IPPOLITO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TOBIA IPPOLITO,

Civil Action No. 20-18246

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

STUART RABNER, C.J.S.C., et al., August 25, 2026

Defendants.

SEMPER, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendants William M. Laufer, Esq.,

Alexis N. Laufer, Esq., Kimberly Gronau-Boyd, Esq., and Laufer, Dalena, Jensen, Bradley &

Doran, LLC’s, (collectively, “Laufer Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss pro se Plaintiff Tobia

Ippolito’s (“Plaintiff’) Amended Complaint, (ECF 41, “Amended Complaint” or “AC”; ECF 83-

4, “Laufer Motion” or “Laufer Mot.”); Defendants the State of New Jersey, former Governor Philip

D. Murphy, former State of New Jersey Attorney General Gurbir S. Grewal, Governor Mikie

Sherrill, and Acting Attorney General Jennifer Davenport’s (collectively, “State Defendants”)

Motion to Dismiss, (ECF 84-1, “State Motion” or “State Mot.”); Defendants Supreme Court of

New Jersey, Stuart J. Rabner, C.J., Heather Joy Baker, Stuart A. Minkowitz, A.J.S.C., Thomas L.

Weisenbeck, J.S.C., Thomas J. Critchley, Jr., J.S.C., Phillip J. Maenza, J.S.C., Michael E. Hubner,

J.A.D., Alison E. Accurso, P.J.A.D., Clarkson S. Fisher, J.A.D., Robert J. Gilson, P.J.A.D.,

Carmen Messano, J.A.D., Catherine I. Enright, J.S.C., Michael Lasko and Caryn Galgano’s

(collectively, “State Judiciary Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss, (ECF 87-1, “State Judiciary

Motion” or “State Jud. Mot.”); and pro se Defendant Lisa Ippolito’s (“Lisa”) Motion to Dismiss,

(ECF 92, “Lisa Ippolito’s Motion” or “L. Mot.”), (collectively, “Defendants” and “Motions”). The

Court has decided the Motions upon the submissions of the parties, without oral argument,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons stated

below, the Laufer Motion, State Motion, State Judiciary Motion, and Lisa Ippolito’s Motion are

GRANTED; Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

This action arises from a series of events and New Jersey state court decisions related to

pro se Plaintiff Tobia Ippolito’s divorce proceedings and subsequent appeals. (See generally AC.)

Defendant Lisa Ippolito is Plaintiff’s former spouse who filed for divorce from Plaintiff in New

Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, Family Part in Morris County on July 25, 2012

(“Matrimonial Matter”). (See id. ¶¶ 26, 34.) The Laufer Defendants are attorneys who represented

Lisa during the Matrimonial Matter. (Id. ¶¶ 27-30.) The State Judiciary Defendants are state court

judges who presided over the Matrimonial Matter or subsequent appeals and state court personnel.

(Id. ¶¶ 7-9, 13-24.) The State Defendants are New Jersey public officials who allegedly failed to

investigate alleged wrongdoings of the State Judiciary Defendants. (See id. ¶¶ 10-12, 185-86.)

A. The Matrimonial Matter

1. Hon. Philip J. Maenza, J.S.C.

From August 2012 to September 2013, Defendant Judge Maenza presided over the

Matrimonial Matter, which included the distribution of Plaintiff and Lisa’s substantial martial

1 When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court

is obligated to accept as true allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be

drawn therefrom. See Rocks v. City of Phila., 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989). The Court also

considers any “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint.” In re Burlington

Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). The Court construes pro se filings

liberally. See Marcinek v. Comm’r, 467 F. App’x 153, 154 (3d Cir. 2012).

assets—approximately $7,000,000 in liquid assets, an unmortgaged $5,000,000 “Crestview

Mansion,” two other unmortgaged homes, and a net worth of about $13,000,000. (See id. ¶¶ 36-

38, 47-48, 50.) Judge Maenza awarded the Crestview Mansion to Lisa, instructed the sale of their

two other homes, and ordered Plaintiff to pay Lisa $55,000 per month in spousal support. (Id. ¶¶

48, 50-52.) Plaintiff alleges that Judge Maenza’s ruling left him “homeless and [without] ability

to pay” due to the onset of Plaintiff’s 100% disability, which the Social Security Administration

determined to be October 8, 2012. (See id. ¶¶ 6, 49, 52.)

In August 2013, Plaintiff sought to disqualify Judge Maenza due to alleged prejudice and

bias. (Id. ¶ 53.) In his first appearance before Judge Maenza on August 17, 2012, Plaintiff alleges

Judge Maenza disparagingly called Plaintiff and his family “tomatoes,” after “assum[ing]

[Plaintiff] was Italian.” (Id. ¶ 43.) In subsequent hearings, Plaintiff alleges Judge Maenza

continued to mock his national origin, called him a “jerk,” and stated that he “wished [Plaintiff]

was incarcerated.” (Id. ¶¶ 45-46.) Although Judge Maenza found Plaintiff’s allegations to be

“devoid of merit,” he recused himself from the Matrimonial Matter on September 30, 2013. (Id.

¶ 55.) In late 2016, Judge Maenza appeared before the New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee

and was reprimanded for his conduct toward Plaintiff during the Matrimonial Matter. (Id. ¶¶ 59,

73, 169-73.)

2. Hon. Michael E. Hubner, J.S.C.

In October 2013, the Matrimonial Matter was reassigned to Defendant Judge Hubner. (Id.

¶ 60.) Plaintiff promptly sought relief from Judge Maenza’s previous orders, and Judge Hubner

denied review allegedly because Judge Maenza dispelled Plaintiff’s claims of bias in his recusal

statement. (Id. ¶¶ 61-64.) On April 16, 2014, Judge Hubner ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to

why he should not be held in contempt. (Id. ¶ 65.) Plaintiff alleges the order originated from

information Judge Hubner received in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability (“HIPPA”) Act and related state laws. (Id.) After an April 23, 2014 hearing on

the issue, Judge Hubner found Plaintiff in contempt of court and ordered him to submit to a

psychological evaluation. (Id. ¶¶ 66-67.) On June 23, 2014, Plaintiff appealed Judge Hubner’s

contempt order to the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division. (Id. ¶ 68.)

On May 8, 2015, Plaintiff moved to disqualify Judge Hubner due to his alleged possession

of unlawful information and cleanse the Matrimonial Matter record of all information released in

violation of privacy laws. (Id. ¶ 85.) Plaintiff’s motion was mooted due to the transfer of the

Matrimonial Matter from Judge Hubner to Judge Critchley, which Plaintiff received notice of and

objected to on June 11, 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 86-91.)

3. Hon. Thomas J. Critchley, J.S.C.

Judge Critchley promptly set the Matrimonial Matter for trial. (Id. ¶¶ 96-97.) Plaintiff

then commenced a bankruptcy matter, filed certifications in support of probable cause against

Judges Maenza, Hubner and Critchley, and petitioned for removal of the Matrimonial Matter to

this Court.2 (Id. ¶¶ 126-34.) Judge Critchley proceeded to trial without further delay, and this

Court ultimately denied removal. (Id. ¶¶ 135, 139.) In February 2016, at the conclusion of an

eight-day trial, Judge Critchley ordered $116,000 of the marital assets to be distributed to Lisa.

(See id. ¶¶ 136-37; State Jud. Mot. at 2.) But enforcement of the post-trial order was stayed until

a bankruptcy-related automatic stay was lifted on May 31, 2016. (AC ¶¶ 141, 153.)

On June 13, 2016, Judge Critchley ordered Plaintiff incarcerated for failure to comply with

numerous court orders related to Plaintiff’s support obligations. (Id. ¶ 154; ECF 41-2, “Attachment

2 Plaintiff sought a stay pending appeal of his contempt order, which the Appellate Division

granted, and then later vacated the contempt order on November 15, 2015. (Id. ¶¶ 103-05, 115.)

6” or “6/13/2016 Transcript” at 24:19-25:19.) Plaintiff was again taken into custody for continued

noncompliance on June 20, 2016. (See AC ¶ 155.) Plaintiff then filed for emergent relief, which

the Appellate Division granted and ordered Plaintiff’s release from incarceration on June 22, 2016.

(Id. ¶ 157.) On August 8, 2016, Plaintiff was arrested again for outstanding support obligations.

(Id. ¶ 159.) Plaintiff alleges that correctional officers “attack[ed] and beat” him while being

transported to and from court for subsequent hearings on August 9 and September 6, 2016. (Id. ¶¶

160-61.) After traveling back from court on September 6, Plaintiff was subsequently hospitalized,

released, and then placed in solitary confinement in the Morris County Correctional facility for 21

days. (Id. ¶¶ 162, 164.)

Also on September 6, 2016, Judge Critchley issued a final judgment of divorce (“FJOD”)

in the Matrimonial Matter.3 (Id. ¶ 163.) On May 8, 2020, New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate

Division Judges Clarkson S. Fisher, Alison E. Accurso, and Robert J. Gilson affirmed Judge

Critchley’s FJOD. (See id. ¶ 206.) On June 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed a notice of petition in the

Supreme Court of New Jersey and again moved to proceed indigent. (Id. ¶ 209.) The Supreme

Court of New Jersey subsequently denied Plaintiff’s indigency motion and ordered Plaintiff to pay

the requisite court fees, which Plaintiff alleges is a violation of his due process rights. (Id. ¶¶ 216-

19.)

Between 2020 and 2024, numerous disputes arose between Plaintiff and the state judicial

system regarding the amount Plaintiff owed in arrears and attorney fees, and Plaintiff alleges his

non-payment resulted in his incarceration and other restrictions being placed on him in violation

3 Plaintiff then moved to proceed indigent and requested transcripts from the court at no cost,

which Judge Critchley denied on October 31, 2016. (AC ¶¶ 166-67.) Plaintiff appealed, and the

Appellate Division affirmed the court’s denial. (See id. ¶¶ 168, 175.)

of his liberties. (See id. ¶¶ 220-63.) As of February 29, 2024, Plaintiff continued to fail to fulfill

his support obligations and owed $8,286,148.21 in arrears. (See id. ¶ 261.)

B. Procedural History

On December 8, 2020, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court. (ECF 1.) On May 10, 2024,

Plaintiff filed the operative Amended Complaint. (See generally AC.) In his Amended Complaint,

Plaintiff appears to allege due process and equal protection violations under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I-II, V, VI); intentional and/or negligent

infliction of emotional distress (Count III); wrongful execution and enforcement of laws (Count

IV); and abuse of process (Count VII). (See id. ¶¶ 264-382.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory and

injunctive relief regarding his state court indigency status, and monetary relief. (See id. at 46-47.)

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 44, 55, 56.) After

several extension requests and in lieu of an opposition, Plaintiff moved to stay this matter to seek

appellate review on October 23, 2024. (See ECF Nos. 57, 59, 64, 66, 68.) This Court granted the

stay on October 29, 2024, and administratively terminated the pending motions to dismiss. (ECF

72.) On October 9 and 24, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to provide an update on the status of

his appeal by October 16 and 31, respectfully. (ECF Nos. 74, 76.) On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff

filed a non-responsive letter indicating that he did not pursue an appeal. (ECF 77.) This Court

subsequently lifted the stay and set a briefing schedule where Defendants were ordered to refile

their previous motions to dismiss on or before January 23, 2026. (ECF Nos. 78, 81.)

On January 20, 2026, the Laufer Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint. (Laufer Mot.) The State Defendants moved on January 23, 2026, (State Mot.), and

the State Judiciary Defendants moved on January 30 after this Court granted a one-week extension.

(State Jud. Mot.; ECF 86.) Pro se Defendant Lisa Ippolito filed two untimely motions to dismiss

on February 2 and 3, 2026, which the Court considers collectively and nunc pro tunc due to filing

complications identified in Lisa’s submissions. (L. Mot.; see ECF Nos. 88, 91, 94.) Pursuant to

this Court’s scheduling order and 2026 motion calendar, Plaintiff’s opposition to the Laufer

Motion and State Motion was due on February 3, 2026, and his opposition to the State Judiciary

Motion and Lisa Ippolito’s Motion was due on February 17. (ECF 81); see L. Civ. R. 78.1(a). On

March 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed a letter advising the Court that he was diagnosed with pneumonia

on February 28. (ECF 95.) This Court construed Plaintiff’s letter as an extension request and,

pursuant to the Court’s discretion, subsequently denied an extension as Plaintiff had sufficient time

to file opposition papers or request an extension by February 3 and 17, well before his diagnosis

on February 28. (ECF 96); see L. Civ. R. 6.1(b). Additionally, the Court previously granted

Plaintiff numerous extension and stay requests in this matter, which substantially delayed

adjudication over five and a half years. (See ECF Nos. 13, 16, 36, 40, 58, 60, 64, 76.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“When a motion under Rule 12 is based on more than one ground, the court should consider

the 12(b)(1) challenge first because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, all other defenses and objections become moot.” Dickerson v. Bank of Am., N.A., No.

12-3922, 2013 WL 1163483, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013) (citing In re Corestates Trust Fee Litig.,

837 F. Supp. 104, 105 (E.D. Pa. 1993)). In considering dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, a district court’s focus is not on whether the factual allegations entitle a plaintiff to

relief, but rather on whether the court has jurisdiction to hear the claim and grant relief. Maertin

v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 434, 445 (D.N.J. 2002).

Rule 12(b)(1) motions may challenge subject matter jurisdiction based upon the face of the

complaint or its underlying facts. Common Cause of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d

Cir. 2009); Pittman v. Metuchen Police Dept., No. 08-2373, 2009 WL 3207854, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept.

29, 2009) (citing James Wm. Moore, 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.30[4] (3d ed. 2007)). A

facial attack questions the sufficiency of the pleading and requires the trial court to accept the

allegations in the complaint as true. Common Cause of Pa., 558 F.3d at 257; Pittman, 2009 WL

3207854, at *1. A factual attack, by contrast, calls upon the court to weigh the evidence. Pittman,

2009 WL 3207854, at *1.

Here, the State and State Judiciary Defendants assert the defense of sovereign immunity

under the Eleventh Amendment based on the pleadings, thereby raising a facial attack. See Perez

v. New Jersey, No. 14-4610, 2015 WL 4394229, at *3 (D.N.J. July 15, 2015) (“[T]he State

Defendants’ motion asserts the defense of sovereign immunity based on the facts as pleaded in the

Second Amended Complaint and is thus a facial attack.”). Accordingly, “the Court must consider

the allegations of the complaint as true,” much like a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Bd. of Trs.

of Trucking Emps. of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Caliber Auto Transfer, Inc., No. 09-6447,

2010 WL 2521091, at *8 (D.N.J. June 11, 2010) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d

294, 302 (3d Cir. 2006)).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.” For a complaint to survive dismissal under the rule, it must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially

plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Although the

plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show

more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Connelly v. Lane Const.

Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a

result, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will

uncover proof of [his] claims.” Id. at 789.

When a plaintiff files a complaint pro se, their “pleadings must be liberally construed.”

Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x 924, 926 (3d Cir. 2005). The arguments of pro se litigants

“must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Courts must

accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor

of the Plaintiff. Phillips v. Ctny. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). However, when

a Plaintiff alleges legal conclusions disguised as factual assertions, or factual assertions that are

otherwise unreasonable, the court is under no obligation to accept such allegations as true. Baraka

v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding a court is “not compelled to accept

unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual

allegations”). If, after reviewing the pleadings, a court determines that a plaintiff failed to establish

a claim and construed all reasonable facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the court may

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Stringer v.

Bureau of Prisons, Federal Agency, 145 F. App’x 751, 2005 WL 2009019, at *1 (3d Cir. 2005).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff’s Federal Claims Are Barred on Immunity Grounds.

Plaintiff asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the State and State Judiciary Defendants.

(See AC ¶¶ 1, 3.) Section 1983 does not provide substantive rights; rather, it provides a vehicle

for vindicating violations of other federal rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)

(citation omitted). To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) a person deprived

him of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law; and (2) the person who deprived him of

that right acted under color of state law. Velez v. Fuentes, No. 15-6939, 2016 WL 4107689, at *2

(D.N.J. July 29, 2016) (citation omitted).

The State and State Judiciary Defendants raise several grounds for dismissing Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint. (See generally State Mot.; State Jud. Mot.) First, the Eleventh Amendment

bars Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims because the State of New Jersey is entitled to sovereign

immunity and the other State and State Judiciary Defendants are arms of the State.4 Second, for

Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims, former Governor Murphy and former Attorney General

Grewal, the state court judges, and remaining state employees are entitled to qualified immunity,

absolute judicial immunity, and quasi-judicial immunity, respectively.5 Thus, none of the State or

State Judiciary Defendants are “persons” subject to liability under § 1983, and the Court must

accordingly dismiss Counts I-II, V, and VI of the Amended Complaint. The Court agrees and

addresses each argument in turn.6

4 A motion to dismiss based upon sovereign immunity is properly brought pursuant to Rule

12(b)(1) because sovereign immunity implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See

Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Eleventh

Amendment is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.”).

5 “Assertions of judicial and qualified immunity, as affirmative defenses which raise ‘insuperable

barriers’ to claims, see Flight Sys., Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys., 112 F.3d 124, 127 (3d. Cir. 1997), are

analyzed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Edelglass v. New Jersey, No. 14-760, 2015 WL 225810, at *6

(D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2015) (citing Green v. Maraio, 722 F.2d 1013, 1015-19 (3d Cir. 1983)).

6 The State and State Judiciary Defendants further argue, inter alia, that Plaintiff has failed to plead

a plausible claim for relief, and that the Court must abstain from hearing Plaintiff’s claims under

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (See generally State Mot.; State Jud. Mot.) Because the Court

dismisses Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as to them on immunity grounds, the Court need not

consider Defendants’ additional grounds for dismissal.

1. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity

The State and State Judiciary Defendants argue that this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction as to Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims because they are subject to sovereign

immunity. (State Mot. at 17-21; State Jud. Mot. at 6-10).

A federal court generally does not have jurisdiction over suits against “a state or state

agency … brought in federal court by one of its own citizens regardless of the relief sought, unless

Congress specifically abrogates the state’s immunity or the state waives its own immunity.”

Thorpe v. New Jersey, 246 F. App’x 86, 87 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Accordingly,

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity protects non-consenting states from suits brought in

federal court by private citizens seeking monetary damages. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984). The immunity extends beyond the State and immunizes

state agencies, departments, and officials, provided they constitute “arm[s] of the state.” Alabama

v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); see also Haybarger v. Lawrence Ctny. Adult Prob. & Parole,

551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that the shield of Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity extends to “subunits of the State”).

Specifically, the Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United

States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any

Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Courts have interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as

affirming “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity” as a limit on a federal court’s

authority. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 98. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars all private suits

against non-consenting states in federal court. Lombardo v. Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d

190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890)); see Pennhurst, 465 U.S.

at 101. The bar extends to state employees acting in their official capacities, in addition to agencies

and departments of the State. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101.

Although there are three exceptions to sovereign immunity, none apply in this case. First,

“Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity in the exercise of its power to enforce the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Antonelli v. New Jersey, 310 F. Supp. 2d 700, 713 (D.N.J. 2004). It is

clear, however, that Congress did not abrogate states’ sovereign immunity in enacting any of the

statutes raised here. See Bennett v. City of Atlantic City, 288 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683-84 (D.N.J.

2003) (explaining that Congress did not abrogate state immunity when enacting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,

1983 or 1985); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (finding that § 1983 does not override

a state’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity).

Second, a state may waive sovereign immunity by consenting to suit in federal court by

“invok[ing] [its] jurisdiction by bringing suit,” or by making “a clear declaration that it intends to

submit itself to [federal court] jurisdiction.” MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491,

503-04 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, there is no indication that the State or State Judiciary Defendants

waived their sovereign immunity. (See State Mot. at 17-21; State Jud. Mot. at 6-8.)

Under the third exception, the Ex Parte Young doctrine, “individual state officers can be

sued in their individual capacities for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to end

continuing or ongoing violations of federal law.”7 MCI Telecomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 506 (citing

Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). “This exception to the Eleventh Amendment is a

very narrow one,” and does not apply to “[l]awsuits seeking retroactive relief, usually in the form

7 The theory of the Ex Parte Young doctrine is that a claim for prospective relief for an ongoing

violation of federal law is “not an action against the state because the [alleged violation] would

strip the officer of his official authority.” MCI Telecomm. Corp., 271 F.3d at 506 (citing

Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 103).

of monetary damages and declaratory judgment for past conduct, against a state official.” Doe v.

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 148 F. Supp. 2d 462, 483 (D.N.J. 2001). Here, Plaintiff seeks a

“declaratory order” against the State and State Judiciary Defendants to overturn the State

Judiciary’s denial of his indigency status, which allegedly resulted in violations of “Plaintiff’s

rights under the United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal

Protection Clauses ….” (AC at 47.) Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to plausibly state a claim for

prospective injunctive relief as his allegations stem from past conduct in the Matrimonial Matter—

not a continuing violation of federal law, and therefore the Ex Parte Young exception does not

apply.

Furthermore, “[t]o state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis added). Neither a state nor entity that is an arm of the state for

Eleventh Amendment purposes qualify as a “person” under Section 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official

capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”); N.J. Chinese Cmty. Ctr. v. McAleer, No. 21-8320, 2022

WL 3403297, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2022) (citation omitted) (“[B]ecause a state is not a ‘person’

within the meaning of section 1983 . . . it follows that the State of New Jersey cannot be held liable

as a ‘person’ under any of these sections of the Civil Rights Act.”). And in Allen v. Debello, 861

F.3d 433 (3d Cir. 2017), the Third Circuit found that when judicial defendants have acted in an

adjudicatory capacity and not in an enforcement capacity, they are not proper defendants in § 1983

litigation. Id. at 442. Here, the State Judiciary Defendants acted in an adjudicatory capacity by

presiding over the Matrimonial Matter and subsequent appeals. To be sure, the State Judiciary

Defendants did not initiate these actions; rather, a non-judicial party, Lisa Ippolitio, initiated the

divorce and related custody determinations. See id. (finding that state court judges who presided

over a custody dispute are not proper parties under § 1983). Thus, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are

not proper.

Accordingly, because the State and State Judiciary Defendants, in their official capacities,

are either considered a State or “arms” of the State, and no exception applies, they are entitled to

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The Court DISMISSES Counts I-II, V, and VI of the

Amended Complaint against the State and State Judiciary Defendants, in their official capacities,

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

2. Qualified Immunity

The State Defendants further argue that former Governor Philip D. Murphy and former

Attorney General Gurbir S. Grewal are immune from suit in their individual capacities. (State

Mot. at 21-24.)

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243,

249-50 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). “Qualified

immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when

they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and

liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. “To overcome

qualified immunity, a plaintiff must plead facts ‘showing (1) that the official violated a statutory

or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged

conduct.’” Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 168-69 (3d

Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). For the second prong, “there

must be sufficient precedent at the time of action, factually similar to the plaintiff’s allegations, to

put defendant on notice that his or her conduct is constitutionally prohibited.” Id. at 169 (quoting

McLaughlin v. Watson, 271 F.3d 566, 572 (3d Cir. 2001)). And the clearly established right must

be framed “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id.

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001)).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that former Governor Murphy and former Attorney General Grewal

declined to investigate alleged State Judiciary Defendants’ wrongdoings that Plaintiff reported.

(See AC ¶¶ 185-86.) State Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not have a statutory or

constitutional right to demand an investigation—let alone a clearly established right. (State Mot.

at 24 (citing al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735).) In fact, the Third Circuit has noted that “[t]here is no

statutory or common law right, much less a constitutional right, to [such] an investigation.” Fuchs

v. Mercer Cnty., 260 F. App’x 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell v.

McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007)) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619

(1973) (observing that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or

nonprosecution of another”)).

Accordingly, former Governor Murphy and former Attorney General Grewal are entitled

to qualified immunity. The Court DISMISSES Counts I-II, V, and VI of the Amended Complaint

against them on these grounds pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

3. Absolute Judicial Immunity

The State Judiciary Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s claims against the state court

judges in their individual capacities must be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of absolute judicial

immunity. (State Jud. Mot. at 16-18.)

“A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and

will not be liable for his judicial acts.” Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.

2009) (quoting Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)). “A judge will not be deprived

of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his

authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted ‘in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction.’” Id. (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court of the United States has, however, identified two exceptions to this

rule. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in

the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). To determine whether an

act is judicial, courts look to “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally

performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge

in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). “Second, a judge is not

immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S.at 12. “[A] judge does not act in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction when the judge enters an order at least colorably within the jurisdiction of her court

even though a court rule or other procedural constraint required another judge to act in the matter.”

Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 771 (3d Cir. 2000).

The Court finds that the facts laid out in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint describe judicial

conduct carried out within the State Judiciary’s jurisdiction. For example, Plaintiff claims that:

the State Judiciary Defendants violated his substantive and procedural due process rights by

denying Plaintiff indigency status and free transcripts, (see AC ¶ 270); Superior Court Judge

Maenza awarded the Crestview Mansion to Lisa without notice and ordered Plaintiff to pay

$55,000 per month in support obligations, (id. ¶¶ 48, 52); Superior Court Judge Hubner, acting sua

sponte, found Plaintiff in contempt and ordered a psychological evaluation, (id. ¶ 67); Superior

Court Judge Critchley held proceedings without Plaintiff, issued the FJOD, and ordered Plaintiff

incarcerated for failure to comply with his support obligations, (id. ¶¶ 154-55, 163); Appellate

Division Judges Fisher, Accurso and Gibson affirmed Judge Critchley’s FJOD on all points, (id. ¶

206); and Supreme Court of New Jersey Chief Justice Rabner ordered Plaintiff to pay the requisite

filing fees after denying his motion to proceed as an indigent, (id. ¶ 216).

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff alleges the State Judiciary Defendants “conspir[ed] to

conceal the bad acts of their colleagues,” (see id. at 2), allegations of a conspiracy do not alter the

result that the state court judges are entitled to immunity for their judicial acts, including ordering

support obligations and custody in divorce proceedings and denying applications to proceed

indigent. See Owens v. Armstrong, 171 F. Supp. 3d 316, 330 (D.N.J. 2016) (holding that judicial

immunity extends to suits where it is alleged that the judge is acting as part of a conspiracy) (citing

Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 26-27 (1980)); see also Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d

Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of conspiracy claim on judicial immunity grounds). Likewise, any

allegations of restricting Plaintiff’s access to the courts, (see AC ¶ 3), are subject to absolute

immunity as a judge’s judicial jurisdiction is to be broadly construed, and “[a] judge will not be

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in

excess of his authority.” See Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769; see also N.J. Ct. R. 2:7-1(a) (noting the

court’s authority to deny applications to proceed indigent and motions for relief from fees)

Finally, Plaintiff’s conclusory pleadings as to the State Judiciary Defendants’ alleged

deprivation of substantive and procedural due process and equal protection of the law fails to meet

the pleading standards set forth in Twombly and Iqbal.8 The State Judiciary Defendants’

involvement with Plaintiff arises out of the Matrimonial Matter and subsequent appeals, a family

court dispute regarding the Ippolito family’s divorce and custody. The allegations within the

Amended Complaint against the State Judiciary Defendants are rooted in the work as jurists—

issuing decisions, rulings, and orders in their capacity as presiding state court judges. Despite the

litany of allegations, the supposed “non-judicial” actions are either under the purview of judicial

acts covered by absolute judicial immunity, or they woefully lack the specificity or clarity

necessary to conform to the pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal.

As a result, Plaintiff has not pled any facts to show that the State Judiciary Defendants’

various actions in the Matrimonial Matter and subsequent appeals were non-judicial or taken in

the absence of jurisdiction. Accordingly, Defendants Stuart J. Rabner, C.J., Stuart A. Minkowitz,

A.J.S.C., Thomas L. Weisenbeck, J.S.C., Thomas J. Critchley, Jr., J.S.C., Phillip J. Maenza, J.S.C.,

Michael E. Hubner, J.A.D., Alison E. Accurso, P.J.A.D., Clarkson S. Fisher, J.A.D., Robert J.

Gilson, P.J.A.D., Carmen Messano, J.A.D., Catherine I. Enright, J.S.C. are entitled to absolute

judicial immunity; and the Court DISMISSES Counts I-II, V, and VI of the Amended Complaint

against them on these grounds pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

4. Quasi-Judicial Immunity

The State Judiciary Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants

Heather Joy Baker (“Baker”), Michael Lasko (“Lasko”), and Caryn Galgano (“Galgano”) in their

8 The Court recognizes Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, and therefore, generally construes the

pleadings liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than papers filed by attorneys.

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court, however, need not “credit a pro se

plaintiff's ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions.’” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 282

(D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).

individual capacities must be dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity. (State

Jud. Mot. at 18-20.)

Quasi-judicial immunity protects a range of judicial employees, including “those who serve

as ‘arms of the court,’ ... fulfill[ing] a quasi-judicial role at the court’s request.” Russell v.

Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 126 (3d

Cir. 2001)). To determine whether the judicial employee is “fulfill[ing] a quasi-judicial role,”

courts take a “functional approach to immunity.” Id. Courts “examine the nature of the functions

with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to

evaluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the

appropriate exercise of those functions.” Id. (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224

(1988)).

However, “[m]erely being part of the judicial function, even an extremely important part,

will not automatically entitle one to quasi-judicial immunity.” Id. “The Third Circuit has adopted

the six-factor test outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478

(1978), as the “touchstones of its quasi-judicial immunity inquiry.” Khawam v. Allen, No. 23-

22465, 2025 WL 654107, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2025). “Those factors are (1) the need to assure

that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (2) the presence

of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling

unconstitutional conduct; (3) insulation from political influence; (4) the importance of precedent;

(5) the adversary nature of the process; and (6) the correctability of error on appeal.” Id. (citing

Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. Decker, 631 F.3d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 2011)).

Here, after applying the factors, the Court concludes that Defendants Baker, Lasko, and

Galgano were performing a quasi-judicial function at the State Judiciary’s request and are therefore

entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Baker is the Clerk of the New Jersey Supreme Court, (AC ¶

8), and allegedly denied some of Plaintiff’s applications regarding his appeal of the Matrimonial

Matter at the behest of Chief Justice Rabner. (See id. ¶¶ 197, 205, 216.) The Third Circuit has

found that clerks of New Jersey courts “are entitled to ‘absolute quasi-judicial immunity for [their]

actions taken in [their] capacity as [a] [c]lerk ….’” See, e.g., Grossberger v. Clerk of Sup. Ct., No.

21-19959, 2025 WL 3294373, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2025) (quoting Nemeth v. Off. of Clerk of

Superior Ct. of N.J., 837 F. App’x 924, 928 (3d Cir. 2020)). Because the Court concludes that the

judges comprising the State Judiciary Defendants—including Chief Justice Rabner—are entitled

to absolute judicial immunity, Baker is also “absolutely immune for simply acting as an

intermediary between [Plaintiff] and the judge.” Gallas, 211 F.3d at 773.

Lasko and Galgano are probation officers in the Probation Division of the Morris/Sussex

Vicinage of the Superior Court of New Jersey (“Probation”), (see id. ¶¶ 23-24), and allegedly

refused to credit Plaintiff’s support arrears in the Matrimonial Matter upon service of related court

orders. (Id. ¶¶ 236, 239-43.) “As quasi-judicial officers, probation officers are cloaked with

judicial immunity when they act pursuant to a court directive.” Torres v. Velasquez, No. 17-1685,

2017 WL 5725053, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2017) (citing Stankowski v. Farley, 251 F. App’x. 743,

746 (3d Cir. 2007)). In this case, after a determination of Plaintiff’s ability to pay, Judge Critchley

incarcerated Plaintiff for 196 days for failing to pay over $6,000,000.00 in arrears and ordered

Plaintiff to report to Probation on a weekly basis after his release. (AC ¶¶ 231-35.) It therefore

follows that Lasko and Galgano acted pursuant to their roles of fulfilling Judge Critchley’s

directives when allegedly considering Plaintiff’s documents related to Plaintiff’s arrears. See Dey-

El v. Rosenberg, No. 14-7091, 2015 WL 4391399, at *3 (D.N.J. July 15, 2015) (citing Pell v. Ross,

No. A–4799–03T5, 2006 WL 572339, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb.28, 2006) (finding

quasi-judicial immunity for a probation officer who performed duties as required by court order

compelling child support obligor’s incarceration)).

While the Supreme Court has identified two narrow exceptions to the rule of quasi-judicial

immunity, neither are appliable here.9 To be sure, aside from merely asserting that Defendants

Baker, Lasko, and Galgano are not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, (see AC ¶ 1), Plaintiff fails

to show, first, that their alleged actions were unrelated to their roles, or second, that they acted

completely without jurisdiction. And there is nothing in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint that

credibly suggests so. Therefore, Defendants Baker, Lasko, and Galgano enjoy the benefit of quasi-

judicial immunity; and the Court DISMISSES Counts I-II, V, and VI of the Amended Complaint

against them on these grounds pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

B. The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State

Law Claims.

In Counts III, IV, and VII of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts intentional or

negligent infliction of emotional distress, failure to enforce the law, and abuse of process claims

under New Jersey law against the State and State Judiciary Defendants, the Laufer Defendants,

and Defendant Lisa Ippolito. (See AC ¶¶ 1, 5.) Plaintiff sought to have his state law claims heard

in this Court as supplemental claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). (Id.)

The Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

First, “the Eleventh Amendment bars the adjudication of pendent state law claims against

nonconsenting state defendants in federal court.” Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534

U.S. 533, 540-41 (2002). Second, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline

9 Like absolute judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity does not extend to non-judicial

actions—i.e., actions not taken in a judicial capacity—nor does judicial immunity extend to actions

that, although judicial in nature, are taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502

U.S. at 11-12.

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the court “has dismissed all claims over which

it has original jurisdiction.” Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In

exercising its discretion, “the district court should take into account generally accepted principles

of ‘judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants.’” Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Del.

Cnty., Pa., 983 F.2d 1277, 1284 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715, 726 (1966)). Where the federal claims are dismissed at an early stage in the litigation, courts

generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims. Id. at 1284-85; United

Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726; see also City of Pittsburgh Comm’n. on Hum. Rels. v. Key Bank

USA, 163 F. App’x 163, 166 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[I]f it appears that all federal claims are subject to

dismissal, the court should not exercise jurisdiction over remaining claims unless ‘extraordinary

circumstances’ exist.”).

Here, because Plaintiff’s intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, failure to

enforce the law, and abuse of process claims are based purely on state law, they are not claims

over which this Court has original jurisdiction. Thus, the Court is barred from exercising

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against the State and State Judiciary

Defendants in their official capacities, and, in its discretion at the motion to dismiss phase in this

litigation, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in the remaining circumstances.

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Counts III, IV, and VII of the Amended Complaint in their

entirety pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

C. The Court Denies Plaintiff Leave to Further Amend His Claims.

Defendants contend that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with

prejudice. (See generally Motions.) “A dismissal with prejudice operates as an adjudication on

the merits and typically prevents the plaintiff from subsequently litigating his claims in either the

original or any other forum.” Papera v. Pa. Quarried Bluestone Co., 948 F.3d 607, 610-11 (3d

Cir. 2020) (internal quotation omitted). A dismissal without prejudice, in contrast, “does not

operate as an adjudication upon the merits,” and therefore, has no preclusive effect. Id.

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims in Counts I, II, V, and VI with

prejudice.10 However, because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

remaining state law claims, there has been no respective adjudication on the merits, “and therefore

it is improper to dismiss [such claims] with prejudice.” See, e.g., Hicks v. N.J.D.O.C., No. 16-927,

2017 WL 168917, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 17, 2017) (dismissing complaint on sovereign immunity

grounds without prejudice). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Counts III, IV, and VII and

Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims in Counts I, II, V, and VI without prejudice.

The Court next considers whether leave to amend should be granted. See Free Speech

Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 519, 545 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Leave to amend should be

freely given when justice so requires, including for a curative amendment unless such an

10 “The Third Circuit has approved of dismissal with prejudice on judicial immunity grounds.”

Bright v. Hoebich, No. 24-9625, 2025 WL 1311401, at *4 n.4 (D.N.J. May 6, 2025) (citing, inter

alia, Williams v. Stack, No. 23-2685, 2024 WL 3548766, at *1 (3d Cir. July 26, 2024) (per curiam)

(approving a district court’s dismissal with prejudice when claims are dismissed on judicial

immunity grounds)). “Dismissal with prejudice is proper because any amendment of the claims

against the [State Judiciary Defendants] would be futile as all the events alleged involve [their]

judicial role.” Id.

The Third Circuit has also approved of dismissal with prejudice on qualified immunity grounds.

See Roth v. City of Hermitage, 709 F. App’x 733, 736 (3d Cir. 2017) (remanding “to allow the

District Court to consider whether the claims … should be dismissed with prejudice on the basis

of qualified immunity”); see also Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 300 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]

district court must avail itself of the procedures available under the Federal Rules to facilitate an

early resolution of the qualified immunity issue.”).

amendment would be inequitable or futile.”). Given Plaintiff’s claims, the Court finds that even

if Plaintiff were to plead new facts, he would be unable to avoid the sovereign immunity bar to

suit extensively briefed by the State and State Judiciary Defendants. As a result, the Court denies

Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint as further amendment would be futile. See,

e.g., Clemente v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 25-1967, 2025 WL 3043374, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 31, 2025)

(finding amendment futile after dismissal without prejudice on sovereign immunity grounds “as

[Plaintiff] could not add any factual allegations to overcome th[e] barrier to relief”); Berk v. New

Jersey Unemp. Ins., No. 23-12891, 2024 WL 4891749, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 2024) (same).

Therefore, the Court’s dismissal of this matter is final. See Aldossari on Behalf of Aldossari v.

Ripp, 49 F.4th 236, 262 (3d Cir. 2022); Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2019).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint are GRANTED. All individual-capacity claims against Defendants are DISMISSED

with prejudice. All official-capacity claims against Defendants are DISMISSED without

prejudice and without leave to amend. An appropriate order follows.

/s/ Jamel K. Semper .

HON. JAMEL K. SEMPER

United States District Judge

Orig: Clerk

cc: Stacey D. Adams, U.S.M.J.

Parties