DILLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARC JOHNSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 25-1202

)

OFFICER ANTHONY M. DILLEY, )

DISTRICT ATTORNEY MATTHEW )

CULLEN, THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH )

and THE COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Marc Johnson (“Plaintiff”) filed his Complaint (Docket No. 1) in this matter

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated by Defendant Allegheny

County Assistant District Attorney Matthew Cullen (“ADA Cullen”) and others during his arrest

on October 18, 2024, and in the course of the subsequent prosecution of charges against him.

Presently before the Court is ADA Cullen’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (the

“Motion”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and supporting brief

(Docket Nos. 12, 13), Plaintiff’s brief in opposition (Docket No. 21), and ADA Cullen’s reply

brief (Docket No. 33). For the following reasons, ADA Cullen’s Motion will be granted and

Plaintiff’s claims against ADA Cullen will be dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court presents herein an abbreviated version of the relevant facts, viewed in the light

most favorable to Plaintiff, as alleged in the Complaint1 and as set forth in certain additional

1 Plaintiff contends that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

and 1343. (Docket No. 1, ¶ 2).

documents that are properly considered by the Court in considering the Rule 12(b)(6) motion here.

On October 18, 2024, Plaintiff was arrested and charged in a Police Criminal Complaint

(“Criminal Complaint”) in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, with

one count each of the following offenses: Recklessly Endangering Another Person, in violation

of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2705; Resisting Arrest, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5104; Evading Arrest, in

violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5104.2(a); and Disorderly Conduct, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A.

§ 5503(a)(1). (Docket No. 12-1).

According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause attached to the Criminal Complaint,2 Officer

Anthony M. Dilley (“Officer Dilley”), an officer with the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police who is also

named as a Defendant in this matter, was working an approved secondary employment detail at a

farmers’ market in the City of Pittsburgh, when he heard a male voice call out, “Hey Officer

Dilley.” (Docket No. 12-1 at 6). As they had had prior interactions, Officer Dilley immediately

recognized the speaker as Plaintiff. (Id.). Officer Dilley was also aware that Plaintiff had several

active warrants for his arrest at that time. (Id.). Officer Dilley advised Plaintiff of the existence

of such arrest warrants, and that Plaintiff should walk outside the farmers’ market so that he could

be taken into custody away from the crowd. (Id.). As they exited the main portion of the farmers’

market, Officer Dilley explained to Plaintiff that he would be detained while the arrest warrants

were confirmed, at which point Plaintiff immediately began to walk away from Officer Dilley.

2 Although Plaintiff attached to his Complaint in this case the underlying state court Criminal Complaint, he

omitted the Affidavit of Probable Cause that was a required attachment to the Criminal Complaint. See Sanders v.

Mullaney, No. 1:22-CV-00355, 2025 WL 3704294, at *4 (Dec. 22, 2025) (noting that an affidavit is required when

the charging officer also requests an arrest warrant). That full document, the Criminal Complaint with attached

Affidavit of Probable Cause, is referred to herein and is attached to ADA Cullen’s Motion. (Docket No. 12-1). “In

deciding motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), courts generally consider only the allegations in the complaint,

exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.” Lum v.

Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004). Here, the Affidavit of Probable Cause is a matter of public record

and is also integral to Plaintiff’s claims, see infra. The Court may consider and rely on the full text of the Criminal

Complaint and attached Affidavit of Probable Cause, since Plaintiff has conceded its relevance and accuracy by

attaching a portion of it to the Complaint and by relying on it in alleging the claims in his Complaint.

(Id.). When Officer Dilley told Plaintiff to stop, Plaintiff began running and Officer Dilley chased

him on foot. (Id.). Plaintiff fled into the farmers’ market, and Officer Dilley chased him through

a crowd of people and approximately six separate stands selling farmers’ market items. (Id.). The

pursuit lasted approximately 45 seconds, at which point a bystander tripped Plaintiff, who fell into

a stand selling items out of glass bottles. (Id.). Plaintiff knocked the stand over and fell into a

crowd of people in the walkway. (Id.) Plaintiff got back up and took about eight more steps, until

he was again pushed by a bystander. (Id.). Plaintiff fell again and narrowly missed hitting a person

who was seated in a chair speaking to a group of children. (Id.).

Officer Dilley then attempted to take Plaintiff into custody and ordered him to place his

hands behind his back. (Docket No. 12-1 at 6). Plaintiff did not comply, rolled onto his back, and

said “why” when advised to follow commands and roll onto his belly. (Id.). Officer Dilley had to

physically roll Plaintiff onto his belly, while Plaintiff actively resisted and attempted to get back

up onto his knees. (Id.). After a brief struggle, Officer Dilley was able to take Plaintiff into

custody. (Id.).

Plaintiff’s preliminary arraignment was held and bail was set by a Magisterial District

Judge on or about October 20, 2024.3 (Docket No. 23-1 at 1-3). A hearing in Plaintiff’s criminal

case based on the above incident was held on October 30, 2024. (Id. at 3). The docket of the

criminal case indicates that Plaintiff was present at the hearing, that the charges for Recklessly

Endangering Another Person and Disorderly Conduct were withdrawn at that time, and that

3 Defendant Officer Dilley attached to his brief in support of his Motion to Dismiss a copy of the Magisterial

District Court Docket. (Docket No. 23-1). As noted, supra, with regard to the Affidavit of Probable Cause attached

to the underlying Criminal Complaint here, the Court may consider the Magisterial District Court docket and the Court

of Common Pleas docket since, in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court may look beyond the complaint

to matters of public record, including court files and records, and documents referenced in the complaint or that are

essential to a plaintiff’s claim that are attached to a defendant’s motion. See Colbert v. Mercy Behav. Health, 845 F.

Supp. 2d 633, 637 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196

(3d Cir. 1993)).

Plaintiff waived his right to a preliminary hearing on the remaining charges of Resisting Arrest

and Evading Arrest. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff’s bail was altered by Order of Court on February 18, 2025,

from a monetary bond to non-monetary conditions of release. (Docket No. 23-1 at 2).

As to the allegations relevant to ADA Cullen specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on

December 16, 2024, ADA Cullen “continued the prosecution” of Plaintiff by filing an

“Information.”4 (Docket No. 1, ¶ 15). Plaintiff also avers that on March 25, 2025, his defense

counsel “was forced to file a Motion to Compel Discovery.” (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiff further alleges

that “the Commonwealth, through [ADA] Cullen or another agent, filed a Petition for Protective

Order” to avoid its discovery obligations. (Id. ¶ 19). Plaintiff alleges that on March 31, 2025, “the

Honorable Thomas P. Caulfield granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery and ordered the

Commonwealth to produce the requested materials.” (Id. ¶ 20). Finally, Plaintiff avers that on

July 24, 2025, “the Allegheny County District Attorney’s Office entered an order of nolle prosequi

on the two remaining charges against Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 21).

As noted above, the Complaint in this case, which is based on the events surrounding

Plaintiff’s arrest, detention and prosecution of the Criminal Complaint filed against him in state

court, alleges a variety of claims against a number of Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Only two claims are alleged against ADA Cullen: Count III, Malicious Prosecution (against

Officer Dilley and ADA Cullen, in their individual capacities); and Count IV, Excessive Bail

(against Officer Dilley and ADA Cullen in their individual capacities). (Docket 1 at 8-9). ADA

Cullen has filed his Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, the motion has been fully briefed by the

4 A copy of the Information (which is a court filing that the Court may properly consider here) referenced in

Paragraph 15 of the Complaint is attached to ADA Cullen’s Motion to Dismiss as “Exhibit C.” (Docket No. 12-3).

parties, and it is ripe for decision.5

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations contained in the

complaint must be accepted as true and must be construed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, and the court must “‘determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint,

the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.’” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d

Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)); see Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief,” the complaint must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.’” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, while “this standard does not require

‘detailed factual allegations,’” Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

It should be further noted, therefore, that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Supreme

Court has noted that a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard “‘does not impose a probability

5 The other Defendants named in this matter have filed motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them as

well. Those motions are being addressed by the Court in separate Memorandum Opinions and Orders.

requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at

234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, the requirement that a court accept as true all

factual allegations does not extend to legal conclusions; thus, a court is “‘not bound to accept as

true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

To review a complaint under this standard, the Court proceeds in three steps. See Connelly

v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). First, the Court notes the elements of a

claim. See id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the Court eliminates conclusory allegations.

See id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). And finally, the Court assumes the remaining well-pleaded

facts are true and assesses “‘whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” Id.

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

B. Pro Se Pleadings

Although courts must generally construe pro se pleadings liberally pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2),

courts are not required to accept legal conclusions disguised as statements of fact, unsupported

conclusions, or unwarranted references. See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir.

2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). “[A] pro se complaint must still contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Wallace v. Fegan, 455 F. App’x 137, 139 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Thus, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a

claim,” and “they cannot flout procedural rules – they must abide by the same rules that apply to

all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal

citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff brings his constitutional claims in this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

does not create any substantive rights, but instead provides a remedy for deprivations of rights

created by the Constitution of the United States or federal law. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,

471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). Accordingly, “[t]o state a claim for relief in an action brought under

§ 1983, [a plaintiff] must establish that [he was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.”

American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Plaintiff asserts here that

ADA Cullen violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments6 to the

Constitution of the United States by maliciously prosecuting his case and by subjecting him to

excessive bail.

In moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against him, ADA Cullen argues that such claims

must be dismissed with prejudice because he is entitled to absolute immunity from liability for

actions taken in connection with judicial proceedings. (Docket No. 13 at 7-10). See Odd v.

Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3d

Cir. 2011). ADA Cullen contends that his alleged actions here were clearly taken in connection

with judicial proceedings while he was acting in his capacity as a prosecutor for the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Docket No. 13 at 7).

To determine whether absolute prosecutorial immunity applies, the Court of Appeals for

6 Although Plaintiff indicates in the Complaint that he brings certain claims under the Fourteenth Amendment

as well as the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, in his brief in response to Defendant Officer Dilley’s motion to dismiss,

Plaintiff indicates that he wishes to withdraw his claims to the extent they are brought under the Fourteenth

Amendment, and he concedes that his Malicious Prosecution claim (Count III) should proceed solely under the Fourth

Amendment, and his Excessive Bail claim (Count IV) should proceed solely under the Eighth Amendment. (Docket

No. 43 at 6). Therefore, the Court will not address Plaintiff’s claims to the extent they are brought under the Fourteenth

Amendment.

the Third Circuit applies a two-step analysis: “First, we ascertain just what conduct forms the

basis for plaintiff’s cause of action. Then, we determine what function (prosecutorial,

administrative, investigative, or something else entirely) that act served.” Roberts v. Lau, 90 F.4th

618, 625 (3d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Specifically, “courts must

focus upon the functional nature of the activities rather than [the prosecutor’s] status to determine

whether absolute immunity is warranted.” Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 159 (3d Cir. 2020)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “That functional test separates advocacy from

everything else, entitling a prosecutor to absolute immunity only for work intimately associated

with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. at 159-60 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

First, as noted, supra, Plaintiff alleges that ADA Cullen filed an Information, Plaintiff’s

counsel had to file a Motion to Compel Discovery, ADA Cullen (or another agent) filed a Petition

for Protective Order, Judge Caulfield granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery and ordered the

Commonwealth to produce the requested materials, and the District Attorney’s office entered an

order of nolle prosequi for the two remaining charges against Plaintiff. (Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 15, 18,

19, 20, 21).

Second, the Court must determine whether those alleged acts served a prosecutorial

function. As to filing the Information, when a plaintiff alleges that a prosecutor filed an

information or complaint without there being probable cause, or when a plaintiff otherwise alleges

that a prosecutor committed a wrongful prosecution, the plaintiff is alleging activity “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” for which the prosecutor is entitled to

the defense of absolute immunity. See Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d at 164 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Moreover, the decision whether “to initiate a prosecution is at the core of a

prosecutor’s judicial role,” and a “prosecutor is absolutely immune when making this decision,

even where he acts without a good faith belief that any wrongdoing has occurred.” Kulwicki v.

Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463-64 (3d Cir. 1992).

Furthermore, upon review of the Complaint, the Court finds that all averments regarding

ADA Cullen involve actions he allegedly undertook, or decisions he allegedly made, while acting

in criminal judicial proceedings on behalf of the Commonwealth and while functioning as an

advocate for the Commonwealth in connection with Plaintiff’s criminal judicial proceedings. All

of these alleged actions constitute “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation

of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the

State,” to which prosecutorial immunity extends. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273

(1993). Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a claim of Excessive Bail against ADA Cullen,

acts covered by absolute prosecutorial immunity also include making arguments to a district justice

or trial court regarding the court’s setting of a bail amount. See Hersh v. Rellehan, 325 F. Supp.

3d 613, 616 (E.D. Pa. 2018); see also Swope v. City of Pittsburgh, 90 F. Supp. 3d 400, 412 (W.D.

Pa. 2015) (citing James v. York Cnty. Police Dep’t, 160 F. App’x 126, 133 (3d Cir. 2005), and

noting that in Pennsylvania “the district justice alone is charged with the responsibility of setting

bail”).

Regardless, Plaintiff argues that ADA Cullen’s Motion should be denied because it is based

on a false and unauthenticated record. (Docket No. 21 at 4-5). Plaintiff states that he disputes the

authenticity of the documents relied upon by ADA Cullen in his Motion, so the Court cannot

consider them on a motion to dismiss. (Id. at 2-3, 5). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the Court

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County docket sheet from his criminal case, which ADA Cullen

attached to his Motion, bears no official markings to prove it was ever filed with or generated by

a court. (Id. at 1-3). Plaintiff argues that ADA Cullen’s entire immunity argument depends on the

existence of a legitimate judicial proceeding, and the only evidence offered is a document of

contested origin and authenticity, so the motion to dismiss should be denied. (Id. at 2-3).

Plaintiff is incorrect in this regard.7 The docket sheet to which he refers, and which ADA

Cullen has attached to his Motion, is incorporated by reference into the Complaint, is alleged by

Plaintiff to be integral to his claims, and is a public record in judicial proceedings related to or

underlying the present case, of which the Court may take judicial notice. See Buck v.

Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur

R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)); Golden v. Cook, 293 F. Supp. 2d

546, 551 (W.D. Pa. 2003). The Court therefore takes judicial notice of said docket sheet in finding

that the actions alleged by ADA Cullen in the Complaint, described above, are actions to which

prosecutorial immunity extends.

Plaintiff also argues that the prosecution of his underlying criminal case was conducted in

bad faith, which precludes ADA Cullen’s immunity here. (Docket No. 21 at 3-4). Plaintiff

contends that because there were not charges filed, ADA Cullen’s alleged actions “seeking a high

bail and engaging in motion practice – were not advocacy within a legitimate prosecution,” but

were instead “acts in furtherance of an ongoing investigation under the guise of a prosecution.”

(Id. at 5). Such unsupported statements – which hint at ADA Cullen’s alleged actions being

investigative rather than prosecutorial in nature – fail to overcome ADA Cullen’s right to

prosecutorial immunity. Moreover, as ADA Cullen notes, Plaintiff’s statements rely upon his

7 Plaintiff argues that, because he disputes the authenticity of such court documents referenced by ADA Cullen,

there is a factual dispute over the record and the Court cannot take judicial notice of the documents. The Court notes,

however, that there is no factual dispute in this regard since ADA Cullen has also attached certified copies of the

relevant documents, which are also available to the public, and he has identified the Pennsylvania Unified Judicial

System public docket access website. (Docket No. 33 at 2).

proffer of a Police Criminal Complaint that failed to include the attached Affidavit of Probable

Cause, see discussion, supra. (Docket No. 33 at 3). Assuming that Plaintiff’s failure to include

the Affidavit of Probable Cause in his attachment of the Criminal Complaint to the Complaint here

was an innocent mistake by a pro se plaintiff, and not an effort to mislead the Court, the Court

finds that the facts alleged in the Complaint, considered along with the full Criminal Complaint

and docket sheet in Plaintiff’s underlying state criminal case, show that the alleged actions by

ADA Cullen were matters intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process and

not investigative matters normally carried out by police officers. As the Court finds that the

conduct of ADA Cullen that is alleged in the Complaint is not investigatory as Plaintiff contends,

the Court further finds that ADA Cullen may invoke absolute immunity as a complete bar to civil

liability for such conduct in this case. See Harris v. Cashman, No. 2:20-CV-00528, 2021 WL

602679, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2021).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, and applying the functional test set forth, supra,

it is clear that Plaintiff’s concerns about ADA Cullen’s conduct relate to his advocacy in the

judicial portion of Plaintiff’s criminal case. Plaintiff avers that ADA Cullen filed the Information

against him, engaged in discovery disputes, and withdrew claims against him. Even considering

the allegations in the Complaint as a whole, along with the Criminal Complaint as a whole and the

docket sheet in the underlying criminal case, Plaintiff has not alleged conduct that is investigatory

rather than prosecutorial in nature. Because prosecutorial immunity bars any claim against ADA

Cullen related to the prosecution of Plaintiff’s criminal case, this Court concludes that amendment

of such claims would be futile. See Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100,

113 (3d Cir. 2018) (indicating that if a civil rights complaint fails to state a claim, a district court

must grant leave to amend unless such amendment would be inequitable or futile). Thus,

Plaintiff’s claims against ADA Cullen will be dismissed from this case with prejudice.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, ADA Cullen’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint will be

granted, and Plaintiff’s claims against ADA Cullen will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because amendment of such claims

would be futile, the dismissal will be with prejudice.

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: August 27, 2026 s/ W. Scott Hardy

W. Scott Hardy

United States District Judge

cc/ecf: All counsel of record

Marc Johnson (via U.S. Mail)