Mugford

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

DEBORAH MUGFORD,

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS

Case No. 2:25-cv-919-KCD-KRH

SURVIVING MOTHER OF

PHILLIP MUGFORD, AND AS

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

ON BEHALF OF THE ESTATE OF

PHILLIP MUGFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

SERGEANT JUAN BASILIO,

INDIVIDUALLY; OFFICER

CHRISTOPHER YEUNG,

INDIVIDUALLY; SERGEANT

RAMI TABIL, INDIVIDUALLY;

NURSE JOHN DOES,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This case stems from a tragedy. Phillip Mugford took his own life while

incarcerated at the Charlotte Correctional Institution. His mother, Deborah

Mugford, now brings this civil rights lawsuit on behalf of his estate, claiming

that he was subjected to excessive force and deliberate indifference.

Defendants Juan Basilio and Christoper Yeung, the corrections officers who

responded to his cell, move to dismiss. (Doc. 50.) For the reasons below,

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

I. Background

Here are the relevant facts taken from the operative complaint, which

at this stage must be taken as true. Phillip’s mental health plummeted

behind bars. (Doc. 42 ¶ 56.) He suffered from severe psychological distress,

manifesting in screams and hallucinations echoing from his cell. (Id.)

Cellmates described his agonizing episodes as “war flashbacks.” (Id. ¶ 59.)

Yet when Phillip cried out for help, the corrections officers allegedly did

nothing. (Id. ¶¶ 61-62, 66.) His repeated requests for medication and

psychiatric treatment went unanswered. (Id. ¶¶ 68-69.)

The day of his suicide, Phillip was in restrictive confinement because of

his mental illness and decline. (Id. ¶ 15.) Prison staff allegedly skipped a

mandatory security check at 4:40 pm. (Id. ¶¶ 44-45.) At around 5:10 pm,

another inmate noticed Phillip hanging from a bed sheet in his cell and called

for help. (Id. ¶ 15-18.) Basilio and Yeung responded to his cell door, but did

not go in. Instead, they directed Phillip to stop hanging, but he didn’t

respond. (Id. ¶ 19.) Basilio then sprayed two canisters of a chemical agent

into Phillip’s cell and repeatedly told him to stop hanging, while Yeung stood

by. (Id. ¶ 21.) The estate believes that the chemical spray contributed to

Phillip’s death. (Id. ¶ 23.)

Basilio and Yeung waited until supervising officers arrived at the cell

around 5:13 pm before attempting to enter. (Id. ¶ 24.) Yeung handcuffed

Phillip, and he was removed from the cell as lifesaving measures were

performed. (Id. ¶ 26.)

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient

facts, accepted as true, to state a facially plausible claim for relief.” Galette v.

Goodell, No. 23-10896, 2023 WL 7391697, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2023). “A

claim is facially plausible if it pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. The question at this stage is not whether the plaintiff will

ultimately win, but simply whether the complaint can proceed into discovery.

At this starting gate, we must accept the complaint’s factual allegations

as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). That benefit of the doubt,

however, has limits. The court is not bound to accept legal conclusions

dressed up as factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007). A pleading that offers nothing more than “labels and conclusions”

or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not unlock

the courthouse doors. Id. In short, the plaintiff must tell a factual story that

makes the defendant’s liability plausible, not just point a finger and recite

the law. See, e.g., Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th

Cir. 2003).

III. Discussion

The estate brings three claims against Basilio and Yeung: excessive

force (Counts I & II) and deliberate indifference (Count III).

A. Excessive Force (Counts I & II)

The estate alleges that Basilio and Yeung violated Phillip’s Eighth

Amendment right to be free from excessive force when they sprayed chemical

gas in Phillip’s cell when he was hung by the bed sheet, incapacitated. The

estate also alleges that Yeung failed to intervene as Basilio deployed the

chemical gas. Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity for

their actions. The Court agrees.

“Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who deprives

someone of their federally protected rights under color of state law.” King v.

Marceno, No. 2:24-CV-375-KCD-DNF, 2025 WL 3080544, at *4 (M.D. Fla.

Nov. 4, 2025). “[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits force that offends

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether significant injury

is evident[.]” Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). So

jailers who use, or fail to intervene in the use of, excessive force may face

liability under § 1983. See Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1301 (11th

Cir. 2022) (“[A] claim for failure to intervene requires an act of excessive force

by the perpetrating officer in the first instance[.]”); Crocker v. Beatty, 995

F.3d 1232, 1246 (11th Cir. 2021).

To be entitled to qualified immunity, a government official must first

prove that he was acting within his discretionary authority at the time of the

alleged violation. See Donald v. Norris, 131 F.4th 1255 (11th Cir. 2025). After

a defendant meets this initial burden, the plaintiff must show that (1) the

official violated his constitutional or statutory rights and (2) those rights

were clearly established at the time the official acted. See Jones v. Fransen,

857 F.3d 843, 851 (11th Cir. 2017). “When qualified immunity is asserted in

the context of a motion to dismiss, [courts] look to the pleadings to see if the

plaintiff has successfully alleged the violation of a clearly established right.”

O’Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1206 (11th Cir. 2004).

There is no dispute that Basilio and Yeung were acting within the

scope of their authority. So the burden shifts to the estate to establish that

qualified immunity does not apply. See Bailey v. Wheeler, 843 F.3d 473, 480

(11th Cir. 2016). Here, the qualified immunity analysis begins—and ends—

with whether the alleged constitutional violation was contrary to clearly

established law.

“The touchstone of the ‘clearly established’ inquiry is whether the

official had ‘fair warning’ and notice that his conduct violated the

constitutional right in question.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1221 (11th

Cir. 2016 (11th Cir. 2016). For the law to be clearly established, “case law

must ordinarily have been earlier developed in such a concrete and factually

defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the

defendant’s place, that what he is doing violates a federal law.” Priester v.

City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000). “The Court

looks to the binding precedent set forth in the decisions of the Supreme

Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest court of the state ... to decide

whether a right is clearly established.” Melton, 841 F.3d at 1221. “Exact

factual identity with a previously decided case is not required, but the

unlawfulness of the conduct must be apparent from the pre-existing law.”

Coffin v. Brandau, 642 F.3d 999, 1013 (11th Cir. 2011).

At the time of the constitutional violation here, the estate has identified

no clearly established law that could have given Basilio and Yeung fair notice

that spraying Phillip before they entered his cell amounted to excessive force.

Officers may use chemical agents so long as a valid penological reason

supports its use and it is not used in “quantities greater than necessary or for

the sole purpose of punishment or the infliction of pain.” Thomas v. Bryant,

614 F.3d 1288, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is well-established that the use

of chemical agents on recalcitrant prisoners is not per se unconstitutional.”);

see also Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1264 (acknowledging “pepper-spray” may be

used to subdue an inmate when penologically necessary); Danley v. Allen, 540

F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Pepper spray is an accepted non-lethal

means of controlling unruly inmates”). “Force is deemed legitimate in a

custodial setting as long as it is applied in a good faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline [and not] maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002).

The Florida Administrative Code echoes this authority by authorizing

the Department of Corrections to use the force applied here. The Code

authorizes “reactionary force” to prevent an inmate from “attempting to hang

himself.” Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-602.210(4)(b)(7). “Reactionary use of force” is

defined as “[a]ny force that must be administered quickly or immediately to

compel the cessation of an inmate’s violence or resistance to a lawful order.”

Id. at 33-602.210(1)(x). The use of chemical agents to “[p]revent an inmate

from inflicting any self-injury or from attempting to commit suicide” is

authorized. Id. at 33-602.210(5)(b)(1).

The estate relies on Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010),

to argue a violation of a clearly established right. But in Thomas, the

prisoner was in his cell, posing no immediate threat of harm to himself when

he was pepper-sprayed. Id. at 1312. Self-harm is the scenario that officers

were confronted with here, and the Eleventh Circuit has found that pepper

spray on a suicidal or self-harming inmate is not excessive force. In Jacoby v.

Baldwin Cnty., 596 F. App’x 757 (11th Cir. 2014), the court held that prison

officers were justified in using pepper spray to extract a detainee from his cell

safely because the detainee had threatened violence in addition to self-harm

and officers reasonably could have believed the detainee might harm himself

further. Id. at 766.

Taking the estate’s allegations as true, not every reasonable officer

would have known that spraying a chemical agent into an inmate’s cell who

is attempting to commit suicide violates the Eighth Amendment right against

excessive force. At bottom, “[p]rison guards may use force when necessary to

restore order and need not wait until disturbances reach dangerous

proportions before responding.” Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th

Cir. 1990). Because “[p]epper spray is an accepted non-lethal means of

controlling unruly inmates,” Danley, 540 F.3d at 1307, the officers here did

not clearly use excessive force by deploying spray in order to force Phillip to

comply with their orders. Thus, the officers are entitled to qualified

immunity.

B. Deliberate Indifference (Count III)

The estate alleges that Basilio and Talib were deliberately indifferent

to Phillip’s serious medical condition. The estate made the same claim

against Defendant Centurion, which was dismissed because the nurses did

not know that Phillip was suicidal. (Doc. 65 at 7 (“The Eighth Amendment

requires subjective awareness of a strong likelihood of suicide.”) The same

reasoning and result apply here. The allegations do not establish that Basilio

and Yeung had actual, subjective notice of a strong likelihood of suicide. And

without that notice, the estate’s deliberate indifference claims directed at

Phillip’s suicide must be dismissed. See Gantt v. Everett, 162 F.4th 1107,

1111-12 (11th Cir. 2025); Hofer v. City of Auburn, Ala., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1308,

1316 (M.D. Ala. 2001).

IV. Conclusion

Basilio and Yeung are entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive

force claims. And the Court has previously noted what was missing from the

estate’s deliberate indifference claims: facts showing an actual notice of a

strong likelihood of suicide. (Doc. 40.) Despite an opportunity to cure that

defect, the estate failed to do so. When a plaintiff is given a roadmap of what

the law requires and still cannot plead the necessary facts, it strongly

suggests those facts do not exist. Keeping these claims alive would thus be

futile. What is more, the estate has not asked for leave to amend its

complaint a second time. And “a district court is not required to grant a

plaintiff who is represented by counsel leave to amend his complaint sua

sponte.” Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 544 (11th

Cir. 2002). The estate had its chance to state a viable claim, and the law does

not require the Court to give it another one. Accordingly, Defendants Basilio

and Yeung’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 50) is GRANTED. The claims in Counts

I, II, and III are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to

terminate Juan Basilio and Christoper Yeung, but judgment is withheld until

the conclusion of this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on August 27, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek

United States District Judge

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