MONROE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DA’JWAN QUINTAJ MONROE,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:25CV35

CORPORAL RODRIGUEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case arises from events that took summary judgment. Further, because

place during Da’Jwan Quintaj the defendants have not met the

Monroe’s pre-trial detention at the requisite sealing standard, their

Moore County Detention Center in motion to seal is denied.

2023 and 2024. Monroe, the plaintiff

in this Section 1983 civil action, I. FACTS

alleges that Corporal Rodriguez and

Officer Wilkes, both with the Moore The undisputed facts1 show the

County Sheriff’s Office, assaulted him following:

without provocation, in violation of

A. December 1, 2023 Incident:

his right under the Fourteenth

Use of the Drive Stun Weapon.

Amendment to be free from pre-trial

punishment.

On December 1, 2023, Monroe was a

pre-trial detainee at the Moore

The defendants have moved for

County Detention Center (MCDC) in

summary judgment and to seal

the green area. See generally Docket

certain documents provided in

Entry 28, Ex. C, Declaration of Justin

support thereof. Because the

Wilkes (hereinafter Wilkes Decl.) ¶ 8.

undisputed facts show that the

At the time, the MCDC was divided

defendants are entitled to judgment

into color-coded areas (red, blue,

as a matter of law, it is recommended

yellow, green) and security levels

that the Court grant their motion for

1 Monroe did not respond to the motion declarations and accompanying exhibits

for summary judgment and filed an the defendants submitted in support of

unverified complaint. Accordingly, the their motion.

facts are taken from the sworn

ranging from maximum to low. See id. Monroe did not. See Wilkes Decl. ¶ 11.

¶ 4. Wilkes then deployed his drive stun

(conducted energy) weapon into

At approximately 8:45 am, Wilkes, Monroe’s right arm for approximately

then a detention officer (DO) at the one to two seconds. See id.; see

MCDC, was conducting property pick Sheffield Decl. ¶ 16. Monroe pulled his

up in administrative segregation with arm back into his cell. See Wilkes

DO Sheffield. Monroe was standing Decl. ¶ 11; see Sheffield Decl. ¶ 16. His

handcuffed outside of his cell at the shoulder was not dislocated, see

door; as Wilkes was collecting Wilkes Decl. ¶ 18, but he sustained

property in the cell, Monroe moved in injuries to his wrists from the

front of the doorway and told Wilkes handcuffs, see Docket Entry 28, Ex. D

to stop searching his cell. See id. ¶ 8; (documenting injuries through

see also Docket Entry 28, Ex. F, photographs). Shortly thereafter, a

Declaration of Mary Sheffield nurse at the MCDC visited Monroe.

(hereinafter Sheffield Decl.) ¶ 9. See id. ¶ 13.

When Wilkes finished, Monroe was Sheffield reported the incident, and

supposed to return to his cell. See MCDC personnel charged Monroe

Wilkes Decl. ¶ 8. But, as Monroe did with a number of violations, including

so, he yelled, “Fuck you! Fuck this tampering with or destruction of any

place!” and something about a “bitch locking device, interfering with

ass.” See Sheffield Decl. ¶ 13. Wilkes lockdowns or searches, failure to obey

began to remove Monroe’s handcuffs and follow orders, and use of profane

through the food pass of the cell door. language and/or gestures, or

See Wilkes Decl. ¶ 9. Once Wilkes excessive noise. See Docket Entry 28,

removed the left cuff, Monroe began Ex. D.

to try to jerk away. See id.; see

Sheffield Decl. ¶ 13. Wilkes used the B. April 9, 2024 Incident: Code

tether to gain control of Monroe so he Red and Use of the Restraint

could remove the other handcuff. See Chair.

Wilkes Decl. ¶ 9.

Monroe was still a pre-trial detainee

Before Wilkes could close the food at the MCDC on April 9, 2024. At

pass door, Monroe put his arm approximately 8:03 pm that evening,

through it and held it open. See id. Corporal Rodriguez, DO Stanley, and

¶ 10; see Sheffield Decl. ¶ 14. Wilkes DO Connor entered MCDC cell block

told Monroe multiple times to put his blue levels 1 and 2 to return inmates

arm back in the cell, but Monroe to their cells post-exercise. See Docket

refused. See Wilkes Decl. ¶ 10. Wilkes Entry 28, Ex. G, Declaration of

then gave Monroe two direct orders to Abraham Rodriguez (hereinafter

pull his arm back or else he would be Rodriguez Decl.) ¶ 7.

drive stunned. See id.; see Sheffield

Decl. ¶ 15.

At the time, detention officers at the different secured sections of the

MCDC used the term “code red” to facility. See id. ¶ 6. It is two

refer to the highest-level emergency, interlocking doors or gates that are

indicating “a serious disturbance never opened at the same time,

requiring immediate response. It ensuring that one door is fully closed

signals a major incident . . . and and locked before the next opens. See

typically triggers a full lockdown of id.

the Detention Center.” See id. ¶ 5.

Monroe continued to curse at

Rodriguez told Monroe, who was Rodriguez and Brogan, at which time

detained in this area, to pack his Rodriguez placed him on the ground

belongings, turn around in his cell, on his stomach using “control

and place both hands through the trap techniques.” See id. ¶ 12. Monroe then

on the door. See id. ¶ 8. Monroe said, “on God you about to get this

questioned why he was being moved, fucking lawsuit on your ass! You ain’t

initially refused to comply, but even have to slam me Rodriguez! You

ultimately acquiesced to being just a bitch ass nigga on God! Fuck off

handcuffed and shackled. See id. ¶ 9. nigga!” See id. ¶ 13. Brogan called for

Rodriguez began to escort Monroe to a Code Red while assisting Rodriguez

green levels 1 / 2. See id. When they in subduing Monroe. See id. Monroe

arrived at 102B green, Monroe yelled, “Call the code! Call the code

attempted to wrestle out of nigga! Call the code!” See id.

Rodriguez’s grip and yelled,

“RODRIGUEZ! DON’T TOUCH ME DOs Freeman and James arrived;

MAN! ON GOD YOU NEED TO TAKE Rodriguez directed them to use a

YOUR HANDS OFF ME BRUH!” See four-point carry to take Monroe out of

id. ¶ 10. Rodriguez told Monroe to the sally port. See id. ¶ 14. Freeman

stop moving evasively. See id. and James carried Monroe out of the

Monroe, in response, tried to push sally port and placed him onto the

himself away from Rodgriguez and floor outside of the exercise day room

Brogan. See id. ¶ 11; see also Docket of green levels 1/ 2. See id. ¶ 15.

Entry 28, Ex. J, Declaration of Connor Rodriguez helped the other officers

Brogan (hereinafter Brogan Decl.) ¶ 11 place Monroe in a temporary restraint

(“[Monroe] would stop or try to turn system consisting of a shoulder

until Corporal Rodriguez told him to harness, leg restraints, and an ankle

stop, then he would stop.”). Rodriguez strap that secures the person in an

ordered Monroe to stop, but he did upright seated position, reducing the

not. See Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 11. risk of potential asphyxia and

Rodriguez then placed Monroe preventing the occupant from

against the sally port door. See id. harming himself or others. See id.

Rodriguez took Monroe, in these

The sally port door in the MCDC is a restraints, into an area for a two- hour

secure, controlled entry area used to cool down period. See id. ¶ 16.

move inmates or staff between Rodriguez confirmed that he could fit

at least one finger between the you can wait. I can pack my stuff. I

handcuffs. See id. He advised Monroe don’t trust you CO’s.” See id. ¶ 24.

that he would be monitored four Monroe then continued to refuse,

times an hour for danger to others. saying, “fuck no.” See id.

See id.

Rodriguez then deployed a two-

As he was doing so, Monroe lodged second burst of his OC spray can into

various slurs at Rodriguez, telling him Monroe’s right eye and the side of his

that he was a “fucking gay ass nigga” face. See id. ¶ 25. Monroe replied,

and telling him to “[g]o and suck some “you a jackass for that! You a real hoe

dick.” See id. ¶ 17. for that shit!” See id. Sergeant Danley

arrived to help Rodriguez, who again

Rodriguez prepared an incident instructed Monroe to place both arms

report documenting what took place through the food pass. See id. ¶ 26.

and MCDC personnel charged Again, Monroe refused, saying, “I’m

Monroe with a number of infractions not going anywhere with you alone!

arising from it, including threatening . . . You need to call your back up right

staff, participation in a disturbance, now!” See id.

failure to obey and follow orders,

disorderly conduct, use of profane After Rodriguez threatened to use the

language and/or gestures, or OC fogger, Monroe complied. See id.

excessive noise, and code red. See While Rodriguez was taking Monroe

Docket Entry 28, Ex. H. to red level 1, Monroe would jerk away

and say, “[D]on’t fucking push me!”

C. The November 19, 2024 See id. ¶ 27. Rodriguez instructed

Incident: Use of the OC Spray Monroe to be quiet, but he refused.

Can. See id. Once at red level 1, cell 113,

Rodriguez asked Monroe if he wanted

On this day, at approximately 1:20 to be decontaminated, and Monroe

am, Rodriguez learned about an indicated he did. See id. ¶ 28.

ongoing situation with Monroe and Rodriguez then used the pump

DO Holder in the yellow level of the sprayer to decontaminate Monroe

MCDC. See Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 22. and secured him in the cell. See id.

Rodriguez went to yellow level 1, cell A short time later, around 1:50 am,

114 and directed Monroe to put on his when Rodriguez returned to the lower

jumpsuit and place both hands housing unit with fresh clothes for

through the food pass so he could be Monroe, he heard a loud banging

handcuffed. See id. ¶ 23. Instead, noise coming from cell 113. See id.

Monroe began packing up his items ¶ 29. When he arrived at the cell, he

and continued to do so even after saw the door being rattled. See id.

Rodriguez directed him to stop. See ¶ 30. Rodriguez told Monroe to turn

id. Rodriguez told Monroe to come to around and place both hands through

the door; Monroe responded: “Nah, the food pass to be handcuffed. See id.

¶ 31. At the time, Rodriguez intended staff, kicking/beating cell door, failure

to take him out of the cell block and to obey and follow orders, and

place him in the restraint participation in a disturbance. See

management chair. See id. Docket Entry 28, Ex. P.

Rodriguez and DO Holder worked D. The December 31, 2024

together to place Monroe in the chair Incident: Contraband in

once they escorted him out of the cell Monroe’s Cell.

block. See id. ¶ 33. Monroe attempted

to jerk his left arm away during the On this date, Monroe was still a pre-

process. See id. In response, trial detainee at the MCDC. At

Rodriguez applied pressure approximately 10:30 pm that evening,

underneath Monroe’s jawline, using DOs Edmonds and Hudson were

both his middle and index finger returning property in green levels 1 /2

while keeping away from his throat. during routine facility operations. See

See id. ¶ 34. Monroe yelled, “GET Docket Entry 28, Ex. R, Declaration of

YOUR FUCKING HANDS AWAY Dalton Edmonds (hereinafter

FROM MY THROAT! GET YOUR Edmonds Decl.) ¶ 7. Hudson was

FUCKING HANDS OFF MY searching each cell while Edmonds

THROAT!” See Docket Entry 28, Ex. watched. See id. ¶ 8. At green 110,

P. Rodriguez stopped as soon as Monroe’s cell, Edmonds watched

Monroe was secured. See id. Monroe Monroe while Hudson searched the

was taken to the exercise room for a cell. See id. ¶ 9. While she was running

two-hour cool down period. See her handcuff key between the support

Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 36. He continued to bar for the desk and the wall,

yell once there, stating (among other Edmonds heard an object hit the

things): “I’m coming after everyone in floor. See id. Hudson then handed

here! God has a plan and im [sic] Edmonds a mustard packet

going to sue everyone in this bitch.” containing three red circular pills. See

See id. id. ¶ 10.

MCDC personnel advised the nurse in Monroe began repeating that Hudson

the facility both when Rodriguez planted the pills there. See id.

sprayed Monroe and when he was Edmonds showed the pills to

placed in the restraint chair. See Rodriguez and Danley; Rodriguez

Docket Entry 28, Ex. O, Declaration of identified them as 200 mg ibuprofen

Seth Danley (hereinafter Danley pills and noted that the nurse typically

Decl.) ¶¶ 18, 19. provides Monroe with white-colored

600 mg ibuprofen tablets. See id. ¶ 11.

Rodriguez prepared an incident Hudson filled out an incident report

report documenting what took place related to the search, and MCDC

and MCDC personnel charged personnel charged Monroe with

Monroe with a number of infractions various infractions, including

arising from it, including threatening hoarding of medications, lying to

staff, contraband, and misuse or “cruel/unusual punishment.” See id.

abuse of authorized medications or at 3-4.

possession of unauthorized

medications. See Docket Entry, Ex. S. The defendants answered, see Docket

Entry 15, and the magistrate judge set

E. Monroe’s Disciplinary Record. a discovery schedule, see Docket

Entry 16. The defendants moved for

In addition to the incident reports summary judgment and to seal

provided in connection with the exhibits provided in connection

events described above, the therewith, see Docket Entries 26 and

defendants have also submitted 29, and Monroe requested an

Monroe’s full disciplinary record from extension of time to respond, see

his tenure at the MCDC, which spans Docket Entry 31, which the magistrate

357 pages. See Docket Entry 28, Ex. A. judge granted, see Docket Entry dated

02/02/2026.

II. PROCEDURAL

HISTORY The Clerk mailed Monroe the

standard Roseboro letter informing

Monroe filed this Section 1983 suit, him of the motion and his right to

alleging in an unverified complaint respond. The letter warned Monroe

that Rodriguez (sued in his individual that if he failed to respond to the

and official capacities), a “Major motion, the Court may “conclude that

Flint” (sued in his official capacity),2 the defendant[‘s] contentions are

Edmonds (sued in his individual and undisputed” and grant judgment in

official capacities), and Wilkes (sued their favor. Docket Entry 30. See also

in his individual capacity) violated his M.D.N.C. Civ. L.R. 7.3(k) (“If no

constitutional rights. See Docket response brief is filed within the time

Entry 2 (hereinafter Compl.). Monroe required by this rule, the motion will

detailed a “statement of claims” be considered and decided as an

describing his version of the events uncontested motion, and ordinarily

above and cites the violated rights as will be granted without further

“medial treatment/physcological [sic] notice.”). Despite the Court’s

Medicine,” “Phonecall/ warning, Monroe has not responded

communication,” “Food to the motion,3 nor did he verify the

Nourishment,” “Harassment,” and

2 While the undisputed facts reference a the Court should dismiss all claims

MCDC employee named William Flint against “Major Flint.”

and contain an affidavit from him

authenticating the exhibits filed in 3 There is also no entry on the docket of

support of the motion for summary the Roseboro letter being returned as

judgment, see generally Docket Entry 28 undeliverable. Therefore, it is presumed

and see id., Ex. X, there is no evidence of that Monroe received it.

his involvement in any of the incidents

referenced in the complaint. Accordingly,

factual allegations in his Complaint, there is no genuine dispute as to any

see Docket Entry 2, such that they material fact and the movant is

could be considered as more than entitled to judgment as a matter of

mere allegations, see Gowen v. law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

Winfield, 130 F.4th 162, 175-76 (4th dispute of material fact exists “if the

Cir. 2025). evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the

Nevertheless, the Court cannot nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

summarily grant the motion because Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

Monroe’s failure to respond “does not (1986). In analyzing a summary

fulfill the burdens imposed on moving judgment motion, courts

parties by Rule 56 [of the Federal “must construe all facts and

Rules of Civil Procedure].” Custer v. reasonable inferences in the light

Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 most favorable to the nonmoving

(4th Cir. 1993). “Rule 56 requires that party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59

the moving party establish, in F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023).

addition to the absence of a dispute

over any material fact, that it is The moving party bears the burden of

‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of establishing the absence of a genuine

law.’” Id. Thus, although Monroe’s dispute of material fact by

failure to respond may leave the “identifying those portions of ‘the

defendants’ facts uncontroverted, pleadings, depositions, answers to

they “must still show that the interrogatories, and admissions on

uncontroverted facts entitle [them] to file, together with the affidavits, if any’

‘a judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. which it believes demonstrates the

See also Campbell v. Hewitt, absence of a genuine issue of material

Coleman & Assocs., Inc., 21 F.3d 52, fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

55-56 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that, U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule

even if the absence of a response, “the 56).

court should look at the movant’s own

papers . . . [and] determine if the “Where, as here, the nonmoving party

record of filed depositions, answers to bears the ultimate burden of proof at

interrogatories, admissions, and trial, the moving party may discharge

affidavits[] demonstrates that a its initial burden at summary

genuine issue exists as to any material judgment by ‘showing – that is,

fact”). pointing out to the . . . court – that

there is an absence of evidence to

These matters are ripe for disposition. support the nonmoving party’s case.’”

Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp.,

III. STANDARD OF LLC, 117 F.4th 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2024)

REVIEW (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

325). “If the moving party carries this

A court “shall grant summary initial burden, the burden then shifts

judgment if the movant shows that to the nonmoving party, who must ‘go

beyond the pleadings and by [his] 2009). A plaintiff bringing suit

own affidavits, or by the depositions, pursuant to § 1983 must show that a

answers to interrogatories, and person acting under color of state law

admissions on file, designate specific violated a constitutional or other

facts showing that there is a genuine federal legal right. West v. Atkins, 487

issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).

A. Excessive Force

“An affidavit or declaration used to

support [summary judgment] must Here, the first constitutional right at

be made on personal knowledge, set issue is the right to be free from an

out facts that would be admissible in officer’s use of excessive force, derived

evidence, and show that the affiant or from the Fourteenth Amendment. See

declarant is competent to testify on Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. n.10 (1989) (noting that the

56(c)(4); see also Evans v. Techs. Fourteenth Amendment “protects a

Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, pretrial detainee from the use of

962 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Williams v. excessive force that amounts to

Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. punishment”); see also Short v.

1991)). Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 606 (4th Cir.

2023) (“[T]his Court extended Estelle

Finally, a party cannot rely on from Eighth Amendment claims to

statements in a brief to support a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

motion for summary judgment, Due Process Clause claims, reasoning

because they are not evidence. City of that ‘due process is at least as co-

Greensboro v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of extensive as the guarantees of the

Elections, No. 15-CV-559, 2017 WL [E]ighth amendment.’”) (quoting and

11488724, at *1 n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, citing Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d

2017) (collecting cases); see also Hill 1291, 1294 (4th Cir. 1978)).

v. Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022

WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23, To succeed on such a claim, a pretrial

2022). detainee must show only that the

force “purposely or knowingly used

IV. GOVERNING LAW against him was objectively

unreasonable.” See Kingsley v.

Title 42, United States Code, Section Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397

1983 “is a federal statutory remedy (2015). “[O]bjective reasonableness

available to those deprived of rights turns on the ‘facts and circumstances

secured to them by the Constitution of each particular case.’” Id. (quoting

and, in a more sharply limited way, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). And courts

the statutory laws of the United make this determination “from the

States” by persons acting under color perspective of a reasonable officer on

of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l the scene, including what the officer

Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. knew at the time, not with the 20/20

vision of hindsight[] . . . account[ing] B. Deliberate Indifference

for the legitimate interests that stem to Serious Medical Needs

from [the government’s] need to

manage the facility . . . .” See id. Monroe’s claim also sounds in

(internal quotation and citation deliberate indifference, also derived

omitted) (alteration in original). from the Fourteenth Amendment due

process clause.

Courts may consider the following in

weighing the reasonableness or In Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160,

unreasonableness of the force 164 (4th Cir. 1984), the Fourth Circuit

exerted: “the relationship between the Court of Appeals adopted an objective

need for the use of force and the test for Fourteenth Amendment

amount of force used; the extent of the claims of deliberate indifference to

plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by serious medical needs, derived from

the officer to temper or to limit the the Supreme Court’s holding in Bell v.

amount of force; the severity of the Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979),

security problem at issue; the threat wherein the Court held that “[i]n

reasonably perceived by the officer; evaluating the constitutionality of

and whether the plaintiff was actively conditions or restrictions of pretrial

resisting.” See id. detention . . . the proper inquiry is

whether those conditions amount to

The United States Supreme Court punishment of the detainee.” “The

recognized in Kingsley that “[o]fficers Court in Bell explained that whereas

facing disturbances ‘are often forced the Eighth Amendment only protects

to make split-second judgments—in post-conviction detainees from ‘cruel

circumstances that are tense, and unusual punishment,’ the

uncertain, and rapidly evolving.’” Id. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

(quoting and citing Graham, 490 U.S. Clause protects pretrial detainees

at 397). Therefore, it has directed from being punished at all.” Short, 87

courts to judge the reasonableness of F.4th at 606 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at

the force applied “from the 535-37).

perspective and with the knowledge of

the defendant officer. We have also Thus, “deliberate indifference to

explained that a court must take serious medical needs violates the

account of the legitimate interests in Fourteenth Amendment even in the

managing a jail, acknowledging as absence of subjective intent to punish

part of the objective reasonableness because no legitimate nonpunitive

analysis that deference to policies and goal is served by a denial or

practices needed to maintain order unreasonable delay in providing

and institutional security is medical treatment where the need for

appropriate.” See id. at 399-400. such treatment is apparent.” See id.

(internal quotation and citation

omitted).

Thus, obvious that even a lay person would

easily recognize the necessity for a

To state a claim for deliberate doctor’s attention.” Scinto v.

indifference to a medical need, Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th

the specific type of deliberate Cir. 2016).

indifference claim at issue in

this case, a pretrial detainee V. DISCUSSION

must plead that

As the moving party seeking summary

(1) they had a medical condition judgment, the defendants bear the

or injury that posed a initial burden of demonstrating the

substantial risk of serious absence of a genuine issue of material

harm; fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

(2) the defendant intentionally, There is no dispute that MCDC

knowingly, or recklessly acted personnel exerted force in the three

or failed to act to appropriately instances detailed in the complaint:

address the risk that the specifically, the deployment of the

condition posed; drive stun weapon on December 1,

2023, the use of the restraint chair on

(3) the defendant knew or April 9, 2024, and the deployment of

should have known (a) that the the OC spray can on November 19,

detainee had that condition and 2024.

(b) that the defendant’s action

or inaction posed an As noted above, the Kinglsey Court

unjustifiably high risk of harm; directed courts to consider, in

and weighing excessive force claims under

the Fourteenth Amendment, “the

(4) as a result, the detainee was relationship between the need for the

harmed. use of force and the amount of force

used; the extent of the plaintiff’s

Short, 87 F.4th at 611.4 injury; any effort made by the officer

to temper or to limit the amount of

A serious medical need is one that has

force; the severity of the security

been “diagnosed by a physician as

problem at issue; the threat

mandating treatment” or is “so

4 In Short, the Fourth Circuit found that in harm. . . . Now, it is sufficient that the

in Fourteenth Amendment deliberate plaintiff show . . . that the defendant

indifference claims, “[t]he plaintiff no should have known of that condition and

longer has to show that the defendant that risk, and acted accordingly.” See 87

had actual knowledge of the detainee’s F.4th at 611.

serious medical condition and

consciously disregarded the risk that

their action or failure to act would result

reasonably perceived by the officer; officer]’s use of force to subdue

and whether the plaintiff was actively Plaintiff was directly proportional to

resisting.” 576 U.S. at 397. Plaintiff’s refusal to follow commands

and comply with officer directives in

A. The Court Should Grant the accordance with the policies and

Defendants’ Motion for protocols of the Detention Center to

Summary Judgment as to the maintain security and order. Thus,

December 1, 2023 Incident. there was a clear relationship between

the need for the use of force and the

As to the use of the drive stun weapon, amount of force used.” See Brewton v.

it is well-settled in this Circuit that Wright, No. 8:24-CV-07655-RMG-

“[d]eploying a taser is a serious use of WSB, 2026 WL 2087978, at *14

force. The weapon is designed to (D.S.C. June 12, 2026), report and

caus[e] . . . excruciating pain[.]” See recommendation adopted, 2026 WL

Est. of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong 2086996 (July 20, 2026) (granting

v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, summary judgment to officer

902 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal defendant who tased resistant

quotation and citation omitted) plaintiff in detention center).

(alteration in original). And the

Fourth Circuit has determined that As to the extent of Monroe’s injury,

“tasers are proportional force only there is no evidence that he sustained

when deployed in response to a one from the use of the drive stun.

situation in which a reasonable officer See, e.g., Jones v. Henderson Cnty.

would perceive some immediate Det. Ctr., No. 1:15-CV-132-FDW, 2017

danger that could be mitigated by WL 581324, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13,

using the taser.” See id. 2017) (finding Kingsley injury prong

not satisfied where the plaintiff

Under Kingsley, then, the need for the “suffered only minimal injuries from

use of the taser must be the use of the TASER, including a hole

commensurate with its impact. And where the barb of the TASER pricked

here, the undisputed facts are that, him and the pain . . . from getting

preceding the drive stun, Monroe electrocuted. Plaintiff did not require

tried to prevent Wilkes from any medication from these injuries.”)

searching his cell, screamed (internal quotation and citation

obscenities at him, attempted to jerk omitted). And while Monroe was

away while having his handcuffs inside of a cell at the time Wilkes used

removed through the food pass door, the drive stun weapon, limiting the

and then held the food pass door open weight of the security factor and the

despite multiple commands to stop. reasonably perceived threat, Monroe

See Wilkes Decl. ¶¶ 8-9, 13-14. Thus, was actively resisting officer

“[a]s to the first Kingsley factor—the commands.

relationship between the need for the

use of force and the amount of force Weighing all of the Kingsley factors

used—the Court notes that [the then, the undisputed facts establish

that Wilkes’ exertion of force on to comply with staff’s orders required

December 1, 2023 was not excessive. some type of force to restore

And courts evaluating the use of force discipline and order.”).

where plaintiffs obstruct food flaps

have concurred. See, e.g., id.; see also, And to the extent Monroe advances a

e.g., Diamond v. Odedere, C/A No. deliberate indifference claim based on

1:22-cv-287, 2024 WL 230113, at *6 any medical care not provided to treat

(M.D.N.C. Jan. 22, 2024) (granting the effects of the drive stun weapon,

summary judgment for defendant there are no facts by which any

officers on excessive force claim reasonable jury could find in his favor.

where they used a short burst of There is no evidence he sustained any

chemical munitions to gain injury at all, let alone met any of the

compliance of inmate blocking food other factors set forth in Short, 87

flap), report and recommendation F.4th at 611.

adopted, 2024 WL 1014123 (Mar. 8,

2024); Jackson v. DeAngelo, C/A No. Further, qualified immunity protects

6:15-cv-3725-TMC-KFM, 2016 WL Wilkes from suit. This doctrine

4154688, at *4 (D.S.C. June 29, 2016) “‘balances two important interests,’

(granting summary judgment for namely, the need to hold accountable

defendant officers in food flap public officials who exercise power

encounter, finding that the officer was irresponsibly, and the need to shield

“authorized to restore order and officials who perform their duties

discipline when faced with a responsibly from ‘harassment,

noncompliant inmate and to use distraction, and liability.’” Byers v.

appropriate force in relation to the Painter, 173 F.4th 155, 160 (4th Cir.

level of noncompliance if necessary”), 2026) (quoting Peason v. Callahan,

report and recommendation 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). To

adopted, 2016 WL 4123900 (Aug. 3, determine if qualified immunity

2016); Lloyd v. MacNeish, C/A No. protects an officer, the court asks two

5:12-CT-3163-FL, 2015 WL 1391476, questions: “(1) whether a statutory or

at *13 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2015) constitutional violation occurred, and

(granting summary judgment for (2) whether the right was clearly

defendant officers on excessive force established at the time of the

claim, finding there was no evidence violation.” Harrold v. Hagen, 174

the officers “used force maliciously F.4th 393, 401-02 (4th Cir. 2026). “If

and sadistically” where they “engaged the answer on either question is ‘no,’

in a brief struggle with plaintiff to the officer being sued is entitled to

close the food slot door”); Karavias v. qualified immunity.” Id. at 402.

Virginia, C/A No. 7:12-cv-624, 2013

Here, because there was no

WL 3879701, at *3 (W.D. Va. July 26,

constitutional violation, Wilkes is

2013) (“Plaintiff’s arms did not belong

entitled to qualified immunity.

outside of his cell when returning the

lunch tray, and his persistent refusal

B. The Court Should Grant the Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 763 (4th Cir.

Defendants’ Motion for 1996). “‘Plaintiff’s placement in a

Summary Judgment as to the restraint chair . . . does not in and of

April 9, 2024 Incident. itself constitute an excessive use of

force, as the use of devices such as

This incident also involves Monroe restraint chairs or four-point bed

defying orders. At approximately 8:03 restraints have repeatedly been found

pm, Rodriguez went to Monroe’s cell to be constitutional when used

and directed him to pack his appropriately.’” Battle v. Richland

belongings and place both hands Cnty., No. CV 8:23-CV-2653-RMG-

through the food flap door for WSB, 2025 WL 2918280, at *11

handcuffing. See Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 8. (D.S.C. July 30, 2025), report and

Monroe questioned why he was being recommendation adopted, 2025 WL

moved, initially did not comply, but 2754050 (Sept. 29, 2025) (quoting

ultimately did as ordered. See id. ¶ 9. Rodriguez v. Taylor, C/A No. 9:08-

cv-01027-RBH, 2008 WL 5244480,

While Rodriguez was moving Monroe at *8 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2008)). As the

to a different level in the facility, Fourth Circuit noted in Williams,

Monroe attempted to wrestle out of though, the length of time a detainee

his grip and began yelling at him. See is restrained bears on the

id. ¶ 10. When Rodriguez told him to constitutionality of the force. See 77

stop, Monroe tried to push himself F.3d at 764. There, the plaintiff stated

away from Rodriguez and Brogan, a viable claim of excessive force after

who was assisting. See id. ¶ 11; see also eight hours so confined. See id.

Brogan Decl. ¶ 11. Monroe continued

to curse at both officers; Rodriguez Here, MCDC personnel placed

then placed him on the ground using Monroe in the restraint chair for a

“control techniques.” See Rodriguez two-hour cool down period with no

Decl. ¶ 12. Brogan called for a code red further application of force, in

while helping Rodriguez subdue response to disruptive behavior and

Monroe. See id. ¶ 13. Two other failure to follow commands.

officers arrived and Rodriguez

directed them to use a four-point As to the first Kingsley factor,

carry to take Monroe out of the sally measuring the need for the force

port to the exercise room, where against the force exerted, Monroe had

officers put him in the temporary defied officer orders to be cuffed, then

restraint chair. See id. ¶¶ 14-15. He attempted to wrestle away from

remained there for two hours. See id. officers, requiring the officers to

¶ 16. restrain him on the ground and call a

code red to summon other officers to

Officers may confine detainees in assist. Under these circumstances,

restraints to maintain “order and where neither verbal commands nor

control” without per se violating the handcuffs had managed Monroe’s

Constitution. See Williams v. behavior, the use of the restraint chair

was not disproportionate to the need. 942177 (Mar. 10, 2017), aff’d, 714 F.

As to the second Kingsley factor App’x 307 (4th Cir. 2018)

regarding the injury suffered, there is (unpublished); Mackey v. Anderson

nothing in the record indicating Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. CA 6:06-1180-

Monroe was injured. Both of these GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1656231, at *1

factors weigh in the defendants’ favor. (D.S.C. June 6, 2007) (“Restraint in a

chair for twelve hours is not a per se

The same is true for the effort the violation of plaintiff’s Fourteenth

officers made to temper the amount of Amendment rights.”); Blakeney v.

force; they did not make use of any Rusk Cnty. Sheriff, 89 F. App’x 897,

chemical spray, drive stun weapons, 899 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished)

or physical force beyond that required (holding that pre-trial detainee’s

to move Monroe from the floor to the rights were not violated when he was

restraint chair. While the record does placed in restraint chair for twenty

not shed much light on any specific hours after he disobeyed orders and

threat posed to the restraining engaged in unruly, destructive

officers, the general security issue was practices, since the purpose was not

real, as evidenced by the need to call punishment).

the code red, and it is undisputed that

Monroe was resisting. Thus, the third, As referenced earlier, there is no

fifth, and sixth Kingsley factors weigh evidence that Monroe suffered any

in the defendants’ favor. injury, so any deliberate indifference

claim would fail, as well. Moreover,

And courts have repeatedly found no because there was no constitutional

constitutional violation in similar violation, Rodriguez is entitled to

scenarios. See, e.g., Evans v. S.L.R. qualified immunity.

Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-CV-2731-HMH-

TER, 2019 WL 1026362, at *8 (D.S.C. This leaves the official capacity claim

Jan. 24, 2019) (finding no violation against Rodriguez. At all times

where plaintiff spent approximately relevant herein, he was serving as a

two hours in restraint chair after corporal in the MCDC upon the

officer found him biting his wrist sheriff’s direction. See Rodriguez

under suicide watch), report and Decl. ¶ 2. An official capacity claim

recommendation adopted sub nom., against Rodriguez is, therefore, a

Evans v. Abraham, 2019 WL 1022141 claim against the sheriff. See

(Mar. 4, 2019); Singleton v. Brown, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

No. CV 9:15-2723-JMC-BM, 2016 WL 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of

11200707, at *16 (D.S.C. Sept. 14, Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55

2016) (holding that restraint in a chair (1978) (noting that official capacity

for six hours was not a constitutional lawsuits “generally represent only

violation where no pepper spray had another way of pleading an action

been used and there was no evidence against an entity of which an officer is

of injuries), report and an agent”)); Wong v. Guilford Cnty.

recommendation adopted, 2017 WL Sheriff Dep’t, No. 1:23cv223, 2024

WL 85548, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Ja. 8, Carolina law, the sheriff . . . has final

2024) (finding the § 1983 official policymaking authority over hiring,

capacity claims against deputies supervising, and discharging

redundant of the § 1983 claim against personnel in the sheriff’s office.”

the sheriff), report and Parker, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 739.

recommendation adopted, 2024 WL

5372414 (Jan. 30, 2024); Parker v. Here, there are no genuine issues of

Bladen Cnty., 583 F. Supp. 2d 736, material fact wherein a reasonable

739 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (“[U]nder North jury could find that Rodriguez, as an

Carolina law, a sheriff’s deputy is an employee of the sheriff, was acting

employee of the sheriff . . . .”) (citation according to the sheriff’s official

omitted). policy of some nature. Accordingly,

the Court should dismiss the claim

But a sheriff cannot be vicariously against him in his official capacity, in

liable for his deputy’s actions under addition to his individual capacity.

§ 1983. See Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011); Monell, 436 C. The Court Should Grant the

U.S. at 691. A local government’s Defendants’ Motion for

“liability under Section 1983 attaches Summary Judgment as to the

only to ‘action [taken] pursuant to November 19, 2024 Incident.

official . . . policy of some nature.’”

Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 897 Here, the force at issue involves

F.3d 538, 554 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting MCDC officers deploying a two-

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 second OC spray can burst into

U.S. 469, 477 (1986)) (alteration in Monroe’s face and putting pressure

Hunter). A single decision may create under his jaw while placing him in a

an official policy “so long as that restraint chair soon thereafter.

governmental unit possessed ‘final

The encounter began when Rodriguez

authority to create official policy.’” Id.

went to Monroe’s cell based on an

(quoting Semple v. City of

“ongoing situation” involving another

Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 712 (4th

officer. See Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 22. He

Cir. 1999)).

told Monroe to put on his jumpsuit

In other words, for the sheriff to be and put his hands through the food

liable under § 1983, the deputy must pass for handcuffing. See id. ¶ 23.

have been “acting pursuant to an Monroe did not do so. He began

unconstitutional policy, practice, or packing up his items, even after

custom of the [sheriff] during this Rodriguez told him to stop, telling

time.” See Mashore v. Naves, No. Rodriguez: “fuck no.” See id. ¶ 24.

1:24CV420, 2025 WL 1698479, at *3 Rodriguez then deployed a two-

(M.D.N.C. Apr. 24, 2025), second burst of his OC spray can in

recommendation and report Monroe’s face. See id. ¶ 25.

adopted, 2025 WL 1697088 (June 17,

2025). Indeed, “under North

Monroe still would not put his arms in sprayed Monroe and when he was

the food pass. See id. ¶ 26. Once placed in the restraint chair. See

Rodriguez threatened to use the OC Danley Decl. ¶¶ 18, 19.

fogger, Monroe complied. See id. As

Rodriguez and Sergeant Danley were 1. The OC spray

taking Monroe to red level 1, Monroe

jerked away, said, “don’t fucking push As to the OC spray, “[i]t is generally

me,” and continued to make noise recognized that it is a violation of the

after Rodriguez told him to be quiet Eighth Amendment for prison

(this was at approximately 1:20 am). officials to use mace, tear gas or other

See id. ¶¶ 26-27. Once they were in the chemical agents in quantities greater

red level, Rodriguez used the pump than necessary or for the sole purpose

sprayer to decontaminate Monroe of infliction of pain.” See Iko v.

and secured him in cell 113. See id. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 240 (4th Cir.

¶ 28. 2008) (citation modified). Prison

officials can lawfully use certain

Minutes later, Monroe began rattling chemical substances, including OC

the door of his cell, which made a loud spray or mace, though, to regain

banging noise. See id. ¶¶ 29-30. “order and discipline and to maintain

Rodriguez decided to take him off the institutional security.” Hudson v.

cell block and place him in the McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). See

restraint chair. See id. ¶ 33. Rodriguez also Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d

and DO Holder worked together to 756, 763 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[M]ace can

place Monroe in the chair once they be constitutionally used in small

escorted him off of the cell block. See quantities to . . . control a recalcitrant

id. ¶ 33. Monroe attempted to jerk his inmate.”) (internal quotation

left arm away during the process. See omitted). “Furthermore, because a

id. In response, Rodriguez applied limited use of mace constitutes a

pressure underneath Monroe’s relatively mild response compared to

jawline, using both his middle and other forms of force, the initial

index finger while keeping away from application of mace indicates a

his throat. See id. ¶ 34. Rodriguez tempered response by the prison

stopped as soon as Monroe was officials.” See id. (internal quotations

secured. See id. Monroe was taken to omitted).

the exercise room for a two-hour cool

down period. See id. ¶ 36. He As with the two earlier incidents,

continued to yell once there, stating Kingsley requires a comparison

(among other things): “I’m coming between the force exerted and the

after everyone in here! God has a plan need for it. And the court should

and im [sic] going to sue everyone in consider this from the vantage point

this bitch.” See id. of what the officer knew at the time,

taking into account the need to

MCDC personnel advised the nurse in manage the facility where Monroe

the facility both when Rodriguez was detained. Here, as documented

above, Monroe had a pattern of Rodriguez acted unreasonably in

disruptive behavior. He would securing Monroe’s compliance.

repeatedly disobey orders. Rodriguez

witnessed some of these incidents. It Likewise, there are no facts by which

was almost 2 am in a detention center. a reasonable jury could find that he

Reasonably, Rodriguez had every was deliberately indifferent to

reason to believe that simple Monroe’s medical needs, either.

commands would not be obeyed (and Rodriguez promptly decontaminated

indeed, here, they were not). He him, and there is no evidence that

administered a brief burst of the OC Monroe suffered any injury from the

spray (which, it should be noted, still encounter. Any Fourteenth

did not deter Monroe). The force was Amendment claims arising from the

commensurate with the need, and this OC spray incident fail.

factor weighs in favor of granting the

motion. See, e.g., Boose v. Adkins, No. Accordingly, because there were no

3:18-cv-1480, 2020 WL 3086885, at constitutional violations, Rodriguez is

*13 (S.D. W. Va. May 20, 2020) also entitled to qualified immunity

(explaining that “[c]ourts in this and the claim against him in his

Circuit have routinely held that law individual capacity does not survive

enforcement and correctional officers summary judgment. Likewise, there

may deploy force in response to are no facts by which a reasonable

threatening, disruptive, or assaultive jury could find that he was acting

behavior”) (collecting cases), report pursuant to a policy of the sheriff, so

and recommendation adopted, 2020 any claims against him in his official

WL 3078333 (June 10, 2020). capacity are equally doomed.

As the extent of the injury, there is no 2. Hands on the jawline and the

evidence in the record that Monroe restraint chair

suffered one. This, too, weighs in

As referenced earlier, Monroe

favor of the defendants. However,

struggled when Rodiguez and Holder

Rodriguez did not appear to make

were attempting to secure him in the

many attempts to limit the amount of

restraint chair, and so Rodriguez

force, nor was the severity of the

applied pressure to his jawline to gain

problem paramount. The fourth and

his compliance. The record contains

fifth factors thus weigh in Monroe’s

no information about how long

favor. The sixth does not: as with the

Rodriguez maintained his hold; it

two earlier incidents, he was actively

only indicates that he stopped as soon

resisting. And continued resisting

as Rodriguez submitted. There is also

after Rodriguez deployed the two-

no information about any injuries

second burst of OC spray. Overall,

Rodriguez may have suffered from the

under Kingsley, based on these facts,

encounter.

no reasonable jury could find that

Under the first Kingsley factor, it was injury therefrom, any deliberate

appropriate for Rodriguez to exert indifference claim fails, as well.

some measure of force; Monroe was

actively struggling with him and Again, because there were no

another officer. And there is no constitutional violations, Rodriguez is

evidence of injury. In fact, the record also entitled to qualified immunity,

contains definitive evidence that and the Court should grant summary

Monroe’s airway was not constricted; judgment as to the claim against him

as Rodriguez applied force to his in his individual capacity. Likewise,

jawline, he yelled, “GET YOUR there are no facts by which a

FUCKING HANDS AWAY FROM MY reasonable jury could find that he was

THROAT! GET YOUR FUCKING acting pursuant to a policy of the

HANDS OFF MY THROAT!” See, e.g., sheriff, so the Court should grant the

Martin v. Shaw, No. 7:19CV00760, motion against him in his official

2021 WL 650891, at *4 (W.D. Va. Feb. capacity.

19, 2021) (“The officers and Martin

also offer evidence that he was able to D. There Are No Viable

talk during the wheelchair ride, Constitutional Claims Arising

making it unreasonable for any fact from the December 31, 2024

finder to be persuaded . . . that Lt. Encounter.

Shaw’s grip [] significantly restricted

Monroe appears to allege in his

his breathing.”). The first two factors

unverified complaint that officers,

thus weigh in the defendants’ favor.

including named defendant

Rodriguez did make an effort to limit

Edmonds, planted contraband in his

the force – he did not make use of the

cell during a search of it on this date.

OC spray or the drive stun weapon –

Even if it was undisputed that any of

and he only used force until

the named defendants did so, that

Rodriguez complied. This weighs in

conduct does not give rise to any

the defendants’ favor.

recognized constitutional claim. The

Likewise, both the threat to the officer closest fit is a First Amendment

and the security threat were real, as retaliation claim, i.e., that the

Monroe was physically struggling defendants planted the contraband in

with two officers. Finally, he was Monroe’s cell in retaliation for

actively resisting. Thus, the fourth, protected conduct. See, e.g., Rollins v.

fifth, and sixth Kingsley factors all Bond, No. CV 5:25-CV-P78-JHM,

support Rodriguez’s actions here. 2025 WL 2734655, at *3 (W.D. Ky.

Accordingly, based on the undisputed Sept. 25, 2025) (recognizing that

facts, no reasonable jury could find prison officials planting contraband

that Rodriguez acted unreasonably in for retaliatory purposes could give

this application of force. rise to a Section 1983 claim if properly

pled). But the Court is not required to

And because the record is devoid of advance Monroe’s claims for him. As

any evidence of Monroe suffering any the Fourth Circuit recently reiterated:

[W]hen the thrust of a E. The Defendants Have Not Met

complaint points to an the Requisite Standard for

“essential grievance,” courts Sealing.

are not required to scour

pleadings for stray phrases that Contemporaneous to filing their

could, with the benefit of motion for summary judgment, the

hindsight, be consistent with defendants filed a motion to seal

another theory, and then Exhibit Y5 in support of the motion,

construe those phrases to assert Monroe’s medical records. See Docket

separate claims. After all, Entry 29. In support thereof, the

district courts are not the legal defendants simply cite “Local Civil

advocates of pro se litigants. Rules 26.1(a)(1) and 79.2,” neither of

Nor are courts required to which address the sealing process.

anticipate all arguments or This is insufficient.

“explore exhaustively all

potential claims of a pro se It is well-settled that the public has a

plaintiff” that are not readily long-established right of access to

apparent from the allegations. judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner,

Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597

See Jackson v. Dameron, 171 F. 4th (1978); Va. Dep’t of State Police v.

641, 650 (4th Cir. 2026) (internal Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th

citations omitted). Cir. 2004). The right derives from two

sources, the common law and the

And even if he had properly pled this First Amendment. United States ex

claim, the undisputed facts – based on rel. Oberg v. Nelnet, Inc., 105 F.4th

the sworn affidavits the defendants 161, 170–71 (4th Cir. 2024). However,

submitted in support of their motion the right of access is not absolute and

– give no indication that any officer can be rebutted. See Rushford v. New

placed the contraband in Monroe’s Yorker, Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253

cell or, even if they had, that there was (4th Cir. 1988). The burden of

any retaliatory motive related thereto. establishing a right to limit public

Accordingly, there would be no access is on the party claiming the

genuine dispute of material fact, and need for confidentiality. Id.

Edmonds would be entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, in any The common law right of access

capacity. applies to all judicial records but can

be rebutted if “countervailing

interests heavily outweigh the public

interests in access.” Id. The First

5 While the defendants moved only to than redacting Exhibit Y of that

seal Exhibit Y, they filed every exhibit in document.

support of their motion under seal rather

Amendment right of access is constitute a compelling interest that

narrower and applies only to outweighs the First Amendment right

particular judicial records and of access to documents, even if the

documents. Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 documents are medical records.” See

F.3d 246, 266 (4th Cir. 2014). To Johnson v. City of Fayetteville,

overcome the right of access based on No.:12–cv–456, 2014 WL 7151147, at

the First Amendment a party must *11–12 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2014). As

show “a compelling governmental the court noted in Musgrove in

interest” and that the restriction is denying such a motion to seal in a

“narrowly tailored.” Id. deliberate indifference case:

When documents are filed in While the Court recognizes that

connection with a dispositive motion, medical records are ordinarily

as here, the “more rigorous First kept confidential, that is not

Amendment standard ... appl[ies].” always the case when those

Va. Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at records are important to a

576 (explaining that once documents lawsuit the patient himself has

produced in discovery are “made part brought. Mr. Musgrove has

of a dispositive motion, they [have] neither joined in the motion to

lost their status as being raw fruits of seal nor expressed any

discovery”) (internal quotation and concerns about the

citation omitted). Thus, the confidentiality of the materials,

defendants “must present specific indicating he has no

reasons in support of [their] confidentiality concerns about

position.” See id. at 575. the limited records at issue.

This they do not do, only making 2022 WL 19977408, at *2.

cursory reference to the nature of the

documents and two inapplicable local Like Musgrove, Monroe has placed

rules. See Musgrove v. Moore, No. his medical condition at issue in his

1:19-CV-164, 2022 WL 19977408, at complaint. He has not joined in the

*2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 20, 2022) (“The motion to seal, and the defendants

defendants’ conclusory references to have not identified with the specificity

an assortment of statutes and required the justification therefor.

regulations does not establish these Accordingly, the motion to seal is

records are confidential or show a denied.

compelling interest to justify

sealing.”) (citing Va. Dep’t of State VI. CONCLUSION

Police, 386 F.3d at 575). And

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

“[f]ederal courts have recognized . . .

that the Court GRANT the motion for

that where a party voluntarily puts his

summary judgment filed under

or her medical information or status

Docket Entry 26.

into issue, it is more difficult to find

that the party’s privacy interests

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the

defendants’ motion to seal, Docket

Entry 29, is DENIED.

The clerk is directed to unseal Docket

Entry 28.

J i Gibson { cFadden

United States Magistrate Judge

August 27, 2026

21