The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
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10 TINA M. S.,
CASE NO. 3:26-CV-5147-DWC
11 Plaintiff,
v.
ORDER REVERSING AND
12 REMANDING DEFENDANT’S
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS
13 SECURITY,
14 Defendant.
15 Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of
16 Defendant’s denial of her applications for supplemental security income (“SSI”) and disability
17 insurance benefits (“DIB”).1 The Court concludes that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
18 erred in evaluating medical opinion evidence. Had the ALJ properly considered this evidence,
19 the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) may have included additional limitations, or the
20 ultimate determination of disability may have changed. The ALJ’s error, therefore, is not
21 harmless, and this matter is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §
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1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties
24 have consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. See Dkt. 3.
1 405(g), to the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration for further proceedings
2 consistent with this order.
3 I. Procedural History
4 Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423 (Title II)
5 on January 30, 2012, alleging disability as of September 10, 2011. Administrative Record
6 (“AR”) 328.2 Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially on August 17, 2012. AR 328. Plaintiff did not
7 appeal the denial.
8 On May 23, 2016, Plaintiff filed another claim, alleging the same onset date in her
9 previous application. AR 16, 486-87. Plaintiff’s claim was denied on July 21, 2016, and upon
10 reconsideration on September 8, 2016. AR 16. Plaintiff subsequently filed an application for SSI
11 benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) on September 28, 2016. AR 16, 489-97.
12 The matter came on for a hearing before ALJ Rebecca Jones (“ALJ Jones”) on December
13 13, 2017. AR 288-89. ALJ Jones concluded there was a procedural error with Plaintiff’s SSI
14 claim and sent it back to the State Agency (“DDS”) for further consideration. AR 16, 288-89.
15 DDS allowed Plaintiff’s SSI claim, determining that she was disabled since September 28, 2016.
16 AR 16.
17 Plaintiff’s supplemental hearing before ALJ Jones was held on December 21, 2018. AR
18 16. On May 21, 2019, ALJ Jones issued a decision and found that Plaintiff was not disabled and
19 did not qualify for DIB between September 10, 2011, and June 30, 2013, the date last insured
20 (“DLI”). AR 17. ALJ Jones did not address Plaintiff’s claim for SSI. AR 16. The Social Security
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22 2 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ de facto reopened Shafer’s 2012 claim because the ALJ “considered ‘on the
merits’ whether [Plaintiff] was disabled during an already-adjudicated period” dating back to September 30, 2011.
23 Dkt. 11 at 18. Neither the ALJ nor the Commissioner address this issue, so the Court finds that the ALJ de facto
reopened Plaintiff’s original application with an alleged onset date of September 30, 2011. Dkt. 14 at 1-19; AR
24 3402-20.
1 Appeals Council (“Appeals Council”) denied review on May 15, 2020, making the
2 Commissioner’s final decision subject to judicial review. AR 1-4. Plaintiff then filed a
3 Complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. AR 2723-
4 25.
5 By an order entered on May 24, 2021, United States Magistrate Judge Theresa L. Fricke
6 reversed and remanded the Commissioner’s decision for further proceedings. AR 2740-41. Judge
7 Fricke held that ALJ Jones erred when she determined that Plaintiff “did not have a medically
8 severe impairment” at Step 2 of the sequential evaluation process. AR 2737. Judge Fricke’s
9 decision was based, in part, on ALJ Jones’s failure to properly consider the medical opinions of
10 Vanessa Honn, Ph.D., a treating provider, and Alyssa Ruddell, Ph.D., an examining provider.
11 AR 2730-37.
12 The matter came on for a second hearing on February 15, 2022, before ALJ Malcolm
13 Ross (“ALJ Ross”). AR 2681-97. ALJ Ross issued a decision on April 13, 2022, and also
14 determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. AR 3215. The Appeals Council denied review, and
15 Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court on June 27, 2022, seeking review of the Commissioner’s
16 decision. AR 3223.
17 On December 7, 2022, United States Magistrate Judge S. Kate Vaughan entered an order
18 reversing and remanding the Commissioner’s decision for further proceedings. AR 3225. Judge
19 Vaughan held that ALJ Ross’s findings were “in direct contradiction to the [previous] court
20 remand order …, and [ALJ Ross] reiterated reasons previously found erroneous” when
21 disregarding the medical opinions of Dr. Honn and Dr. Ruddell. AR 3229-31.
22 The matter came on for a third hearing on July 24, 2023. AR 3166-91. On September 6,
23 2023, ALJ David Johnson (“ALJ Johnson”) issued a decision and concluded that Plaintiff was
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1 not disabled. AR 3154. ALJ Johnson gave “no weight” to Dr. Ruddell’s “opinions [regarding
2 Plaintiff’s] functional limitations and abilities.” AR 3151. Plaintiff proceeded to file a complaint
3 in this Court on November 9, 2023. AR 3499.
4 United States Magistrate Judge Grady Leupold entered an order on July 2, 2024,
5 reversing and remanding the Commissioner’s decision for further proceedings. AR 3503-13.
6 Judge Leupold held that ALJ Johnson erred by discounting Dr. Ruddell’s medical opinion on the
7 basis that she “did not assert that her opinion related to the claimant’s condition during the
8 relevant period of September 2011 through June 2013” and she allegedly did not “review any
9 records when she examined Plaintiff in 2016.” AR 3509-11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 The matter most recently came on for a hearing on September 9, 2025, before ALJ
11 Johnson. AR 3430. ALJ Johnson issued a decision on September 26, 2025, once again
12 determining that Plaintiff was not disabled between September 11, 2011, through June 30, 2013.
13 AR 3420. The Appeals Council denied review, and Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court on
14 February 23, 2026. AR 3392-98; Dkt. 6.
15 II. Standard of Review
16 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of
17 social security benefits if the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by
18 substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th
19 Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). Substantial evidence is
20 “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
21 Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (citation omitted). “We review only the reasons
22 provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground
23 upon which [they] did not rely.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014).
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1 III. Discussion
2 Plaintiff argues that ALJ Johnson erred in: (1) rejecting her subjective testimony
3 regarding her symptoms and limitations; (2) rejecting Dr. Ruddell’s medical opinion; and (3)
4 basing her RFC on inaccurate job incidence data. Dkt. 11 at 4, 11, 14. Plaintiff requests this
5 matter be remanded for an award of benefits. Id. at 18-20.
6 A. Medical Opinion Evidence
7 This case was filed before March 27, 2017, and is therefore governed by the old
8 regulations for evaluating opinion evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b).
9 “Generally, the opinion of a treating physician must be given more weight than the
10 opinion of an examining physician, and the opinion of an examining physician must be afforded
11 more weight than the opinion of a reviewing physician.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1157, 1160
12 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001)). The ALJ
13 must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of either a
14 treating or examining physician. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing
15 Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988); Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th
16 Cir. 1990)).
17 When a treating or examining physician’s opinion is contradicted, the opinion can be
18 rejected “for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the
19 record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir.
20 1995); Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)). The ALJ can accomplish this by
21 “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,
22 stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725
23 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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1 B. Dr. Ruddell’s Opinion
2 Dr. Ruddell conducted a Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluation of Plaintiff on September
3 19, 2016. AR 861. Dr. Ruddell did a clinical interview and a mental status examination (“MSE”)
4 as part of the evaluation. AR 859, 862.
5 Dr. Ruddell diagnosed Plaintiff with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and anxiety.
6 AR 860. Dr. Ruddell opined the diagnosed conditions began around 2005. AR 860. In Dr.
7 Ruddell’s opinion, Plaintiff had marked limitations in her ability to: (1) learn new tasks; (2)
8 adapt to changes in a routine work setting; (3) maintain appropriate behavior in a work setting;
9 (4) complete a normal work day and work week without interruptions from psychologically
10 based symptoms; and (5) set realistic goals and plan independently. AR 861.
11 ALJ Johnson gave “very little weight” to Dr. Ruddell’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s
12 “functional limitations and abilities” for several reasons. AR 3415. First, ALJ Johnson
13 discounted Dr. Ruddell’s opinion because she “did not state that [it] related to the claimant’s
14 condition through the date late insured,” and “nothing in the examination … support[ed] that
15 assertion.” AR 3415. Second, ALJ Johnson found that Dr. Ruddell’s opinion was “not consistent
16 with normal mental status findings” from Plaintiff’s treatments with Dr. Honn from May and
17 June of 2016. AR 3415. Third, ALJ Johnson found that Dr. Ruddell’s opinion was less
18 persuasive because the information in her evaluation “represent[ed the] client[’s] report.” AR
19 3415. Finally, ALJ Johnson determined that Dr. Wiese, the medical expert that testified at
20 Plaintiff’s disability hearing, had a more consistent opinion with the evidence in the record and
21 was therefore entitled more weight. AR 3415.
22 The Court concludes the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Ruddell’s opinion with all four
23 rationales. Each will be discussed in turn.
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1 i. Dr. Ruddell’s Opinion in Relation to Plaintiff’s DLI
2 First, the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Ruddell’s opinion because it was outside the scope
3 of the DLI. AR 3415.
4 “[R]eports containing observations made after the [DLI] are relevant to assess the
5 claimant’s disability.” Smith v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1222, 1125 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Kemp v.
6 Weinberger, 522 F.2d 967, 969 (9th Cir. 1975)). This is so because “medical reports are
7 inevitably rendered retrospectively and should not be disregarded solely on that basis.” Smith,
8 849 F.2d at 1125 (citing Bilby v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985)).
9 Dismissing Dr. Ruddell’s opinion, in part, because she did not say it related to Plaintiff’s
10 condition during the period at issue has been addressed in two of three of the remand orders from
11 this Court. AR 2731, 3230-31. Judge Fricke first concluded that Dr. Ruddell’s opinion was
12 relevant, even though it was rendered post-DLI. AR 2731. And Judge Vaughan found that the
13 ALJ dismissed Dr. Ruddell’s opinion on the same basis despite the previous “remand order
14 [finding] error in this line of reasoning.” AR 3231. Yet again, here, “the ALJ entered findings
15 [that were] in direct contradiction to the [C]ourt remand.” Id. This was an improper basis for
16 discounting Dr. Ruddell’s opinion.3
17 Moreover, regardless of the prior remand orders, the ALJ’s findings are not supported by
18 substantial evidence. Dr. Ruddell’s opinion indicated that Plaintiff’s onset date for anxiety and
19 PTSD was around 2005. AR 860. This, in addition to the fact that Dr. Ruddell’s opinion was
20 consistent with Dr. Honn’s examinations, infra Part IV(B)(ii), supports that Dr. Ruddell’s
21 opinion is relevant for evaluating Plaintiff’s alleged disability during the period at issue.
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3 Rejecting a physician’s opinion that is rendered after the DLI is permissible when they fail to establish the
23 basis for their opinion, such as when the claimant was disabled by their impairments. See Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 602.
But, that is not the case here because Judge Fricke concluded that “the diagnoses offered by Dr. Ruddell were
24 consistent with those rendered by Dr. Honn and supported elsewhere in the record.” AR 2731.
1 Therefore, the Court concludes the ALJ’s finding is not specific and legitimate, and it is
2 not supported by substantial evidence.
3 ii. Inconsistencies Between Dr. Ruddell’s Opinion and Dr. Honn’s
Examinations
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Second, the ALJ determined that Dr. Ruddell’s opinion was inconsistent with the mental
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status findings from Plaintiff’s psychological examinations with Dr. Honn between May 2013
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and June 2016. AR 808-57, 3415.
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The ALJ pointed to the fact that Plaintiff “had[, among other things,] normal attention,
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memory speech, grooming, motor activity, expressive language, orientation, and thought
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processes.” AR 3415. Indeed, many of the mental status examinations conducted by Dr. Honn
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noted normal findings. AR 808-57. And, the examinations generally showed improvement in the
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Plaintiff’s condition. Id. The ALJ, however, does not adequately explain how Dr. Ruddell’s
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opinion is inconsistent these findings; rather, the ALJ provided only a list of Dr. Honn’s findings
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and concluded that those findings were inconsistent with Dr. Ruddell’s opinion. AR 3415.
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Similar to Dr. Honn, Dr. Ruddell’s notes indicated Plaintiff had appropriate appearance, normal
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motor activity, full orientation, and normal stream of mental activity and speech, and Plaintiff’s
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attitude and behavior were within normal limits. AR 862. Additionally, nearly all of Dr. Honn’s
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records noted Plaintiff exhibiting an anxious mood and/or affect, which is similar to Dr.
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Ruddell’s findings where she determined Plaintiff suffered from marked anxiety. AR 808-57,
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860-62, 3510.
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Specific examinations also support Dr. Ruddell’s opinion. For instance, on May 8, 2013,
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Plaintiff’s first appointment with Dr. Honn, Plaintiff expressed that it was “very hard” to leave
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her house. AR 854. Plaintiff reported that she left her house two to three times a week, but she
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previously left only two to three times a month. AR 854. Throughout Plaintiff’s treatment with
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1 Dr. Honn, Plaintiff was able to leave the house more often, but she still struggled doing so. AR
2 808-57. Even in 2015, Plaintiff reported having episodes of panic attacks and she was “afraid to
3 go out much.” AR 814.
4 When viewing Dr. Honn’s treatment notes in totality, there is support for Dr. Ruddell’s
5 opinion. Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1162 (explaining that observations regarding a claimant’s
6 condition must be viewed in the “‘context of the overall diagnostic picture’” (quoting Holohan,
7 246 F.3d at 1205)). Just because Plaintiff made some improvement does not mean she was
8 suffering from a marked limitation resulting from her anxiety and PTSD. Holohan, 246 F.3d at
9 1205 (“[A] person who suffers from severe panic attacks, anxiety, and depression [that] makes
10 some improvement does not mean that the person’s impairments no longer seriously affects her
11 ability to function in a workplace.”); Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1162.
12 The Court concludes that the ALJ has failed to adequately explain how Dr. Ruddell’s
13 opinion is inconsistent with Dr. Honn’s treatment notes. Therefore, the ALJ’s finding is not
14 specific and legitimate, and it is not supported by substantial evidence.
15 iii. Plaintiff’s Self-Reports
16 Third, the ALJ discounted Dr. Ruddell’s opinions because they relied on Plaintiff’s self-
17 reports. AR 3415.
18 An ALJ may reject a physician’s opinion “if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimant’s
19 self-reports that have been properly discounted as incredible.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d
20 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Morgan v. Comm’r. Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602
21 (9th Cir. 1999)). This situation is distinguishable from one in which the doctor provides her own
22 observations in support of her assessments and opinions. See Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
23 Admin., 528 F.3d 1194, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2008). “[W]hen an opinion is not more heavily
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1 based on a patient’s self-reports than on clinical observations, there is no evidentiary basis for
2 rejecting the opinion.” Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1162 (citing Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1199-1200). Notably,
3 a psychiatrist’s clinical interview and MSE are “objective measures” which “cannot be
4 discounted as a self-report.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017).
5 Here, the ALJ failed to explain how Dr. Ruddell’s opinion was based on Plaintiff’s
6 subjective reports, except for recounting Dr. Ruddell noted that “[i]nformation in [her]
7 evaluation represent[ed the] client[’s] report.” See AR 859, 3415. “[I]t is incumbent on the ALJ
8 to provide detailed, reasoned, and legitimate rationales for disregarding the physicians’
9 findings[;]” conclusory reasons do “not achieve the level of specificity” required to justify an
10 ALJ’s rejection of an opinion. Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22.
11 Further, the record does not show Dr. Ruddell relied more heavily on Plaintiff’s self-
12 reported symptoms than other information and objective evidence. See 858-63. Rather, in
13 reaching her opinion, Dr. Ruddell observed Plaintiff and conducted a clinical interview and a
14 MSE. See AR 859-63. Dr. Ruddell did not discredit Plaintiff’s subjective reports and supported
15 her ultimate opinion with objective testing, personal observations, and a clinical interview.
16 Because the ALJ’s finding is conclusory and Dr. Ruddell’s opinion was not more heavily
17 based on Plaintiff’s self-reports, the Court concludes the ALJ’s finding is not specific and
18 legitimate, and it is not supported by substantial evidence.
19 iv. Dr. Wiese’s Opinion
20 Finally, the ALJ found Dr. Ruddell’s opinion was entitled to little weight because Dr.
21 Wiese’s opinion was given great weight. AR 3415. Dr. Wiese concluded4 that while there was
22 “evidence of anxiety” during the period at issue, Plaintiff’s symptoms did not amount to a Step 3
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4 Dr. Wiese testified at Plaintiff’s third disability hearing on July 24, 2023. AR 3169-80.
1 listing. AR 3179. Dr. Wiese explained that that Plaintiff’s symptoms did not “appear to be severe
2 on a continuous basis until” June 2016. AR 3170-71. Dr. Wiese’s opinion was based, in part, on
3 the absence of any documentation detailing the severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms prior to the DLI.
4 AR 3179-80.
5 The Court finds that the ALJ determined Dr. Wiese’s opinion was entitled to “greater
6 weight” than Dr. Ruddell’s opinion for three reasons. First, the ALJ observed “[t]he lack of [a]
7 functional limitation present before the [DLI] despite [Plaintiff’s] anxiety [was] consistent with
8 [Dr. Wiese’s] opinions.” AR 3415. Second, the ALJ noted that Dr. Wiese found Dr. Ruddell’s
9 opinion to be inconsistent with Plaintiff’s “condition from the relevant period of September 2011
10 through June 2013.” AR 3415. And third, the ALJ observed that Dr. Ruddell’s opinion was
11 based on Plaintiff’s subjective reports. AR 3415.
12 As previously explained, an ALJ must provide a specific and legitimate reason to give
13 greater weight to an examining physician over a reviewing physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31.
14 Here, the ALJ failed to do so, as he failed to give adequate reason as to why Dr. Wiese’s opinion
15 deserved greater weight, and he based his decision on improper reasons.
16 First, this Court has previously concluded that “Plaintiff’s agoraphobia and avoidance
17 behaviors [were] documented in the record,” despite there being a gap in treatment prior to the
18 DLI. AR 2734. Second, this Court has also concluded that Dr. Ruddell’s opinion was consistent
19 with Dr. Honn’s examinations. Supra Part IV(B)(ii); AR 2731, 3230-31. Third, the ALJ’s
20 reasoning is conclusory. The ALJ gave more weight to Dr. Wiese’s opinion, in part, because Dr.
21 Ruddell’s opinion was not consistent with Dr. Wiese’s findings. AR 3415. But the ALJ did not
22 explain how Dr. Wiese concluded that Plaintiff exhibited only moderate limitations during the
23 period at issue. AR 3415; Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. Finally, the ALJ impermissibly
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1 determined that Dr. Ruddell’s opinion was based on Plaintiff’s subjective reports and provided
2 little to no support for this finding. Supra Part IV(B)(iii).
3 Therefore, the Court concludes the ALJ’s decision to give greater weight to Dr. Wiese’s
4 opinion over Dr. Ruddell’s is not specific and legitimate, and it is not supported by substantial
5 evidence.
6 C. Harmless Error
7 “[H]armless error principles apply in the Social Security Act context.” Molina v. Astrue,
8 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a).
9 Generally, an error is harmless if it is not prejudicial to the claimant and is “inconsequential to
10 the ultimate nondisability determination.” Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050,
11 1055 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.
12 Applying the harmless error analysis, the Court concludes that the ALJ committed
13 harmful error in evaluating the medical opinion evidence because, had the ALJ properly
14 considered Dr. Ruddell’s opinion, Plaintiff’s RFC may have included additional limitations, or
15 the ultimate determination of disability may have changed. The ALJ’s error, therefore, is not
16 harmless, and the proper disposition is to reverse and remand the matter for additional
17 proceedings. See Stout, 454 F.3d at 1055; see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115.
18 D. Remaining Issues
19 In light of this disposition, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s remaining arguments
20 regarding her subjective symptom testimony or her RFC because, on remand, the ALJ is
21 instructed to reconsider the entire Social Security sequential evaluation process, including
22 Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony and, if necessary, Plaintiff’s RFC. See Social Security
23 Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 (1996) (an RFC “must always consider and address medical
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1 source opinions”); Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009)
2 (“[A]n RFC that fails to take into account a claimant’s limitations is defective.”); Watson v.
3 Astrue, No. ED-CV-09-1447-PLA, 2010 WL 4269545, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2010)
4 (concluding the RFC and hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert at Step Five were
5 defective when the ALJ did not properly consider physicians’ findings).
6 E. Remedy
7 Plaintiff requests this Court remand the case for an award of benefits, or in the
8 alternative, remand “with directions to determine an appropriate onset date.” Dkt. 11 at 19.
9 “‘The decision whether to remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to award
10 benefits[,] is within the discretion of the court.’” Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 682 (9th Cir.
11 2017) (alterations in the original) (quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir.
12 1987)). Generally, “‘[i]f additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative
13 proceeding, a social security case should be remanded.’” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1019 (alterations
14 in the original) (Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)).
15 Courts apply the credit-as-true test when evaluating whether remand with instructions to
16 enter and an award of benefits is appropriate. Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 682-83. In doing so, courts
17 consider whether:
18 (1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings
would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient
19 reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and
(3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be
20 required to find the claimant disabled on remand.
21 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. In some instances, “[a]llowing the Commissioner to decide the issue
22 again would create an unfair ‘heads we win; tails we play again’ system of disability benefits
23 adjudication.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 597 (2004). But remanding with instructions
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1 to enter an award for benefits occurs only in rare circumstances. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d
2 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004).
3 Here, the third factor is not satisfied. The record does not clearly show that, if Dr.
4 Ruddell’s opinion was given great weight, Plaintiff would be found disabled on remand. The
5 Court, however, is mindful that “[r]emanding a disability claim for further proceedings can delay
6 much needed income for claimants who are unable to work and are entitled to benefits, often
7 subjecting them to ‘tremendous financial difficulties while awaiting the outcome of their appeals
8 and procedures on remand.’” Benecke, 379 F.3d at 597 (quoting Varney v. Secretary of Health &
9 Human Services, 859 F.2d 1396, 1398 (1988)). And the Court is also aware that this is the fourth
10 appeal in this case, which is a result of the numerous errors made by the Commissioner. AR
11 2737, 3231-32, 3511-12.
12 Therefore, in light of the ALJ’s repeated errors in discounting Dr. Ruddell’s opinion, on
13 remand, the ALJ is directed to assign great weight to Dr. Ruddell’s opinion and include the
14 opined limitations in Plaintiff’s new RFC and throughout the remaining steps of the sequential
15 evaluation process.
16 IV. Conclusion
17 Based on the foregoing reasons and the relevant record, the Court ORDERS that this
18 matter be REVERSED and REMANDED. As stated above, on remand, the ALJ is directed to
19 assign great weight to Dr. Ruddell’s opinion and include the opined limitations in Plaintiff’s new
20 RFC and throughout the remaining steps of the sequential evaluation process.
21 Dated this 26th day of August, 2026.
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A
23
David W. Christel
United States Magistrate Judge
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