Bridges

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ANDRE BRIDGES, # M44731, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00010-MAB

)

JUSTIN KULICH, )

MATTHEW DULANEY, )

MARSHALL ANDERSON, )

SHANE SULSER, )

AARON TAYLOR, )

VINCENT KIEFER, and )

TREVOR ROWLAND, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue

of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies filed by Defendants Kulich, Dulaney, Sulser,

Taylor, Kiefer, and Rowland (Doc. 39). Plaintiff did not file a response to the motion

within the timeframe for doing so. Consequently, Plaintiff’s failure to respond to

Defendant’s motion is deemed an admission that Defendants’ version of the facts is true.

SDIL-LR 56.1(g). And, for the reasons outlined below, the Motion for Summary Judgment

on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 39) will be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Andre Bridges is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center

(Doc. 42). He filed this pro se civil action for alleged violations of his constitutional rights,

on December 20, 2022 (See Doc. 1, p. 14). Following preliminary review of the Complaint

(Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff was permitted to proceed on the following

claims (Doc. 12, pp. 4-6):

Count 1: Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against

Defendants Kulich, Dulaney, Anderson, Sulser, Taylor, and

Kiefer for spraying Plaintiff with pepper spray, and

sexually and physically assaulting him on December 20,

2022.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs claim against Defendants Kulich, Dulaney,

Anderson, Sulser, Taylor, Kiefer, and Rowland for delaying

and/or denying Plaintiff medical attention for the injuries

he sustained from the assaults of December 20, 2022.

On November 24, 2025, Defendants Kulich, Dulaney, Sulser, Taylor, Kiefer, and

Rowland filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of

Administrative Remedies (Doc. 39). Defendants, after being prompted by the Court, filed

their Rule 56 Notice on December 2, 2026 informing Plaintiff of the consequences of

failing to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment (See Docs. 40, 41). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s response was due on or before January 2, 2026. Plaintiff, however, did not file

a response within the timeframe allotted.1 On March 23, 2026, nearly three months after

his response was originally due, Plaintiff sought an extension of time to respond to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, claiming that his access to the law library

and legal resources was limited and that he did not have the necessary documents from

1 Plaintiff did demonstrate he was able to communicate with the Court during this timeframe, filing a notice

with the Court of a change in his address (See Doc. 42). However, Plaintiff did not indicate in this filing that

he needed any additional time to respond to the Defendants’ Motion or was having difficulty preparing a

response.

another prison (Doc. 48). Defendants responded, with documentation, demonstrating

that Plaintiff made no such requests to use the law library and that Plaintiff could access

legal material from his tablet (Doc. 50). In light of the Defendants’ response, the Court

denied Plaintiff’s much belated request for an extension of time, finding that Plaintiff

failed to demonstrate good cause or excusable neglect to justify an extension after missing

his deadline by nearly three months (Doc. 52).

FACTS

In this case, Plaintiff’s failure to respond to Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is deemed an admission that Defendant’s version of the facts is true. SDIL-LR

56.1(g) (“All material facts set forth in a Statement of Material Facts . . . shall be deemed

admitted for purposes of summary judgment unless specifically disputed.”). The Court

thus credits Defendant’s uncontroverted facts so long as they are properly supported by

evidence in the record. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2); Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 667 F.3d 877,

884 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).

Relevant Grievances

According to the grievance records, Plaintiff filed two grievances shortly after the

incident at issue in his Complaint (See Doc. 39-2). The next grievance Plaintiff filed was a

year later and was wholly unrelated to this case (Id. at p. 2). Accordingly, the following

two grievances are the relevant grievances for the Court’s analysis: Grievance No. 383-1-

23, dated December 27, 2022 (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7; Doc. 39-1, pp. 38-39); and Grievance No.

168-1-23, dated January 13, 2023 (Doc. 1, pp. 9-10; Doc. 39-1, pp. 41-42). The Court will

discuss each of these grievances in turn.

Grievance No. 383-1-23

In this grievance dated December 27, 2022, Plaintiff describes the alleged excessive

force and sexual assault of December 20, 2022 (Count 1), by unknown officers in tactical

uniforms (Doc. 1, p. 6, 39-1, pp. 38-39; 39-2, p. 1). Plaintiff also grieves the unknown

officers’ refusal to provide him any medical attention, despite his numerous request (Id.)

(Count 2). The counselor’s response to Plaintiff’s grievance is dated May 2, 2023 (Id.). The

IGRV records indicate the counselor’s response was returned to Plaintiff on May 9, 2023

(Doc. 39-2, p. 1). The counselor’s response to Plaintiff’s grievance noted the incident had

already been investigated and deemed unsubstantiated by IA (Internal Affairs), and

Plaintiff was seen for x-rays in January 2023 (Doc. 1, p. 6; Doc. 39-1, pp. 38-39). According

to the IGRV log, this grievance was never submitted by Plaintiff for second level review

to the grievance office (See Doc. 39-2, p.1). The IGRV log also indicates that Plaintiff failed

to submit this grievance to the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) for further review

(Id.). The grievance was stamped “Received” by the Administrative Review Board

(“ARB”) on May 23, 2023 (Doc. 1, p. 6; Doc. 39-1, pp. 38-39). The ARB returned the

grievance on June 5, 2023, noting “Additional information required” and instructing

Plaintiff to provide a copy of the response to his grievance, including the grievance

officer’s and CAO’s response (Doc. 1, p. 8; Doc. 39-1, p. 37). However, there is no

documentation in the record indicating that Plaintiff ever resubmitted any of these

materials to the ARB.2

Grievance No. 168-1-23

Plaintiff dated this grievance January 13, 2023 and marked it as an emergency. In

it, he states that he wrote a grievance on December 27 concerning a PREA incident where

he was sexually assaulted by a staff member and complaining he had been retaliated

against since making that report (Doc. 1, p. 9; Doc. 39-1, p. 41). Plaintiff requested an

investigation and restoration of his yard and TV privileges (Id.). The CAO deemed the

grievance a non-emergency on January 18, 2023. Id. A counselor’s response dated

February 24, 2023 noted that Plaintiff’s TV had been returned and his yard privileges

restored. Id. The counselor’s response was returned to Plaintiff on March 1, 2023 (Doc.

39-2, p. 1). After receiving the counselor’s response, Plaintiff failed to submit this

grievance for second level review to grievance officer or the CAO (Doc. 39-2, p.1). 3 It

appears Plaintiff again appealed this grievance straight to the ARB. On May 23, 2023 the

ARB received Plaintiff’s grievance and on June 1, 2023, the ARB determined the grievance

was not submitted in the proper timeframe and found there was no justification for

additional consideration (Doc. 1, p. 12; Doc. 39-1, p. 40).

2 This makes sense because the IGRV records make clear that Plaintiff never pursued this grievance further

to the grievance officer or CAO after receiving the counselor’s response.

3 Plaintiff attached a Memorandum from Warden Anthony Wills dated February 27, 2023 to his Complaint

(Doc. 1, p. 11). However, this Memorandum is a response to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”)

investigation conducted as a result of Plaintiff’s allegations made on January 9, 2023. Although the

allegations that were investigated appear to be the same conduct at issue in Plaintiff’s grievance, the PREA

investigation is separate and apart from the grievance process and the Court cannot construe it as a CAO

response to Grievance 168-1-23. And even if the Court did construe it as such, the evidence still

demonstrates that Plaintiff never submitted this grievance to the grievance officer, which is the required

second step in the grievance process.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s task is to view the record

and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party

and decide if there is a genuine material dispute of fact. Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources,

Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2021); Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 763 F.3d 832,

836 (7th Cir. 2014). In instances like this, where “a nonmovant fails to respond to a motion

for summary judgment, the movant ‘still ha[s] to show that summary judgment was

proper given the undisputed facts,’ with those facts taken as usual in the light most

favorable to the nonmovant.” Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 543 (7th Cir. 2011)).

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner may not file a

lawsuit about prison conditions unless and until he has exhausted all available

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir.

2008). “The exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense, which the defendants bear

the burden of proving.” Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Crouch

v. Brown, 27 F.4th 1315, 1320 (7th Cir. 2022). In order for a prisoner to properly exhaust

his administrative remedies, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the place,

and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d

1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the

administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 1024. Exhaustion must

be fully completed before the prisoner files suit; a case filed while a grievance appeal is

still ongoing is premature and must be dismissed without prejudice. Chambers v. Sood,

956 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).

Because Plaintiff was an IDOC inmate when he filed this action, he was required

to follow the grievance process set forth in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 ILL.

ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017). Under IDOC’s procedure, an inmate initiates a

grievance with his counselor, and he may then submit his grievance to a grievance officer

at his facility, and to the CAO at his facility. “A grievance must be filed...within 60 days

after the discovery of the incident, occurrence or problem that gives rise to the grievance.”

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). A grievance must “contain factual details regarding

each aspect of the offender’s complaint, including what happened, when, where, and the

name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.”

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). If the prisoner does not know a person’s name, he “must

include as much descriptive information about the individual as possible.” Id. If an

inmate is unsatisfied with the outcome at the facility, he must appeal to the ARB within

30 days. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). Only after a grievance is reviewed by the ARB

is it deemed exhausted. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023-24.

An inmate is required to exhaust only those administrative remedies that are

available to him. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016). Administrative remedies

become “unavailable” when prison officials fail to respond to a properly filed inmate

grievance or when prison employees thwart a prisoner from exhausting. Lewis v.

Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002); Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.

Here, with respect to Grievance No. 383-1-23, the counselor’s response to Plaintiff

is dated May 2, 2023 (Doc. 1, p. 6, 39-1, pp. 38-29; 39-2, p. 1). The IGRV records indicate

the response was returned to Plaintiff on May 9, 2026 (Doc. 39-2, p. 1). The undisputed

evidence before the Court demonstrates that Plaintiff did not pursue this grievance to

second level review with the grievance officer, as he was required to do (Doc. 39-2, p. 1).

Instead, once Plaintiff received a response from his counselor, he appealed straight to the

ARB, which returned his grievance, instructing him to resubmit the grievance with the

grievance officer’s response and CAO’s response, which Plaintiff failed to do (Doc. 39-1,

p. 37). In short, Plaintiff skipped two critical steps in the grievance process, which is fatal.4

With respect to Grievance 168-1-23, Plaintiff dated this grievance January 13, 2023,

marked it as an emergency, but the CAO deemed the grievance a non-emergency on

January 18, 2023 (Doc. 1, p. 9; Doc. 39-1, p. 41). The counselor’s response to Plaintiff’s

grievance is dated February 24, 2023 (Id.). The IGRV records indicate the counselor’s

response was returned to Plaintiff on March 1, 2023 (Doc. 39-2, p. 1). Again here, the

undisputed evidence before the Court is that Plaintiff again failed to pursue this

grievance to the grievance officer and the CAO (Doc. 39-2, p.1), thus missing critical steps

4 Although the approximate four-month delay in the counselor’s response raises an eyebrow, Plaintiff did

ultimately receive a response to Grievance No. 383-1-23. Plaintiff waited for that response, received it, but

simply took the wrong step in appealing the grievance straight to the ARB rather than the grievance office,

as he was required to do. Moreover, Plaintiff filed a subsequent grievance on January 13, 2023 (Grievance

No. 168-1-23) while he was awaiting a response to his first grievance and the counselor responded to that

grievance on February 24, 2023 (Doc. 39-1, p. 41). The counselor’s response was returned to Plaintiff on

March 1, 2023 (Doc. 39-2, p. 1).

in the grievance process. Instead, Plaintiff appealed this grievance straight to the ARB on

May 23, 2023. The ARB determined the grievance was not submitted in the proper

timeframe and found there was no justification for additional consideration (Doc. 1, p.

12; Doc. 39-1, p. 40). Granted, it might have made more sense had the ARB simply denied

Grievance 168-1-23 for the same reasons it denied Plaintiff’s other relevant grievance: i.e.

that it did not contain the grievance officer’s and CAO’s response (Compare Doc. 39-1, p.

37 with 39-1, p. 40). However, the Court does not believe this is of consequence because

the record before the Court clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff failed to follow all of the

necessary steps in the grievance process before appealing his grievance to the ARB. In

other words, Plaintiff’s grievance was procedurally deficient and could not be addressed

by the ARB on the merits.

In sum, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff skipped two critical

steps in the grievance process, which is fatal. After receiving the counselor’s response,

Plaintiff appealed each of the two relevant grievances straight to the ARB. Plaintiff was

required to appeal each of these grievances to the grievance officer and then to the CAO

before appealing to the ARB. Because Plaintiff failed to follow the necessary steps, he did

not fully exhaust his claims with respect to the Defendants. Accordingly, the Motion for

Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion (Doc. 39) will be GRANTED.

DISPOSITION

The Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative

Remedies filed by Kulich, Dulaney, Sulser, Taylor, Kiefer, and Rowland (Doc. 39) is

GRANTED. Defendants Justin Kulich, Matthew Dulaney, Shane Sulser, Aaron Taylor,

Vincent Kiefer, and Trevor Rowland are DISMISSED from this action without prejudice

for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claims against

them.

As of the date of this Order, Defendant Anderson has not yet submitted a motion

for summary judgment on the matter of exhaustion, in accordance with the Initial

Scheduling and Discovery Order (Doc. 35, pp. 5-6; see also Docs. 57, 58). If Anderson files

such a motion, Plaintiff will have 30 days to respond or to ask the Court for more time to

do so (Doc. 35, p. 5).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 28, 2026

Pak be Bray

MARK □□ BEATTY

United States Magistrate Judge

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