Opinion

Rucker

Court
District Court, D. Oregon
Filed
Aug 27, 2026
Cited by
0 cases

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

VIRGIL RUCKER,

Case No. 2:25-cv-01881-SI

Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.

O.D.O.C., et al.,

Defendant.

SIMON, District Judge.

This prisoner civil rights case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (#29). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants

are denying him an appropriate course of medical care that will adequately address ailments he is

experiencing with his knee, back, and shoulders. He believes that Defendants’ denial of medical

care is retaliatory in nature due to Plaintiff’s attempts to seek redress of his grievances. He asks

the Court to order his immediate transfer to another institution for the purpose of receiving

adequate medical treatment to include physical therapy.1

1 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants are denying him access to legal resources, but his request

for preliminary injunctive relief pertains only to the need for immediate medical care. Even if

this were not the case, Plaintiff has not shown that he was prejudiced by any limitation on his

access to legal materials at his prison. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354-55 (1996).

1 - ORDER

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A plaintiff may also qualify for

a preliminary injunction by showing that there are serious questions going to the merits of his

claim and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor, so long as the other Winter

factors are also met. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127. 1134-35 (9th Cir.

2011). A request for a mandatory injunction seeking relief well beyond the status quo is

disfavored and shall not be granted unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.

Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1994).

In this case, the basis of Plaintiff’s Motion is his purported inability to receive medical

attention, including physical therapy, at the Snake River Correctional Institution (“SRCI”). A

Nurse Manager at SRCI provided the Court with a Declaration in which she states:

4. Plaintiff Rucker does not presently have an order for

physical therapy. Plaintiff Rucker was seen on July 23, 2026 and

imaging of his back was ordered. Plaintiff Rucker was also seen on

June10, 2026 at which time an x-ray of his bilateral shoulders was

ordered; that x-ray was completed on June 18, 2026.

5. Physical therapy may be ordered by AIC Rucker’s medical

provider in the further depending upon the provider’s review and

assessment of AIC Rucker’s x-ray, imaging, and related findings.

At this time, an order for physical therapy is premature.

Declaration of Lisa Price (#45).

Although Plaintiff asserts that Defendants are refusing to provide him with medical care

in retaliation for complaints he has lodged, the limited record before the Court shows that

2 - ORDER

Plaintiff is actively receiving medical attention at SRCI. In this respect, Plaintiff has a low

likelihood of prevailing on the merits of a First Amendment retaliation claim. Silva v. Di

Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2011) (overruled on other grounds as recognized by

Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (2015)) (requiring a defendant to take an adverse

action against a plaintiff in response to the exercise of protected conduct). In addition, Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment medical claim also appears to lack merit where his preference for a particular

course of medical treatment that differs from what the SRCI physicians have prescribed does not

amount to deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d

240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Shields v. Kunkel, 442 F.2d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1971); Mayfield v.

Craven, 433 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1970); McKinney v. People of State of Cal., 427 F.2d 160 (9th

Cir. 1970).

Similarly, because Plaintiff is actively receiving medical attention, he is unlikely to suffer

irreparable injury if the Court declines to grant him preliminary injunctive relief. Given that

Plaintiff has a low probability of success on the merits of his claims, and also that he is unlikely

to suffer irreparable injury, injunctive relief is not appropriate. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520

U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic

remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden

of persuasion.” ) (italics in original, internal quotations and citation omitted).

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3 - ORDER

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (#29) is

denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

August 27, 2026 . [Aaa < cS oe

DATE Michael H. Simon

United States District Judge

4 - ORDER

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