The opinion
1 Aug 26, 2026
2 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
3
4
5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
7 TRISTAN S.,1
No. 4:26-CV-03021-RLP
8 Plaintiff,
9 v. ORDER REVERSING AND
REMANDING THE
10 FRANK BISIGNANO COMMISSIONER’S DECISION FOR
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL FURTHER ADMINISTRATIVE
11 SECURITY, PROCEEDINGS
12 Defendant.
13
BEFORE THE COURT is an appeal from an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
14
denial of disability claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). ECF No. 7.
15
The Court considered the matter without oral argument. For the reasons discussed
16
below, Mr. S.’s brief is granted as to the assignments of error but denied as to
17
remedy, and the Commissioners request to remand the matter for further proceedings
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is granted.
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20
1 Plaintiff’s first name and last initial are used to protect his privacy.
1 BACKGROUND
2 Mr. S. was born in 2003. He had an IEP throughout school and dropped out
3 in the tenth grade. Tr. 92, 1128-29. He has some criminal history, including being
4 charged with assault when he was 13 and an armed robbery charge from 2022. Tr.
5 695, 1098. He has a history of substance abuse disorder, having been admitted to
6 medical centers for withdrawal management more than once. Tr. 317, 645, 1497.
7 He also has alleges to have a variety of mental disorders, including, but not limited
8 to, schizophrenia, personality disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
9 bipolar, and depression. Tr. 21. Based on these impairments, Mr. S. filed for Child
10 Disability Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, alleging onset September
11 24, 2021. Tr. 285, 295.
12 The claim for social security benefits was denied on December 20, 2022. His
13 request for reconsideration was denied. Tr. 119-26. Mr. S. made a timely request
14 for a hearing before an ALJ. Tr. 49.
15 Leading up to the hearing, Mr. S. developed symptoms including headaches
16 and vision loss, being seen at the emergency room three times for these symptoms
17 within two weeks. Tr. 59.
18 A hearing was held on November 12, 2024. Tr. 49-105. Mr. S. appeared
19 with a representative. Id. A vocational expert (VE) and medical expert (ME) also
20 appeared. Tr. 49. The ME opined Mr. S. has mild impairment in
1 understanding, remembering fine information, moderate impairment and
2 interacting with others, moderate impairment and concentrating, persisting and
3 maintaining pace, and moderate impairment in adapting or managing oneself. Tr.
4 65. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on January 8, 2025, and the appeals
5 council denied review. Tr. 17-29.
6 STANDARD OF REVIEW
7 This Court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
8 is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review is limited; the
9 Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by substantial
10 evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.
11 2012). If the evidence in the record “is susceptible to more than one rational
12 interpretation, [the Court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by
13 inferences reasonably drawn from the record.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
14 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502(a),
15 416.902(a) (citation omitted).
16 FIVE-STEP EVALUATION PROCESS
17 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within the
18 meaning of the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to engage in
19 any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
20 mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
1 can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42
2 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant’s impairment must be
3 “of such severity that he is not only unable to do [his or her] previous work[,] but
4 cannot, considering [his or her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any
5 other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42
6 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3(B).
7 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine
8 whether a claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-
9 (v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, if the claimant is engaged in “substantial
10 gainful activity,” the Commissioner must find the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.
11 §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the Commissioner considers the severity of
12 the claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the
13 claimant suffers from “any impairment or combination of impairments which
14 significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work
15 activities,” the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).
16 At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to severe
17 impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person
18 from engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii),
19 416.920(a)(4)(iii).
20 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the
1 severity of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must assess the
2 claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC), which is the claimant’s ability to
3 perform physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her
4 limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1).
5 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s
6 RFC, the claimant is capable of performing work he or she has performed in the past
7 (past relevant work). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If not, the
8 analysis proceeds to step five and the Commissioner considers whether, in view of
9 the claimant’s RFC, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national
10 economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). The claimant bears the
11 burden of proof at steps one through four above. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,
12 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the
13 Commissioner to establish (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and
14 (2) such work “exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. §§
15 404.1560(c)(2), 416.960(c)(2); Beltran v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).
16 When a claimant has documented medical evidence of alcoholism or drug
17 addiction, a disabled finding under the five-step inquiry does not automatically
18 qualify them for disability benefits. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954
19 (9th Cir. 2001); SSR 13-2P, 2013 WL 621536, at *4 (Feb. 20, 2013). The SSA's
20 implementing regulations specify: “If we find that you are disabled and have
1 medical evidence of your drug addiction or alcoholism, we must determine whether
2 your drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the
3 determination of disability.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a), 416.935(a); see also Jarvis v.
4 Berryhill, 722 F. App'x 616, 619 (9th Cir. 2018).
5 To determine whether drug addiction is a contributing factor material to the
6 determination of disability, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant would still be
7 disabled if she were not using drugs. SSR 13-2P, 2013 WL 621536, at *4–5. This
8 requires the ALJ to repeat the five-step evaluation, separating out the impact of the
9 drug addiction from the other non-substance related impairments. See Ball v.
10 Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2001). However, if, and only if, the ALJ
11 finds that the claimant is disabled and there is “medical evidence” of his or her
12 substance abuse, “then the ALJ should proceed under §§ 404.1535 or 416.935 to
13 determine if the claimant ‘would still [be found] disabled if [he or she] stopped using
14 alcohol or drugs.’” Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 949 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535,
15 416.935). If the claimant's remaining limitations would be disabling without the
16 drug-related impairments, then the drug addiction is not material to the
17 determination of disability and the claimant is disabled. Id. at 954. In materiality
18 determinations, the claimant bears the burden of proving her drug addiction is not a
19 contributing factor material to the disability determination. Id.
20 SSR 13-2p explains that “[m]any people with DAA have co-occurring mental
1 disorders; that is, a mental disorder(s) diagnosed by an acceptable medical source in
2 addition to their DAA. We do not know of any research data that we can use to
3 predict reliably that any given claimant's co-occurring mental disorder would
4 improve, or the extent to which it would improve, if the claimant were to stop using
5 drugs or alcohol.” Soc. Sec. Ruling, SSR 13-2p; Titles II & Xvi: Evaluating Cases
6 Involving Drug Addiction & Alcoholism (Daa), SSR 13-2p (S.S.A. Feb. 20, 2013).
7 ALJ’S FINDINGS
8 The ALJ first found Mr. S. was under 22 at onset date and has not engaged in
9 substantial gainful activity since then. Tr. 19. At step two, the ALJ found Mr. S.
10 suffered from the following severe impairments: schizophrenia and other psychotic
11 disorders; personality disorder; depressive, bipolar, and related disorders; trauma and
12 stressor-related disorder; and substance addiction disorders. Tr. 20. At step three, the
13 ALJ found Mr. S. does not have an impairment or any combination of impairments
14 that meet or medically equals the severity of a listed impairment. Tr. 20.
15 The ALJ then determined Mr. S. has the RFC to perform a full range of work
16 at all exertional levels but is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks with frequent
17 interaction with supervisors, co-workers and the public, and he can deal with
18 frequent changes in the work setting. Tr. 21.
19 The ALJ found Mr. S. has no past relevant work at step four. Tr. 30. At step
20 five, the ALJ found there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
1 economy that Mr. S. can perform such as industrial cleaner, hand packager, and
2 sweeper cleaner industrial. Tr. 30-31. Therefore, the ALJ concluded Mr. S. has not
3 been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from September 24,
4 2021, through the date of the decision. Tr. 31.
5 ANALYSIS
6 The parties agree the ALJ erred in its analysis but disagree as to remedy. Mr.
7 S. contends the record supports a remand for immediate award of benefits. The
8 Commissioner requests a remand for further proceedings. Because the record is not
9 sufficiently developed to justify an award of benefits, the Court agrees with the
10 Commissioner and remands for further proceedings.
11 To assist on remand, the Court details each of Mr. S.’s assignments of error.
12 Medical Opinions
13 Mr. S. contends the ALJ erred in assessing the medial opinions of Nurse
14 Austin and Dr. Price. With respect to Nurse Austin, he argues it was improper for
15 the ALJ to discount the opinion due to it not being vocationally defined. With
16 respect to Dr. Price, he argues the ALJ did not identify what testimony she was
17 crediting and thus did not articulate the supportability factor in a way that can be
18 meaningfully reviewed. The Court agrees with these assessments.
19 The ALJ must consider and evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical
20 opinions or prior administrative medical findings from medical sources. 20 C.F.R.
1 §§ 416.920c(a) and (b), 404.1520c(a) and (b). The factors for evaluating the
2 persuasiveness of medical opinions and prior administrative findings include
3 supportability, consistency, the source's relationship with the claimant, any
4 specialization of the source, and other factors (such as the source's familiarity with
5 other evidence in the file or an understanding of Social Security's disability
6 program). 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(c)(1)-(5), 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5). Supportability
7 and consistency are the most important factors, and the ALJ must explain how both
8 factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(b)(2), 404.1520c(b)(2). The ALJ
9 may explain how they considered the other factors, but is not required to do so,
10 except in cases where two or more opinions are equally well-supported and
11 consistent with the record. Id.
12 This Court reviews ALJ’s findings for substantial evidence. Woods v.
13 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022). Further, “[w]here evidence is
14 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that
15 must be upheld.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
16 The ALJ’s only stated reason for rejecting Nurse Austin’s opinion is that she
17 used non-vocationally defined language. Tr. 30. Although there may be value in
18 having medical opinions framed in vocationally relevant language, here, the ALJ
19 conceded that the language “may be challenged” sufficiently communicated at
20 least some limitation. Tr. 30. See also Lilian R. v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 2026
1 WL 1031189 at *4 (D. Or. Apr. 16, 2026) (finding error where the ALJ found the
2 medical opinion “persuasive” but did not adopt specific limitations therein only
3 because it was “not vocationally defined.”). Any reason for rejecting a medical
4 opinion must be grounded in the consistency and supportability factors, and the
5 ALJ does not discuss either factor here.
6 Next, the ALJ credited Dr. Price’s testimony, finding she rendered her
7 opinion in her area of expertise, reviewed the record and provided citations to the
8 evidence in support of her conclusion. Tr. 30. Dr. Price testified that Mr. S. could
9 do simple repetitive tasks with manual labor and a work environment, but with
10 only 1-2 co-workers, a routine and flexible work environment, no time pressures
11 and only frequent changes in the work setting. Tr. 22. The ALJ did not identify
12 what testimony of Dr. Price’s was credited and failed to include all of the
13 limitations assessed by Dr. Price in the RFC. Specifically, the RFC does not
14 include a limitation of no time pressure or frequent changes in the work setting.
15 To the extent the ALJ accepts a doctor's findings, the ALJ is required to
16 include them in the RFC. Van Sickle v. Astrue, 385 F. App’x 739, 741 (9th Cir.
17 2010). The ALJ’s limited discussion of Dr. Price’s opinion does not allow for
18 meaningful review. Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1278 (9th Cir. 2020)
19 (“Because the ALJ did not provide enough reasoning in order for us to
20 meaningfully determine whether the ALJ's conclusions were supported by
1 substantial evidence, we cannot treat the error as harmless.”); Woods, 32 F.4th at
2 792 (ALJ must explain how they considered the supportability and consistency
3 factors.); Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he
4 agency [must] set forth the reasoning behind its decisions in a way that allows for
5 meaningful review.”); Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090,
6 1103 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Although the ALJ's analysis need not be extensive, the ALJ
7 must provide some reasoning in order for us to meaningfully determine whether
8 the ALJ's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.”).
9 On remand the ALJ is directed to reevaluate the medical opinion and
10 provide legally sufficient explanations for the weight assigned to them, taking into
11 account all limitations assessed.
12 Symptom Testimony
13 Mr. S. contends the reasons provided by the ALJ to discredit his testimony—
14 that he had a history of illicit drug use and failed to comply with prescribed
15 medications—were not “clear and convincing.” Again, the Court agrees.
16 An ALJ engages in a two-step analysis to determine whether to discount a
17 claimant’s testimony regarding subjective symptoms. SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL
18 1119029, at *2. “First, the ALJ must determine whether there is ‘objective medical
19 evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to
20 produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.’” Molina, 674 F.3d at 1112 (quoting
1 Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009)). Second, “[i]f the claimant
2 meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject
3 the claimant’s testimony about the severity of the symptoms if [the ALJ] gives
4 ‘specific, clear and convincing reasons’ for the rejection.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763
5 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
6 The ALJ found Mr. S.’s statements concerning intensity, persistence and
7 limiting effects of his alleged symptoms are not entirely consistent with his history
8 of drug use and lack of compliance with prescribed medications. Tr. 22-28. These
9 are legally insufficient justifications for rejecting Mr. S.’s testimony. The fact that a
10 claimant uses substances is not itself a reason to discount their credibility. See Julio
11 S. v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 7006718 at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2024). As to Mr. S.’s
12 noncompliance with medications, the ALJ does not identify what symptoms are
13 discredited and whether the medication was prescribed to treat the discredited
14 symptoms. The ALJ’s citations to the record largely relate to periods of relapse and
15 not to management of his psychiatric conditions. See Tr. 1097-98, 1101, 1158, 1170,
16 1181-128. This falls short of the specificity required and means the finding regarding
17 Mr. S.’s symptoms statements is not supported by substantial evidence.
18 Headaches and Vision Loss
19 Mr. S. contends the ALJ did not appropriately consider his vision loss,
20 headaches, and brain mass at step two or in the RFC determination. The Court
1 agrees.
2 Step two is “a de minimus screening device [used] to dispose of groundless
3 claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). “Thus, applying our
4 normal standard of review to the requirements of step two, [the Court] must
5 determine whether the ALJ had substantial evidence to find that the medical
6 evidence clearly established that [Plaintiff] did not have a medically severe
7 impairment or combination of impairments.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 687
8 (9th Cir. 2005).
9 The Commissioner does not put forth any reason why Mr. S.’s headache and
10 related symptoms should not be found to be medically determinable impairments.
11 On remand, the ALJ should make a new step two which addresses all of Mr. S.’s
12 alleged impairments and, if appropriate, make an RFC finding which takes into
13 account all of Mr. S’s limitations, even those from non-severe impairments.
14 Remedy
15 Mr. S. contends that because the ALJ found Dr. F.’s opinion persuasive and
16 his findings would compel disability if such limitations were included in the RFC
17 based on 2 separate limitations, there is no need to further develop the record. Dr.
18 F. opined Mr. S. will have “occasional” difficulty in sustained concentration and
19 persistence but would be able to do so “most of the time,” Tr. 124, and that he is
20 “[c]apable of occasional contact with supervisors, co-workers and the public.” Id.
1 During the hearing, the VE testified an employee cannot miss more than 1 day of
2 work per month or be off-task over 10% without risking termination, and that
3 training periods require more than occasional interaction with supervisors during
4 the training period establishes that he is disabled. See Tr. 96. Thus, Mr. S. urges
5 and award of benefits is the appropriate remedy.
6 To remand for an award of benefits, the Court must conclude that “the
7 record has been fully developed and further administrative proceedings would
8 serve no useful purpose.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014).
9 “This requirement will not be satisfied if ‘the record raises crucial questions as to
10 the extent of [a claimant's] impairment given inconsistencies between his
11 testimony and the medical evidence in the record,’ because ‘[t]hese are exactly the
12 sort of issues that should be remanded to the agency for further proceedings.’”
13 Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 495 (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1105).
14 In this case, even if Dr. F’s testimony is fully credited, it does not answer the
15 question whether substance abuse was a contributing factor to disability. The ALJ
16 is required to conduct a DAA analysis before a finding of disability can be made.
17 The Ninth Circuit has held that remand is “necessary” where the ALJ did not
18 perform a proper [DAA] analysis[.]” Monan v. Astrue, 377 F. App’x 629, 630 (9th
19 Cir. 2010). In so holding, the Ninth Circuit explained that “there was no [initial
20 five-step] determination [that the claimant was] ‘disabled,’” and thus “while the
1 ALJ discussed [the claimant's] drug use, he could not have performed the
2 mandated DAA absent a disability determination.” Id. In this case, given the
3 significant evidence of DAA and the deficiencies in the ALJ’s decision, the Court
4 finds additional proceedings are the appropriate remedy.
5 CONCLUSION
6 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, this Court concludes the
7 ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence and free of harmful legal
8 error.
9 1. Mr. S.’s Brief, ECF No. 7, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
10 2. Defendant’s Brief, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED as to the issue of remedy.
11 3. This case is REVERSED and REMANDED for further administrative
12 proceedings consistent with this Order pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §
13 405(g). In addition to the issues discussed above, the ALJ is instructed as follows:
14 a. Mr. S.’s headaches, vision loss and related symptoms are to be
15 evaluated at step two, and any limitations established therefrom shall
16 be incorporated into the RFC;
17 b. The limitations found in the prior administrative finding are to be
18 included in Mr. S.’s RFC: (1) occasional absenteeism would render
19 jobs in the economy unavailable and (2) inability to complete training
20 would render jobs in the economy unavailable;
1 c. Mr. S.’s symptoms statements are to be reevaluated. In evaluating Mr.
2 S.’s symptom allegations, the ALJ is directed to review SR 13-2p,
3 which provides: “Adjudicators must not presume that all claimants
4 with DAA are inherently less credible than other claimants. We will
5 apply our policy in SSR 96-7p and our regulations as in any other
6 case, considering the facts of each case. In addition, adjudicators must
7 consider a claimant’s co-occurring mental disorder(s) when they
8 evaluate the credibility of the claimant's allegations.”
9 d. The medical opinions of Dr. Price and Nurse Austin are to be
10 reassessed and the record developed where necessary;
11 e. The ALJ is instructed to complete the initial five-step inquiry without
12 considering the impact of Mr. S.’s substance abuse on his
13 impairments. If the ALJ determines during the initial five-step inquiry
14 that he is not disabled, then the ALJ need not proceed with the
15 analysis under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535 or 416.935 utilizing SSR 13-2p.
16 For cases involving co-occurring mental disorders, the ALJ is
17 instructed to review SSR 13-2p(7), which states:
18 a. Many people with DAA have co-occurring mental
disorders; that is, a mental disorder(s) diagnosed by an
19 acceptable medical source in addition to their DAA. We
do not know of any research data that we can use to
20 predict reliably that any given claimant's co-occurring
mental disorder would improve, or the extent to which it
1 would improve, if the claimant were to stop using drugs
or alcohol.
2 b. To support a finding that DAA is material, we must have
evidence in the case record that establishes that a
3 claimant with a co-occurring mental disorder(s) would
not be disabled in the absence of DAA. Unlike cases
4 involving physical impairments, we do not permit
adjudicators to rely exclusively on medical expertise and
5 the nature of a claimant's mental disorder.
6}| SSR 13-2p, 2013 WL 621536, at *9.
7 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Clerk is directed to enter this Order
8 || and provide copies to counsel. Judgment shall be entered for Mr. S. the file shall be
CLOSED.
10 DATED August 26, 2026.
12 REBECCA L. PENNELL
United States District Judge
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ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
EOP BIIRPTUER ADNMINTOCTR ATIVE DRACERNINIMG * 17