The opinion
Filed 7/30/26 Modified and Certified for Pub. 8/28/26 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, B336981 c/w B340065
(Los Angeles County Super.
Petitioner and Appellant; Ct. No. 22STCP03070)
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
WORKERS, LOCAL 18,
Real Party in Interest and
Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
STATE, COUNTY AND
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES et al.,
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent;
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent.
APPEALS from a judgment and an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Curtis A. Kin, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded.
Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard, David W. Tyra
and Alec D. Tyra for Petitioner and Appellant.
Schwartz, Steinsapir, Dohrmann & Sommers and Daniel E.
Curry for Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
Rothner, Segall & Greenstone, Hannah Weinstein and
Julia Harumi Mass for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
_________________________
Beginning in 1980 the Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power (DWP) and the City of Los Angeles (City) maintained
a reciprocal retirement benefits arrangement (Reciprocity or the
Reciprocal Arrangement). This arrangement allowed employees
transferring between DWP and the City to carry their pension
service credits between the two retirement systems. In 2010,
DWP decided to withdraw from Reciprocity. In 2013 the City
then adopted Ordinance No. 182824 (the 2013 Ordinance), which
suspended the Reciprocal Arrangement.
City employees and their unions1 (collectively the Coalition)
filed an unfair labor relations practice claim before the
1 The Coalition of City of Los Angeles Unions, which
represents current and former City employees whose retirement
benefits are administered by the Los Angeles City Employees’
Retirement System, consists of: American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, District Council 36 and its
Local Unions 741, 901, 2006, 2626, 3090, and 3672; Service
Employees International Union, Local 721; Laborer’s
2
Los Angeles Employees Relations Board (ERB). The Coalition
alleged the City failed to bargain or meet and confer with the
Coalition over the suspension of the Reciprocal Arrangement.
The ERB agreed the City violated its duty to engage in “effects
bargaining” regarding possible ways to mitigate the effects of the
suspension of the Reciprocal Arrangement. The ERB ordered the
City to bargain with the Coalition and to make whole Coalition-
represented employees who sustained losses, including reduced
pension or other benefits, resulting from the City’s unilateral
implementation of the suspension, until the City had satisfied its
obligation to bargain. The trial court then denied the City’s
petition for writ of mandate challenging the ERB’s order and
granted the Coalition’s petition seeking to enforce it.
The City does not dispute that it had a duty to bargain over
the effects of ending Reciprocity. Instead, it challenges only the
remedy ordered by the ERB. It argues the ERB lacked authority
to order make-whole relief and, even if it possessed that
authority, fashioned an improper remedy that failed to restore
the parties to the status quo existing when the City’s bargaining
obligation arose. The City further contends the ERB’s order is
vague and overbroad, and violates separation-of-powers
principles. Finally, it challenges the trial court’s postjudgment
award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5. We affirm.
International Union of North America, Local 777; Los Angeles
and Orange County Building & Construction Trades Council;
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 501; and
Teamsters Union, Local 911.
3
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Different Los Angeles City Retirement Plans and the
Reciprocal Arrangement
The City provides retirement benefits to its employees
through different retirement systems, two of which are relevant
here. One is the Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement System
(LACERS), for most City officers and employees. (Los Angeles
City Charter, §§ 500, 1102, subd. (a), 1150.)2 The Los Angeles
City Council (City Council) has authority to establish or modify
LACERS benefits under the procedures set forth in the Charter.
(Charter, § 1168.) The terms of the LACERS plan are codified in
the Los Angeles Administrative Code.3 (Charter, § 1150,
subd. (b).)
The DWP provides retirement benefits through the Water
and Power Employees’ Retirement Plan (WPERP). (Charter,
§ 603.) WPERP operates autonomously, with an independent
source of funding and a separate budget. (Charter § 603.) Like
the City with respect to LACERS, DWP has authority to modify
WPERP benefits, and the WPERP Board of Administration
manages and administers the plan and its funds. (Charter,
§§ 1102, subd. (c), 1104, subd. (c), 1106, 1186.)
Beginning around 1980, LACERS and WPERP entered into
an arrangement governing the transfer of retirement benefits
between the two systems. In January 1980, the City Council
enacted former section 4.1060 to implement the arrangement
between LACERS and WPERP. This code section was later
2 Charter references are to the Los Angeles City Charter.
3 Undesignated section references are to the Los Angeles
Administrative Code.
4
renumbered without substantive change as section 4.1095.
Under this arrangement, employees transferring between DWP
and any City department (in either direction) could transfer their
employee pension contributions and interest on those
contributions to the new retirement system. The receiving
retirement system treated the transferring employees as if they
had spent their entire City career under that retirement system.
Both LACERS and WPERP are defined-benefit plans that
calculate retirement benefits based on an employee’s years of
service, compensation, and a multiplier. (§§ 4.1005, 4.1007,
4.1080.7.) As a result, the number of years of credited service
directly affects the amount of an employee’s pension. Reciprocity
allowed the employee to transfer credit for years of employment
from one system to another, thereby increasing the employee’s
pension.
The Reciprocal Arrangement contemplated that both
LACERS and WPERP would participate. Specifically,
section 4.1095, subdivision (k), reads: “Reciprocity of Benefit
Provisions and Conditions Affecting this Section. It is the
intent and purpose of this section to provide, or help to provide,
portability between the LACERS and the WPERP. The
achievement of complete portability of benefits is dependent upon
appropriate action by the governing body of the WPERP. Should
the implementation of any provisions of this section be possible
only if some specific action is taken by the WPERP, then, and as
to such provisions only, the effect of this section shall be
suspended until appropriate action has been taken by the
WPERP.”
5
B. WPERP’s Suspension of the Reciprocal Arrangement and
the 2013 Ordinance
In 2010 the WPERP Board commissioned a study of
Reciprocity that determined more employees transferred from the
City to DWP than in the opposite direction, increasing WPERP’s
unfunded liability by approximately $183 million. The WPERP
Board voted to suspend Reciprocity. The City Council voted to
veto WPERP’s changes, which led to litigation about whether
WPERP needed the approval of the City Council to change this
aspect of its retirement plan. (Romero, et al. v. City Council of the
City of Los Angeles, etc., et al., LASC Case No. BC449834
(Romero).) The Coalition was not a party to the Romero
litigation. Only the City, the DWP, and International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 18 (Local 18), the union
representing employees who receive their retirement benefits
from WPERP, were parties to the Romero litigation.
That litigation ultimately resulted in a settlement that was
finalized on November 18, 2013. The City agreed to suspend
Reciprocity so that “each retirement plan (WPERP and LACERS)
will be fiscally responsible only for the years of service and final
average salary the member earned while a member of that
retirement plan.” The City would continue to recognize WPERP
service only to determine retirement eligibility, consistent with
Internal Revenue Service regulations.
In October and November 2013 the City Attorney sent to
the City Council drafts of an ordinance to amend the provisions of
the Administrative Code governing LACERS “to suspend
reciprocity … and to make related changes.” The City Attorney
advised that the proposed ordinance “changes retirement
benefits.” The amendments provided that retirement benefits
6
would be calculated based only on service in LACERS-covered
positions, while WPERP service would count only for the purpose
of determining an employee’s eligibility to retire.
On November 7, 2013, the Coalition notified the City’s
Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) that, under state law and the
City’s Employee Relations Ordinance (ERO; § 4.800 et seq.), the
City was required to bargain over the suspension of Reciprocity.
The next day the City Council directed the CAO to meet with the
Coalition. The CAO took the position that the City would provide
information and answer questions but had no duty to formally
meet and confer. (In the later proceedings before the ERB, the
City conceded its duty to bargain arose no later than November 7,
2013, when the proposed ordinance was introduced and the
Coalition demanded bargaining.) On December 9, 2013, the
Coalition sent a follow-up letter identifying what it understood to
be the effects of suspending Reciprocity on its members.
On December 10, 2013, the City Council adopted the
2013 Ordinance, effective January 1, 2014, “to suspend
reciprocity between the Los Angeles City Employees’ Retirement
System and Water and Power Employees’ Retirement Plan, and
to make related changes.” Under the Ordinance, LACERS no
longer credited prior WPERP service when calculating retirement
benefits, except to determine retirement eligibility (i.e., that
employees have worked enough years to qualify for retirement).
The 2013 Ordinance allows employees moving from a
WPERP-covered position to a LACERS-covered position to
“purchase” their WPERP service for LACERS purposes, so that
their retirement benefits are based on the aggregate of their
LACERS-covered and WPERP-covered service. (See § 4.1020.1.)
To do so, the employee must pay both the employee and employer
7
contributions that would have been made to LACERS during the
period of WPERP employment. (Ibid.) For example, an employee
earning $100,000 annually who seeks to purchase two years of
WPERP service would have to pay LACERS $60,000. (Ibid.) The
City stipulated that a Senior Clerk Typist who worked 15 years
in a LACERS-covered position, transferred to a WPERP-covered
position for 15 years, and then retired would receive $16,195.16
less annually under the 2013 Ordinance than under Reciprocity,
and $12,426.71 less than if the employee had remained in a
LACERS-covered position.
C. The Coalition Files Unfair Employee Relations Practice
Charges Against the City Before the ERB
In the City of Los Angeles, the ERO, section 4.800 et seq. of
the Los Angeles Administrative Code, governs labor relations
between the City and its employees. The ERO requires the City
to meet and confer with employee organizations over wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and makes
it an unfair employee relations practice to fail to do so. (See
§§ 4.830, subd. (a), 4.860, subd (a)(3).) The ERO also established
the ERB, the City administrative agency responsible for resolving
labor disputes. (See § 4.810(a).) Section 4.810, subdivision (f), of
the ERO identifies the ERB’s “powers and duties.” The list
contains nine subdivisions. Relevant here, subdivision (f)(4)
states one of the ERB’s powers is “[t]o investigate and determine
the validity of charges of unfair employee relations practices, to
make findings, and to issue orders to cease and desist which are
not in conflict with other provisions of law.” Subdivision (f)(12)
states the ERB also has the power “[t]o perform such other duties
as may be necessary to carry out the Board’s responsibilities
under the provisions of this chapter.”
8
On November 21, 2013, the Coalition filed unfair employee
relations practice charges against the City before the ERB based
on the City’s refusal to bargain over the suspension of
Reciprocity. The Coalition alleged the City “violated its duty to
negotiate in good faith” with the Coalition “before taking
unilateral action to implement changes in reciprocity, retirement
benefits, retiree medical benefits, and transfer and promotion
rights.” It alleged these actions violated sections 4.830,
subdivision (a), 4.857, and 4.860, subdivisions (a)(1) and (3), and
constituted unfair employee relations practices. As remedies, the
Coalition sought: “an order directing that the City (a) cease and
desist from its refusal to meet and confer with the Coalitions
Unions concerning matters within the scope of representation,
including reciprocity between the LACERS and WPERP and the
benefits resulting from reciprocity; (b) cease and desist from its
implementation of, and immediately rescind and give no effect to,
any other unilateral changes in retirement and retiree medical
benefits and/or transfer and promotion rights of the employee
classifications represented by the Coalitions Unions; (c) cease and
desist from any other efforts to modify retirement benefits and/or
transfer rights for represented classifications without meeting
and conferring with the Coalition Unions; (d) cease and desist
from interfering with, denying or violating rights protected by the
ERO; (e) make whole any employee for losses resulting from the
City’s unlawful actions as alleged herein; and (f) post notices
stating that the City has violated the ERO.”
D. The Hearing Officer’s Findings
An ERB-appointed hearing officer conducted a series of
evidentiary hearings culminating in three reports. The hearing
officer concluded the City violated the ERO by failing to meet and
9
confer and bargain over the effects of ending Reciprocity, but not
the decisions to withdraw its opposition to WPERP’s suspension
of Reciprocity in the Romero litigation and to end Reciprocity by
adopting the 2013 Ordinance.4 He found the City had some
discretion over how the suspension of Reciprocity would be
implemented and was obligated to negotiate with the affected
employees on these issues. For instance, the end of Reciprocity
affected not only WPERP service credit, but also related issues
such as retiree health subsidies and protected leave.
With respect to the remedy, the hearing officer concluded
that “restoring the status quo ante” was not appropriate because
“such an order would require the City to do more than the City
was ever required to do,” and WPERP was not a party to the
proceedings and could not be compelled to participate. Although
a complete restoration of the pre-Romero system was therefore
impracticable, the hearing officer concluded the City’s “blatant
disregard” of its bargaining obligation required a remedy that
would “empower the Coalition to bargain for benefits that are
equivalent to what existed prior to the mess that followed
WPERP’s decision to end the statutory reciprocity scheme.” He
stated, “Here, that means a bargaining order and a make-whole
remedy for any employee who can show a loss of income, pension,
or other benefits as a consequence of the City’s violation of its
bargaining obligation.” At the same time, he “reject[ed] the
4 He also noted the City had an independent obligation to
bargain with the Coalition Unions over the implementation of the
terms of the settlement agreement in the Romero litigation
because the Coalition’s memorandum of understanding had a
requirement that the City bargain over changes in pension
benefits.
10
Coalition’s request that the Board declare various provisions in
the Administrative Code void and unenforceable.”
E. The ERB’s Final Decision and Order
In June 2022, the ERB issued its final decision and order.
With limited exceptions, the ERB adopted the hearing officer’s
“factual findings, reasoning, and legal conclusions.” It agreed the
City had no duty to bargain over the City’s decision to withdraw
its opposition to WPERP’s decision to suspend Reciprocity. It
also concluded “the City was obligated under … [s]ection 4.1095,
as it existed prior to January 1, 2014, to stop counting employees’
prior WPERP service for LACERS benefit purposes when
WPERP suspended reciprocity,” but the City still had a duty to
bargain the effects of the end of Reciprocity.
In adopting the hearing officer’s reasoning and
recommendations regarding a make-whole remedy, the ERB
emphasized a make-whole remedy in an effects bargaining case
like this one should be of limited duration, with the make-whole
remedy ending when the bargaining process ends.
The ERB ordered the City to:
• “meet and confer in good faith with the Coalition about
the effects of WPERP’s suspension of reciprocity,”
including:
o “Whether and, if so, how WPERP service should be
counted by LACERS in determining eligibility for
disability retirement and the amount of disability
allowance;”
o “Whether and, if so, how prior WPERP years of
service should be recognized by LACERS for Benefits
purposes;”
11
o “How the LACERS retiree health subsidy should be
treated for individuals transferring from LACERS to
WPERP covered positions;”
o “How long employees in WPERP positions who are on
protected leave from LACERS positions should have
to decide on returning to LACERS positions;” and
o “Whether and how the end of reciprocity impacted
transfers.”
• “make whole Coalition-represented employees who have
sustained any losses (including a reduced pension or
other benefits) due to unilateral changes implemented
on or after January 1, 2014 to the manner in which
WPERP years of service are treated or who sustain any
such losses in the future ... from the date any impacted
employee began to experience harm (i.e., January 1,
2014) until the earliest of:
o the date the Parties have ceased negotiating because
they have reached agreement as part of complying
with this Order;
o the date the Parties have reached impasse and
exhausted any post-impasse procedures that may be
required or agreed upon; or
o failure by the Coalition to request bargaining or to
bargain in good faith as a part of complying with this
Order;” and
• “cease and desist from enforcing or otherwise applying
against Coalition-represented employees the
Los Angeles Administrative Code provisions that
address, for any purpose, how to treat periods of service
with WPERP for employees who move from a WPERP-
12
covered position to a LACERS-covered position on or
after January 1, 2014 until the earliest occurrence of”
the conditions described regarding the parties’
bargaining obligations above.
F. The Trial Court Proceedings
In August 2022 the City filed a petition for writ of mandate
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. The City did not
challenge the ERB’s determination that it violated the ERO by
failing to bargain over the effects of ending Reciprocity. Instead,
it challenged only the ERB’s remedial order, arguing the ERB
lacked authority to order make-whole relief and that the directive
the City cease and desist from enforcing provisions of the
Administrative Code exceeded the ERB’s authority, was
unsupported by its findings, and was impermissibly overbroad.
The Coalition filed a cross-petition under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1085, seeking an order requiring the City to
comply with the ERB’s order.5
In November 2023 the trial court denied the City’s petition
and granted the Coalition’s. The court concluded that
section 4.810, subdivision (f)(12), of the ERO—which authorizes
the ERB to “perform such other duties as may be necessary to
carry out [its] responsibilities”—empowered the ERB to order
make-whole relief. It further determined make-whole relief was
an appropriate remedy for an effects-bargaining violation. The
5 Local 18 also filed a cross-petition under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5, making many of the same arguments
as the City in challenging the ERB’s decision. On appeal, Local
18 joins in the City’s arguments and otherwise does not advance
any of its own arguments.
13
court rejected the City’s separation-of-powers challenge,
reasoning the ERB’s order did not compel legislative action and
that section 4.1095, subdivision (k), did not “expressly restrict the
City’s ability to credit WPERP service” going forward. Finally,
the court determined the ERB’s cease-and-desist order was not
overbroad or vague.
The court also granted the Coalition’s motion for attorney
fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
The City timely appealed both the judgment denying its
writ petition and the order awarding attorney fees.
DISCUSSION
A. Effects Bargaining and the ERB’s Exclusive Authority over
Alleged Labor Law Violations by the City
The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code
section 3500 et seq., governs collective bargaining for local
government employees in California. (County of Los Angeles v.
Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th
905, 915-916 (County of Los Angeles); Singletary v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 18 (2012)
212 Cal.App.4th 34, 41 (Singletary).) “[T]he MMBA imposes
‘mandatory bargaining requirements’ for employer actions within
the ‘scope of representation,’ i.e., with ‘significant effect on the
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” of
the bargaining-unit employees.’ [Citations.] This duty to bargain
requires the public employer ‘ “to refrain from making unilateral
changes in wages and working conditions until the employer and
employee association have bargained to impasse.” ’ ” (Los Angeles
County Prof. Peace Officers Assn. v. County of Los Angeles (2026)
14
119 Cal.App.5th 1091, 1098-1099 (Los Angeles County Prof. Peace
Officers).)
“Employers are also required to bargain over the effects
and implementation of changes that fall outside the scope of
representation but have reasonably foreseeable impacts on issues
within the scope of representation.” (Trustees of California State
University v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 90, 103; accord, Los Angeles County Prof. Peace
Officers, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096, fn. 1 [“ ‘Effects
bargaining’ refers to an employer’s duty under the [MMBA] to
‘bargain regarding the “effects of a decision that has a foreseeable
effect on matters within the scope of representation, even where
the decision itself is not negotiable.” ’ ”]; see International Assn. of
Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment
Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 276-277; Stationary
Engineers Local 39 v. City of Sacramento (2013) PERB Dec.
No. 2351-M, p. 47 [even for employer actions not within the scope
of representation, employer has a duty to bargain “before
implementing a new or changed policy” that will “hav[e] a
foreseeable effect on matters within the scope of
representation”].) In this event, “the employer must provide
notice and an opportunity to meet and confer after it has reached
a firm decision but before the decision is implemented.”
(Trustees, at p. 104.) “[M]atters deemed subject to effects
bargaining include severance pay, vacation pay, seniority, and
pensions.” (Claremont Police Officers Assn. v. City of Claremont
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 623, 634.) As stated, the City does not
challenge the ERB’s determination that it violated its obligation
to bargain with the Coalition regarding the effects of the
suspension of Reciprocity.
15
In most parts of California, unions bring labor law
violations under the MMBA, such as violations of the obligation
to bargain, before the California Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB) (Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (b)), and PERB is
“ ‘vested with the authority to interpret … the MMBA’ ”
(Singletary, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 42, fn. 6). However, the
MMBA carves out an exception for the City: “the employee
relations commissions established by, and in effect for … the City
of Los Angeles pursuant to [Government Code] Section 3507,”
i.e., the ERB, has “the power and responsibility to take actions on
… all unfair practices [committed by the City], and to issue
determinations and orders as [the ERB] deem[s] necessary,
consistent with and pursuant to the policies of” the MMBA. (Gov.
Code, § 3509, subd. (d); see Singletary, at p. 40, fn. 4.)6
Accordingly, the ERB, not PERB, has jurisdiction over the City’s
labor law violations, but, as the City acknowledges, the ERB’s
6 “Section 3507, subdivision (a) [of the Government Code]
authorizes public agencies to adopt rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of the MMBA, and in 1971, the City
adopted [the ERO] for this purpose.” (Singletary, supra,
212 Cal.App.4th at p. 39.) As discussed, the ERO created the
ERB and authorized it to, among other things, determine the
validity of charges of unfair employee relations practices. (ERO,
§ 4.800; City of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles Employee
Relations Bd. (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 150, 159-160.) In 1968 Los
Angeles County created its own employee relations commissions
called the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission
(ERCOM) that has the exclusive authority to implement the
MMBA for Los Angeles County agencies. (Gov. Code, § 3509,
subd. (d); City of Los Angeles, at p. 159.) Thus, the MMBA carves
out exceptions for both the City and the County of Los Angeles.
(Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (d); Singletary, at p. 43.)
16
orders must be consistent with the policies of the MMBA as
interpreted and administered by PERB. (See County of
Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 917 [discussing parallel
exception for ERCOM in Los Angeles County].) “ ‘The MMBA
deals with a matter of statewide concern, and its standards may
not be undercut by contradictory rules or procedures that would
frustrate its purposes. [Citations.] Local regulation is permitted
only if “consistent with the purposes of the MMBA.” ’ ” (Id. at
pp. 923-925.)
B. Standard of Review
“ ‘In reviewing a trial court’s judgment on a petition for
writ of mandate, the appellate court is required to exercise
independent judgment on legal issues.’ ” (Los Angeles County
Prof. Peace Officers, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099.) “A court
exercises its independent judgment reviewing an agency’s
interpretation of the law, applying any appropriate deference to
the agency’s legal interpretation.” (Shear Development Co., LLC
v. California Coastal Com. (2026) 19 Cal.5th 334, 350.)
“Although ‘courts retain final authority to “ ‘state the true
meaning of [any] statute,’ ” ’ they ‘ “generally defer to PERB’s
construction of labor law provisions within its jurisdiction,” ’ ”
including the MMBA. (Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Public
Employment Relations Bd. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 725, 743;
accord, Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018)
5 Cal.5th 898, 911-912 (Boling I); see Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th
982, 997, fn. 5 [“PERB is ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘one of those agencies presumably
equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized
field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the
authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and
17
therefore must respect.’ ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[c]ourts generally
defer to PERB’s construction of labor law provisions within its
jurisdiction.’ ”].) We follow PERB’s statutory interpretation
“ ‘unless it is clearly erroneous.’ ” (Boling I, at p. 911; accord,
People ex rel. Internat. Assn. of Firefighters, etc. v. City of Palo
Alto (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 602, 617 (Internat. Assn. of
Firefighters).) Decisions from PERB interpreting the MMBA are
highly persuasive on legal matters within PERB’s area of
expertise. (Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, at p. 996;
County of Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 917.)
Although Boling I addresses deference owed to PERB’s
construction of labor laws, not the ERB’s, the ERB is the agency
for the City of Los Angeles with a specialized field of knowledge
with respect to implementing the ERO. Because interpretation of
the ERO falls squarely within the ERB’s “ ‘ “legislatively
designated field of expertise” ’ ” (Boling I, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
p. 912), we defer to the ERB’s interpretation of the ERO unless it
is clearly erroneous (see Boling I, at p. 904). However, we “retain
final authority to ‘ “state the true meaning of the [ordinance].” ’ ”
(Id. at p. 912.)
C. The ERB’s Conclusion It Was Empowered To Order a Make-
whole Remedy Was Not Clearly Erroneous
The ERB ordered the City to “make whole Coalition-
represented employees who have sustained any losses (including
a reduced pension or other benefits) due to unilateral changes
implemented on or after January 1, 2014 to the manner in which
WPERP years of service are treated or who sustain any such
losses in the future ... from the date any impacted employee
began to experience harm (i.e., January 1, 2014) until the earliest
of” the date the parties reached agreement or impasse (unless the
18
Coalition failed to request bargaining or to bargain in good faith).
The ERB adopted the hearing officer’s reasoning, consistent with
the ERB’s past precedent, that the ERB had authority to order
such affirmative relief and determined a make-whole remedy was
appropriate for the violation found. (See Los Angeles Police
Protective League v. Los Angeles Police Dept. and the City of
Los Angeles (1988) ERB Dec. No. U-74, at p. 6 [concluding the
ERB “has broad power under the ERO to rectify the unfair
employee relations practices found herein, up to and including
restoration of the status quo ante”].) Contrary to the City’s
contention, the ERB’s interpretation of its remedial powers was
not clearly erroneous.
1. The ERO does not limit the ERB’s remedial powers to
prospective cease and desist orders
The City contends the “ERB’s ‘make-whole’ remedy
exceeded its authority and jurisdiction” and that the ERB is
limited to “issuing prospective relief that the City cease
committing such violations in the future.” The ERB’s contrary
interpretation of its powers under the ERO and the MMBA was
not clearly erroneous.
“Our review of local regulations is guided by the same
established rules we use for statutory construction.” (Berkeley
Hills Watershed Coalition v. City of Berkeley (2019)
31 Cal.App.5th 880, 897.) In interpreting an ordinance like the
ERO, “ ‘ “our fundamental task is to ‘ascertain the intent of the
lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the’ ” ’ ” ordinance.
(Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.) “We
consider first the words of [an ordinance], as the most reliable
indicator of legislative intent.” (Tuolumne Jobs & Small
Business Alliance v. Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1029,
19
1037.)
In arguing the ERO limits the ERB’s remedies to
prospective cease-and-desist orders, the City relies on ERO
section 4.810, subdivision (f)(4). That provision states the ERB
shall have the power and duty “[t]o investigate and determine the
validity of charges of unfair employee relations practices, to make
findings, and to issue orders to cease and desist which are not in
conflict with other provisions of law.” (§ 4.810, subd. (f)(4), italics
added.) However, subdivision (f)(12) of section 4.810 additionally
grants the ERB authority “[t]o perform such other duties as may
be necessary to carry out the [ERB’s] responsibilities under the
provisions of this chapter,” including adjudicating unfair
employee relations practices claims. (See §§ 4.810, subd. (f)(12);
4.860, subd. (c).) The Coalition contends this provision empowers
the ERB to impose additional remedies such as make-whole relief
when the ERB finds the City committed an unfair labor practice.
The Coalition’s interpretation of ERO section 4.810,
subdivision (f)(12), is reasonable because the ERO must be
harmonized with the MMBA. (See State Dept. of Pub. Health v.
Superior Ct. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 940, 955 [“ ‘ “A court must, where
reasonably possible, harmonize statutes, reconcile seeming
inconsistencies in them, and construe them to give force and
effect to all of their provisions.” ’ ”].) As discussed, the City
adopted the ERO to implement the provisions of the MMBA. (See
Singletary, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 39.) “[L]ocal rules [such
as the ERO] cannot conflict with the MMBA. ‘The MMBA deals
with a matter of statewide concern, and its standards may not be
undercut by contradictory rules or procedures that would
frustrate its purposes. [Citations.] Local regulation is permitted
only if “consistent with the purposes of the MMBA.” ’ ” (County of
20
Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 925; accord, Pacifica
Firefighters Assn. v. City of Pacifica (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 758,
772.)
The MMBA dictates that the ERB “shall have the power
and responsibility to take actions on … all unfair practices, and
to issue determinations and orders as [the ERB] deem[s]
necessary, consistent with and pursuant to the policies of this
chapter.” (Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (d); see Singletary, supra,
212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 43-44 & fn. 4 [discussing the ERB’s
powers under Gov. Code, § 3509, subd. (d)].) This MMBA
provision bestows broad authority on the ERB to issue orders it
deems necessary to carry out the policies of the MMBA.
PERB has consistently recognized that retroactive make-
whole relief serves MMBA’s policy objectives. Such relief
“serve[s] the dual purposes of compensating for the harm a
violation causes and deterring further violations,” as well as aims
to provide “ ‘a restoration of the situation as nearly as possible to
that which would have obtained but for the unfair labor
practice.’ ” (Service Employees Internat. Union Local 521 v.
County of Santa Clara (2024) PERB Dec. No. 2900-M, p. 25;
accord Service Employees Internat. Union, Local 99 v. The
Accelerated Schools (2023) PERB Dec. No. 2855, at p. 16 (TAS);
see San Diego Municipal Employees Assn. v. City of San Diego
(2015) PERB Dec. No. 2464-M, at p. 41 [imposing make-whole
relief “prevents the employer from gaining a one-sided and unfair
advantage in negotiations,” “affirm[s] the principle of
bilateralism in negotiations, which is the ‘centerpiece’ of the
MMBA,” and “vindicate[s] the authority of the exclusive
representative in the eyes of employees”].)
Reading the ERO in harmony with the MMBA and PERB’s
21
longstanding recognition that make-whole relief serves core
MMBA objectives, we defer to the ERB’s reasonable
determination that section 4.810, subdivision (f)(12), gives it the
authority to award retroactive make-whole relief when necessary
to remedy an unfair employee relations practice.
D. A Make-whole Remedy Is Appropriate for the Failure To
Engage in Effects Bargaining
As the hearing officer recognized, “PERB has made it clear
that the failure to bargain over effects is just as serious as a
failure to bargain over a mandatory subject of bargaining.” He
cited PERB’s decision in Santa Clara County Correctional Peace
Officers’ Assn. v. County of Santa Clara (2013) PERB Dec. No.
2321-M, at pages 23-24, which emphasized that “[t]he rule
requiring effects bargaining arises from balancing the need of
employers to make unfettered decision[s] about the direction of
the enterprise with the rights of employees … to a voice in
workplace matters related to wages, hours and terms and
conditions of employment. In other words, effects bargaining is
not a stepchild of decision bargaining. It is just as important as
bargaining over a decision to alter the terms and conditions of
employment.” “In remedying effects bargaining violations, PERB
recognizes that they are equally harmful as decision bargaining
violations, as both disrupt and destabilize employer-employee
relations by creating an imbalance in the power between
management and employee organizations.” (TAS, supra, PERB
Dec. No. 2855, at p. 17.)
Make-whole remedies are customary for effects bargaining
violations, just as they are for decision bargaining violations.
(Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 376, 389 (Boling II) [typical PERB remedy for
22
violation of duty to engage in effects bargaining is to order such
bargaining and award back pay7 for the affected employees until
bargaining results in an agreement or impasse].) As discussed, a
make-whole remedy is designed to “ ‘restore[] ... the situation as
nearly as possible to that which would have obtained but for the
unfair labor practice.’ ” (Culver City Employees Assn. v. City of
Culver City (2020) PERB Dec. No. 2731-M, at p. 50 (Culver City
Employees Assn.); see Engineers and Architects Assn. v. City of
Los Angeles et al. (2006) ERB Dec. No. U-185, at p. 2 [“the
standard remedy for an unlawful unilateral change is restoration
of the status quo ante prior to commencing negotiations”].) “The
usual remedy for an employer’s violation of its effects bargaining
obligation is an order to bargain … over the effects, with a
limited backpay award to make employees whole for losses
suffered and to mitigate as much as possible the imbalance in the
parties’ bargaining positions resulting from the employer’s
unlawful conduct.” (American Federation of State, County &
Municipal Employees Local 3299 et al. v. Regents of the Univ. of
California (2021) PERB Dec. No. 2783-H, pp. 31-32; accord, TAS,
supra, PERB Dec. No. 2855, at p. 19 [if an employer violates its
duty to bargain over effects, “full retroactive back pay may be
necessary to provide adequate compensation, deterrence, and a
level field for fair effects negotiations”]; Culver City Employees
7 The term “back pay,” as used by PERB, generally refers to
all forms of make-whole relief, including relief from detrimental
effects on medical or retirement benefits. (TAS, supra, PERB
Dec. No. 2855, at p. 17 fn. 11; California School Employees Assn.,
Chapter 32 v. Bellflower Unified School Dist. (2022) PERB Dec.
No. 2544a, at pp. 33-34.)
23
Assn., at p. 50; Service Employees Internat. Union Local 521 v.
County of Kern et al. (2019) PERB Dec. No. 2659-M, at p. 25.)
The ERB has previously ordered make-whole relief for a
failure to engage in effects bargaining, including ordering
employees’ reinstatement. (See, e.g., United Firefighters of
Los Angeles City et al. v. Los Angeles City Fire Dept. (1994) ERB
Dec. No. U107, at. p. 2.) Indeed, the City concedes that “an
appropriate make-whole remedy in the context of an effects
bargaining case is one that seeks a restoration of the situation as
nearly as possible to that which would have been obtained but for
the [alleged] unfair labor practice and to thereby restore the
‘economic status quo.’ ” The City contends, however, that the
ERB’s particular remedy here far exceeded the appropriate limits
of a make-whole remedy. Having determined that the ERB is
empowered to order make-whole remedies for the City’s failure to
engage in effects bargaining, we turn to the City’s argument with
respect to the propriety of the specific relief ordered by the ERB
in this case.
E. The Particular Make-whole Remedy Was Not an Abuse of
Discretion
The hearing officer found the City’s disregard of its
obligation to engage in effects bargain troubling. While WPERP’s
withdrawal was the “triggering event,” the City chose to “ignore
the Commission’s plea for a seat at the table” while negotiating
with WPERP and Local 18 over the consequences of WPERP’s
decision that were disruptive to Coalition members. Although
the hearing officer determined an order fully restoring the status
quo ante was not possible, because the ERB “lack[ed] the ability
to recreate or replicate the reciprocity arrangement that existed
prior to WPERP’s decision [to withdraw from the arrangement]
24
and the Romero settlement,” it was necessary to impose a remedy
that would “empower the Coalition to bargain for benefits that
are equivalent to what existed” prior to the termination of
Reciprocity. (See Boling II, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 389
[where PERB “has no power to directly undo an action,” the
proper “remedy is to order bargaining over the effects of the
action and backpay for the affected bargaining unit employees
during the bargaining process”].) The ERB adopted this
conclusion and ordered the City to make whole Coalition-
represented employees who sustained or would sustain any
losses, including reduced pensions or other reduced benefits, due
to the City’s termination of Reciprocity as of January 1, 2014.
This remedy would remain in force until the parties reached
agreement or impasse or the Coalition failed to request
bargaining or to bargain in good faith.
We review the ERB’s remedial orders for abuse of
discretion. (See Boling II, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 387
[reviewing PERB remedial order for abuse of discretion].)
“Generally, a ‘remedial order “should stand unless it can be
shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other
than those which can be fairly said to effectuate the policies” ’ ” of
the animating legislation. (Ibid.) “Doubts as to the appropriate
remedy for unfair practices, including the appropriate measure of
back pay, are … resolved against the respondent whose unlawful
conduct made such uncertainty possible.” (Culver City Employees
Assn., supra, PERB Dec. No. 2731-M, at pp. 54-55; see Internat.
Assn. of Firefighters, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 626 [faulting
trial court for “insufficiently deferr[ing] to PERB’s expertise” on
the appropriate remedy for an MMBA violation].)
25
1. The remedy did not conflict with other provisions of
law
The City argues that, even assuming the ERB had
authority to order make-whole relief, the remedy here exceeded
the permissible scope of that authority. The City contends “[a]n
order requiring the City to ‘make up’ the difference between the
level of LACERS benefits Coalition-represented employees would
have received under reciprocity and what they will now receive
without reciprocity is inappropriate because … it would
accomplish more than the City was legally required to do.”
Focusing on the fact that ERO section 4.810, subdivision (f)(4),
grants the ERB the power “to issue orders to cease and desist
which are not in conflict with other provisions of law,” it contends
the ERB’s remedies exceeded its powers because the remedies
conflicted with other provisions of law. (Italics added.)
The City heavily relies on our decision in American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. City of
Los Angeles (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 179 (AFSCME I), concerning
a related dispute arising from WPERP’s suspension of Reciprocity
and the City’s adoption of the 2013 Ordinance terminating
Reciprocity. (Id. at p. 183.) In that case, the Coalition alleged
the 2013 Ordinance impaired vested contractual pension rights in
violation of the California Constitution’s contracts clause. (Id. at
p. 188.) We rejected that claim, holding that although
Reciprocity could have the effect of reducing future pension
benefits for employees who transferred between the City and
DWP, the employees did not possess a vested right to Reciprocity
protected by the contracts clause. (Id. at p. 189.) The City
argues that the ERB’s make-whole remedy was inconsistent with
26
our holding in AFSCME I that Coalition employees were not
legally entitled to continued Reciprocity.
Contrary to the City’s contention, the ERB did not restore
Reciprocity; it temporarily restored the Coalition employees to
the position they were in at the point the City’s duty to engage in
effects bargaining arose. Even though the Coalition employees do
not have a vested right to Reciprocity, they remained entitled to
relief that restored their former bargaining position. The City
improperly conflates the issues of whether Reciprocity is a vested
right and whether the Coalition had a right to engage in effects
bargaining with the City over the termination of Reciprocity.
(See California Association of Professional Scientists v.
Schwarzenegger (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 371, 381-382 [holding
constitutional issue whether a state law violated the contracts
clause by impairing retirement benefits was “separate and
distinct from any issue of whether the state violated its collective
bargaining obligations”]; see also American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, Local 101 v. City of San Jose
(2013) PERB Dec. No. 2341-M, at pp. 46-49 [distinguishing claim
that city’s actions interfered with a “vested employee right” from
claim that city failed to bargain].)
In effects-bargaining cases, employers are often legally
entitled to make the underlying decision without bargaining. Yet
employees still have the right to bargain over the effects of that
decision and to remedies that restore the status quo (as best
possible) until the employer satisfies its duty to bargain—even
though the employees are not legally entitled to have that status
quo continue indefinitely. For example, although a public
employer may lawfully decide to lay off employees because of
financial necessity, it must still bargain over the effects of those
27
layoffs, including “ ‘ “the timing of the layoffs and the number
and identity of employees affected.” ’ ” (Trustees of California
State Univ. v. Pub. Emp. Relations Bd., supra, 118 Cal.App.5th at
p. 103; see International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-
CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd., supra, 51 Cal.4th at
p. 277.) Pending the employer’s satisfaction of its duty to
bargain, the ERB (or whatever employee relations commission
has jurisdiction) could issue a remedial order awarding the laid-
off employees back pay until the parties completed the effects-
bargaining process.
Here, the ERB stressed the make-whole relief was “of a
limited duration, with the make-whole remedy ending when the
bargaining process ends.” Under the ERB’s order, the City must
make affected employees whole “from the date any impacted
employee[s] began to experience harm (i.e., January 1, 2014)
until the earliest of” the date the parties reach an agreement, the
parties reach an impasse, or the Coalition fails to request
bargaining or fails to bargain in good faith. This temporary relief
is not equivalent to a permanent restoration of Reciprocity.8
8 The City further contends under section 4.1095,
subdivision (k), Reciprocity was automatically suspended when
WPERP withdrew from the arrangement in 2010, making the
2013 Ordinance merely “an acknowledgement of the economic
reality” created by WPERP’s unilateral decision and the ERB’s
remedy a “resuscitation of a reciprocal arrangement that had
been eliminated years before.” However, there is no indication
the City stopped crediting WPERP service for its employees
before the 2013 Ordinance became effective on January 1, 2014.
Thus, WPERP’s 2010 vote to suspend Reciprocity is not material
to whether the make-whole remedy was appropriate.
28
2. The ERB’s make-whole remedy did not violate the
separation of powers doctrine
The City argues that the make-whole remedy violated the
separation of powers doctrine by “invalidating” section 4.1095,
subdivision (k), which the City argues permitted the City to cease
providing reciprocity benefits if WPERP stopped participating in
Reciprocity. The City contends the ERB’s order “effectively
requires the City Council to approve reciprocity in the absence of
a reciprocal partner, i.e., WPERP,” and thus “impermissibly
encroaches on the City Council’s legislative power under City
Charter Section 1168 to establish LACERS benefits by
ordinance.” We reject the City’s contention.
Under the separation of powers doctrine, courts, or a quasi-
judicial agency like the ERB, “ ‘may not encroach on matters
normally left to the Legislature.’ ” (Armstrong v. Superior Ct.
(2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 768, 788; see City of Palo Alto v. Public
Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1271, 1310-
1311.) The ERB’s remedial orders must be vacated if they violate
the separation of powers doctrine. (See Boling II, supra,
33 Cal.App.5th at p. 388; see, e.g., City of Palo Alto, at p. 1310
[vacating PERB remedy ordering city council to rescind a
resolution referring a ballot measure to voters].)9
9 Although a labor board violates the separation of powers
doctrine by ordering a legislative body to enact or rescind
legislation, “[i]t is … within PERB’s power to declare void a
resolution passed in violation of the MMBA. [Citation.] Such a
declaration ‘effectively returns the parties to the status quo
ante.’ ” (County of Sonoma v. Public Employment Relations Bd.,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 189; accord, Internat. Assn. of
Firefighters, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 610; City of Palo Alto v.
29
“[T]he separation of powers doctrine is violated only when
the actions of a branch of government defeat or materially impair
the inherent functions of another branch.” (In re Rosenkrantz
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 662.) But “the separation-of-powers
doctrine ‘permits actions of one branch that may significantly
affect those of another branch.’ ” (People v. Standish (2006)
38 Cal.4th 858, 879; see People v. Nash (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th
1041, 1073-1074.)
The ERB’s make-whole remedy did not “invalidate”
section 4.1095, subdivision (k).10 The relief maintaining the
status quo until the conclusion of the bargaining process was
temporary. The make-whole remedy did not defeat or materially
impair the inherent functions of the City, and thus did not violate
the separation of powers doctrine.
3. The make-whole remedy was appropriate
The ERB’s remedy restored the parties, as nearly as
practicable, to the position they occupied when the City’s
Public Employment Relations Bd., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1315-1316.)
10 Section 4.1095, subdivision (k), provides: “It is the intent
and purpose of this section to provide, or help to provide,
portability between the LACERS and the WPERP. The
achievement of complete portability of benefits is dependent upon
appropriate action by the governing body of the WPERP. Should
the implementation of any provisions of this section be possible
only if some specific action is taken by the WPERP, then, and as
to such provisions only, the effect of this section shall be
suspended until appropriate action has been taken by the
WPERP.” As discussed, in December 2013, the City adopted the
2013 Ordinance suspending Reciprocity. (§ 4.1095, subd. (l); see
AFSCME I, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 188.)
30
bargaining obligation attached. (See TAS, supra, PERB Dec. No.
2855, at p. 20 [back pay appropriate remedy for an effects
bargaining obligation until the parties reach an agreement or
reach an impasse]; County of Kern et al., supra, PERB Dec.
No. 2659-M, at p. 26 [“A make-whole award should be tailored ‘to
expunge the actual consequences’ of an unfair practice, including
restoration of ‘the economic status quo that would have obtained
but for the respondent’s wrongful act.’ ”].)
“Although an employer engaged in effects negotiations need
not bargain over the policy reasons for its decision, it cannot
refuse to bargain over alternatives, as those alternatives
fundamentally impact the employment effects at issue.
[Citations.] Indeed, one purpose of effects bargaining is to permit
the exclusive representative an opportunity to persuade the
employer to consider alternatives that may diminish the impact
of the decision on employees.” (See TAS, supra, PERB Dec.
No. 2855, at pp. 13-14, fn. 8, 26-28.) Had the Coalition been
afforded timely effects bargaining, it could have negotiated
alternatives that might have mitigated the impact on employees.
For example, the Coalition argues it could have attempted to
negotiate a more affordable rate for the purchase of WPERP
credits—under the 2013 Ordinance, an employee earning
$100,000 annually who seeks to purchase two years of WPERP
service would have to pay LACERS $60,000.
Boling II, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 376 is instructive. The
issue in that case was the appropriateness of the remedy PERB
ordered for the City of San Diego’s failure to engage in effects
bargaining over the mayor’s decision to advance a citizens’
petition reform initiative without meeting and conferring with
employees’ unions about the effect of the initiative on employees.
31
(Id. at p. 381.) The appellate court affirmed PERB’s order that
San Diego pay the affected employees the difference between the
compensation (including retirement benefits) the employees
would have received before the initiative became effective and the
compensation they received after it became effective. (Id. at
pp. 381-382.) While PERB had ordered this compensatory relief
be in effect until the initiative was “no longer in effect” or another
agreement was reached, the court concluded “PERB’s
compensatory remedy essentially invalidates the Initiative by
rendering the Initiative perpetually ineffectual,” improperly
encroaching on constitutional and statutory law and policy
matters. (Id. at pp. 382, 387-388.)
The court noted, “When, as here, PERB has no power to
directly undo an action, PERB’s remedy is not to indirectly undo
the action or treat the action as if it has been or will be undone.
Instead, PERB’s remedy is to order bargaining over the effects of
the action and backpay for the affected bargaining unit
employees during the bargaining process.” (Boling II, supra,
33 Cal.App.5th at p. 389.) Thus, the court limited the
compensatory relief so that it would extend only until the
completion of the bargaining process. The court determined
“[t]his modification serves the functions PERB intended. ‘It is
“compensatory in that it reimburses employees for the losses they
incur as a result of delays in the collective bargaining process.”
[Citation.] At the same time “it ... reduces the employer’s
financial incentive for refusing to bargain in order to avoid the
expenses [the employer] would be required to pay if [the
employer] had entered into a collective bargaining agreement.” ’ ”
(Ibid.)
32
Thus, the court in Boling II approved a make-whole remedy
very similar to the one here—until the employer satisfied its duty
to bargain, requiring the employer to make up the difference
between the compensation and benefits the affected employees
would have received before the initiative and what they received
after. Once the employer discharged its bargaining duties, the
compensatory remedy would cease. Likewise, the make-whole
remedy the ERB imposed on the City is temporally limited to the
point at which the City has discharged its obligation to engage in
effects bargaining.11
The ERB did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a
remedy designed to vindicate the Coalition’s right to effects
bargaining that reasonably approximates the bargaining position
the parties would have occupied had the City fulfilled its
statutory obligation.
F. The Remedy Is Not Vague or Overbroad
The ERB also directed the City to “cease and desist from
enforcing or otherwise applying against Coalition-represented
11 Contrary to the City’s arguments, Gonzales Union High
School Teachers Assn., CTA/NEA v. Gonzales Union High School
Dist. (1993) PERB Dec. No. 1006 does not suggest the make-
whole remedy here was inappropriate. There, PERB declined to
require the employer to pay increased health insurance costs as
part of a make-whole remedy because doing so would require the
employer to exceed an express contribution cap contained in the
parties’ collective bargaining agreement. (Id. at pp. 22-23.) Here,
by contrast, the Coalition never agreed to any contractual
limitation governing retirement benefits if Reciprocity ended.
Moreover, the City has made no showing the make-whole remedy
here would “lead to the absurd result” of jeopardizing the benefits
at issue, as was the case in Gonzales. (Ibid.)
33
employees the [Administrative Code] provisions that address, for
any purpose, how to treat periods of service with WPERP for
employees who move from a WPERP-covered position to a
LACERS-covered position on or after January 1, 2014.” The City
argues the order is impermissibly vague because it does not
identify the specific Administrative Code provisions to which it
applies and is overbroad because it uses the phrase “for any
purpose.”
An injunction is impermissibly vague only if it is “set forth
‘ “in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.” ’ ” (People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 266, 316; accord, People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna
(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1116.) “[W]e do not pursue the inquiry in
the abstract. To be considered unconstitutionally vague, an
injunction must suffer from vagueness in all its applications
[citation], since ‘[a] contextual application of otherwise
unqualified legal language may supply the clue to a law’s
meaning, giving facially standardless language a constitutionally
sufficient concreteness.’ ” (Uber Technologies, at p. 316; see also
In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 [due process requires
only that an order be sufficiently precise for a person to know
what is required].)
Although the ERB’s order does not list every relevant
Administrative Code provision, it clearly identifies the category of
provisions—those governing the treatment of WPERP service for
employees transferring to LACERS-covered positions after
January 1, 2014. An injunction “need not etch forbidden actions
with microscopic precision, but may instead draw entire
categories of proscribed conduct.” (People ex rel. Gascon v.
34
HomeAdvisor, Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1083.) Here, the
category is readily identifiable: the post-2013 Administrative
Code provisions implementing the suspension of Reciprocity.
Indeed, the City identifies no provision that it cannot determine
is either included or excluded by the order.
Moreover, the order must be read in light of the ERB’s
findings. The ERB specifically identified the subjects requiring
effects bargaining, including disability retirement, pension
calculations, retiree health subsidies, leave rights, and employee
transfers. The remedial order simply tracks those subjects by
directing the City not to apply the post-2013 changes affecting
WPERP service credit until it satisfies its bargaining obligations.
(See People ex rel. Gascon v. HomeAdvisor, Inc., supra,
49 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084 [“ ‘the language of the injunction must
be interpreted in light of the record which discloses the kind of
conduct that was sought to be enjoined’ ”].)
Nor does the phrase “for any purpose” render the order
overbroad. The ERB found that the City’s bargaining obligation
extended to effects flowing from the suspension of Reciprocity,
not merely to pension calculations. Because the unlawful conduct
affected multiple aspects of how WPERP service was treated
under LACERS, the ERB reasonably framed the remedy in broad
terms. The City again does not identify any specific application
of the order that it cannot understand or administer.
The City also contends the remedy is overbroad because the
ERB “expressly found that the City was obligated under …
section 4.1095[, subdivision ](k) to stop counting WPERP service
for LACERS benefits once WPERP withdrew from reciprocity,”
“but the cease-and-desist order prohibits the City from enforcing
[Administrative Code] provisions governing WPERP service ‘for
35
any purpose.’ ” This merely repackages the City’s contention
that, once WPERP suspended Reciprocity, the City could not
lawfully be required to continue recognizing any aspect of it. As
we have explained, that argument conflates the Coalition’s lack
of vested rights with the distinct purpose of make-whole relief—
to restore the parties, as nearly as possible, to the status quo that
existed when the City’s duty to bargain arose. For the reasons
already discussed, we reject that argument here as well.
G. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Awarding the Coalition
Attorney Fees
1. Applicable law and standard of review
“Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 is an exception to
the general rule that parties in litigation pay their own attorney
fees. [Citation.] The statute encourages ‘ “litigants to pursue
meritorious public interest litigation vindicating important rights
and benefitting a broad swath of citizens, and ... achieves this
aim by compensating successful litigants with an award of
attorney’s fees.” ’ ” (McDoniel v. Kavry Management, LLC (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 949, 976; see Conservatorship of Whitley (2010)
50 Cal.4th 1206, 1224 [section 1021.5 is aimed at “solving the
problem of the nonaffordability of litigation that will benefit the
public but cannot pay its own way”].) As relevant here, Code of
Civil Procedure section 1021.5 authorizes an award of attorney
fees “ ‘to a successful party against one or more opposing parties
in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an
important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant
benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred
on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity
and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by
one public entity against another public entity, are such as to
36
make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the
interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.’ ” (Raptors
Are the Solution v. CropLife America (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 237,
249-250 (Raptors Are the Solution).)
We generally review rulings on fee requests under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1021.5 for abuse of discretion.
(Conservatorship of Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1213; Make
UC A Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California (2025)
117 Cal.App.5th 282, 287 (Make UC A Good Neighbor).)
2. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining
the Coalition was a successful party
The City first argues the trial court erroneously concluded
the Coalition was the “successful party.” According to the City,
the Coalition prevailed on only one of four substantive issues
brought before the ERB and failed to obtain most of the relief it
originally sought.
“ ‘The “successful party” under [Code of Civil Procedure]
section 1021.5 is “the party to litigation that achieves its
objectives.” ’ ” (Raptors Are the Solution, supra, 120 Cal.App.5th
at p. 261, quoting Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004)
34 Cal.4th 553, 571; see Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281,
1292 [a plaintiff is successful if it succeeds on any significant
issue and achieves some benefit sought].) “The inquiry is both
‘pragmatic’ and ‘broad.’ [Citation.] To be successful, a party need
not obtain a favorable final judgment [citations] nor succeed on
all its claims.” (Make UC A Good Neighbor, supra,
117 Cal.App.5th at p. 288; see City of Oakland v. Oakland Police
& Fire Retirement System (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 688, 708.)
The City takes too narrow a view of the Coalition’s
objectives and the relief it obtained. The Coalition alleged the
37
City’s failure to negotiate in good faith violated sections 4.830,
subdivision (a), 4.857, and 4.860, subdivisions (a)(1) and (3), and
constituted an unfair employee relations practice. As relief, it
sought orders requiring the City to (1) cease refusing to meet and
confer over Reciprocity and its benefits, (2) rescind unilateral
changes to retirement and retiree medical benefits and transfer
rights, (3) refrain from making similar unilateral changes in the
future, (4) cease interfering with rights protected by the ERO,
and (5) make affected employees whole, and post notices
acknowledging its violations.12
The Coalition broadly achieved its goals. The ERB
determined the City failed to meet and confer in violation of ERO
sections 4.830, subdivision (a), and 4.860, subdivision (a)(3)—
two of the three statutory provisions the Coalition identified. The
Board also granted relief consistent with the Coalition’s principal
requests by ordering the City to cease and desist from its
unlawful failure to negotiate and to make affected employees
whole for losses resulting from the violations.
Even if the Coalition did not obtain every form of relief it
requested, “ ‘[t]he critical fact is the impact of the action,’ ” and
parties “ ‘may be considered successful if they succeed on any
significant issue in the litigation that achieves some of the benefit
they sought in bringing suit.’ ” (Make UC A Good Neighbor,
supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 288; see Raptors Are the Solution,
supra, 120 Cal.App.5th at p. 261 [a “party need not succeed on all
of its claims”].) The trial court therefore reasonably concluded
that, “while the Coalition did not prevail on all issues,” it “did
12 Although the Coalition sought these five bases for relief,
the City only references four.
38
prevail with respect to the requirement to bargain over the
effects of the suspension of reciprocity and the make-whole
remedy starting from January 1, 2014,” which were the “crux”
and the “significant issue” in the unfair employee relations
practice charge.
3. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining
the Coalition vindicated an important public right
“Having established the threshold requirement” that the
Coalition was a successful party, “the first part of the three-prong
inquiry is whether ‘the litigation resulted in the enforcement of
an important right affecting the public interest.’ ” (Grossmont
Union High School Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp. (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 552, 576.) “The ‘important public right’ can have
any legal source, ‘constitutional, statutory or other.’ ” (Ibid.)
“When determining whether a litigant has vindicated an
important right affecting the public interest, ‘[t]he “judiciary
[must] exercise judgment in attempting to ascertain the ‘strength’
or ‘societal importance’ of the right involved.” [Citation.] “The
strength or societal importance of a particular right generally is
determined by realistically assessing the significance of that
right in terms of its relationship to the achievement of
fundamental legislative goals.” ’ ” (City of Oakland v. Oakland
Police & Fire Retirement System, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at
p. 710.)
The City contends the trial court erred in determining the
Coalition vindicated an important public right because the “ERB
award of an erroneous ‘make-whole’ remedy based on an alleged
failure to engage in effects bargaining after the adoption of the
Ordinance is a narrow dispute between a labor organization and
a city government that does not vindicate broader principles of
39
law.” However, the City “adopts an unduly narrow definition of
the relevant public interest and the nature of the benefit
achieved by the litigation.” (Let Them Choose v. San Diego
Unified School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 953, 963.) The trial
court correctly concluded that in ensuring compliance with the
duty to bargain under the MMBA, the litigation enforced an
important public right that promotes fair labor relations in the
public sector. (See Indio Police Command Unit Assn. v. City of
Indio (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 521, 542 [affirming attorney fee
award under Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 in action enforcing
important public right to bargain under the MMBA]; Los Angeles
Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (1986)
188 Cal.App.3d 1, 12-14 [lawsuit to enforce meet and confer
obligations under the MMBA vindicated an important public
right]; see also People Ex Rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v.
City of Seal Beach (1984) 36 Cal.3d 591, 594 [affirming attorney
fee award under Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5 in suit to enforce meet
and confer rights under MMBA].)
4. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining
the Coalition obtained a significant benefit for the
public or a large group of people
“The second prong of the analysis under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1021.5 is whether ‘ “a significant benefit has
been conferred on the general public or a large class of
individuals.” ’ ” (Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. Diego
Plus Education Corp., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 579.)
“ ‘ “ ‘[T]he “significant benefit” that will justify an attorney fee
award need not represent a “tangible” asset or a “concrete” gain
but, in some cases, may be recognized simply from the
effectuation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory policy.’
40
[Citation.] The benefit may be conceptual or doctrinal [citation],
and … ‘the litigation underlying the [Code of Civil Procedure]
section 1021.5 award can involve rights or benefits that are
somewhat intangible.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 579-580.)
The City asserts the litigation did not confer a significant
public benefit because the decision is “not ‘a ringing declaration
of rights of all or most’ of public employees in the City of
Los Angeles” and instead “only applies to a tiny minority of those
employees, who have transferred from WPERP to LACERS since
January 1, 2014.” However, the trial court could reasonably
conclude that clarifying the scope of the ERB’s remedial authority
and the City’s bargaining obligations significantly benefits not
only the affected Coalition employees but also other City
employees and bargaining units confronting similar disputes.
(See Indio Police Command Unit Assn. v. City of Indio, supra,
230 Cal.App.4th at pp. 534-544 [trial court reasonably concluded
that litigation benefitted not just the union and its 14 members,
“but also benefitted other employee unions within the City, whose
employees the City has stated were being subjected to similar
reorganization plans”].)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the
Coalition attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5.
5. The Coalition is entitled to its attorney fees on appeal
The Coalition also requests its attorney fees on appeal. “As
in the trial court, attorney’s fees on appeal are recoverable if
authorized by contract, statute, or law. [Citation.] A statute
authorizing an award of attorney’s fees in the trial court
ordinarily authorizes an award of fees incurred on appeal unless
the statute specifically provides otherwise.” (Baer v. Tedder
41
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1150.) As the prevailing party on
appeal, the Coalition is entitled to an award of attorney fees for
the appeal under section 1021.5. (See Center for Biological
Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th
866, 901.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment and attorney fees order are affirmed. The
trial court is directed to award the Coalition its reasonable
attorney fees and costs on appeal. (Center for Biological Diversity
v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 901.)
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
42
Filed 8/28/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, B336981 c/w B340065
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
Petitioner and Appellant; No. 22STCP03070)
INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL
WORKERS, LOCAL 18,
Real Party in Interest and ORDER MODIFYING
Appellant, OPINION AND CERTIFYING
v. OPINION FOR
PUBLICATION
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
STATE, COUNTY AND [NO CHANGE IN APPELLATE
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES et al., JUDGMENT]
Real Party in Interest and
Respondent;
CITY OF LOS ANGELES
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on July 30, 2026
be modified as follows:
1. On page 3, first line, which reads “Los Angeles
Employees Relations Board” should be deleted and
should read “Los Angeles Employee Relations Board”;
2. On page 4, second paragraph, fourth sentence which
reads “(Charter § 603.)” should be deleted and should
read “(Charter, § 603.)”;
3. On page 16, footnote 6, second complete sentence
from the bottom which reads “In 1968 Los Angeles
County created its own employee relations
commissions” should be deleted and should read “In
1968 Los Angeles County created its own employee
relations commission”;
4. On page 18, first paragraph, last line which reads
“County of Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 917.)”
should be deleted and should read “see County of Los
Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 917.)”;
5. On page 21, last complete paragraph, middle of the
paragraph which reads, “accord Service Employees
Internat. Union, Local 99 v. The” should be deleted
and should read “accord, Service Employees Internat.
Union, Local 99 v. The”; and
2
6. On page 26, last paragraph, last complete sentence
which reads “We rejected that claim, holding that
although” should be deleted and now read “We
rejected that claim, holding that although
suspending”.
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on July 30,
2026 was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For
good cause it now appears that the opinion should be published in
the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
There is no change in the appellate judgment.
MARTINEZ, P. J. SEGAL, J. STONE, J.
3