The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
MARELLA O., )
Plaintiff,
Vv. 1:25CV435
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security, )
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Marella O. (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the
Social Security Act (the “Act”), as amended (42 U.S.C. § 405(g)), to obtain judicial review of a
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act. The parties have filed cross-motions
for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court for review.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on May 17, 2022, alleging a disability
onset date of June 25, 2021. (Ir. at 17, 221-22.)! Her application was denied initially (Tr. at
100-06, 122-31) and upon reconsideration (Tr. at 107-17, 133-40). Thereafter, Plaintiff
requested an administrative hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
(Tr. at 141-42.) On January 9, 2024, Plaintiff, along with her attorney, attended the subsequent
1 Transctipt citations refer to the Sealed Administrative Record [Doc. #4].
telephone hearing, at which both Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert testified. (Ir. at
17, 35-74.) Following the hearing, the AL] concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within
the meaning of the Act (Ir. at 28), and on April 9, 2025, the Appeals Counsel denied Plaintiffs
request for review of that decision, thereby making the AL]’s conclusion the Commissionet’s
final decision for purposes of judicial review (Tr. at 1-6).
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal law “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of
social secutity benefits.” Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, the
scope of review of such a decision is “extremely limited.” Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144
(4th Cir. 1981). “The courts ate not to try the case de novo.” Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d
396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, “a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the
AL] if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the
correct legal standard.” Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation omitted).
“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.”’ Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). “It consists of more than a metre
scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Mastro v. Apfel, 270
F.3d 171, 176 4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “If there is
evidence to justify a refusal to ditect a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is
substantial evidence.” Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Tn reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh
conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the
[ALJ].” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). “Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the
responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.” Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. “The issue before
[the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled, but whether the
finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was
reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585,
589 (4th Cir. 1996).
In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that “[a] claimant for disability
benefits bears the burden of proving a disability.” Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 4th Cir.
1981). In this context, “disability” means the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).?
“The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims.” Hancock,
667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4)). “Under this process, the
2 “The Social Secusity Act comprises two disability benefits programs. The Social Security Disability Insurance
Program (SSDI), established by Title IT of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., provides benefits to
disabled persons who have contributed to the program while employed. The Supplemental Security Income
Program (SSI), established by Title XVI of the Act as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., provides benefits to
indigent disabled persons. The statutory definitions and the regulations promulgated by the Secretary for
determining disability, see 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 (SSDI); 20 C.F.R. pt. 416 (SSD, governing these two programs are,
in all aspects relevant here, substantively identical.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589 n.1.
Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period
of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the
requitements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not,
could perform any other work in the national economy.” Id.
A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence
forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. For example, “[t|he first step
determines whether the claimant is engaged in ‘substantial gainful activity.’ If the claimant is
working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is ‘severely’ disabled.
If not, benefits are denied.” Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at the first two steps, and if
the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a “listed impairment” at step three, “the claimant
is disabled.” Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and two,
but falters at step three, ie., “[i]f a claimant’s impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal or
exceed a listed impairment,” then “the ALJ must assess the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (RFC’).” Id. at 179.3 Step four then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on
that RFC, the claimant can “perform past relevant work”; if so, the claimant does not quality
3 “REC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite [the claimant’s] limitations.” Hines, 453 F.3d
at 562 (noting that administrative regulations requite RFC to reflect claimant’s “ability to do sustained work-
related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis . . . [which] means 8
hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule” (internal emphasis and quotation marks
omutted)). The RFC includes both a “physical exertional or strength limitation” that assesses the claimant’s
“ability to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations
(mental, sensory, or skin impairments).” Hall, 658 F.2d at 265. “RFC is to be determined by the ALJ only after
[the ALJ] considers all relevant evidence of a claimant’s impairments and any related symptoms (e.g. paiti).”
Hines, 453 F.3d at 562-63.
as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior
wotk, the analysis ptoceeds to the fifth step, which “requites the [Government] to prove that
a significant number of jobs exist which the claimant could perform, despite the claimant’s
impairments.” Hines, 453 F.3d at 563. In making this determination, the ALJ must decide
“whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the claimant’s RFC]
and [the claimant’s| vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work expetience) to adjust
to a new job.” Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carry its
“evidentiaty burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available
in the community,” the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.
Ill. DISCUSSION
In the present case, the AL] found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since her alleged onset date, June 25, 2021. The AL] therefore concluded that Plaintiff
met her burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process. (Tr. at 19.) At step two, the
AL) further determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
obesity, status-post cerebrovascular accident (CVA) with residual symptoms,
headache/migtaine, fibromyalgia, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder[.]
(Tr. at 19.) The AL] found at step three that none of the impairments identified at step two,
individually or in combination, met or equaled a disability listing. (Ir. at 20-21.) The AL]
therefore assessed Plaintiff's RFC and determined that she could perform light work with the
following, additional limitations:
[Plaintiff] could frequently climb ramps and stairs, but only occasionally climb
stepladders up to 4 vertical feet in height, with no climbing of higher ladders or
of ropes ot scaffolds of any height. She could frequently balance, kneel, and
ctouch [and] occasionally stoop and crawl. [Plaintiff] could frequently handle,
finger, feel, push, pull, and use hand controls with the bilateral upper
extremities. She could occasionally perform talk requirements as part of the
assigned work. She could occasionally tolerate exposure to extreme cold, and
to vibration, atmospheric conditions, moving mechanical parts, and high,
exposed places. She could tolerate exposure up to and including moderate
noise. She could perform work needing little or no judgment to do simple
duties that can be learned on the job or in a short period of time, usually within
30 days, and for which little specific vocational preparation and judgment are
needed. She could perform work requiring sustained concentration and
persistence for no greater than approximately 2 hours at a time. She could
perform work that is not frequently performed on an assembly line or at a
similar production-pace. [Plaintiff] could tolerate occasional changes to the
work setting and the manner and method of performing the assigned work [and]
perform work that frequently provides for two 15-minute breaks and one 30-
minute break for each 8-hour shift worked, occurring at such times as directed
by the employer. She could tolerate occasional interactions with supervisors,
coworkers, and the public when performing the assigned work.
(Tr. at 21.) Based on this determination and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ
determined at step four of the analysis that Plaintiff was unable to perform any of her past
relevant work. (Tr. at 26.) However, the ALJ further found at step five that, given Plaintiffs
age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the vocational expert as to these
factors, she could perform other jobs available in significant numbers in the national economy.
(Ir. at 27-28.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act.
(Ir. at 28.)
Plaintiff now contends that the ALJ failed to adequately account for the vocationally
limiting effects of her migraine headaches when assessing her RFC, despite having included
migraines among Plaintiff's severe impairments at step two of the sequential analysis.
She notes that, although the ALJ limited her to work in an environment with no more than
moderate noise to account for her migraine limitations, the ALJ omitted other potential RFC
limitations relating to her migraines, such as the need for time off task or absences. (Pl.’s Br.
[Doc. #7] at 6.)
As Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p instructs, “[t]he RFC assessment must first
identify the individual’s functional limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related
abilities on a function-by-function basis,” including the functions listed in the regulations.
Social Security Ruling 96-8p: Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles I] and XVI: Assessing
Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1. “Only after
such a function-by-function analysis may an ALJ express RFC in terms of the exertional levels
of work.” Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 187 (4th Cir. 2016) G@nternal quotations and
citations omitted). Further, the “RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion
describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g.,
laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations).” SSR 96-
8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7. An ALJ must “both identify evidence that supports his conclusion
and build an accurate and logical bridge from [that] evidence to his conclusion.” Woods v.
Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasis omitted).
The Fourth Circuit has noted that a per se rule requiring remand when the ALJ does not
perform an explicit function-by-function analysis “is inappropriate given that remand would
prove futile in cases where the ALJ does not discuss functions that are ‘irrelevant or
uncontested.”’ Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cichocki v.
Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)). Rather, remand may be appropriate
“where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant’s capacity to perform relevant functions, despite
contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ’s analysis
frustrate meaningful review.” Id.(quoting Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177).
Here, as recounted in the administrative decision, Plaintiff testified that
[s]he charted her migraines and had headaches five of [the] nine days [leading
up to her January 2024 hearing]. Her headaches never fully g0 away. Headaches
can cause nausea and vomiting, and she might try over the counter medication
ot other things. One headache lasted neatly a month and she went into the
hospital for medication.
(Ir. at 22) (citing Tr. at 54-55). Plaintiff also indicated that she “can drive but she does not
because she gets dizzy with headaches.” (Tr. at 22, 56.) However, the ALJ ultimately
concluded that Plaintiffs “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record for the reasons explained in [the] decision.” (Tr. at 23.)
Plaintiff argues, in part, that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiffs statements regarding
the limiting effects of her headaches less than fully consistent with the medical evidence and
other evidence of record. Under the applicable regulations, the AL]’s decision must “contain
specific reasons for the weight given to the individual’s symptoms, be consistent with and
supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent
reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” Social Security
Ruling 16-3p, Titles I and XVI: Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, SSR 16-3p,
2017 WL 5180304 (Oct. 25, 2017) (‘SSR 16-3p”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Moreover,
in Arakas v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 983 F.3d 83 (4th Cir. 2020), the Fourth Circuit clarified the
procedure an AL] must follow when assessing a claimant’s statements:
When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, AL]s must use the two-step
framework set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029
(Mar. 16, 2016). First, the ALJ must determine whether objective medical
evidence presents a “medically determinable impairment’ that could reasonably
be expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(b); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *3.
Second, after finding a medically determinable impairment, the AL] must assess
the intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms to determine how they
affect the claimant’s ability to work and whether the claimant is disabled. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1529(c); SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *4. At this step,
objective evidence is not required to find the claimant disabled. SSR 16-3p, 2016
WL 1119029, at *4-5. SSR 16-3p recognizes that “[s]ymptoms cannot always
be measured objectively through clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” Id. at *4. Thus, the AL] must consider the entire case record and
may “not disregard an individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the objective medical evidence
does not substantiate” them. Id. at *5.
983 F.3d at 95-96. Thus, the second patt of the test requites the ALJ to consider all available
evidence, including Plaintiffs statements about her pain, in order to evaluate “the intensity
and persistence of the claimant’s pain, and the extent to which it affects [her] ability to work.”
Craig, 76 F.3d at 595. This approach facilitates the ALJ’s ultimate goal, which is to accurately
determine the extent to which Plaintiffs pain or other symptoms limit her ability to perform
basic work activities. Relevant evidence for this inquiry includes Plaintiff's “medical history,
medical signs, and laboratory findings,” Craig, 76 F.3d at 595, as well as the following factors
set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3):
(i) [Plaintiffs] daily activities;
(it) The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of [plaintiffs] pain or
other symptoms;
(iii) Precipitating and aggravating factors;
(iv) The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication
[Plaintiff] take[s] or [has] taken to alleviate [her] pain or other symptoms;
(v) ‘Treatment, other than medication, [Plaintiff] recetve[s] or [has] recetved
for telief of [her] pain or other symptoms;
(vi) Any measures [Plaintiff] use[s] or [has] used to relieve [her] pain or other
symptoms (e.g., lying flat on [her] back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes
evety hour, sleeping on a board, etc.); and
(vit) Other factors concerning [Plaintiffs] functional limitations and
restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
In the present case, the AL] provided mote than conclusory statements discounting
Plaintiffs testimony. As instructed by the regulations, the AL] considered the entire case
record and explained his reasons for deviating from Plaintiffs statements regarding the impact
of her symptoms on her ability to work. This explanation was provided throughout the AL]’s
REC discussion.
For example, the ALJ considered Plaintiffs treatment records regarding her headaches,
including a June 1, 2022 visit with her neurologist (Tr. at 23.) However, the AL] found that
PlaintifPs headaches “responded to medication” and that the record “did not support the
alleged lack of functioning.” (Tr. at 24.) ‘This analysis is supported by the medical record. At
the visit on June 1, 2022 discussed by the ALJ, Plaintiff indicated at that time that her migraines
had recently worsened. (I't. at 23, 725.) As for frequency, she indicated that the headaches
were “occurting about twice a week on average” and lasted “3 or 4 hours at a time.” (Tr. at
725.) Up until that time, Plaintiff had treated her migraines with ibuprofen and Flonase, but
she found that they were no longer effective. (Tr. at 725.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs provider at
Raleigh Neurology Associates, Dr. David Konanc, prescribed Zolmitriptan nasal spray to treat
PlaintifPs acute migraines. (Ir. at 728, 729.) Other records similarly reflect increased
headaches around the time of the June 1, 2022 visit with Dr. Konanc. In a visit with a Nurse
Practitioner about two weeks earlier in May 2022, Plaintiff indicated that, in the two weeks
leading up to the appointment, she experienced “tight frontal headaches radiating to [the]
occipital region,” and which she treated with over-the-counter allergy medications, including
cetirizine and Sudafed. (Tr. at 463.) In addition, two weeks after the visit with Dr. Konanc,
on June 19, 2022, Plaintiff presented to the emergency department with complaints of a
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headache, and providers concluded that her headache was a symptom of an infection, in this
case a kidney infection accompanied by a high fever. (Tr. at 768.) Notably, Plaintiff again
assetted that her “migraines and nausea h[ad] been worse since May.” (Tr. at 768.) ‘Thus, the
medical record clearly reflects treatment for migraines/headaches in May and June 2022, and
the AL] acknowledged that treatment in the review of the record.
Most notably, a July 15, 2022 treatment note from Plaintiffs family medicine physician,
Dr. Julia Sargent, just a few weeks later, reflects that Plaintiff had “a migraine every day for
over a month,” but this problem had “resolved,” after the nasal spray prescribed by neurology
to treat Plaintiffs migraines had been approved by insurance. (Tr. at 881.) Similarly, an
October 2022 treatment record likewise reflects that she “had severe migraines through May
and June followed by a kidney infection” and her headaches had “resolved.” (Tr. at 865.) She
reported ongoing nausea, and was assessed with depression and anxiety. (Ir. at 867.) The
medical record does not include any further treatment records for headaches or migraines for
the rest of 2022 or all of 2023. She did not return to her neurologist after June 1, 2022, and
she did not return to any provider for treatment of migraines, although she continued to get
treatment for fibromyalgia, muscles spasms, and depression and anxiety.*
Thus, the treatment records reflect that PlaintifPs migraine/headaches had “resolved”,
as teflected in the July 2022 and October 2022 treatment records, based on the medication
“ She also did not seek migraine-specific treatment at any of her previous neurology appointments prior to June
2022. (See Tr. at 724-48.) In a Family Medicine assessment in July 2021, she noted “mild to moderate”
headaches that “come and go” over the prior couple of weeks. (Tr. at 564.). In addition, on one prior occasion,
in September 2021, Plaintiff presented at the Chatham Emergency Department complaining of three days of
intermittent dizziness, posterior eye pressure, headache, and shortness of breath. (Tr. at 500.) Plaintiff tested
positive for COVID-19, which her provider indicated as the likely source of her headache and other symptoms.
(Tr. at 500.)
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ptovided by Dr. Konanc, which provides substantial evidence for the ALJ’s finding that
PlaintifPs headaches “responded to medication.” (Tr. at 24.) In addition, the lack of further
treatment further supports the AL]’s finding that the headaches responded to medication, and
that the record “did not support the alleged loss of functioning.”
At the hearing, Plaintiff testified to recent migraines in 2024, during the week prior to
the heating. When asked about the frequency of her migraines, Plaintiff responded that she
had “started getting them again almost every night,” indicating that problem had recently
resumed after a lull. (Tr. at 54) (emphasis added). She specifically testified that her headaches
had been worse in the nine days leading up to her January 9, 2024 hearing. (Tr. at 54.) The
AL] next questioned Plaintiff about treatment, asking “are you having to sleep, or are you
having to go in a dark room? Cold compresses on your head? What’s going on there?” (Tr.
at 54.) ‘T'o this Plaintiff responded,
well, I will do any number of those things. It just kind of depends on where
I’m at in the headache, if I can get somewhere and try to quiet it down, to try
to, you know, take me some ‘Tylenol, put me something over my eyes. [’m
usually doing [a] multitude of things, because I never know what’s going to
work.
(Tr. at 55.) Plaintiff also testified to a migraine that lasted “almost a month” that required her
to go to the hospital until they could put her back on the medications to “contain the
migraines” (T'r. at 55), which is consistent with the records of a June 2022 migraine that was
resolved with medication. In addition, PlaintifPs testimony that she takes Tylenol to resolve
her headaches likewise supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff's headaches were resolved with
medication.
12
Notably, the ALJ acknowledged this testimony (Tr. at 22-23) and specifically included
restrictions in the RFC in light of Plaintiffs testimony. The AL] noted that Plaintiff gets
“dizzy with headaches” (Tt. at 22, 56), and the RFC includes a limitation to no climbing ladders
ovet 4 feet. In addition, the AL] specifically found that Plaintiff “is limited to no gteater than
moderate noise exposutes due to headache/migtaine” (Tt. at 24), which is supported by
Plaintiffs testimony that, when a headache began, she tried to “get somewhete . . . to quiet it
down.” (Ir. at 55.) The ALJ further explained that a limitation to no more than moderate
noise also “provides [Plaintiff] with a working environment that is potentially less distracting
and less stressful than work in areas of loud or greater noise.” (Ir. at 24.) Thus, the ALJ
specifically addressed Plaintiffs headaches/migtaines based on the extent of the evidence in
the record, and included specific limitations in the RFC directed to the testimony regarding
the symptoms.
Plaintiff now contends that she would be absent from work due to migraines and
headaches, but even taking Plaintiffs testimony regarding her recent migraine symptoms at
face value, she still points to no evidence that these symptoms wete so pervasive throughout
the time period at issue that they required further RFC limitations, let alone a finding of
disability. Rather, the record indicates that Plaintiff experienced two flares of migraine activity,
one in May and June of 2022, and the other in the weeks leading up to her January 2024
hearing. Plaintiff, who bears the burden of proving disability, presents no evidence that her
headaches would cause any specific work limitations. Given the record here, the ALJ was not
required to include further restrictions regarding absences and time off task given the lack of
suppott for such limitations, as well as contrary evidence, including Plaintiffs limited
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treatment history. Plaintiffs current argument that migraines would cause her to miss two or
more days of work per month, and therefore would be disabling, amounts to nothing more
than conjecture. In fact, Plaintiff herself never testified that she would require such a
restriction as a result of her migraines.°
Moteover, none of Plaintiffs providers or other medical sources opined that Plaintiffs
headaches caused any limitations at all during the time period in question. Indeed, the
Consultative Examiner concluded that Plaintiff had “no physical limitations” and had
“physically improved” by the time of the April 2023 consultative examination. (Ir. at 24,1203-
07). The Consultative Examiner also found that Plaintiff only “gave partial effort on some
portions of the exam” and that “the exam included inconsistencies.” (Tr. at 25, 1207). No
medical provider opined that Plaintiff would miss work due to headaches or migraines, or that
het headaches or migraines wete in any way disabling. The ALJ considered this opinion
evidence but nevertheless included limitations to account for PlaintifPs headaches, based on
her testimony, but noted that PlaintifPs headaches/migraines tesolved with treatment, and
concluded that the headaches/migtaines and other symptoms were not as disabling as alleged.
5 Plaintiff relies on the Fourth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Woody v. Kijakazi, No. 22-1437, 2023 WL
5745359, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 6, 2023), to argue that, because the AL] “neither (a) included an absenteeism/off-
task limitation in the RFC finding nor (b) explained why such a limitation was unnecessary,” remand is required.
(PL’s Br. at 7.) In Woody, the Court held that “the ALJ erred by not making specific findings regarding how
often [the plaintiff] would be absent from work due to the frequency and severity of her headaches” where the
“vocational expert testified a hypothetical person would be precluded from maintaining full time employment
if she were absent more than once a month” and the record showed that, “even after receiving treatment that
reduced the frequency of her headaches, [the plaintiff] still reported getting headaches about once a week..”
This scenario differs significantly from the present case. Here, as set out above, Plaintiff presented no evidence
that her migtaine headaches occurred frequently throughout the alleged disability period or that they failed to
respond to treatment. Thus, there was no basis for the AL] to make specific findings regarding migraine
frequency or severity when formulating Plaintiffs RFC.
14
Plaintiff does not point to any medical evidence that was not considered or addressed by the
Accordingly, this is not a scenatio in which the AL] failed “to assess [the] claimant’s
capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where
other inadequacies in the ALJ’s analysis frustrate meaningful review.” Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636
(quoting Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177). Here, the ALJ included PlaintifPs migraines among her
severe impairments, crafted the RFC to account for her credibly established limitations, and
explained the omission of additional limitations in accordance with the regulations and
relevant case law, including Arakas. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the AL}’s
determination.
To the extent that Plaintiff essentially asks the Court to teconsider the AL}’s
conclusions and te-weigh the evidence presented, it is not the function of this Court to te-
weigh the evidence or reconsider the AL]’s determinations if they are supported by substantial
evidence. As noted above, “[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as
to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ.”
Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (internal brackets and quotation omitted). Thus, the issue before
the Court is not whether a different fact-finder could have drawn a different conclusion, or
even “whether [Plaintiff) is disabled,” but rather, “whether the AL]'s finding that [plaintiff] is
not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct
application of the relevant law.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. Here, the AL] reviewed the evidence
and explained his conclusion in a lengthy, detailed decision. That determination is supported
15
by substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff's Motion to Reverse the Decision of the
Commissioner should therefore be denied.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissionet’s decision finding
no disability be AFFIRMED, that Plaintiffs Dispositive Brief [Doc. #7] be DENIED, that
Defendant’s Dispositive Brief [Doc. #9] be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED
with prejudice.
This, the 27 day of August, 2026.
.
nited States Magistrate Judge
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