wait to discuss

the issue with the Jail’s physician, Dr. Baby Than, at an upcoming appointment. Sec-

ond Am. Compl. ¶ 96; First 04/09/2024 Kite; Second 04/09/2024 Kite. The next week,

Cobb saw Dr. Than, who called the Burn Clinic and left a message for Nurse Peterson

about the laser treatment. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 97; R. 123-7, Pl.’s Exh. 7, 04/17/2024

Medical Note. Over the next few months, Cobb submitted multiple Medical Kites re-

questing an update on the scheduling of his laser treatment. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 98;

R. 123-8, Pl.’s Exh. 8, 04/18/2024 Kite; R. 123-9, Pl.’s Exh. 9, 04/22/2024 Kite; R. 123-

10, Pl.’s Exh. 10, 05/05/2024 Kite; R. 123-11, Pl.’s Exh. 11, 05/27/2024 Kite; R. 123-

12, Pl.’s Exh. 12, 06/09/2024 Kite. Different nurses responded that they did not have

further information, that Cobb could discuss the issue with Dr. Than or a nurse at

his next appointment, or that they would follow up about scheduling the treatment.

Second Am. Compl. ¶ 98; 04/18/2024 Kite; 04/22/2024 Kite; 05/05/2024 Kite;

05/27/2024 Kite; 06/09/2024 Kite.

Eventually, in June 2024, Nurse Nicholas Fontana added a note to Cobb’s med-

ical file stating that he had received a call from Nurse Baral at the Burn Clinic, who

provided an overview of Cobb’s case. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 100. Nurse Baral

advised that Cobb should follow up for “elective laser treatment.” Id. ¶ 100. Cobb says

that Nurse Fontana refused to schedule the laser treatment because it was inaccu-

rately characterized as “elective,” when it was actually necessary to relieve his pain

and discomfort. Id. ¶¶ 101–02.

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Cobb filed a grievance with the Jail asking to be taken to the Burn Clinic for

laser treatment, which was denied. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 106; R. 123-13, Pl.’s Exh.

13, Grievance. He appealed, and Chief of Corrections Sciame denied the appeal. Sec-

ond Am. Compl. ¶ 107; R. 123-14, Pl.’s Exh. 14, Grievance Appeal; R. 123-15, Pl.’s

Exh. 15, Sciame Letter. Sciame concluded that the appeal was unfounded because

Cobb’s “case ha[d] been reviewed by the Loyola Burn Center with [Jail] medical staff

and a treatment plan ha[d] been developed.” Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 107–08; Sciame

Letter. Sciame also noted that the laser treatment was elective. Second Am. Compl.

¶¶ 107–08; Sciame Letter.

Cobb was later transferred back to Lake County Jail, where he received laser

treatment. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 110, 112, 116.

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only

include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the de-

fendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up).2 The Seventh Circuit has

explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended

to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might

2This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,

and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,

18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).

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keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)). At the same time, the Su-

preme Court instructs that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible

claim for relief will … be a context-specific task.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679

(2009). The Seventh Circuit has drawn a context-dependent distinction between rel-

atively straightforward employment discrimination claims versus more complex

claims. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2010).

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police

of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). These allegations “must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,

rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

III. Analysis

Because Cobb was a pretrial detainee at McHenry County Jail, the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause governs his medical-care claim. Second Am.

Compl. ¶ 13; McGee v. Parsano, 55 F.4th 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2022). To adequately plead

a medical-care claim, a pretrial detainee must plausibly allege the defendant “did not

take reasonable available measures to abate the risk of serious harm to [the de-

tainee], even though reasonable officers under the circumstances would have

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understood the high degree of risk involved, making the consequences of the defend-

ant[’s] conduct obvious.” Zemlick v. Burkhart, 164 F.4th 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 2026)

(cleaned up). In other words, the detainee must plead that “a reasonable officer in the

defendant’s shoes would have recognized that the plaintiff was seriously ill or injured

and thus needed medical care.” Id. (cleaned up). Unlike Eighth Amendment claims

for post-sentencing prisoners, this inquiry is objective; “a plaintiff does not need to

[allege] subjective awareness of the risk of harm.” Id. (cleaned up).

Sciame argues that Cobb fails to state a plausible claim against him because,

based on the facts alleged, (1) Sciame did not personally interfere with Cobb’s care,

(2) it was objectively reasonable for Sciame to rely on the recommendations of medical

personnel, (3) Sciame is entitled to qualified immunity, and (4) Sciame’s actions did

not cause Cobb’s denial of medical care. R. 132, Def.’s Br. at 3–6.3 The Court addresses

each argument in turn.

The first argument is that Cobb does not allege that Sciame personally inter-

fered with Cobb’s medical care. Def.’s Br. at 3–5. “To face section 1983 liability, a

defendant must be personally (not vicariously) responsible for the deprivation of the

plaintiff’s constitutional right.” Zemlick, 164 F.4th at 1011. Supervisory officers like

Sciame “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn

a blind eye for fear of what they might see.” Id. (cleaned up). Cobb’s grievance appeal

3Sciame also argues that Cobb’s “group pleading” does not “establish what Sciame

himself did.” Def.’s Br. at 5–6. But the Second Amended Complaint clearly alleges that Sci-

ame denied Cobb’s grievance appeal. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 107–08.

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notified Sciame that he had not received laser treatment, and Sciame approved this

medical decision by denying the appeal. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 106–08; Grievance

Appeal; Sciame Letter. Cobb thus adequately pleads that Sciame was personally in-

volved in the alleged due process violation. See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 782

(7th Cir. 2015).4

Sciame next argues that it was not objectively unreasonable for him to deny

the grievance appeal based on the medical professionals’ determination that the laser

treatment was elective. Def.’s Br. at 5. “Although pretrial detainees have a right un-

der the Fourteenth Amendment to adequate medical care,” the Seventh Circuit has

“long recognized that correctional institutions typically engage in the division of labor

between medical professionals and other security and administrative staff.” McGee,

55 F.4th at 569 (cleaned up). “When detainees are under the care of medical experts,

non-medical jail staff may generally trust the professionals to provide appropriate

medical attention.” Id. (cleaned up). “An exception exists only if a jail official had

reason to know that the medical staff was failing to treat or inadequately treating an

inmate.” Id. (cleaned up).

4In arguing that he was not personally involved in any constitutional deprivation, Sci-

ame relies on inapposite cases. See Def.’s Br. at 4. For instance, he cites Burks v. Raemisch,

555 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2009), which held that a prison official was not deliberately indifferent

for responding to a grievance by directing medical personnel to provide the prisoner with

care, and denying another grievance as untimely. Id. at 595–96. But the Seventh Circuit

acknowledged that the official “played a[] personal role” in the case by reviewing the griev-

ances. Id. at 594.

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Here, even viewing the allegations in Cobb’s favor, it was objectively reasona-

ble for Sciame to defer to Nurse Fontana’s denial of the laser treatment. Based on the

allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, Sciame knew only that Cobb had

other treatments in place (pain medication, lotions, and creams), and that the recom-

mended laser treatment was elective. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91, 100, 106; 04/17/2024

Medical Note; Sciame Letter. Cobb contends that Nurse Peterson determined that

the treatment was necessary, not merely elective, and that Nurse Baral could not

override that determination because Baral had not personally examined Cobb. Sec-

ond Am. Compl. ¶ 101; R. 138, Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 6–7. But the actual grievance says

only that Cobb “was given a referral by burn specialist Paula Peterson, APN to have

laser [treatment] for keloid scar to chest [sic] for itching and pain.” Grievance; see

also Grievance Appeal (asking “to be taken to[] Loyola University Medical Burn Cen-

ter for keloid[] removal as referred by burn specialist Paula Peterson”). The grievance

and appeal do not dispute or address Nurse Baral’s characterization that the referral

was for an elective treatment. Thus, there are no facts to suggest that Sciame knew

that Nurse Peterson had previously determined that the treatment was necessary,

rather than elective (and by extension, that Sciame knew that Nurse Fontana was

inadequately treating Cobb by denying the laser treatment). Because the only infor-

mation Sciame had was that the current treatment plan was adequate and laser

treatment was elective, it was objectively reasonable for him to defer to Nurse Fon-

tana’s denial of the laser treatment.

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Even if the Court reads Cobb’s grievance and appeal generously to clearly in-

form Sciame that Nurse Peterson believed the treatment was not elective, Sciame’s

denial of the appeal would still have been objectively reasonable. Even in that sce-

nario, Sciame would have had two conflicting pieces of information from medical pro-

fessionals: a referral from Nurse Peterson that characterized the laser treatment as

necessary, and a statement from Nurse Baral that the treatment was elective. Both

nurses work at the Burn Clinic, and the more recent characterization came from

Nurse Baral. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 91, 100. It would not be objectively unrea-

sonable for a jail official in Sciame’s position to defer to the more recent characteriza-

tion from the same clinic, and thus conclude that laser treatment was unnecessary.

Cf. Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that jail med-

ical staff acted reasonably by prescribing non-narcotic pain medication to a detainee

based on his surgeon’s recommendation, even though the detainee’s other physician

had previously “followed a different court of treatment” by prescribing narcotics). Be-

cause Cobb fails to allege any facts that suggest Sciame’s denial of the grievance ap-

peal was objectively unreasonable, he does not plausibly state a Fourteenth Amend-

ment claim against Sciame.

In the alternative, at the very least, qualified immunity shields Sciame from

liability. “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions—like jail offi-

cials managing pre-trial detainees—are immune from civil liability …. Such officials

receive qualified immunity unless: (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitu-

tional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the

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time.” Zemlick, 164 F.4th at 1010 (cleaned up). As just described, Cobb does not plau-

sibly allege that Sciame violated his constitutional rights. But even if Cobb had met

that threshold, he must also defeat qualified immunity at the second step. See id.

“For a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must place the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” McGee, 55 F.4th at 572 (cleaned up). Specifi-

cally, “every reasonable officer must have understood that deferring to the judgment

of medical staff in these circumstances was unlawful.” Id.

Cobb cannot overcome qualified immunity at the second step. He identifies no

cases holding that a jail official violated a pretrial detainee’s constitutional rights in

similar factual circumstances. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 10–11 (citing general case law

about detainees’ rights to medical care); see also McGee, 55 F.4th at 572 (describing

how plaintiffs cannot “rel[y] on cherry-picked legal propositions about an inmate’s

constitutional entitlement to adequate medical care” to show that, under the partic-

ular facts of their case, a constitutional violation was clearly established). To the con-

trary, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that jail officials “are not constitution-

ally obligated to override the judgment of medical professionals unless they have rea-

son to know that an inmate is receiving inadequate treatment.” McGee, 55 F.4th at

573. And the Seventh Circuit has permitted jail officials to defer to medical staff un-

der circumstances where it was arguably much more obvious that the detainee re-

quired medical care. See id. at 574; see also Zemlick, 164 F.4th at 1013 (collecting

cases). Given the established law, reasonable officers in Sciame’s position would not

have understood that deferring to Nurse Fontana’s denial of the laser treatment was

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unlawful. Thus, it was not clearly established that Sciame would violate Cobb’s con-

stitutional rights by denying his grievance appeal. See Zemlick, 164 F.4th at 1013–

14. Cobb cannot overcome qualified immunity, which is an independent basis to grant

Sciame’s motion to dismiss.

Lastly, Sciame argues that Cobb fails to allege causation because the Jail’s

health services “had already classified” the laser treatment as elective, and Sciame’s

grievance appeal denial “could not have changed that classification.” Def.’s Br. at 6.

But it is plausible that if Sciame, the Chief of Corrections, had granted the appeal

and ordered the medical staff to provide the laser treatment, they would have done

so, regardless of its classification in Cobb’s medical records. Still, because the Court

grants the motion to dismiss on other grounds, there is no need to opine on this issue

further.

IV. Conclusion

The motion to dismiss the claims against Sciame, R. 131, is granted. For now,

the dismissal is without prejudice, and Cobb may file a Third Amended Complaint to

fix the deficiencies (if possible) by September 11, 2026. If no amended pleading is filed

by that deadline, then the dismissal will convert to a dismissal with prejudice without

further order of the Court.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang

Honorable Edmond E. Chang

United States District Judge

DATE: August 28, 2026

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