Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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8 ADRIAN ALVAREZ SOSA, No. 2:26-cv-01330-KES-EGC (HC)

(A-Number: 244-622-052),

9 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner, TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF

10 HABEAS CORPUS AND DENY MOTION

v. TO EXPEDITE DECISION

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TONYA ANDREWS, et al., (Docs. 1 & 18)

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Respondents. [14-DAY DEADLINE]

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15 I. INTRODUCTION

16 Petitioner Adrian Alvarez Sosa is an immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition

17 for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). On April 14, 2026, in denying

18 Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order, the District Judge determined that Petitioner’s

19 detention falls under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), and not 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as Petitioner contends.

20 (Doc. 9). On July 6, 2026, Petitioner filed a reply in support of his petition, which he additionally

21 titled as a motion to expedite decision, where he further argues that he is not subject to mandatory

22 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), and that in any event, his detention without a bond

23 hearing has become unconstitutionally prolonged. (Doc. 18).

24 For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that Petitioner is detained under the

25 authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) and that his detention has not yet become unreasonably

26 prolonged within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the undersigned

27 recommends that the petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and that the motion

28 to expedite decision (Doc. 18) be DENIED AS MOOT.

1 II. BACKGROUND

2 A. Petitioner’s Immigration History

3 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba. (Doc. 8, Ex. 1). On July 13, 2024, he arrived at

4 the Gateway International Bridge in Brownsville, Texas, and was paroled into the United States

5 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Id.). On July 21, 2025, an immigration judge in Orlando,

6 Florida granted Petitioner’s motion to terminate removal proceedings. (Id.). Petitioner represents

7 that he has a pending Form I-485 application to adjust status based on his marriage to a United

8 States citizen, received by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services on July 24, 2025. (Doc. 18

9 at 2). Respondents have not disputed this representation.

10 On January 28, 2026, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers arrested

11 Petitioner. (Doc. 8, Ex. 1). A Notice to Appear, dated March 7, 2026, charges Petitioner as

12 removable under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §

13 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). (Id., Ex. 5). Petitioner is detained at the California City Correctional Center.

14 Removal proceedings are pending and active. An immigration court hearing set for July 2,

15 2026 was continued at Petitioner’s request. (Doc. 20). His next immigration court hearing is

16 scheduled for July 30, 2026. (Id.). No removal order has been issued, and no appeal is pending.

17 (Id., Ex. 3).

18 B. Florida Criminal Proceedings

19 On June 5, 2025, the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office arrested Petitioner for battery in

20 violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a). (Doc. 8, Ex. 2). The State charged Petitioner with

21 misdemeanor battery on July 29, 2025. (Id., Ex. 2). On April 6, 2026, the Manatee County Circuit

22 Court issued a no-bond bench warrant ordering Petitioner to show cause why he did not appear in

23 court that day.1 (Id., Ex. 3). The case, No. 2025MM001484AX, remains open. (Doc. 20).

24 On January 5, 2026, the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office arrested Petitioner for burglary of

25 an occupied dwelling in violation of Fla. Stat. § 810.02(3)(a), a second-degree felony. (Doc. 8,

26 Exs. 2 & 4). A $25,000 surety bond was posted on January 27, 2026, and Petitioner was released

27 from state custody. (Id., Ex. 4). The pre-trial hearing set for July 9, 2026 was continued to

28 1 It appears Petitioner was in ICE custody in California on April 6, 2026.

1 September 10, 2026. (Doc. 20, Ex. 2). The case, No. 26-00123-CF, remains open. (Id.).

2 C. Duration of Immigration Detention

3 Petitioner asserts that he has been detained since January 5, 2026, a period he characterizes

4 as approximately six months as of July 6, 2026. (Doc. 18). The record does not support that

5 computation. Petitioner was in Pinellas County pretrial custody on the burglary charge from

6 January 5 until January 27, 2026, when a surety bond was posted. (Doc. 8, Ex. 4). ICE assumed

7 custody on January 28, 2026. (Id., Ex. 1). Time spent in state custody on criminal charges does

8 not count toward the duration of immigration detention. See Jaranow v. Bondi, 819 F. Supp. 3d

9 1229, 1236 (W.D. Wash. 2026). The relevant period of immigration detention is therefore

10 approximately five months and three weeks.

11 D. Procedural History

12 On April 6, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant petition and a motion for temporary restraining

13 order. (Docs. 1 & 2). The District Judge ordered Respondents to show cause. (Doc. 7).

14 Respondents filed their response on April 9, 2026. (Doc. 8). On April 14, 2026, the District Judge

15 denied the motion for temporary restraining order and determined that Petitioner’s detention falls

16 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), and not 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as Petitioner contends. (Doc. 9). On

17 May 18, 2026, Petitioner filed a supplemental brief. (Doc. 14). On June 3, 2026, Respondents

18 filed a response to Petitioner’s supplemental brief and opposition to habeas relief. (Doc. 17). On

19 July 6, 2026, Petitioner filed a reply in support of his petition, which he additionally titled as a

20 motion to expedite decision, where he further argues that he is not subject to mandatory detention

21 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E), and that in any event, his detention without a bond hearing has

22 become unconstitutionally prolonged. (Doc. 18). At the undersigned’s direction (Doc. 19),

23 Respondents filed a status report on July 17, 2026 (Doc. 20).

24 III. DISCUSSION

25 A. Jurisdiction

26 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in

27 violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

28 “[D]istrict courts retain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to consider habeas challenges to

1 immigration detention that are sufficiently independent of the merits of [a] removal order.” Lopez-

2 Marroquin v. Barr, 955 F.3d 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court has confirmed that

3 federal courts have jurisdiction to review a constitutional challenge to a noncitizen’s detention. See

4 Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).

5 B. Petitioner Is Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)

6 The Laken Riley Act added a category of aliens subject to mandatory detention, covering

7 any alien who: “(i) is inadmissible under paragraph (6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) of section 1182(a) of this

8 title; and (ii) is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits

9 committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting,

10 or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily

11 injury to another person…” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)-(ii). The terms in section 1226(c)(1)(E)

12 “have the meanings given such terms in the jurisdiction in which the acts occurred.” 8 U.S.C. §

13 1226(c)(2).

14 Here, both prongs are satisfied. As to prong (i), the operative Notice to Appear charges

15 Petitioner as inadmissible under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). (Doc. 8, Ex. 5). As to prong (ii),

16 Petitioner was arrested on January 5, 2026 for, and is presently charged with, burglary of an

17 occupied dwelling under Fla. Stat. § 810.02(3)(a), an offense deemed a “burglary” in the

18 jurisdiction where the acts occurred. Accordingly, Petitioner’s detention falls under section

19 1226(c)(1)(E), and Petitioner’s contention that he is detained under section 1226(a) and is entitled

20 to a bond hearing as a matter of statutory right fails.

21 Petitioner’s principal statutory argument is that section 1226(c)(1)(E) cannot apply because

22 “no charges were ever formally prosecuted” and state authorities “exercised their discretion not to

23 prosecute Petitioner’s case at all.” (Doc. 18 at 3-4). The record refutes that premise. The State

24 Attorney for the Sixth Judicial Circuit filed charges on January 21, 2026, and the case remains open

25 with a pre-trial hearing set for September 10, 2026. (Doc. 20, Ex. 2). Likewise, the separate

26 Manatee County prosecution remains open, with charges filed on July 29, 2025. (Id., Ex. 1).

27 C. Petitioner’s Detention Has Not Yet Become Unreasonably Prolonged

28 The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no person shall be “deprived of

1 life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “It is well established that the Fifth

2 Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law” in removal proceedings, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.

3 292, 306 (1993), and “[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious

4 constitutional problem,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). At the same time,

5 “[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of that

6 process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 531.

7 In Demore, the Supreme Court sustained such detention under section 1226(c) on the

8 understanding that it lasts only "for the brief period necessary for [the noncitizen’s] removal

9 proceedings,” relying on data reflecting detention averaging approximately a month and a half, and

10 approximately five months in the minority of cases involving an appeal to the Board of Immigration

11 Appeals. Demore, 538 U.S. at 513, 529-31. Demore does not, however, foreclose a Due Process

12 Clause challenge where detention extends well beyond the period the Court contemplated. See id.

13 at 532-33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (a detainee “could be entitled to an individualized

14 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became

15 unreasonable or unjustified”).

16 There is no bright-line rule fixing the point at which detention under section 1226(c)

17 becomes unreasonable. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297-303 (2018); see also

18 Gonzalez v. Bonnar, No. 18-cv-05321-JSC, 2019 WL 330906, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019).

19 Where a Due Process Clause challenge is presented, courts in this circuit and district evaluate such

20 challenge under the three-factor framework of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See

21 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2022); Diep v. Wofford, No. 1:24-cv-

22 01238-SKO, 2025 WL 604744 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2025). Relevant to that inquiry are the duration

23 of detention to date, the anticipated duration of future detention, delays attributable to either party,

24 and the likelihood that the proceedings will result in a final removal order. Rodriguez Diaz, 53

25 F.4th at 1207-08.

26 Petitioner has been in immigration detention for approximately five months and three

27 weeks. That period is at or near, but has not exceeded, the period Demore identified as the ordinary

28 duration of detention during removal proceedings, including those involving an administrative

1 appeal. 538 U.S. at 529-31.

2 The posture of the proceedings likewise does not yet suggest indefinite detention. An

3 immigration court hearing is set for July 30, 2026. No removal order has been issued, no appeal is

4 pending, and nothing in the record indicates the proceedings have been suspended or indefinitely

5 deferred. Additionally, some of the delays are attributable to Petitioner, who requested the

6 continuance of the July 2, 2026 immigration court hearing. Delay a petitioner himself sought

7 weighs against a finding that his detention has become unreasonable.

8 Nonetheless, the undersigned still considers and balances the Mathews factors, weighing

9 the private interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the Government’s interest. Mathews,

10 424 U.S. at 335. First, Petitioner’s interest in “freedom from prolonged detention” is

11 “unquestionably substantial.” Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). Petitioner

12 was paroled into the United States, has a pending application for adjustment of status based on

13 marriage to a United States citizen, and is separated from his spouse by his detention. This factor

14 weighs in Petitioner’s favor.

15 Second, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [a petitioner’s] interest is high” where he

16 “has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.” Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-

17 07996-NC, 2020 WL 510347, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020). Petitioner hasn’t received a bond or

18 custody redetermination. The premise of an individualized bond hearing is that assertions of

19 dangerousness and flight risk are tested before a neutral adjudicator rather than presumed from the

20 face of a charging document, and the probable value of such a hearing is not trivial. This factor

21 weighs in Petitioner’s favor. However, such weight is a function of time. The procedural protection

22 Congress provided for noncitizens detained under section 1226(c) is the removal proceeding itself,

23 which Demore held sufficient for the period such proceedings ordinarily require. Where detention

24 remains within that period and the removal proceeding is moving forward, the marginal value of

25 superimposing an additional custody hearing is lower compared to instances where detention

26 lengthens indeterminately.

27 Third, the Government's interest “[includes] the function involved and the fiscal and

28 administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424

1 U.S. at 335. The Government has a strong interest in effecting removal. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531.

2 In addition, the Government has a strong interest in protecting the public. Those interests do not

3 diminish with the passage of time. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208. Congress has further

4 determined that noncitizens who are inadmissible and charged with the offenses enumerated in

5 section 1226(c)(1)(E) are to be detained during the pendency of removal proceedings, and that

6 legislative judgment is entitled to weight. This factor weighs in the Government’s favor.

7 In balancing the factors, the question is not whether an individualized hearing would have

8 value, but whether the Constitution requires one at this stage of Petitioner’s detention. The

9 undersigned concludes that the balance has not yet tipped in Petitioner’s favor because, amongst

10 other factors, Petitioner’s detention has not yet exceeded the period Demore held constitutionally

11 permissible, his removal proceedings remain active with a hearing set for July 30, 2026, and a

12 portion of the delay is of his own making. Petitioner’s continued detention, at approximately five

13 months and three weeks, remains constitutionally permissible.

14 However, the undersigned’s recommendation of denial rests on duration, and duration

15 changes. Therefore, the undersigned recommends denial without prejudice so that Petitioner may

16 return to this Court if his detention continues to lengthen without resolution of his removal

17 proceedings.

18 D. Petitioner’s Motion to Expedite Decision

19 In light of these findings and recommendations, Petitioner’s motion to expedite decision

20 (Doc. 18) should be denied as moot. The motion was included as part of Petitioner’s reply in

21 support of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the undersigned considered the arguments

22 therein in reaching the conclusions here.

23 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

24 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

25 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be DENIED WITHOUT

26 PREJUDICE; and,

27 2. The motion to expedite decision (Doc. 18) be DENIED AS MOOT.

28 These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Court

1 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304

2 | of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California.

3 | Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, a

4 | party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Jd. The document

5 | should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation” and shall

6 | not exceed fifteen (15) pages, except by leave of court with good cause shown. The Court will not

7 | consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s),

8 | the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page number,

9 | when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the

10 | fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when reviewing these Findings

11 | and Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure

12 | to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson

13 | v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014). This recommendation is not an order that is

14 | immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to

15 | Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

16 | Court’s judgment.

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12 IT IS SO ORDERED. .

19 | Dated: _ July 21, 2026 Cu iy du Gxllo

50 UNITED STATES MWGISTRATE JUDGE

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