Totaram

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Tyler Totaram, also known as Tyler A. Totaram, also

known as Tyler Alexander Totaram,

Plaintiff,

2:24-cv-7304

-v- (NJC) (LGD)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Trans Union LLC,

also known as TransUnion, Experian Information Solutions,

Inc.,

Defendants.

ORDER

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:

On October 17, 2024, Plaintiff Tyler Totaram initiated this action against Defendants

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Trans Union LLC, and Experian Information Solutions, Inc., bringing

claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., and the New

York Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “NYFCRA”), GBL § 374, et seq., arising from Defendants’

alleged failure to investigate and correct inaccurate credit reporting resulting from identity theft

and unlawful attempts to collect on a fraudulent debt. (See generally, ECF No. 1.) After

discovery, Defendants filed a motion to amend their answers and counterclaims. (See ECF Nos.

55, 56, 57.) Totaram opposed. (ECF No. 58.) On November 13, 2025, I referred the motion to

Magistrate Judge Lee Dunst for a written report and recommendation. (Elec. Order, November

13, 2025.)

On March 31, 2026, Judge Dunst issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)

recommending that Defendants’ motion be granted in its entirety. A copy of the R&R was

provided to all parties’ counsel via ECF on March 31, 2026. (ECF No. 71.) The R&R instructed

that any objections to its findings must be filed within fourteen (14) days of service of the R&R.

(R&R at 12.) Consequently, the deadline for objections was April 14, 2026. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(2) (requiring a party to file objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation

within 14 days of service). The date for filing objections to the R&R has thus expired, and no

party has filed an objection to the R&R.

In reviewing a report and recommendation, a court “may accept, reject, or modify, in

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.

§636(b)(1)(C). If no objections are filed, a district court reviews a report and recommendation

for clear error. King v. Paradise Auto Sales I, Inc., No. 15-cv-1188, 2016 WL 4595991, at *1

(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2016). Because no party has timely filed objections to the R&R, I may review

the R&R for clear error. Id. Nevertheless, I reviewed the R&R de novo out of an abundance of

caution.

Having reviewed the motion papers, the applicable law, and the R&R, I adopt the R&R’s

recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion to amend in its entirety.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, I adopt the R&R and grant Defendants’ motion to amend

their answers and counterclaims. (ECF Nos. 55, 56, 57.) Defendants shall file amended answers

and counterclaims by September 2, 2026.

Dated: Central Islip, New York

August 26, 2026

/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury

NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY

United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

----------------------------------------------------------X

TYLER TOTARAM a/k/a TYLER A.

TOTARAM a/k/a TYLER ALEXANDER

TOTARAM, REPORT AND

Plaintiff, RECOMMENDATION

v.

2:24-cv-07304-NJC-LGD

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; TRANS UNION

LLC a/k/a TRANSUNION; and EXPERIAN

INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC.

Defendants.

----------------------------------------------------------X

LEE G. DUNST, Magistrate Judge:

Presently before the Court is Defendants Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), Trans

Union LLC (“Trans Union”) and Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s (“Experian,” and

together, the “Defendants”) Motion to Amend the Answer and Counterclaims (the “Motion” or

“Mot.”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). See Electronic Case File Numbers

(“ECF No.”) 55, 56, 57. On November 13, 2025, Judge Nusrat J. Choudhury referred the Motion

to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation. See Nov. 13, 2025 Order. For the

following reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Motion be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Procedural Background

Plaintiff initiated this action on October 17, 2024 (see ECF No. 1), and Defendants timely

filed their Answers. See ECF Nos. 24, 29, 31. Pursuant to the February 18, 2025 Case

Management Order entered by the undersigned, the Court set May 16, 2025 as the deadline for

amendment of the pleadings. See ECF No. 38. The undersigned also ordered that “[a]ny motion

to amend the pleadings to add claims or join additional parties filed on or after 5/17/2025 will be

denied absent a showing of good cause under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). See Sacerdote v. New York

University, 9 F. 4th 95, 115 (2d. Cir. 2021).” Id.

On May 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Discovery” seeking a conference

regarding a discovery dispute, which included Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Defendant Experian’s

subpoena directed to non-party Credit Repair Boss. See ECF No. 41. On June 2, 2025, the Court

granted in part and denied in part the Motion to Quash, and permitted some discovery from

Credit Repair Boss. See June 2, 2025 Order.

On October 15, 2025, Wells Fargo filed the present Motion. See ECF No. 55. Trans

Union and Experian then filed Motions for Joinder in connection with the Motion shortly

thereafter. See ECF Nos. 56, 57. On November 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed his opposition to the

Motion. See ECF No. 58 (the “Opposition” or “Opp”.). Judge Choudhury referred the Motion to

the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation on November 13, 2025. See Nov. 13, 2025

Order. On November 21, 2025, Defendants filed a reply in support of the Motion. See ECF No.

60 (the “Reply”).

On December 1, 2025, the undersigned requested further information from the parties in

support of the Motion and Opposition. See Dec. 1, 2025 Order. The parties filed their respective

responses on December 2, 2025. See ECF Nos. 62, 63.

Following an unsuccessful Settlement Conference on January 20, 2026, the undersigned

requested a status report from the parties. See Jan. 20, 2026 Order. On February 3, 2026, the

parties submitted a joint status report in which Plaintiff confirmed he was maintaining his

opposition to the Motion. See ECF No. 68.

B. Relevant Factual Background

Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants arising under the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(“FCRA”) (15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.) and its implementing Regulation V (12 C.F.R. Part 1022),

the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and its implementing Regulation F (15 U.S.C

§ 1692, et seq. and 12 C.F.R § 1006.1, et seq.), and New York General Business Law (“GBL”)

which codifies New York’s Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “NYFCRA”) (GBL § 374, et seq.)

arising from an alleged incident of identity theft against Plaintiff. See ECF No. 1 (the

“Complaint” or “Compl.”) ⁋ 1, 13.

Defendant Experian initially subpoenaed non-party Credit Report Boss on or about

March 19, 2025 (see Reply at 1), and the subpoena was the subject of Plaintiff’s Motion to

Quash on May 19, 2025. See ECF No. 41 at 1. Notably, Credit Repair Boss did not object to this

subpoena. See June 2, 2025 Order. Following the Court’s June 2, 2025 Order in which the Court

denied in part the Motion to Quash, the parties completed fact discovery, which in relevant part,

included: (1) document productions by Credit Report Boss on June 23, 2025 and July 9, 2025;

(2) depositions of two Credit Report Boss employees on August 27, 2025; and (3) Plaintiff’s

deposition on September 11, 2025. See Mot. at 1. Fact discovery closed, pursuant to this Court’s

order, on September 19, 2025. See Sept. 3, 2025 Order (granting extension of fact discovery

deadline).

In its June 23, 2025 document production, Credit Report Boss produced a document titled

“Claim Recovery Remittance Agreement,” (the “CRR Agreement”) between Plaintiff and New

Hope Credit Services Inc. (“New Hope”).1 See Mot. at 1, Opp. at 1. The CRR Agreement states,

in part, that Plaintiff agreed to “remit[] all of [his] monetary recovery to New Hope . . . for any

1 While the CRR Agreement references “New Hope Credit Services Inc,” the footer on the

document also references Credit Repair Boss. See ECF No. 55-2 at 2.

and all claims, demands, and cause or causes of action of any kind whatsoever discovered by

[New Hope], which [Plaintiff] has or may have against any entity, person or persons arising

under” the FCRA, FDCPA, and “any applicable state or local laws related to a consumer law

legal claim.” See Mot. at 1-2. During the August 27, 2025 deposition of Credit Repair Boss

employee Samantha Oh, she testified regarding Credit Repair Boss’ role in assisting Plaintiff

with “fact-finding and evidence-gathering in pursuit of this private federal claim,” and referring

him to an attorney pursuant to the terms of the CRR Agreement. See Mot. at Ex. 3 at 32:1-34:19.

During the September 11, 2025 deposition of Plaintiff, Plaintiff testified to his understanding of

the CRR Agreement. See Mot. at Ex. 4 at 238:17-23; 279:15-19.

Plaintiff did not produce the CRR Agreement during discovery. See Mot. at 1-2. On the

contrary, in his Motion to Quash, Plaintiff argued that any documents from Credit Repair Boss

would be, in essence, not relevant to this dispute. See ECF No. 41 at 3 (in which Plaintiff argued

“no information can be received from either Plaintiff’s counsel or Credit Repair Boss that would

shed any light as to why the incorrect, wrongful, and inaccurate information remained on

Plaintiff’s credit report”).

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants now contend that the CRR Agreement, coupled with the deposition testimony

of Ms. Oh and Plaintiff, necessitates amendment of their affirmative defenses to include a

standing defense and a champerty defense. 2 See Mot. at 1. Plaintiff opposes the Motion, arguing

2 Champerty is a common law doctrine to “prevent or curtail the commercialization or trading in

litigation,” and is codified in New York's Judiciary Law § 489. Silverman, Tr. of Ests. of Nat'l Events

Holdings, LLC v. Citibank, N.A., 665 B.R. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Bluebird Partners, L.P. v.

First Fid. Bank, N.A., 94 N.Y.2d 726, 729 (2000)). That is, if the primary purpose of an assignment is to

bring a lawsuit or proceeding, then the assignment is in violation of the champerty statute and therefore is

null and void. See Justinian Cap. SPC v. West LB AG, 28 N.Y.3d 160, 166 (2016) (finding champertous

conduct where the lawsuit was not merely an incidental or secondary purpose of an assignment, but “its

that Defendants have not shown good cause for amending their affirmative defenses after the

Court’s May 16, 2025 deadline, so that granting leave to amend at this stage would cause

Plaintiff to suffer “undue prejudice.” See Opp. at 1.

A. Legal Standard

Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) applies to amendments made prior to a

scheduling order's deadline to amend, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) applies when

amendments are sought after a deadline to amend has passed. See Stone #1 v. Annucci, No. 20-

CV-1326-RAO-TW, 2024 WL 2032915, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2024) (granting leave to amend

after the deadline for amendment had passed); see also Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 115

(2d Cir. 2021) (“At the outset of the litigation, a plaintiff may freely amend her pleadings

pursuant to Rule 15(a)(1) as of right without court permission . . . [t]he period of “liberal”

amendment ends if the district court issues a scheduling order setting a date after which no

amendment will be permitted …but the plaintiff may [amend] up [sic] a showing of the “good

cause” that is required to modify a scheduling order under Rule 16(b)(4).”) “Where . . . the

Court sets a deadline for amendments to the complaint and a party moves to amend once the

deadline has passed, the Court must balance the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a) against the

requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b).” See Stone #1, No. 20-CV-1326-RAO-

TW, 2024 WL 2032915, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2024) (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Atos IT Sols. &

Servs., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 3d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)). While Rule 15(a) is considered more flexible,

Rule 16(b)(4) requires “good cause” for amendment. See International Technologies Marketing,

Inc. v. Verint Systems, Ltd., 850 F. App'x 38, 43 (2d Cir. 2021).

very essence”). Champerty is an affirmative defense, and the defendant bears the burden of proof. See

Phoenix Light SF Ltd. v. U.S. Bank, 612 F. Supp. 3d 263, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Once a Court has found that there is good cause to amend under Rule 16, “[t]he court

should freely give leave when justice so requires” under Rule 15. A Rule 15(a) motion “should

be denied only for such reasons as undue delay, bad faith, futility of the amendment, and perhaps

most important, the resulting prejudice to the opposing party.” Richardson Greenshields

Securities, Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647, 653 n.6 (2d Cir. 1987); see also Cajilema v. Barrett Roofs,

Inc., 794 F. Supp. 3d 102, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (holding that in the absence of “undue delay, bad

faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,” leave to amend should be “freely given”).

Delay alone, however, is an insufficient justification for the denial of a motion to amend under

Rule 15(a). See Block v. First Blood Associates, 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993); see also State

Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that “[m]ere

delay, however, absent a showing of bad faith or undue prejudice, does not provide a basis for a

district court to deny the right to amend”). Rule 15 places the burden on the party opposing a

motion to amend to demonstrate that the motion should be denied for undue delay, prejudice, bad

faith, or futility. See Qanouni v. D&H Ladies Apparel LLC, No. 18CV2763 (GBD) (DF), 2021

WL 9036182, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2021) (holding that under Rule 15, “the party opposing a

motion to amend bears the burden of establishing that the amendment should be denied”); see

also Blaskiewicz v. County of Suffolk, 29 F. Supp. 2d 134, 137-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citation

omitted) (the court held that the opposing party bore the burden of demonstrating that leave to

amend was prejudicial or futile).

B. Defendants’ Motion Meets the Rule 15 and Rule 16 Standards to Amend

Here, Defendants demonstrate good cause to amend pursuant to Rule 16(b), and Plaintiff

does not show that amendment would cause undue delay or prejudice, nor that amendment

would be futile under Rule 15(a).

1. Defendants Demonstrate Good Cause to Amend Under Rule 16

Whether good cause exists under Rule 16(b) “depends on the diligence of the moving

party. . . . [and] the movant must show that the deadlines could not have been reasonably met

despite its diligence.” Volunteer Fire Association of Tappan, Inc. v. County of Rockland, No. 09-

CV-4622, 2010 WL 4968247, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010). “A party is not considered to have

acted diligently where the proposed amendment is based on information that the party knew, or

should have known, in advance of the motion deadline.” Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc. v. Del

Monte Foods, Inc., 304 F.R.D. 170, 174-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate good cause. See Qanouni, No. 18CV2763

(GBD) (DF), 2021 WL 9036182, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2021) (holding that pursuant to Rule

16, the “moving party must demonstrate good cause for a belated motion”). Nonetheless, “the

decision as to whether to let Rule 16(b) stand as a bar to amendment lies within the court's

discretion.” See id. (citing Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 339-41 (2d Cir.

2000)).

Defendants here have demonstrated good cause pursuant to Rule 16(b), as the proposed

amendment is based on information that Defendants did not know, or should have known, in

advance of the May 16, 2025 deadline. Defendants timely served the Credit Repair Boss

subpoena in March 2025 but did not receive the CRR Agreement until June 2025. Plaintiff

argues that Defendants were “not diligent in investigating the foreseeable relationship between

Plaintiff and his credit repair advisors before the May 17 deadline,” (Opp. at 2), but Defendants

served the subpoena two months before the deadline to amend, and well in advance of the fact

discovery deadline. Notably, Plaintiff did not produce the CRR Agreement himself and, in fact,

sought unsuccessfully to quash the subpoena to Credit Repair Boss. The Court finds that

Defendants were diligent in obtaining the CRR Agreement and promptly moving to amend once

they gathered the relevant testimony on the document – thus, good cause to amend exists under

Rule 16(b).

2. Plaintiff Fails to Demonstrate Undue Delay, Futility, or Prejudice

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate undue delay, futility, or prejudice, and thus he has not

met his burden to oppose amendment under Rule 15(a)(2).

a. The Motion is Timely

The record laid out in both the Motion and the Opposition demonstrates the events

preceding the proposed amendment as follows:

• On February 18, 2025, the Court entered a Case Management Order, setting the deadline

for amendment of pleadings as May 16, 2025. See Feb. 18, 2025 Order.

• In that same order, the Court stated that “[a]ny motion to amend the pleadings to add

claims or join additional parties filed on or after 5/17/2025 will be denied absent a

showing of good cause under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). See Sacerdote v. New York

University, 9 F. 4th 95, 115 (2d. Cir. 2021).” Id.

• Experian issued a subpoena to Credit Repair Boss on March 19, 2025. See ECF No. 41-1.

• The parties met and conferred on the subpoena on April 4, 2025. See Reply at 1.

• The parties submitted a joint letter containing Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash the subpoena

to Credit Repair Boss on May 19, 2025. See ECF No. 41.

• The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash. See June 2,

2025 Order.

• Credit Repair Boss produced documents in response to the subpoena on June 23, 2025,

and July 9, 2025. See Mot. at 1. This document production included the CRR Agreement,

which Plaintiff had not previously produced during the course of discovery. See id.

• Defendants deposed two Credit Repair Boss employees on August 27, 2025. See id.

• Defendants deposed Plaintiff on September 11, 2025. See id.

• The parties met and conferred on October 10, 2025 to review Defendants’ proposed

amended answer. See Mot. at 2.

• On October 15, 2025, Wells Fargo filed the Motion. See ECF No. 55. Trans Union and

Experian promptly filed Motions for Joinder. See ECF Nos. 56, 57.

Based on this chronology, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants unduly delayed

amendment. Defendants did not sit on their hands once they finally received the CRR Agreement

after the Court denied in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash on June 2, 2025, but pursued

subsequent necessary discovery related to the CRR Agreement. See Qanouni, 2021 WL 9036182,

at *9 (holding that plaintiffs “actively engaged” in efforts to prepare amendment from when they

first learned new evidence to when they moved to amend two months later); see also Salomon v.

Adderley Indus., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 502, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that “[b]ecause

Plaintiffs learned about the putative employer status of the additional parties through discovery

after the expiration of the scheduling order deadline, their inability to add the parties prior to the

expiration of the deadline did not constitute a failure of diligence”); Soroof Trading Dev. Co. v.

GE Microgen, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 142, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (in which the Court found that plaintiff

“promptly moved to amend its complaint” one year and seven months from the deadline for

amendment); Securities and Exchange Commission v. DCI Telecommunications, Inc., 207 F.R.D.

32, 34–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (allowing amendment of pleadings four months after the plaintiff

learned relevant supporting facts). Defendants here sought to amend in a timely manner as they

met and conferred with Plaintiff on October 10, 2025 – which was approximately four weeks

after Plaintif’s deposition, approximately six weeks after the Credit Repair Boss deposition, and

approximately four months after the Credit Repair Boss document production (which had been

opposed by Plaintiff).

b. Amendment is Not Futile

In determining futility, the test that the Court must apply is whether “the proposed claim

could not withstand a Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Salazar v. Browne Realty

Assocs., L.L.C., 796 F. Supp. 2d 378, 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Lucente v. IBM Corp., 310

F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). That is, the Court must determine if the proposed amendment

contains “sufficient factual matter” which, accepted as true, states a claim that is “‘plausible on

its face’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

Plaintiff argues that the proposed amended affirmative defenses are futile. See Opp.

at 3-5. The Court disagrees. The lack of standing defense is not futile because whether the CRR

Agreement assigns proceeds of Plaintiff’s FCRA claim itself is not a question of law, but one of

fact. See Santiago v. Steinhart, No. 89 CIV. 2069 (RPP), 1993 WL 410402, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.

13, 1993) (“[I]f the alleged futility is based on factual issues which are in dispute, leave to amend

should not be denied.”) (citation omitted). Whether Plaintiff repudiated the CRR Agreement as

he claims (Opp. at 4) is also a question of fact in dispute. See id. Viewing the proposed standing

affirmative defense in a light most favorable to the moving party, the Court finds there is a

colorable claim to assert the standing defense. See Santiago, No. 89 CIV. 2069 (RPP), 1993 WL

410402, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1993). The champerty defense is similarly not futile at this

stage of the litigation as Plaintiff relies on arguments concerning the purpose of the CRR

Agreement (Opp. at 5), but that position, too, is premature at this stage of the litigation, and the

defense is thus plausible on its face. See id.

c. Amendment Does Not Prejudice Plaintiff

Prejudice arises under Rule 15 when an amendment would require the party opposing

amendment to “expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for

trial” or would “significantly delay the resolution of the dispute.” Block v. First Blood Assocs.,

988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff argues that the proposed affirmative defenses would “necessitate a complete

reopening of discovery . . . [and he] would be forced to notice and conduct depositions of New

Hope, and likely re-depose CRB’s corporate designee and Plaintiff himself.” See Opp. at 3.

The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument. First, Plaintiff testified to his

understanding of the CRR Agreement during his September 11, 2025 deposition, in which

Plaintiff’s counsel was present. See Mot. at Ex. 4 at 2:3-6. Moreover, Plaintiff’s counsel

apparently did not even attend the August 27, 2025 depositions of Credit Repair Boss employees

— two months after the CRR Agreement was produced. See Reply at 2. Plaintiff cannot now

argue that he is prejudiced by the claimed inability to re-depose Credit Repair Boss when he had

two months to review the CRR Agreement yet chose neither to notice nor attend the Credit

Repair Boss depositions. Moreover, Plaintiff chose not to notice the deposition of New Hope at

any point between the production of the CRR Agreement and the fact discovery deadline, and the

Court finds it unlikely that Defendants’ prospective amendment of affirmative defenses would

have changed that strategy. In any event, it is clear that Plaintiff will not have to expend

significant additional resources to litigate this case when the claims remain the same, and all

relevant parties and third parties were available for depositions before fact discovery closed. Cf.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. IDW Grp., LLC, No. 08 Civ. 9116(PGG), 2009 WL 1357946, at

**4–5 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2009) (finding no undue prejudice, even after discovery had concluded

and amendment sought to add a new defendant).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Motion be granted in its

entirety.

IV. OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b)(2), the parties shall have fourteen (14)

days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections. See also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a) & (d) (addressing computation of days). Any requests for an extension of time for

filing objections must be directed to Judge Choudhury. FAILURE TO FILE TIMELY

OBJECTIONS SHALL CONSTITUTE A WAIVER OF THOSE OBJECTIONS BOTH IN THE

DISTRICT COURT AND ON LATER APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154-55, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435

(1985); Frydman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 743 F. App'x 486, 487 (2d Cir. 2018); McConnell

v. ABC-Amega, Inc., 338 F. App'x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2009); F.D.I.C. v. Hillcrest Assocs., 66 F.3d

566, 569 (2d Cir. 1995).

SO ORDERED:

Dated: Central Islip, New York /s/ Lee G. Dunst

March 31, 2026 ________________________

LEE G. DUNST

United States Magistrate Judge