Opinion

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8 United States District Court

9 Central District of California

10 Western Division

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12 DESTINY ARCHULETA, etc., CV 24-09747 TJH (PDx)

13 Plaintiff,

14 v.

Order

15 AUTISM BEHAVIOR SERVICES

INC., et al.,

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Defendants.

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18 The Court has considered Plaintiff Destiny Archuleta’s motion to remand [dkt. #

19 17], together with the moving and opposing papers.

20 From approximately December, 2020, through January, 2022, Archuleta worked

21 for Autism Services as a technician.

22 On September 12, 2024, Archuleta filed this putative class action wage and hour

23 case in the Los Angeles County Superior Court against Defendant Autism Behavior

24 Services Inc. [“Autism Services”] on behalf of herself and all current and former hourly

25 and/or non-exempt employees who worked for Autism Services in California from four

26 years prior to the filing of this case through entry of the final judgment. Archuleta

27 alleged that Autism Services violated various provisions of the California Labor Code

28 and the California Business and Professions Code because it, inter alia, failed to pay all

1 wages owed, provide meal and rest periods, and timely pay all wages due upon

2 termination of employment.

3 On November 12, 2024, Autism Services removed pursuant to the Class Action

4 Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) [“CAFA”]. In its notice of removal, Autism Services

5 alleged that CAFA’s removal requirements were met because (1) there were more than

6 100 putative class members; (2) the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000.00; and

7 (3) there was minimal diversity between the parties. In support of its notice of removal,

8 Autism Services provided a declaration, dated November 11, 2024, from Claire Norris,

9 its director of human resources, stating that: (1) Autism Services employed

10 approximately 1,325 non-exempt employees during the class period; (2) “[M]embers of

11 the [p]utative [c]lass claim residency in Washington, Arizona, Tennessee, and New

12 Mexico among other states”; and (3) Approximately 1,068 members of the putative class

13 left their employment with Autism Services between September 12, 2020, and September

14 12, 2024.

15 On May 23, 2025, in response to Archuleta’s informal discovery request, Autism

16 Services produced an unauthenticated list of information regarding putative class

17 members [“the List”]. The List did not include employees’ names. Rather, the List

18 included columns entitled “Last Known State of Resi”; “Position_Title”; “Last Known

19 Work_Location”; “Pay_Frequency”; and “Pay_Type” with corresponding entries for

20 each of 1,328 employees. Neither party addressed the obvious shortcomings of the

21 heading entitled “Last Known State of Resi”. For now, the Court will assume that that

22 heading reflects each employee’s last known state of residence.

23 Of the 1,328 putative class members listed on the List, only five had a last known

24 state of residence other than California. Two of those five putative class members

25 resided in Nevada, two resided in Texas, and one resided in Wyoming. The Court took

26 note that the states of residency identified on the List differed significantly from the

27 states identified in Norris’s prior declaration submitted in support of Autism Service’s

28 notice of removal, but neither party addressed those differences.

1 On May 28, 2025, at a meet and confer session, the parties discussed the fact that

2 the List was not authenticated. Consequently, Autism Services agreed to provide a

3 declaration authenticating the List. Thereafter, Autism Services presented another

4 declaration from Norris, dated December 4, 2025, stating that the List “reflects the last

5 known states of domicile of the putative class members ... .” Again, neither party

6 commented on the discrepancy between Norris’s second declaration, which used

7 domicile, and the List, which used “Last Known State of Resi”.

8 Archuleta, now, moves to remand.

9 The removing party has the initial burden of establishing federal jurisdiction in the

10 notice of removal. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006).

11 A plaintiff may challenge the removal by filing a motion to remand. 28 U.S.C. §

12 1447(c). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), a motion to remand based on procedural

13 defects in the removal process must be filed within 30 days of the filing of the notice of

14 removal. Northern Calif. Dist. Council of Laborers v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co.,

15 69 F.3d 1034, 1038 (9th Cir. 1995). However, a motion based on the lack of subject

16 matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time before final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

17 Because Archuleta’s motion to remand is not based on a procedural defect, it is timely.

18 Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be facial or factual. NewGen, LLC

19 v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 614 (9th Cir. 2016). “A facial attack accepts the truth

20 of the plaintiff’s allegations but asserts that they are insufficient on their face to invoke

21 federal jurisdiction.” NewGen, 840 F.3d at 614. If a facial issue can be remedied by an

22 amendment that could cure the deficient jurisdictional allegations, the Court is

23 authorized to grant leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1653. NewGen, 840 F.3d at

24 614. In contrast, a factual attack challenges the truth of the jurisdictional allegations, and

25 triggers the defendant’s obligation to produce evidence to establish that the Court,

26 indeed, has subject matter jurisdiction. NewGen, 840 F.3d at 614. Thus, only upon a

27 factual attack must a defendant support its allegations by a preponderance of the

28 evidence with competent proof. Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2014).

1 Under a facial attack, the defendant is not required to present evidence in support of

2 removal jurisdiction. Ehrman v. Cox Comms., Inc., 932 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 2019).

3 Archuleta argued that this case should be remanded because Autism Services

4 failed to establish minimal diversity, which is a factual attack. Accordingly, the burden

5 is on Autism Services to produce evidence to establish that the Court, indeed, has subject

6 matter jurisdiction over this case. See NewGen, 840 F.3d at 614.

7 If the Court determines that minimal diversity exists, here, Archuleta, further,

8 argued that this case falls under the home state exception to CAFA jurisdiction.

9 CAFA Jurisdiction

10 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A), the Court has subject matter jurisdiction

11 over a CAFA class action where (1) there are at least 100 class members in the

12 aggregate; (2) the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.00; and (3)

13 minimal diversity exists. Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (9th Cir.

14 2007). Archuleta did not challenge the amount in controversy or that there are at least

15 100 putative class members, here. Consequently, the Court will focus on whether

16 minimal diversity exists, here.

17 Minimal Diversity

18 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A), CAFA jurisdiction requires only minimal

19 diversity. Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 2005). Minimal

20 diversity exists where (1) any one putative class member is a citizen of a state different

21 from any defendant; (2) any one putative class member is a foreign state or a citizen or

22 subject of a foreign state, and any defendant is a citizen of a state; or (3) Any putative

23 class member is a citizen of a state, and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or

24 subject of a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).

25 Residency is not equivalent to citizenship. Ehrman, 932 F.3d 1223, 1227. A

26 person's state of citizenship is based on her state of domicile, not her state of residence.

27 Ehrman. A person's domicile is her permanent home where she resides with the intention

28 to remain or to which she intends to return. Ehrman. A person who resides in a state is

1 not necessarily domiciled in that state. Ehrman.

2 In its notice of removal, Autism Services alleged that minimal diversity exists,

3 here, because the putative class includes citizens of various states, including Washington,

4 Arizona, Tennessee, and New Mexico.

5 Autism Service’s Citizenship

6 A corporation is a citizen of both its state of incorporation and the state where it

7 has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). A corporation’s principal

8 place of business is the state where the corporation's board of directors and high level

9 officers direct, control and coordinate its activities, and is often referred to as the

10 corporation's nerve center. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80-81, 92-93 (2010).

11 In its notice of removal, Autism Services conclusory alleged that it is a citizen of

12 the State of California. It did not allege its state of incorporation or its principal place

13 of business. See Hertz . Instead, it cited to the declaration of Norris, its human resources

14 director, filed in support of the notice of removal. In her declaration, Norris stated that

15 Autism Services is incorporated in California, and that “the majority of the Company’s

16 corporate officers work from its headquarters in Lake Forest, California, and direct and

17 coordinate the Company’s activities from its headquarters in California.”

18 Norris’s declaration did not sufficiently establish the location of Autism Service’s

19 principal place of business. Norris’s declaration did not identify Autism Services’

20 principal place of business, its nerve center, or the location from where Autism Services’

21 board of directors and high level officers direct, control and coordinate its corporate

22 activities. See Hertz.

23 Because that pleading deficiency is a facial defect, not a factual defect, it would

24 be subject to amendment. See NewGen, 840 F.3d at 614. However, that is not the only

25 deficiency here. The Court will proceed on the assumption that Autism Services is a

26 California corporation with its principal place of business in California.

27 Citizenship of Putative Class Members

28 Diversity jurisdiction is based on facts that existed as of the date of removal.

1 Mondragon v. Cap. One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2013). Consequently,

2 in determining whether minimal diversity exists, here, the Court must consider the

3 citizenship of the parties as of the date of removal – November 12, 2024. See

4 Mondragon.

5 In support of its opposition, Autism Services provided a declaration, dated

6 February 4, 2026, from putative class member Annaleece Perez. Perez declared that she

7 was employed by Autism Services from July 6, 2023, to May 27, 2025, and that she

8 currently resides in Oregon, and had lived in Oregon since June, 2025. Because Perez’s

9 declaration is silent as to where she resided, let alone where she was domiciled, on

10 November 12, 2024, the date of removal, her declaration does not establish that her

11 citizenship was diverse from Autism Services’ citizenship. See Mondragon.

12 Moreover, the List failed to establish the citizenship of any of the putative class

13 members because it provided only the last known state of residency for each of the

14 putative class members. The List did not identify any class member’s domicile, let alone

15 prove domicile by a preponderance of the evidence. See Mondragon, 736 F.3d at 884.

16 Further, the December 4, 2025, declaration of Norris, which stated that the List

17 contained the domicile for each of the putative class members is not sufficient to override

18 the List’s notation that the identified states are the putative class members’ last known

19 state of residence. Even if the List’s heading was Domicile, that, by itself, would not be

20 sufficient evidence of any putative class member’s intent to remain in, or return to, that

21 state. See Ehrman,932 F.3d 1223, 1227.

22 Accordingly, Autism Services failed to produce competent proof that establishes,

23 by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of minimal diversity. See Leite.

24 Consequently, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case, thereby

25 requiring this case to be remanded.

26 Attorneys’ Fees

27 Archuleta requested an award of $7,500.00 for attorneys’ fees upon remand.

28 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), upon granting a motion to remand, the Court may

1 || award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff for fees incurred as a result of the

2 || removal. Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005). However, “absent

3 || unusual circumstances, attorney's fees should not be awarded when the removing party

4 || has an objectively reasonable basis for removal.” Martin, 546 U.S. at 132; Gardner v.

5 || UICT, 508 F.3d 559, 561 (9th Cir. 2007).

6 Here, there was an objectively reasonable basis for removal. However, Autism

7 || Services failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support that objectively reasonable

8 || basis.

9 Consequently, the request for attorneys’ fees will be denied.

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11 Accordingly,

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13 It is Orsered that Plaintiffs motion to remand be, and hereby is, ranted,

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15 It is further Ordered that Plaintiff's motion for attorneys’ fees be, and hereby

16 || is, Denied,

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18 || Date: August 5, 2026 a p=

□□□ (altace

20 etry J. Hatter, Jr.

SHenior United States District □□□□□

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Order — Page 7 of 7