Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

PETER WILLIAMS, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 4:26-cv-00433-P

DALLAS-FORT WORTH INTERNATIONAL

AIRPORT BOARD, ET AL.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 10.

Having reviewed the filing and the relevant law, the Court will GRANT

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to the Section 1983 claims and

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

claims.

BACKGROUND

On April 14, 2024, Plaintiffs Peter Williams and Dr. Mary Jane

Williams were ticketed passengers on American Airlines flights from

Evansville, Indiana to Phoenix, Arizona with a connection at Dallas-

Fort Worth International Airport (“DFW”). ECF No. 2 at 5. During a

dispute over baggage policy between Plaintiffs and American Airlines,

Defendant Officer B. Jackson and three unidentified officers responded

to the jetway. ECF No. 2 at 5. After some back and forth, officers and

airline personnel eventually instructed Mr. Williams to vacate the

jetway. ECF No. 2 at 6. Mr. Williams nevertheless attempted to re-board

the aircraft, at which point Officer Jackson grabbed Mr. Williams. ECF

No. 2 at 6. Plaintiffs and Defendant dispute what happens next.

Compare ECF No. 2 at 6 with ECF No. 10 at 9.

According to police body-cam footage, Officer Jackson stated that Mr.

Williams was “under arrest now” and attempted to restrain him. ECF

No. 18-1, Exhibit 4 at 2:06. Mr. Williams can be heard replying “No”

repeatedly and appears to be physically resisting arrest for a period of

roughly 25 seconds. ECF No. 18-1, Exhibit 4 at 2:10–2:45. Eventually,

Officer Jackson takes Mr. Williams to the ground in what appears to be

an attempt to restrain and handcuff him. ECF No. 18-1, Exhibit 4 at

2:45–2:51. Mr. Williams continues to writhe on the ground, evading

handcuffs, at which point Officer Jackson places knee in his back and

once again informs him that he is under arrest. ECF No. 18-1, Exhibit 4

at 2:52. Once more, Mr. Williams replies repeatedly “No.” ECF No. 18-

1, Exhibit 4 at 2:53–2:55. There is then a period of brief respite wherein

Officer Jackson continues to have his knee on Mr. Williams who is

audibly objecting but does not appear to be actively resisting, though his

hands remain uncuffed. ECF No. 18-1, Exhibit 4 at 3:00–3:15. After this

period, Officer Jackson informs Mr. Williams that “if you do not put your

hands behind your back, you will be tased.” ECF No. 18-1, Exhibit 4 at

3:15. Mr. Williams nevertheless continues to verbally object and

physically resists Officer Jackson’s attempt to restrain his hands. ECF

No. 18-1, Exhibit 4 at 3:26. Officer Jackson finally discharges his taser

once to Mr. Williams’ side. ECF No. 18-1, Exhibit 4 at 3:29.

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Dallas-Fort Worth International

Airport Board (“the Board”), Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Department of

Public Safety, Officer Jackson, and bystander officers on April 8th, 2026,

alleging civil-rights violations under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and advancing

various state-law claims. ECF No. 1. On June 22nd, 2026, Defendant

offered the Motion now under consideration.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), dismissal is appropriate if Plaintiffs’

pleading fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In

conducting that review, the Court accepts “all well-pleaded facts as true

and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.”

Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F. 3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The

court does not, however, “presume true a number of categories of

statements, including legal conclusions; mere labels; threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal., 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009)).

A court ruling on a motion to dismiss “may rely on the complaint, its

proper attachments, documents incorporated into the complaint by

reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”

Randall D. Wolcott M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir.

2011). Further, a court may permissibly consider “[d]ocuments that a

defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss” without converting the

motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment if those documents

“are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her

claim.”1 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 499 (2000)

(quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429,

431 (7th Cir. 1993)). Moreover, where video recordings are included in

the pleadings, the video depictions of events, viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiffs, should be adopted over the factual allegations

in the complaint if the video “blatantly contradict[s]” those allegations.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007).

ANALYSIS

The Court’s analysis proceeds in three parts. First, the Court reasons

that Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against Officer Jackson are barred

by qualified immunity and should therefore be dismissed. This applies

with equal force to Plaintiffs’ claims as to bystander liability. Second,

the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged a claim for

municipal liability. Third, the Court concludes that it may, in its

discretion, decline to hear Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims.

A. The Officers are Entitled to Qualified Immunity Because

No Clearly Established Law “Squarely Governs”

“Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct

violates a clearly established [statutory or] constitutional right.”

1 This applies, too, to video exhibits. See Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 678

(7th Cir. 2024) (writing that “the court, therefore, may examine exhibits, including

video exhibits, attached to the complaint, or referenced in the pleading if they are

central to the claim”); Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2024)

(affirming the district court’s consideration of video evidence despite it not being

attached to, or even mentioned in, the plaintiff’s complaint).

Converse v. City of Kemah, 961 F.3d 771, 774 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting

Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003)). “Although

qualified immunity is nominally an affirmative defense, the plaintiff

bears a heightened burden to negate the defense once properly raised.”

Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff bears the burden to “plead facts which, if proved, would defeat

the claim of immunity.” Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir.

2019) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, Officer Jackson is entitled to qualified immunity at the

motion-to-dismiss stage unless Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to

plausibly show that (1) the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional

right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established at the time

of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129

S. Ct. 808, 816 (2009). The Court has discretion as to which of the two

prongs should be analyzed first. Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 236 (2021).

Because Plaintiffs do not carry their burden as to the clearly established

prong, this Court need not evaluate the validity of the excessive force

claim.

Plaintiffs do not plausibly show that Officer Jackson violated any

“clearly established” right. This burden is a heavy one: A right is “clearly

established” only if preexisting precedent “ha[s] placed the . . .

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 741 (2011). This restrictive analysis provides that the right must

be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna,

577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Courts must not "define clearly established law at a high level

of generality"; instead, their "inquiry must be undertaken in light of the

specific context of the case." Id. at 12 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Therefore, unless existing precedent "squarely

governs" the conduct at issue, an official will be entitled to qualified

immunity. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per

curiam); Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (emphasizing that "[t]he dispositive

question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly

established" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

To put it pointedly, Plaintiffs must "identify[] a case in which an

officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the

[Constitution], and . . . explain[] why the case clearly proscribed the

conduct of that individual officer." Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph v.

Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 345 (5th Cir. 2020). This cannot be undertaken

at too broad a level of generality, id., and it certainly cannot be

established by citation to nonexistent cases.2

Here, Plaintiffs make a borderline sanctionable attempt to identify

“clearly established” law from five cases. ECF No. 18. Three of these

cases—Iko v. Shreve, 122 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 1997), Yates v. Terry, 817

F.3d 877 (4th Cir. 2016), and Dawkins v. Fields 354 F.3d 392 (5th Cir.

2003)—are either non-existent or mistakenly out-of-circuit and, in any

event, inapposite. With respect to Dawkins, this Court cannot even find

a case purporting to “clearly establish” law on the matter and wastes its

limited judicial resources in doing so. As to Iko, mistakenly cited as a

5th Circuit case, Plaintiffs presumably meant to refer to Iko v. Shreve,

535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008). But this out-of-circuit case concerned

correctional officers who broke up a fight by administering pepper spray

to a non-confrontational inmate, not a taser applied to a resistant

passenger. It therefore cannot constitute “clearly established” law in

this Circuit nor “squarely governs” on its own facts. The same is true of

Yates. This out-of-circuit decision concerned an officer who tased a non-

resisting arrestee three separate times. Id. at 881. There, the officer

tased Yates for a second time when the suspect was already on the

ground “ma[king] no attempt to get up” and a third time after he asked

his brother to call for the officer’s supervisor. Id. Yates is thus both non-

2 The Court cautions that use of generative artificial intelligence that results in

repeated misrepresentations of law may qualify for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P.

11(b)–(c) (“The rule . . . require[s] litigants to ‘stop-and-think’ before initially making

legal or factual contentions . . . A litigant’s obligations . . . include reaffirming to the

court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after learning

that they cease to have any merit.”); Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 3.01 (“A

lawyer shall not . . . assert or controvert an issue [in a proceeding], unless the lawyer

reasonably believes that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.”); Id.

3.03(a)(1) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact

or law to a tribunal”); Id. 8.04(a)(3) (A lawyer shall not “engage in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit[,] or misrepresentation”). The Fifth Circuit, for example,

recently approved a $2,500 sanction for AI hallucinated misrepresentations. Fletcher

v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 168 F.4th 231 (2026).

binding and materially dissimilar. Neither of these cases therefore carry

Plaintiffs’ burden. The Court has little patience for such “lazy

lawyering.”

The remaining two cases, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) and

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), fare no better. Plaintiffs argue

that Garner clearly establishes that non-deadly force against a

compliant, non-threatening person is unreasonable. ECF No. 18 at 7.

But this formulation asks too much of Garner. In Garner, police officers

pursued and shot a fleeing purse-snatcher. 471 U.S. at 4. At most, the

5th Circuit has noted, Garner stands for the proposition that deadly

force is prohibited against an unarmed burglary suspect fleeing on foot

who poses no immediate threat. Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th

1159, 1167 (5th Cir. 2021). It simply does not follow that because deadly

force is unreasonable under those circumstances, non-deadly force (like

a taser) must be too. Cf. ECF. No 18 at 7. That inference gets the

reasoning precisely backward and is the kind of defective, over-

generalized extension that the Supreme Court has repudiated. See, e.g.,

Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018) (rejecting use of broad

formulation of Garner’s holding).

Graham v. Connor does not help Plaintiffs either. In Graham, the

Court held that the question of excessive force requires “requires careful

attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether

he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). There, officers applied

force to a diabetic detained during an investigative stop that resulted in

a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, and an injured

shoulder. Id. at 390. But the Court cautioned that “officers are often

forced to make split-second judgments––in circumstances that are

tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving––about the amount of force that

is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396. The reasonableness of

force required, therefore, should be “judged from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Id. at 397.

Here, the Court need not, and does not, decide whether Jackson

violated the Fourth Amendment when he used force against Plaintiffs.

For even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—a

proposition that is not at all evident—Plaintiffs’ desired principle simply

cannot be extracted from Garner with sufficient clarity to constitute

“clearly established” law. Cf. ECF. No. 18 at 7 (misconstruing Garner to

stand for the proposition that application of force against a compliant,

non-threatening person is always objectively unreasonable).

In any event, the Supreme Court has noted that “Garner and

Graham do not by themselves create clearly established law outside an

‘obvious case.’” White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. 73, 80 (2017) (internal

quotation marks omitted). And while undoubtedly “obvious” excessive

force cases can arise, they are extremely rare. See, e.g., Taylor v. Riojas,

141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020) (per curiam) (noting that to qualify as an

“obvious” case, there must be (1) particularly egregious facts and (2) no

evidence that the officials’ actions were compelled by necessity or

exigency). The facts alleged here involving a single taser discharge

against a non-compliant adult are not so egregious as to be an obvious

case.

The “clearly established” inquiry is demanding, especially in claims

for excessive force. Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir.

2019). Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

341, 106 (1986). Here, Plaintiffs failed to identify any clearly established

law that would place beyond doubt the constitutional question in this

case. As a result, their excessive force claim cannot succeed.

Finally, while it is true that an officer who is present at the scene

and does not take reasonable measures to protect a suspect from another

officer's use of excessive force may be liable under Section 1983, Hale v.

Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995), this claim rises and falls with

Plaintiffs’ claim against Officer Jackson. If Plaintiffs do not plausibly

allege that clearly establish law forbids Officer Jackson’s actions, then

a fortiori they have not proved that bystanding officers were not entitled

to immunity. Put otherwise, if a reasonable official would not have

understood that his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, neither

would a reasonable bystander. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim for

bystander liability by excessive force are also barred.

B. Plaintiffs Do Not Plausibly Allege Municipal Liability

Plaintiffs’ complaint presses two theories of municipal liability. First,

Plaintiffs allege that DFW had a “custom and practice” of using

excessive force against compliant individuals. ECF No. 2 at 12. Second,

Plaintiffs allege that DFW failed to train officers who violated

constitutional rights. ECF No. 2 at 12. Neither claim survives.3

1. Plaintiffs Do Not Plausibly Allege Custom and Practice

A governmental entity may only be held liable in a Section 1983 suit

when the complained-of constitutional injury, here the use of excessive

force, results from “execution of a government’s policy or custom.”

Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Per Monell,

“municipal liability under § 1983 requires proof of three elements: [1] a

policymaker; [2] an official policy; and [3] a violation of constitutional

rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.” Id. at 694. To

proceed beyond the pleading stage, a complaint’s “description of a policy

or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation

. . . cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.” Spiller v. City

of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997).

The problem is that Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege any official

policy or custom at all. The second element—an official policy—includes

“[a] policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially

adopted and promulgated by the municipality’s lawmaking officers or by

3 Plaintiffs sue both DFW Airport Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) and DFW

International Airport Board (‘the Board”). For Plaintiffs to sue a department of a city,

that department must enjoy a separate legal existence. Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep’t,

939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1991). But as Defendants note, DFW DPS does not “enjoy

a separate legal existence” from the city. ECF No. 10 at 17. The capacity of an entity

to be sued is determined “by the law of the state where the court is located.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 17(b); see also Darby 939 F.2d at 313. Unless the political entity that created

the department has taken “explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural

authority,” the department lacks the capacity to sue or to be sued. Id. Plaintiffs’ do not

allege separate jural authority and, in any event, concede this point in their Reply.

ECF No. 18 at 9. Even assuming arguendo that they are separate entities, Plaintiffs

have not plausibly alleged Monell liability against either entity and thus both claims

should be dismissed.

an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making

authority.” Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984)

(en banc) (per curiam). But the complaint does not identify a single

official policy to supply the requisite moving force behind the alleged

violation. ECF No. 2.

True, an official policy may also be “[a] persistent, widespread

practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by

officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled

as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy” and

“practically have the force of law.” Id; see also Connick v. Thompson, 563

U.S. 51, 61 (2011). But Plaintiffs do not plead that DFW maintained a

policy of widespread and persistent use of excessive force. Nowhere in

the complaint do Plaintiffs allege other incidents of excessive force or

misuse of taser. The only oblique reference to a pattern is that the “police

regularly encounter non-criminal customer service disputes,” ECF No.

18 at 9, and a threadbare recitation in the complaint of a “custom and

practice of using excessive force against compliant individuals.” ECF No.

2 at 9. But, as the Fifth Circuit has noted, “if actions of city employees

are to be used to prove a custom for which the municipality is liable,

those actions must have occurred for so long or so frequently that the

course of conduct warrants the attribution to the governing body of

knowledge that the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted

practice of city employees.” Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842

(5th Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs’ conclusory statements without additional

factual enhancement do not come close to plausibly alleging the custom

or policy required for municipal liability.

2. Plaintiff’s Do Not Plausibly Allege a Failure to Train

Neither have Plaintiffs plausibly pleaded that DFW’s allegedly

inadequate training or supervision of Officer Jackson was a moving force

behind the supposed constitutional violation. To establish municipal

liability under a failure-to train theory, Plaintiffs must prove three

elements: 1) the city failed to train or supervise the officers involved; 2)

there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or

train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and 3) the failure

to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th

Cir. 2021). Plaintiffs argue that DFW failed to establish adequate

policies governing taser deployment, to train in de-escalation, and to

discipline or supervise officers, ECF No. 2 at 9, and that this amounted

deliberate indifference to the need for better training and supervision.

ECF No. 2 at 13. Specifically, Plaintiffs seize on Officer Jackson’s fellow

officer’s statement “No, No, it’s good, we got this” to demonstrate

inadequate training and supervision. ECF No. 2 at 13. But this does not

work either.

In Littell v. Houston Independent School District 894 F.3d 616 (5th

Cir. 2018), the Fifth Circuit clarified the two means of proving municipal

liability under a failure-to-train theory outlined by the Supreme Court

in City of Canton v. Harris 489 U.S. 378 (1989). The first is when

violations are so frequent that the factfinder can infer the need for

further training was obvious to policymakers. Littell, 894 F.3d at 624.

But as noted above, Plaintiffs have not alleged a pattern. However, even

absent proof of pattern, the Court noted that deliberate indifference can

still be inferred if the factfinder determines that the risk of

constitutional violations was or should have been an “obvious” or “highly

predictable consequence” of the alleged training inadequacy. Id.

Presumably, Plaintiffs rely on the latter single-incident theory.

Yet Plaintiffs do not plausibly plead that DFW was deliberately

indifferent to the need for further training. The single-incident theory is

generally reserved for those cases in which the government actor was

provided with no training whatsoever. Peña v. City of Rio Grande City,

879 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir. 2018). Further, “[a] municipality’s culpability

for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on

a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).

For one, Plaintiffs’ threadbare allegations argue as to the extent of

training, not that officers lack training whatsoever. ECF No. 2 at 13.

But even more fundamentally, Plaintiffs offer no factual support for

these contentions other than Officer Jackson’s fellow officer’s statement

that “no, no, we got this.” ECF. No 2 at 13. This statement alone,

however, cannot support the inference plaintiff desires. Even supposing

that his admonition to his fellow officer indicates disapproval of the

technique, the lone statement does not plausibly support inadequate

training. The statement could just as well indicate that officers had

received training and therefore disapproved. But the statement and

accompanying threadbare conclusions do not “allege with specificity how

a particular … program is defective.” Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls,

614 F. 3d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 2020). Nor do they approach deliberate

indifference, which “requires a showing of more than negligence or even

gross negligence.” Est. of Davis ex rel. McCully v. City of N. Richland

Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs thus also fail to

plausibly allege municipal liability under a failure-to-train theory.

C. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental jurisdiction

Over Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims

Because the Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are barred by qualified

immunity and foreclosed under Monell, and thus should be dismissed,

only the state law claims remain. Those too should be dismissed.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. We are also

guided by “considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

and comity.” Mendoza v. Murphy, 532 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citing McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1998),

overruled on other grounds by Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d

433 (5th Cir. 2003)). Our general rule is to dismiss state law claims when

the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed. Parker &

Parsley Petrol. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992).

However, we review each claim “on a case-by-case basis, and no single

factor is dispositive.” Mendoza, 532 F.3d at 346.

Here, considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity support dismissal. It would serve the important interests of

federalism and comity, because federal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction that “often are not as well equipped for determinations of

state law as are state courts.” Parker, 972 F.2d at 588–89. Plaintiffs’

state law claims, though themselves subject to serious jurisdictional

hurdles, nevertheless involve interpretation of state law and further

factual development that is best left to state court.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss as to the Section 1983 claims with prejudice and dismisses

the state law claims without prejudice so they can be pursued in

Texas state court.

SO ORDERED on this 27th day of August 2026.

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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