Dodson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

GEORGE DODSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-2328-LKG

v. )

) Dated: August 24, 2026

CARLOS BIVENS, and )

AUGUSTIN KUBRI, )

)

Defendants. )

)

eo)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants Carlos Bivens and Augustin Kubri have filed a motion to dismiss or, in the

Alternative, for Summary Judgment in response to the above-entitled civil rights complaint filed

by pro se, Plaintiff George Dodson. ECF No. 19. Dodson, who at all times relevant to this case

was incarcerated in the Maryland Division of Correction, opposes the motion and moves for

appointment of counsel. ECF Nos. 24, 25.! No hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Local R. 105.6

(2025). For the reasons that follow Defendants’ motion, construed as a motion for summary

judgment, will be GRANTED, and Dodson’s motion to appoint counsel will be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 21, 2024, at 6:00 p.m., when he was incarcerated at Roxbury Correctional

Institution (“RCT”) in Hagerstown, Maryland, Dodson had just finished working sanitation detail

on a housing unit. ECF No. 5 at 4. He stated that he was about to take a shower when he saw

two inmates, Brian Wilson and Bryant Kareem, quickly approaching the tier. /d. Dodson

noticed that both men were “clutching something in their waistband,” which signaled to him that

danger was coming his way. /d. Although Dodson attempted to escape from the tier, he had no

success in fleeing or trying to get help. /d. Instead, he was ‘‘forced to try fighting them off while

Dodson also filed a motion for extension of time (ECF No. 26), but it is unclear why the motion

was filed given he had already filed his response in opposition. Accordingly, that motion will be denied

as moot.

being repeatedly stabbed in [his] upper and lower back.” /d. Dodson states he was also stabbed

multiple times in his head. Jd.

According to Dodson, the officers stationed in the “bubble” watched while he was being

attacked and “after a delayed response,” Officer Kubri came onto the tier and sprayed mace.

ECF No. 5 at 5. In Dodson’s view, had the officers in the bubble closed the tier door or

responded more quickly, he would not have suffered a life-threatening assault. Jd. Dodson

explains that Warden Bivens is named as a Defendant because he believes that if the officers who

were present had the proper training, this incident could have been prevented. /d. Dodson adds

that, “Warden Bivens is in charge of the prison and officers so due to the attack on my life he

should be held accountable for failing to protect me.” /d.

Dodson’s injuries required a trip to an outside hospital for sutures to close the multiple

wounds to his upper and lower back. ECF No. 5 at 5. He also claims the stab wounds to his head

cause him to suffer random headaches. /d. As relief, he asks to be awarded $250,000 and to be

transferred to another prison.” /d.

In the Officer’s Use of Force Incident Reports submitted by defendants, the officers

involved in the incident are listed as K. Owusu-Edusei, A. Kubri, E. Sumvi, B. Lopez, S. Akuma,

and S. Adeniyan. ECF No. 19-4 at 15. In his report, Kubri stated that he was assigned to 3 A-

tier when he observed inmates Bryant and Wilson leave A-tier and walk over to the entrance of

D-tier in Housing Unit 3. Jd. at 19. This occurred while Kubri was letting returning inmates

back onto the tier. /d. He stated that he tried to stop Bryant and Wilson but they “would not

comply” with his order and “then proceeded to get into an altercation” with Dodson at the

entrance of D-tier. /d. Kubri claims he gave multiple orders to the inmates to “stop fighting,”

but they did not comply; he then “administered OC spray from [his] MK9 fogger.” /d. At that

time, the assault stopped. Officer Owusu-Edusei, who was the officer in charge, responded to

the area and placed Dodson in handcuffs; Bryant was handcuffed by Officer Sumvi, and Wilson

was handcuffed by Officer Lopez. Jd. When the area where the assault occurred was searched,

Officer Owusu-Edusei found one homemade weapon consisting of a six-inches long and 2 inches

wide piece of metal sharpened at one end and wrapped in cloth at the other end. Jd. at 17.

? Dodson was transferred to Maryland Correctional Institution Hagerstown on January 17, 2025, and was

transferred from there to Jessup Correctional Institution on October 2, 2025. ECF No. 19-3 at 2. And so,

his request for a transfer is moot.

The incident was investigated by the Intelligence & Investigative Division (“IID”) of the

Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”). ECF No. 19-4 at 2-9 (report

without exhibits). Detective Sergeant R. Fagan investigated, and as part of his investigation, he

interviewed Dodson after he had returned from the hospital. /d. at 8. Dodson told Fagan that

both assailants had weapons and that he did not know either of the inmates but had seen them

before. /d. He related that Bryant and Wilson had been sent by the gang “Murder, Inc.,” because

Dodson had testified against someone years ago. Jd. Dodson also told Fagan that “the had been

telling staff that he was not safe, but he continued to be assigned to General Population.” /d. In

an interview on November |, 2024, Dodson told Fagan he wanted to pursue criminal charges

against Bryant and Wilson. /d. at 9.

The assault on Dodson was captured on the tier surveillance camera stationed at the

opposite end of the tier. ECF No. 19-4 at 8. The video shows two inmates entering the door on

the tier; Dodson briefly attempts to dodge them to no avail; a fight ensues where it appears

Bryant and Wilson are stabbing Dodson; and one of the assailants abandoned the assault and

exited the tier. ECF No. 19-6 (DVD filed separately). It is difficult to tell when the OC spray □

was deployed except for the observable effects it had on those who were present and that the

affray immediately ended. /d. The entire incident, from the time Bryant and Wilson entered the

tier to the time when the assault was clearly over, lasted approximately one minute according to

the timer displayed on the video. /d. It appears that an officer arrived on scene in sponimncely

9 to 15 seconds after the assault on Dodson began. /d.

Defendants state that Dodson had not listed Bryant or Wilson as enemies prior to June 21,

2024. ECF No. 19-7 at 2, 44.

Il. LEGALSTANDARD

In reviewing the amended complaint in light of a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and

construes the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs.,

Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473

(4th Cir, 1997). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a “short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-

Fleming Int'l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,

534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002) (stating that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading

standard” of Rule 8(a)).

The Supreme Court of the United States explained a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the complaint does not need “detailed

factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss. /d. at 555. Instead, “once a claim has been

stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations

in the complaint.” /d. at 563. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting 7wombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jgbal, 556 U.S. at

678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not ‘show[n]’ -- ‘that the pleader

is entitled to relief.’” Jd. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The Court should “view the evidence in the

light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor

without weighing the evidence or assessing the witnesses’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia

Colleton Med. Ctr. Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). Importantly, “the mere existence of

some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported

motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material

fact.” Anderson v, Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original).

While self-represented pleadings are liberally construed, see Erickson v, Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007), this Court maintains an “affirmative obligation . . . to prevent factually

unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens

Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). “A party opposing a properly supported motion for

summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings,’ but

rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Jd. (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). A dispute of material fact is only “genuine” if sufficient evidence favoring

the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 249-50.

“[S]Jummary judgment should only be granted ‘after adequate time for discovery,””

McCray v. Maryland Dept of Transp., Maryland Transit Admin., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir.

2014) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). “[W]hen a party lacks

material facts necessary to combat a summary judgment motion, [he] may file an ‘affidavit or

declaration that, for specified reasons, [the party] cannot present facts essential to justify its

opposition,’ ” referred to as a Rule 56(d) motion. /d. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)).

Rule 56(d) motions “must be granted ‘where the nonmoving party has not had the

opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition.’” /d. at 483-84 (quoting

Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002)). “[S]uch

motions are ‘broadly favored and should be liberally granted.’” /d. at 484 (quoting Greater Balt.

Ctr for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir.

2013) (en banc)). “This is especially true in the context of pro se litigation,” Jenkins v. Woodard,

109 F.4th 242, 251 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Pledger v. Lynch, 5 F.4th 511, 526 (4th Cir. 2021)),

particularly “when a case involves complex factual questions about intent and motive” and “the

relevant facts are exclusively in the control of the opposing party.” Harrods Ltd., 302 F.3d at 247

(citations omitted).

“The threshold showing to support a Rule 56(d) motion is low. For example, when a

nonmovant bears no fault for its ‘little or no opportunity to conduct discovery, and when fact-

intensive issues, such as intent, are involved,’ a formal Rule 56(d) affidavit is not mandatory.”

Escobar-Salmeron v. Moyer, et al., 150 F.4th 360, 369 (4th Cir. 2025), (quoting Harrods Ltd.,

302 F.3d at 244). The nonmovant need only ‘“‘adequately inform] the district court that the

motion is pre-mature and that more discovery is necessary.” Jd.

UI. ANALYSIS

A. Immunity Defenses

Defendants assert that to the extent that Dodson raises any claims against them in their

official capacity, the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must be dismissed. ECF

No. 19-1 at 8. Defendants admit Dodson does not specify whether he is suing them in their

official or personal capacities or both, but apparently wish to ensure that any possibility of an

official capacity claim surviving this stage of litigation is quashed. This Court does not,

however, construe Dodson’s amended complaint as raising any official capacity claims against

the Defendants named. Had he done so, Defendants would be correct in their assertion that the

claims would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Defendants also raise a statutory immunity defense “for all tort claims.” ECF No. 19-1 at

12-13. Defendants assert that if Dodson’s § 1983 complaint could be construed as “making a

claim related to tort liability,” they are statutorily immune from such claims pursuant to Md.

Code Ann., St. Gov’t. § 12-105. /d. Dodson filed his complaint on forms created by this Court

for use in litigating claims filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nowhere in his pleadings does he

invoke the language of a tort claim. The statutory immunity defense is inapplicable here.

Lastly, Defendants raise a qualified immunity defense, claiming that Dodson has failed to

show that defendant’s conduct violated the law. ECF No. 19-1 at 13-14. Because the Court finds

that the undisputed facts entitle Defendants to summary judgment, the qualified immunity

defense need not be reached or addressed.

B. Failure to Protect

In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim of failure to protect from violence,

Plaintiff must establish that Defendants exhibited deliberate or callous indifference to a specific

known risk of harm. See Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1987). “Prison conditions

may be ‘restrictive and even harsh,’ but gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner

by another serves no legitimate penological objective, any more than it squares with evolving

standards of decency. Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-

34 (1994) (citations omitted). “[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows

of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Jd. at 837, see also Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 339-40 (4th

Cir. 1997).

“The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments imposes certain

basic duties on prison officials.” Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Farmer,

511 U.S. at 832). Those duties “include maintaining humane conditions of confinement, including

the provision of adequate medical care and... ‘reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of

the inmates.’” /d. “[N]ot every injury suffered by a prisoner at the hands of another translates into

constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Makdessi v. Fields,

789 F.3d 126, 133 (4th Cir. 2015). A two-part inquiry that includes both an objective and a

subjective component must be satisfied before liability is established. See Raynor, 817 F.3d at

127,

Objectively, the prisoner “must establish a serious deprivation of his rights in the form of a

serious or significant physical or emotional injury” or substantial risk of either injury. Danser v.

Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2014). The objective inquiry requires this Court to

“assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it

violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling

v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). A genuine dispute of fact regarding the extent of the injury

suffered precludes summary judgment. Raynor, 817 F.3d at 128.

Subjectively, a plaintiff must establish that the prison official involved had “‘a sufficiently

culpable state of mind” amounting to ‘deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834. Evidence establishing a culpable state of mind requires actual knowledge of an

excessive risk to the prisoner’s safety or proof that prison officials were aware of facts from which

an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and that the inference

was drawn. Jd. at 837. A plaintiff may “prove an official’s actual knowledge of a substantial risk

‘in the usual ways including inference from circumstantial evidence” so that “’a factfinder may

conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was

obvious.” Raynor, 817 F.3d at 128, see also Ford v. Hooks, 108 F.4th 224, 231 (4th Cir. 2024)

(finding officer who questioned prisoner on housing unit very loudly about who he needed

protection from and why he wanted protective custody may have knowingly exacerbated the

danger making response unreasonable).

Actual knowledge of a substantial risk does not alone impose liability. Where prison officials

responded reasonably to a risk, they may be found free of liability. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.

Where prison officials conclude that they did not have enough information to carry out an

appropriate investigation of a prisoner-plaintiff’s claim that his life was endangered they had not

“consciously disregarded” the risks he described. Ford v. Hooks, 108 F.4th 224, 231 (4th Cir.

2024) (noting plaintiff had not provided names of prisoners who represented a threat and prison

officials did not recognize their responses were inappropriate) (emphasis in original). “In failure

to protect cases, prison guards have no constitutional duty to intervene in the armed assault of one

inmate upon another when intervention would place the guards in danger of physical harm.”

Raynor, 817 F.3d at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d 1005,

1008 (8th Cir. 1995)); Thompson y. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 108 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[P]rison officials

are not liable if taking action would endanger their own lives or if the harm occurred despite their

reasonable efforts to prevent it.”). Failure to take (any/reasonable) action in an ongoing assault,

however, can amount to deliberate indifference. See Cox v. Quinn, 828 F.3d 227, 236 (4th Cir.

2016) (holding correctional officers were deliberately indifferent to prisoner’s substantial risk of

serious harm where correctional officers failed to take reasonable action after prisoner repeatedly

informed them that he feared for his safety before he was beaten); Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525,

532 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (finding no deliberate indifference where unarmed prison officials

did not intervene in an armed attack immediately but called for backup).

Assuming Dodson told someone at RCI that there was a risk of harm to his safety due to

his cooperation or testimony in a case several years before this incident occurred, his inability to

name a specific risk is fatal to his claim. RCI officials had no way of knowing whether Dodson

was more at risk of harm than any other inmate within the general population. A statement of

generalized fear that retribution might be taken against him is not enough to place Defendants on

notice that Dodson required additional precautions such as protective custody. His assertion in

his opposition response that all housing unit tiers are supposed to remain locked at all times

disregards the need to open the doors to allow mass movement for the return of inmates assigned

to the tier following a meal or recreation.

Dodson’s Rule 56(d) request for discovery is inadequate to delay the decision to grant

summary judgment in favor of Defendants. Dodson’s request is formulaic and is submitted on a

form that has no specific bearing on the facts of this case. He does not explain what documents

or facts he does not have access to that would assist in opposing Defendants’ motion; rather, he

simply states that he needs access to more documents. For these reasons, summary judgment

will be granted in favor of Defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION

By separate Order which follows, Defendants’ motion, construed as one seeking summary

judgment, shall be GRANTED. Dodson’s motion to appoint counsel shall be DENIED, and his

motion for extension of time shall be DENIED as moot.

G □□

Date LYDEKAY TGS SBY

United States District Judge