Opinion

DOCUMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ELECTRONICALLY FILED

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DOC #:

DATE FILED: 7/13/2026

OMAR WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

-against- No. 24-cv-7630 (NSR)

DANIEL MARTUSCELLO III, et al., OPINION & ORDER

Defendants.

NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Omar Washington (‘Plaintiff’), who is currently incarcerated at Sing Sing

Correctional Facility (the “Facility”), commenced this pro se action on October 1, 2024, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), 2000cc-5(4)(A), alleging violations of his

constitutional and statutory rights to freely exercise his religion. Plaintiff asserts claims against

Defendants Daniel Martuscello III], Commissioner of the New York State Department of

Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), in his official capacity, as well as

Lieutenant Clarence Fisher, Sergeant Maribel Lopez, Sergeant Latesha Bell, and Correctional

Officer Kayla White, each in their individual capacities as employees of the Facility. Plaintiff

alleges violations of his rights under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth

Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and RLUIPA.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”), Defendants have

moved to dismiss the Complaint. Defendants filed their Memorandum of Law (““Def. Mem.,” ECF

No. 26) and their Reply (“Def. Reply,” ECF No. 29) in support of their motion to dismiss. Plaintiff

filed an Opposition. (“Pl. Opp.,”” ECF No. 25.)

For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN

PART.

BACKGROUND

The following background is drawn from the Complaint, and the Court accepts the

allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Facility. (See Compl. § II. A) He is a member of

the Muslim religion. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully denied the opportunity to

participate in Ramadan observances on March 13, 14, and 18, 2024. (Id. § II. C.) Specifically,

Plaintiff alleges that the “School Building” security personnel intentionally prevented him from

participating in Ramadan services, disregarded the procedures outlined in the Facility

administration’s approved Special Events Package, failed to ensure that he received Ramadan feed-

up trays and sahoor bags on those three occasions, and denied him the opportunity to participate

in the congregational breaking of the fast in the mess hall. (Id. ¶¶ 8–22.)

According to Plaintiff, on the evenings of March 11 and 12, 2024, at approximately 7:45

p.m., Correctional Officer White permitted a group of incarcerated individuals registered with the

Nation of Islam (“N.O.I.”) to travel from the School Building to the Housing Block Building

(“HBB”) mess hall to participate in Ramadan observances. (Id. ¶ 8.) On the evening of March 13,

2024, at approximately 7:45 p.m., Plaintiff, along with approximately ten other incarcerated

individuals registered with the N.O.I., approached Correctional Officer White's desk. (Id. ¶ 9.) The

group informed Officer White that they were assembled for transport from the School Building to

the mess hall to participate in the Ramadan meal. (Id.) Officer White, however, informed Plaintiff

and the other incarcerated individuals that Sergeant Lopez, who oversaw the mess hall, had issued

direct orders “not to place N.O.I. Ramadan participants on a run from the School Building to the

mess hall.” (Id. ¶ 10.)

At approximately 8:00 p.m., Plaintiff requested to speak with an area supervisor in an effort

to resolve what he believed to be a misunderstanding between himself and Officer White. (Id. ¶

11.) Several minutes later, Correctional Sergeant Bell arrived. (Id. ¶ 11.) At approximately 8:10

p.m., Plaintiff presented Sergeant Bell with the N.O.I. Special Events Package (Id. ¶ 12.)

According to Plaintiff, the package was a standard document prepared by DOCCS personnel. (Id.)

The package had been reviewed, approved, and signed by Acting Superintendent Thorpe, Deputy

Superintendent of Programs E. Velez, First Deputy Superintendent of Security B. Thorpe, the

Deputy Superintendent of Administration, and N.O.I. Chaplain Minister Henry Allen Muhammad.

(Id.) The package set forth the procedures governing Ramadan observances within the Facility.

(Id.)

The Complaint further alleges that, after listening to Plaintiff’s concerns, Sergeant Bell

stated that Sergeant Fisher had instructed her to compile a list of all N.O.I. participants housed in

the School Building, including their housing locations. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that he then

provided his name and housing location for inclusion on the list. (Id.) Plaintiff contends the

purpose of this list was to ensure that all listed individuals could receive a “feed up tray” at their

housing location upon arrival from the School Building, since they were not permitted to go to the

mess hall. (Id. ¶ 14.) Upon arriving at his unit around 8:45 p.m., however, Plaintiff alleges that

there was no feed up tray or sahoor bag awaiting him. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff alleges that he was not

only unable to participate in the congregational breaking of the fast but also was denied an entire

meal due to the alleged obstruction and “incompetence” of the Facility’s staff. Plaintiff further

alleges that he could not properly break his Ramadan fast in the early morning hours because he

did not receive a sahoor bag. (Id.)

The Complaint likewise alleges that the same process occurred on the evenings of March

14 and 18, 2024. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff was denied access to the mess hall from the School Building,

and he was deprived of a meal and a sahoor bag upon arriving at his housing unit from the School

Building. (Id.) Due to these events, on April 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed a grievance alleging that

Facility officials had denied him—a registered N.O.I. participant—the opportunity to attend and

participate in certain Ramadan observances, including the congregational breaking of the fast, on

three evenings and three mornings during Ramadan.1 (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff further alleges that he

0F

has been a registered N.O.I. member within DOCCS since 2010 and regularly participates in

Ramadan services, Jumah prayer services, and Islamic classes. (Id. ¶ 19.) At the time of the events

at issue, Plaintiff served as the incarcerated individual facilitator for the N.O.I. in the Facility. (Id.)

Although Plaintiff was allegedly denied his Ramadan feed-up trays and sahoor bags, the

same was not true for other incarcerated individuals at the Facility. According to Plaintiff, other

incarcerated N.O.I. and Muslim individuals housed in the Facility were permitted to receive

Ramadan feed-up trays and sahoor bags upon returning from the School Building to their housing

units on March 13, 14, and 18, 2024, whereas individuals housed in Housing Block 7, including

Plaintiff, were not afforded the same accommodation. (Compl. ¶ 22.)

Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff asserts claims under the First, Fifth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments, in addition to RLUIPA. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief

1 Despite Plaintiff filing a grievance, he alleges that no grievance hearing was conducted, and no facility investigation

was undertaken at the Facility. (Compl. § IV.) Plaintiff subsequently appealed the matter to the Inmate Grievance

Resolution Committee on April 16, 2024. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that the Superintendent failed to respond to the

appeal within twenty-five days, as required by state regulations. (Id.) Plaintiff thereafter appealed to the Central Office

Review Committee (“CORC”) on June 6 and June 27, 2024. (Id.)

against Defendant Daniel F. Martuscello III in his official capacity. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff also seeks

$100,000 in compensatory damages, for which Defendants Fisher, Lopez, Bell, and White would

be jointly and severally liable, and $50,000 in punitive damages against each of those Defendants,

who are sued solely in their individual capacities. (Id. ¶¶ 4–7.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff commenced this pro se action on October 1, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) On September

16, 2025, the Court granted Defendants leave to file a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 22.) Defendants

thereafter filed their Memorandum of Law in support of the motion on October 24, 2025. (ECF

No. 26.) Plaintiff filed his opposition on December 5, 2025. (ECF No. 28.) Defendants filed their

reply memorandum in further support of the motion on December 18, 2025. (ECF No. 29.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper unless the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations in the complaint, “a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. While the Court must take

all material factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s

favor, the Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,”

or to credit “mere conclusory statements” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

The Second Circuit “deem[s] a complaint to include any written instrument attached to it

as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference ... and documents that

plaintiffs either possessed or knew about and upon which they relied in bringing the suit.” Rotham

v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). The critical inquiry is

whether the Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to nudge the claims “across the line from conceivable

to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A motion to dismiss will be denied where the allegations

“allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the Defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Finally, “where, as here, [P]laintiff proceeds pro se, the court must construe

[his][complaint] liberally and interpret [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].”

Corbett v. Annucci, 2018 WL 919832, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 12, 2018); Askew v. Lindsey, 2016 WL

4992641, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2016) (alterations in original) (citing Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723

F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013)). However, “the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not

exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Id.

(quoting Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).

II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, that: “[e]very person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights

elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it

describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see also Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d

121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: “(1) that the defendants deprived him of a right ‘secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States’; and (2) that they did so ‘under color of state law.’” Giordano v. City of New

York, 274 F.3d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,

49–50 (1999)).

DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on several grounds. First, Defendants argue

that they lacked personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. (Def. Mem. at 1.)

Second, Defendants argue that the claims against Defendant Martuscello in his official capacity

are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that Plaintiff has failed to plead standing for

declaratory relief. (Id.) Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege a RLUIPA, Equal

Protection, or Free Exercise claim. (Id.) Finally, Defendants argue that, even if the Court agrees

with Plaintiff’s claims, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Id.) The Court addresses

each argument in turn.

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

The Court begins by analyzing Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims. Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants violated the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by

preventing him from participating in Ramadan observances, denying him the meals and

accommodations associated with those observances, and treating him differently from similarly

situated incarcerated individuals. (Compl. ¶¶ 20–22.) At the outset, however, Plaintiff fails to

plausibly allege standalone violations of the Fifth2 and Eighth3 Amendments. The Court therefore

1F 2F

considers only Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.

A. Sovereign Immunity and Official Capacity Claims

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff’s official capacity claim

for declaratory relief against Defendant Martuscello is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Absent abrogation by Congress, a state is immune from suit in federal court. See Seminole

Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–56 (1996); see also Dube v. State Univ. of New York, 900

F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990). This immunity extends to “arms of the state,” which includes

“officers employed by agencies such as DOCCS.” See Peck v. Annucci, 2025 WL 3022454, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2025) (dismissing § 1983 claims seeking monetary damages against DOCCS

personnel in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment); Williams v. Annucci, 2018

WL 3148362, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2018) (dismissing § 1983 claims seeking monetary

damages against DOCCS Commissioner in his official capacity because they “cannot stand” in

light of sovereign immunity); Matteo v. Perez, 2017 WL 4217142, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017)

(dismissing § 1983 claims against DOCCS official because of Eleventh Amendment). In other

2 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim under the Fifth Amendment, the Complaint contains no factual

allegations supporting such a violation. In any event, any such claim fails as a matter of law because the Fifth

Amendment applies only to actions of the federal government and federal officials, not state

actors. See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002) (addressing the Fifth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause as applied to the federal government); Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952) (“The

Fifth Amendment . . . applies to and restricts only the Federal Government.”). Because all Defendants are officials or

employees of the DOCCS, Plaintiff cannot state a plausible claim under the Fifth Amendment.

3 To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the Complaint fails to state a plausible

claim for relief. The Complaint contains no factual allegations suggesting that Defendants used excessive force, acted

with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs, or subjected Plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions

of confinement. Rather, Plaintiff alleges only that he was denied the opportunity to participate in certain Ramadan

observances, including congregational fast-breaking meals and associated religious meal accommodations, on three

occasions. (Compl. ¶¶ 20–21.) Although such allegations may implicate Plaintiff’s rights under the First Amendment

and RLUIPA, they do not, without more, give rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Wright v. Goord, 554

F.3d 255, 268–69 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that temporary restrictions on religious exercise did not constitute cruel and

unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff purports to assert an Eighth

Amendment claim, that claim is dismissed.

words, “[t]he immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states

themselves to state agents . . . that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d

355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)

(a suit against a state official in their official capacity is “not a suit against the official but rather is

a suit against the official’s office”).

In the context of Section 1983, claims against state officers in their official capacities must

be dismissed because such officials are not considered “person[s]” within the meaning of the

statute. See Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 204 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85

F.3d 86, 88–89 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims against DOCCS

superintendent in official capacity). A limited exception exists, however. State officials may be

sued in their official capacities where the “complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law

and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” See Virginia Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v.

Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254–56 (2011) (citing Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md.,

535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–160 (1908)); see also Mary Jo C.

v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. dismissed, 569 U.S. 1040

(2013); KM Enterprises, Inc. v. McDonald, 518 Fed. Appx. 12, 13 (2d Cir. 2013). This exception

does not apply when a plaintiff seeks money damages. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, 28 F.4th

383, 392 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars the award of money damages against

state officials in their official capacities.”).

Here, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief against Defendant Martuscello. (Compl. § V.A.1.)

However, Defendant Martuscello, as DOCCS Commissioner, was employed by DOCCS during

the events giving rise to this action and is therefore “effectively, arms of [the] state.” Gollomp, 568

F.3d at 366. Plaintiff is consequently barred from pursuing damages against him in his official

capacity. See Pineda v. Doe 1-2, 2025 WL 2145661, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2025) (“The

Eleventh Amendment therefore precludes Plaintiff’s claims . . . under Section 1983 against the

individual defendants, in their official capacities, as officers of the State of New York.”) As

explained above, “New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal

court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting Section 1983.” Javier v.

Russo, 2021 WL 4252061, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2021) (citing Trotman v. Palisades Interstate

Park Comm’n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977)); see also Mamot v. Bd. of Regents, 367 F. App’x.

191, 192 (2d Cir. 2010) (“It is well-established that New York has not consented to § 1983 suits

in federal court, and that § 1983 was not intended to override a state’s sovereign immunity.”). Nor

does Plaintiff benefit from the exception for prospective relief, as the Complaint does not seek

such relief. (Compl. § V.) Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief is likewise barred because

“absent a request for prospective relief, the Eleventh Amendment bars declaratory relief in the

form of a statement that Plaintiff’s constitutional right has been violated in the past.” Mateo v.

Westchester Cnty., 2020 WL 5802838, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2020). Indeed, the Complaint

only challenges Defendants' alleged denial of Plaintiff's participation in Ramadan observances on

March 13, 14, and 18, 2024. (Compl. ¶¶ 8-22.) Such relief is retrospective.

The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Martuscello in his

official capacities without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. This ruling does not

affect Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their individual capacities.

B. Personal Involvement

The Court next considers whether certain Defendants had the requisite personal

involvement to sustain liability under Section 1983. Defendants contend that the Complaint fails

to allege facts plausibly establishing that these Defendants were personally involved in any

constitutional deprivation and instead seeks to impose liability based solely on their supervisory

positions or on actions taken pursuant to the directives of superior officers. (Def. Mem. at 4.)

Plaintiff, by contrast, alleges that each Defendant was personally involved in the alleged

constitutional violations, either through direct participation in the challenged conduct or through

their alleged supervisory responsibilities over the correctional staff responsible for that conduct.

(Compl. ¶¶ 3–7.)

It is well settled that “a defendant in a Section 1983 action may not be held liable . . . for

constitutional violations merely because he held a high position of authority.” Black v. Coughlin,

76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Corbett v. Annucci, 2018 WL 919832, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

13, 2018) (same). To the contrary, “a plaintiff must establish a given defendant’s personal

involvement in the claimed violation in order to hold that defendant liable in his individual

capacity.” Warren v. Pataki, 823 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida,

N.Y., 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004)). In the context of supervisory liability, the Second Circuit

has explained that “there is no special rule for supervisory liability. Instead, a plaintiff must plead

and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions,

has violated the Constitution.’” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).

With that legal framework in mind, the Court must dismiss all Section 1983 claims asserted

against Defendant Martuscello. Plaintiff seeks relief against Defendant Martuscello based on his

alleged “failure to take action to curb known patterns of denying free exercise of incarcerated

individuals,” (Compl. § V), and sues him solely in his official capacity, (Compl. ¶ 3). The

Complaint, however, does not allege that Defendant Martuscello personally participated in the

events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims, implemented or enforced the challenged restriction,

directed the alleged conduct, or otherwise had a sufficient connection to the alleged constitutional

violations beyond his role as DOCCS Commissioner. (See generally Compl.) Rather, Plaintiff’s

allegations rest solely on Defendant Martuscello’s supervisory position and his purported failure

to correct the conduct of his subordinates. (Compl. ¶ 25.) Such allegations are insufficient to state

a claim under Section 1983 because supervisory officials may not be held liable on a theory of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 618; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–

77.

Even if the Court were to liberally construe Plaintiff's allegations as asserting a failure-to-

intervene claim, that claim likewise fails. DOCCS personnel may be liable for failing to intervene

only when they had a realistic opportunity to prevent the alleged constitutional violation but failed

to do so. See Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiff alleges only that

Martuscello became aware of the alleged constitutional violations after they had already occurred

through the grievance process. (Compl. § IV.) Accordingly, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that

Martuscello had a realistic opportunity to prevent the alleged constitutional violations because he

allegedly became aware of the conduct only after it had already occurred through the grievance

process. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a Section 1983 claim against Defendant Martuscello.

C. First Amendment: Free Exercise Clause

The Court next considers Plaintiff’s First Amendment Free Exercise claim. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because the alleged conduct—three instances in which

Plaintiff was prevented from participating in Ramadan observances—does not amount to a

sufficiently substantial burden on his religious exercise and, therefore, does not rise to the level of

a constitutional violation. (Def. Mem. at 9.) Plaintiff responds that being denied the opportunity to

participate in the congregational breaking of the Ramadan fast on three separate occasions

constitutes a substantial burden on his sincerely held religious beliefs and is sufficient to state a

plausible Free Exercise claim. (Compl. at 2.)

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits government interference with

sincerely held religious beliefs and practices. U.S. Const. Amend. I.; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.

709, 719 (2005). Although incarceration necessarily imposes certain limitations on constitutional

rights, prisoners retain the protections of the Free Exercise Clause and must be afforded reasonable

opportunities to practice their religion. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987); Ford v. McGinnis,

352 F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003); Young v. Coughlin, 866 F.2d 567, 570 (2d Cir. 1989). To state

a Free Exercise claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1) the religious belief or practice at

issue is sincerely held; (2) the challenged conduct substantially burdened the exercise of that belief;

and (3) the burden was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Farid v. Smith,

850 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1988); Wiggins v. Griffin, 86 F.4th 987, 992–93 (2d Cir. 2023). A

substantial burden exists where prison officials significantly interfere with an inmate's ability to

engage in religious exercise, including by unjustifiably preventing participation in required

congregate religious observances. See Sabir v. Williams, 52 F.4th 51, 65 n.9 (2d Cir. 2022). In

addition, because Plaintiff seeks relief under Section 1983, he must plausibly allege the personal

involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Tangreti, 983 F.3d at

618; Gronowski v. Spencer, 424 F.3d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 2005).

i. Officer White

First, the Court considers Plaintiff's First Amendment Free Exercise claim against Officer

White. Plaintiff alleges that Officer White had successfully facilitated Plaintiff’s participation in

the Ramadan meal process on the two preceding evenings, during which the process “went

smoothly.” (Compl. ¶ 10.) On the evening at issue, however, Officer White informed Plaintiff that

Sergeant Lopez, who was supervising the mess hall, had directed her “not to place the N.O.I.

Ramadan participants on a run to the mess hall.” (Id.) Thus, by Plaintiff's own allegations, Officer

White did not independently decide to deny Plaintiff access to the Ramadan meal but instead

communicated and carried out Sergeant Lopez's directive. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to plausibly

allege that Officer White, through her own individual actions, violated Plaintiff's rights under the

Free Exercise Clause. See Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 618.

Nor does Plaintiff plausibly allege that Officer White may be held liable for the

continuation of an unconstitutional policy or custom. Although officials may, in certain

circumstances, incur liability by knowingly permitting an unconstitutional practice to persist,

see Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994); Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 618–20; Hernandez v.

Goord, 312 F. Supp. 2d 537, 548–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.

112, 127 (1988), the Complaint contains no factual allegations that Officer White possessed

authority to establish, modify, or terminate the Ramadan transportation procedure. Nor does it

plausibly allege that the procedure was so plainly unconstitutional that Officer White knowingly

permitted a constitutional violation to continue merely by following Sergeant Lopez’s directive.

Rather, the Complaint alleges only that Officer White communicated and implemented Sergeant

Lopez's instruction. Such allegations are insufficient to establish Officer White's personal

involvement under Section 1983. See Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 618. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s First

Amendment Free Exercise claim against Officer White is dismissed.

ii. Sergeant Lopez

Next, the Court considers Plaintiff's First Amendment Free Exercise claim against Sergeant

Lopez. Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Lopez instructed Officer White “not to place the Nation of

Islam Ramadan participants on a run to the mess hall from the School Building,” thereby

preventing Plaintiff from participating in the Ramadan meal. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Unlike Officer White,

Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Lopez, as the supervising sergeant in the mess hall, made the

decision giving rise to the alleged deprivation. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 10.) Construing the Complaint

liberally, as the Court must at this stage, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Sergeant Lopez

personally participated in the challenged conduct. Although Defendants argue that the Complaint

provides “no context” for Sergeant Lopez’s alleged instruction, (Defs.’ Mem. at 13), that argument

is unavailing at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Plaintiff is not required to plead Sergeant Lopez’s

motivation for issuing the directive. Rather, a Free Exercise claim focuses on the objective burden

imposed on a plaintiff's sincerely held religious practices, not the subjective intent of the state

actor. See Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2023); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye

v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993). Accordingly, Plaintiff need only plausibly allege

that Sergeant Lopez directed the challenged conduct and that the directive prevented Plaintiff from

participating in the Ramadan meal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56.

Accepting Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that his participation

in Ramadan constituted a sincerely held religious practice and that Sergeant Lopez’s directive

substantially burdened the exercise of that practice by preventing him from participating in the

Ramadan meal. See Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d at 588–94 (holding that denying an incarcerated

individual participation in a religious feast central to his faith may substantially burden the free

exercise of religion); Sabir, 52 F.4th at 65 n.9 (recognizing that preventing incarcerated individuals

from engaging in sincerely held religious practices may give rise to a Free Exercise claim). At this

stage, the Complaint alleges no legitimate penological justification for Sergeant Lopez’s directive,

nor is any such justification apparent from the face of the Complaint. Accordingly, drawing all

reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the

alleged restriction was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Plaintiff therefore

plausibly states a First Amendment Free Exercise claim against Sergeant Lopez.

iii. Officer Bell and Lieutenant Fisher

Finally, the Court considers Plaintiff’s First Amendment Free Exercise claim against

Sergeant Bell and Lieutenant Fisher. Plaintiff alleges that, after being denied access to the mess

hall, he requested to speak with an area supervisor, at which point Sergeant Bell responded.

(Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff showed Sergeant Bell the N.O.I. Special Events Package outlining the

Ramadan procedures, and Sergeant Bell informed Plaintiff that Lieutenant Fisher had instructed

her to collect the housing locations of the Nation of Islam participants so that they could receive a

"feed up tray" upon returning to their housing units. (Id. ¶¶ 12–13.) Plaintiff provided his housing

information and returned to his cell. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that, upon returning to his housing unit,

no feed-up tray or sahoor bag had been delivered. (Compl. ¶ 15.)

These allegations, however, fail to plausibly establish that Sergeant Bell, through her own

individual actions, deprived Plaintiff of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause. See Tangreti,

983 F.3d at 618. A defendant cannot be held liable under Section 1983 where her involvement was

limited to relaying or implementing another official's directive, without exercising independent

decision-making authority or directly participating in the alleged constitutional deprivation.

See Abreu v. Lipka, 778 F. App’x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order). Rather, to satisfy the

personal involvement requirement, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant exercised

some degree of individual decision-making authority or personally and directly participated in the

challenged conduct. See Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir. 2003); Abreu v. Lipka,

778 F. App’x at 30. To the contrary, the Complaint alleges that Sergeant Bell attempted to facilitate

Plaintiff’s receipt of an alternative Ramadan meal by collecting the information necessary for

delivery pursuant to Lieutenant Fisher’s directive. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Although Plaintiff ultimately did

not receive a feed-up tray, the Complaint contains no factual allegations that Sergeant Bell was

responsible for delivering the tray, exercised authority over the delivery process, or otherwise

caused Plaintiff to be deprived of the meal. Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that he was denied a

meal due to the “obstruction and incompetence of the Correctional staff,” (Compl. ¶ 15), is

insufficient to plausibly attribute the alleged constitutional deprivation to Sergeant Bell.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a First Amendment Free Exercise claim against Sergeant Bell.

The Court reaches a different conclusion with respect to Lieutenant Fisher. Unlike Sergeant

Bell, who is alleged only to have collected Plaintiff’s housing information pursuant to Lieutenant

Fisher’s instructions, Plaintiff alleges that Lieutenant Fisher directed the implementation of the

alternative feed-up tray process. (Compl ¶ 13.) Accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true

and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Fisher

exercised some decision-making authority over the alternative accommodation provided to N.O.I.

Ramadan participants. Because Plaintiff further alleges that the alternative accommodation failed,

resulting in Plaintiff receiving neither a feed-up tray nor a sahoor bag, the Court cannot conclude

at this stage that Lieutenant Fisher was not personally involved in the alleged deprivation of

Plaintiff’s religious exercise. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First

Amendment Free Exercise claim against Lieutenant Fisher is denied.

D. Fourteenth Amendment: Equal Protection Clause

Next, the Court considers Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because his allegation that he was denied equal

protection on the basis of his religion is undermined by his own assertion that other Muslim

incarcerated individuals housed in different housing units were permitted to participate in

Ramadan observances and receive the requested religious accommodations. (Def. Mem. at 10.)

Plaintiff responds that he was treated differently from similarly situated incarcerated individuals

because participants in the Nation of Islam housed in other units were provided substitute Ramadan

meals and permitted to participate in the Ramadan observances, while he was denied those

accommodations. (Compl. ¶ 22.)

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection

Clause requires that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Brown v. City of

Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,

Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). To state an Equal Protection claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff

must plausibly allege that: (1) he was treated differently from others similarly situated; (2) the

disparate treatment resulted from intentional or purposeful discrimination directed at an

identifiable or protected class; and (3) the challenged conduct was not reasonably related to a

legitimate penological interest. See Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2005); Giano

v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1995). Purposeful discrimination requires more than

mere awareness of a policy's adverse effects; rather, the decisionmaker must have selected or

reaffirmed a course of action at least in part because of its adverse effects on the protected group.

See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). In the prison

context, courts evaluate whether challenged conduct is reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests under the framework articulated in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See Phillips, 408

F.3d at 129. Accordingly, the Court considers whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that he was

treated differently from similarly situated inmates because of his religion and, if so, whether the

alleged disparate treatment was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.

Here, the Complaint does not plausibly allege that Plaintiff was subjected to disparate

treatment because of his religion. Although Plaintiff alleges that he personally was denied access

to the Ramadan meal and did not receive a feed-up tray, he also alleges that “other incarcerated

individuals registered N.O.I. and Muslim . . . were afforded the substitute of receiving a Ramadan

feed up tray and sahoor bag.” (Compl. ¶ 22.) These allegations undermine any inference that

Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his religion. Rather, the

Complaint suggests that other inmates of the same religious faith received the very

accommodations that Plaintiff claims he was denied. At most, Plaintiff alleges that he received

different treatment than other N.O.I. inmates housed in different housing units. However, the

Complaint contains no factual allegations permitting the reasonable inference that this disparate

treatment resulted from intentional or purposeful discrimination based on religion, as opposed to

mistake, negligence, or a failure to implement the alternative meal process. Because Plaintiff fails

to plausibly allege that any Defendant acted with discriminatory animus based on Plaintiff's

religion, Plaintiff fails to state an Equal Protection claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Fourteenth

Amendment Equal Protection claims against all Defendants are dismissed.

II. RLUIPA Claims

Finally, the Court considers Plaintiff’s claims under RLUIPA. Plaintiff contends that

Defendants substantially burdened his religious exercise by preventing him from participating in

Ramadan observances without a legitimate governmental justification, thereby stating a claim

under RLUIPA. (Compl. at 2.) Defendants, in turn, argue that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that

missing three Ramadan observances constituted a substantial burden on his religious exercise and,

in any event, that his RLUIPA claims fail because he seeks only monetary damages, which are

unavailable under the statute. (Def. Mem. at 8.)

RLUIPA prohibits a government from imposing a substantial burden on the religious

exercise of an institutionalized person unless the government demonstrates that the burden furthers

a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). To state a claim under RLUIPA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the

challenged conduct substantially burdened his religious exercise. Once that showing is made, the

burden shifts to the government to satisfy RLUIPA’s strict-scrutiny standard. See Holt v. Hobbs,

574 U.S. 352, 362–65 (2015); Wiggins, 86 F.4th at 992–93. However, RLUIPA authorizes only

prospective equitable relief, such as injunctive and declaratory relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a);

Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 287 (2011). It does not authorize claims for monetary damages

against state officials in either their official or individual capacities. Washington v. Gonyea, 731

F.3d 143, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that monetary damages are unavailable

under RLUIPA against state officials in their official or individual capacities in light of Sossamon);

Sossamon v. Texas at 285–93. Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking relief under RLUIPA may pursue

only prospective declaratory or injunctive relief.

Here, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages under RLUIPA against Defendants Fisher,

Lopez, Bell, and White. Because RLUIPA authorizes only prospective equitable relief and does

not permit claims for monetary damages against state officials in either their official or individual

capacities, Plaintiff's request for compensatory relief is dismissed. See Washington v. Gonyea, 731

F.3d 143, 145–46 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285–93 (2011).

Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief against Defendant Martuscello based solely on his

position as DOCCS Commissioner and his alleged failure to take corrective action in response to

Plaintiff's grievances. (Compl. § V.A.1.) That claim likewise fails. The Complaint does not allege

that Martuscello implemented, directed, or enforced the challenged restriction on Plaintiff's

religious exercise or otherwise had a sufficient connection to the alleged RLUIPA violation.

Rather, Plaintiff seeks to impose liability solely by virtue of Martuscello’s supervisory position

and his alleged failure to intervene.

Moreover, Plaintiff seeks only retrospective declaratory relief arising from completed

events during Ramadan in March 2024. Plaintiff does not allege that the challenged restriction

remains in effect or that he faces an ongoing denial of religious accommodations. Because the

Complaint alleges only past conduct and does not plead an ongoing violation of federal law, the

requested declaratory relief is barred. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985); Chan v.

Campanelli, 2024 WL 5120014, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2024). Accordingly, Plaintiff's RLUIPA

claim for declaratory relief against Defendant Martuscello is dismissed.

III. Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because they are

entitled to qualified immunity. (Def. Mem. at 11.) “Qualified immunity shields government

officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right

that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822,

825 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)); see also, e.g., City & Cnty.

of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in

the situation he confronted.” Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 162 (2d Cir. 2012)

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). Accordingly, for an action to lie, “existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Taylor, 575

U.S. at 825 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). “This exacting standard ‘gives

government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by ‘protect[ing]

all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Sheehan, 575 U.S. at

611 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743) (alteration in original).

Significant here, Defendants pursue qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss. “[A]

defendant presenting an immunity defense on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion instead of a motion for

summary judgment must accept the more stringent standard applicable to this procedural route.”

McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2004). “[P]laintiff is entitled to all reasonable

inferences from the facts alleged, not only those that support his claim, but also those that defeat

the immunity defense.” Id. “[T]he motion may be granted only where ‘it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.’”

Id. (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. K–H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1494 (2d Cir.1992)). Defendants

therefore face a “formidable hurdle.” Id. at 434.

Here, construing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all

reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court cannot conclude that Defendants Lopez and Fisher

are entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. As discussed above, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that

Sergeant Lopez personally directed that N.O.I. participants housed in the School Building not to

be transported to the mess hall to participate in the Ramadan fast-breaking meal and that Lieutenant

Fisher directed the implementation of an alternative accommodation that ultimately failed,

resulting in Plaintiff receiving neither a Ramadan feed-up tray nor a sahoor bag. (Compl. ¶¶ 10,

15.) Accepting these allegations as true, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Defendants personally

participated in conduct that substantially burdened his sincerely held religious beliefs without any

apparent legitimate penological justification.

Moreover, at the time of the alleged conduct, it was clearly established that incarcerated

individuals retain protections under the Free Exercise Clause and that prison officials may not

substantially burden an inmate’s sincerely held religious exercise absent a legitimate penological

interest. See Ford, 352 F.3d at 588–94; Young, 866 F.2d at 570. Thus, accepting Plaintiff's

allegations as true, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that a reasonable correctional

official would have believed that intentionally preventing Plaintiff from participating in Ramadan

observances, or implementing an alternative accommodation that failed to provide any meaningful

religious accommodation, was lawful.

Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Martuscello, White,

and Bell on other grounds, it need not separately address qualified immunity as to those

Defendants.

IV. Leave to Amend

Finally, the Court considers whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend. The

Second Circuit has instructed that “a pro se plaintiff who is proceeding in forma pauperis should

be afforded the same opportunity as a pro se fee-paid plaintiff to amend his complaint prior to its

dismissal for failure to state a claim, unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely

it might be, that an amended complaint would succeed in stating a claim.” Cruz v. Gomez, 202

F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Likewise, courts in this Circuit generally afford

pro se litigants at least one opportunity to amend their pleadings before dismissing claims with

prejudice where a liberal reading of the complaint suggests that a valid claim may be

stated. See Owens v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Sanitation, No. 12-CV-3138 (KPF), 2013 WL 150245, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2013); Breer v. Maranville, No. 2:11-CV-301, 2012 WL 6597707, at *3 (D.

Vt. Nov. 27, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 6590795 (D. Vt. Dec. 18,

2012). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and it is not apparent that amendment would

necessarily be futile, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint to cure the

deficiencies identified in this Opinion and Order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Defendant Daniel F. Martuscello III is

dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff's First Amendment Free Exercise claims against Defendants

Kayla White and Laesha Bell are dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

Equal Protection claims are dismissed as against all Defendants without prejudice. Plaintiff’s

claims for monetary damages under RLUIPA are dismissed with prejudice, and Plaintiff’s

RLUIPA claims for declaratory relief against Defendant Daniel F. Martuscello III is dismissed

without prejudice. Defendants' motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment Free Exercise

claims against Defendants Clarence Fisher and Maribel Lopez.

Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, and in light of the Second Circuit’s instruction that a pro

se plaintiff should generally be allowed to amend, Plaintiff is granted leave to file an Amended

Complaint solely with respect to any claims dismissed without prejudice by this Opinion & Order.

If Plaintiff chooses to do so, Plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint by August 24, 2026.

Defendants are then directed to answer or otherwise respond by September 21, 2026. If Plaintiff

fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time allowed, and cannot show good cause to excuse

such failure, the claims dismissed without prejudice by this Opinion & Order will be deemed

dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court will be directed to close this case.

The Court respectfully directs the Clerk of Court to (1) terminate the Motion at ECF No.

26; and (2) mail a copy of this Opinion & Order to pro se Plaintiff at the address listed on the

docket and note service on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2026

White Plains, NY

Nelson S. Roman, U.S.D.J.

25